Cross-Border Trade a Means for Russia to Project Power in Central Asia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 7 – In Soviet times, Moscow used the development of trade between the USSR and border regions in the East bloc countries as a means to project power by promoting cross-border ties and thus reducing the significance of the border for both itself and the countries where it promoted the development of such trade.

            Because data from both Moscow and the capitals of the other countries seldom broke out border trade from all bilateral trade, this tactic seldom received the attention it deserved. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government has been doing something similar and perhaps with greater success because the borders of the new states are not fully formed.

            That the Russian government has continued this Soviet policy has attracted attention both in Ukraine and Belarus, with cross-border trade with the former undercutting Kyiv’s control and opening the way to Russian intervention and such trade with the latter becoming an implicit threat to the territorial integrity of the latter if it fails to cooperate.

                (For a discussion of the less familiar Belarusian case, one that at least potentially could prove especially significant in the coming weeks, see region.expert/belarus-integration/ as discussed at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/12/an-equal-union-between-two-dictators.html.) 

            On the Rhythm of Eurasia portal, Russian commentator Eduard Poletayev discusses how Moscow is promoting cross-border trade in in Kazakhstan, a country where those living opposite the Russian Federation are more likely to be ethnic Russians than those in the interior (ritmeurasia.org/news--2019-12-07--kazahstanskoe-prigraniche-navstrechu-kontaktam-s-sosedjami-46392).

            Both Russian and Kazakhstan economists with whom he spoke agreed that “it is necessary to distinguish trade between two countries and border trade,” not because the latter is not part of the former but because it can at least potentially contribute more to promoting bilateral ties beyond the economy.

            Borders, Poletayev reminds, have “two main functions” – as barriers and as points of contact.  These functions often conflict with one another; and as a result, “border regions are not only about friendship and profitable trade but also barriers which are intended to protect the territory of the state and its national sovereignty.”

            Border trade between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan has developed over the last three decades, but in the last three months, the leaders of both countries have called for a dramatic expansion of this form of exchange; and there have been a series of lower-level meetings to promote the idea.

            “World experience shows,” Poletayev continues, “that the border position of regions of a country potentially are an advantage even for the regions most distant from them.” This is especially true, he suggests, in the border regions of the post-Soviet states which have not yet isolated themselves from each other as fully as many other states have.

            If this border-trade initiative takes off, there will be more Russian activity in ethnic Russian areas of the northern part of Kazakhstan, something that in and of itself could create problems for the government and the region.  And it also sets the stage for competition with China which is also promoting border trade in Kazakhstan areas adjoining its borders.