A Quick Victory by Ukraine Best Outcome for Russia, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – There can be no question that the most important event of the past year was “Russia’s defeat in its war against Ukraine,” Dimitry Savvin says, a defeat brought about not only by the initial hubris of Moscow and the powerful resistance of Ukrainians but by the Kremlin’s unwillingness to cut its losses and declare a victory in March.

            Had it done so after advancing into the Donbass and the land bridge to Crimea and then withdrawn to the pre-February 24 borders, the editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian Harbin portal says, Moscow could have presented what it had done as a victory and would not have suffered the defeat that followed (harbin.lv/god-kotoryy-reshit-sudbu-stoletiya).

            At that time, the West had not imposed the sanctions it decided upon later or lined up as completely behind Kyiv, and the Ukrainian authorities had indicated that they would accept such an outcome at least as an intermediate position. But instead of doing that, Putin and company behaved according to type and pushed on, hoping that by raising the stakes they could win.

            They were profoundly mistaken. The West is now behind Ukraine. Ukraine won’t accept the pre-February 24 borders. The Russian military has been shown not to be the powerful force everyone had assumed but a Potemkin army. And worst of all, Russia has been forced into becoming “a vassal of China.”

            The Kremlin now faces a clear choice in Ukraine, either exiting from the conflict as soon as possible or increasing its military presence there in the hopes of reversing its current defeat. The Kremlin hasn’t chosen either but it is clearly “afraid to leave the war” because doing so, as in the case of Afghanistan, would put the system on course to a new perestroika.

            But the Kremlin’s half way approach, classic in Putin’s time, won’t work, Savvin argues; and it is beginning to backfire not only internationally but within Russia and the ranks of his own regime. Meanwhile, China is picking up the pieces, securing Russia as a kind of second North Korea behind which it can pursue its own goals.

            Russia won’t be the beneficiary of that, the conservative commentator continues; and that reality will become increasingly obvious in the coming months, the recognition of which will likely split Russian elites still further. That the Putin apparatus isn’t pursuing Russian national interests is no surprise; but in this, it isn’t pursuing its own either. That too is becoming clear.

            For all these reasons, Savvin goes on to suggest, “Ukraine in 2023 is becoming the place where, without exaggeration, the fate of the world is going to be decided. The paradox is that the most rapid possible victory of Ukraine is also the best outcome not only for it but also … for Russia.”

            A speedy Ukrainian victory and withdrawal to the borders of 2013 will create conditions for political normalization, the preservation (in general and on the whole) or state unity, at least superficial perestroika-like liberalization and its inclusion in one way or another in the bloc of free nations that is emerging to oppose China.”

            “The alternative, an extended conflict, the intensiveness of which inevitably will fall” would transform the war into something like that between the two Koreas, Savvin suggests. “In this case, Russia under pressure of sanctions will begin to transform itself into a North Korean-like state and its vassal dependence on China will become all-embracing.”