October 1993 Events Put an End to Moscow Patriarchate’s Hopes to Become a Force Independent of the Russian State, New Book Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 27 – At present, when the Moscow Patriarchate is slavishly obedient in all things to the Kremlin, it is difficult to remember that at the end of Soviet times and the beginning of the post-Soviet period, many in the Russian Orthodox Church hoped and believed that their denomination could be an independent actor.

            But those hopes and beliefs were dashed, Kseniya Luchenko argues by what happened in October 1993 when Yeltsin used force to crush his opponents in the Supreme Soviet despite efforts by the Moscow Patriarchate to mediate between them (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2025/12/27/dve-tserkvi-dva-litsa-i-dve-very).

            In a new book, Good Intentions. The Russian church and the Powers from Gorbachev to Putin (in Russian), the former employee of the patriarchate who now writes about religion in Russia as an independent journalist says the October 1993 events forced Patriarch Aleksii II and Metropolitan Kirill “to accept the reality that the ROC could not become an independent force.”

            Indeed, she says, they were compelled to acknowledge that “their moral authority and influence on society was insufficient to be a source of power;” and as a result, they made the final and fateful “choice in favor of ‘a symphony with the state,’” one in which the state and not the church was in charge.

            Luchenko provides details about other key events and especially about the key personalities in the ROC MP, in particular Kirill and Putin’s favorite churchman Metropolitan Tikhon who has played a key role in supporting Putin’s own vision about an uninterrupted history of Russia and the way in which Russian civilization differs from all others.

            Despite all that has happened, the author of the book says there is still some hope for the future because while the MP hierarchy has accepted its role as handmaiden to the Kremlin, many priests and the faithful have not and continue to distance themselves both from Putin and the patriarch.

            Priests of this second living church don’t read the pro-war prayers they are supposed to and do support those of their parishioners and others who oppose the war. Such people are in a weak position compared to the pro-Kremlin hierarchs, but their existence means that dreams of Father Aleksandr Men of 35 years ago for an independent Orthodoxy may yet be realized.