Finno-Ugric Movement Becoming Trans-Atlantic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 21 – Since Moscow blocked most contacts between Finno-Ugric activists outside Russia and Finno-Ugric communities within Russia in the years since 2022, émigré Finno-Ugric activists have been expanding their activities across the Atlantic and now are calling for establishing in the US of a Day of Finno-Ugric Peoples on the third Saturday of October.

            Between the end of Soviet times and the beginning of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, activists in the three Finno-Ugric independent countries – Estonia, Hungary and Finland – took the lead in developing ties with their co-ethnics in the Russian Federation. But as Russia has blocked most of those channels, the activists abroad have begun to look across the Atlantic.

            This year, an American city, Hancock, Michigan, was named the Finno-Ugric Cultural Capital for 2026, hosted meetings with activists and officials from Finno-Ugric countries, and featured a call for the creation in the US of a Day of the Finno-Ugric Peoples on the third Saturday of every October (mariuver.eu/2026/08/21/fu-dvizhenije-transkontinentalnyj/).

            Estonians and Finno-Ugric activists, alarmed by Russia’s actions over the last five years, welcome this call because it will broaden support for numerically small groups inside the Russian Federation in ways that recall the impact of the Captive Nations Week declarations that helped the Baltic countries recover their independence.

            Indeed, Estonian commentator Anti Lillak entitled his report on this development “The Transcontinental Finno-Ugric World” (sirp.ee/transkontinentaalne-soome-ugri-maailm/) and said it was a useful response to Moscow’s actions that were documented in a report to the Estonian foreign ministry earlier this year. (For the text of that detailed report, see fennougria.ee/en/fenno-ugria-report-on-finno-ugric-peoples-in-russia/.)

            The most likely next step to ensure that such a day is created will be for Finno-Ugric activists in the US and Europe to appeal to the Baltic Caucus in the US Congress to have it push for the establishment of a day that will focus American attention on peoples who today are even less well known than were the union republic nationalities in Soviet times. 

Russians Not Telling Putin ‘No’ But No Longer are Saying ‘Yes,’ Gallyamov Argues

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 21 – The average Russia is not now saying “’no’ to Putin,” Abbas Gallyamov says. “That is too dangerous.” But ever more of them are “no longer saying ‘yes’” either, “the only form of opposition available to most in a totalitarian state” and a kind that ultimately subverts such regimes.

            The former Putin speechwriter and current Putin critic says Russians have been on a rollercoaster in this regard since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022. That move “led to a sharp politicization of Russians,” with many backing Putin because they felt involved in “something grandiose” (pointmedia.io/story/6a8810f775d0d3346a25cb7f).

            That response, Gallyamov continues, is typical: “People who feel involved in something grandiose usually are grateful to the one who gave them that opportunity at least as long as the price to pay for this chance does not become to high.” But now that the price has risen and become more obvious, Russians have changed their minds.

            Kremlin repression keeps this disappointment from taking the form of open protest, he says; but that leaves as “the only means of expressing discontent depoliticization,” a good choice for many because it allows for asking “from time to time to ask questions about what is happening” with less risk.

            In this new situation, Gallyamov argues, “the average Russian now does not say ‘no’ to Putin – that is too dangerous; but he just stops saying ‘yes’ to him.” At first, the state welcomes this passivity and even encourages it; but over time, the regime needs more support and such “apathy” becomes a problem.

Depoliticization is not just an escape from politics,” the commentator says. “In conditions when the government demands from a person constant emotional mobilization -- that he should follow, worry, be proud, hate, be willing to sacrifice and unite -- the refusal to do all this becomes a political gesture” – and an ever more important one at that.

Initially, Putin build his power precisely because “he provided the system with legitimacy,” thus reducing the dangers to the central authorities that grew during the 1990s. He stabilized the situation; but now as the population stops saying yes to him because of his repressions and failure to deliver more, “Putin is ever less needed” and elites can see that.

 “What the Russian president is doing in Ukraine and in the international arena as a whole is completely contrary to the interests of the vast majority of the domestic establishment. Elites are rational people and to wreck the country’s economy for the sake of taking a small piece of scorched earth is viewed as a profound mistake.”

And Gallyamov concludes: “depoliticization allows Russians to get out of the game imposed” by Putin;  but eventually, it encourages members of the establishment to think about demanding the leader listen to it or face replacement especially if he is doing things as Putin now is that are harming these elites. 

Kremlin-Backed Buddhist Forum Declaration Suggests Moscow May Drop Judaism from Its List of Favored ‘Traditional Religions of Russia’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Perhaps the most important aspect of the just concluded Fourth International Buddhist Forum in Tyva was not the greetings from Putin or the fact that some 1,000 people from 20 countries took part but rather the meeting’s declaration which violated long-standing practice concerning which are the traditional religions of Russia.

            Since the end of Soviet times, Moscow has been consistent in declaring that there are four traditional religions of Russia – Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism – giving special deference to these and reducing others like Protestantism and Catholicsm to a lesser status (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/kremlin-divides-churches-subordinate-to.html).

            While the Russian Federation does not have a formalized ideology that the Soviet Union did, it does have certain formulations such as about “the four traditional religions of Russia” which are almost never violated. That makes what happened at the Tyva conference so intriguing.

            The forum concluded with a declaration that said in part that “Russia is a multi-confessional, multi-national country where Buddhism, Orthodoxy and Islam live in peace and harmony, failing to mention Judaism in its list (asiarussia.ru/news/52107/ and egov-buryatia.ru/press_center/news/detail.php?ID=208193).

            That a meeting as important as this one should do so is striking and suggests that even though Putin himself has continued to meet with Jewish leaders on occasion and other groups have used the standard formulation in recent months, there appears to be a greater willingness than in the past to change that formulation and drop the reference to Judaism in this favored list.

            That list continues to matter not just as a declaration but as a guide to policy. Putin himself has worked hard to marginalize all faiths not on the list (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/putin-seeks-to-marginalize-or-even.html); and groups as diverse as Protestants and Shamans have sought to join it (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/putins-war-in-ukraine-has-divided.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/02/russias-4000-shamans-seek-official.html).

            If what the Buddhists have now done at a Kremlin-backed meeting is a harbinger of the possible ideological fate of Judaism in Russia, that could presage a major change in Moscow’s policies toward Jews. At the very least, it will encourage those Russian nationalist groups that they may be able to act more aggressively against Judaism than in the past. 

 

More than Just Fears of Mobilization Driving Up New Interest in Emigration among Russians, Emigration Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Unlike in 2022 when most Russians thinking about or actually pursuing emigration because of fears they would be mobilized for service in Ukraine, today, Russians thinking about leaving the country are doing so for a broad range of reasons including the conviction that the situation in Russia is getting worse, Ark emigration activists say.

            This change suggests three important conclusions, although the Ark analysts who report this development aren’t drawing these at least in public. First, even if the threat of mobilization this fall passes, interest in and even actions toward emigration will continue          (echofm.online/news/eto-lyudi-kotorye-gotovy-ehat-pravozashhitniki-iz-kovchega-rasskazali-ehu-o-novoj-volne-emigraczii-iz-rossii).

            Second, the number of steps the Russian government would have to take to change this situation is enormously broad, ranging from a significant decline in repression to an economic policy improving the lives of ordinary Russians and reducing the enormous gap between the wealthy and the poor in that country.

            And third, because the Putin regime shows no signs of moving in that direction, the Kremlin almost certainly will seek to make emigration both less attractive and more difficult and take ever more steps to restore the situation of pre-perestroika times when few people were allowed to leave.

            Given that free travel to and from foreign countries is one of the benefits of the collapse of the Soviet system that Russians say they most value, Putin will likely try to avoid a public declaration that he is closing the borders lest making such a move would likely trigger even more anger than his moves against the internet.

Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t Compensating for Repression with Victories, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Many observers are suggesting that Russians will accept Putin repressions for a long time to come because they accepted Stalin’s a century ago, but those who do are missing an essential point, Abbas Gallyamov says; and it is this: Unlike Stalin, Putin isn’t compensating for his repressions with victories.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter turned Putin critic, “repressions against one’s own population, carried out by the authorities when they are defeating an external enemy, have far more legitimacy than do repressions when the authorities are unable to defeat such an enemy” (echofm.online/opinions/stalin-kompensiroval-repressii-pobedami).

            “Therefore,” Gallyamov says, “it makes no sense in the current situation to point to the fact that Russians supposedly accept the Stalin-era repressions with equanimity. Stalin offset repressions with victories; in recent years, Putin has brought the country nothing but defeats alongside his repressions.”

            And what that means in turn is that Putin must have an outcome in Ukraine that he can present to Russians as a victory or he will likely be confronted with a population that will be far less willing to accept his repressive policies because he hasn’t given them the victory that he has been promising.

            That is a major reason why Putin can’t agree to anything other than what he can describe as a victory, however much pressure anyone puts on him because for him victory in Ukraine is not a geopolitical issue but an existential one of his survival in power and perhaps even more than that. 

Even Before Drone Attacks, Many Russians who had Supported Putin’s War Earlier had Turned against It, Public Sociology Laboratory Interviews Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 30 – Russia’s independent Public Sociology Laboratory earlier this year re-interviewed Russians with whom it had spoken two years ago and who then supported Putin’s war in Ukraine. Now, the Laboratory says, many of them have become critics of the war.

            Most of their criticism, one of the Laboratory’s sociologists says, is still “at the non-political level,” that is it isn’t directed at Putin as such, but the critiques Russians are now offering of the war are often very specific and detailed (cherta.media/interview/kak-menyaetsya-otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-vojne/).

            Significantly, these in-depth interviews took place before Ukraine expanded its drone attacks on Russia this summer, an action that many suggest has brought the war home to Russia and shaken their support for Kremlin policies. That suggests the opposition to the war the Laboratory reports may have continued to increase in recent weeks.

Emigration and Silence Far From Only Options for Russians who Recognize Putin’s Russian Federation as Their ‘Main Enemy,’ Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Many Russians when thinking about how those who object to Putinism and its actions should act offer only two extreme options, emigration so as not to live under its control or silent obedience to the Kremlin lest they get into trouble, despite their feelings, Dimitry Savvin says.

            But in fact, the editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian portal Harbin says, the situation is far more complicated than that and that there are other options although it must be admitted to begin with that “each has its own price” which those choosing it must be willing to pay (harbin.lv/chto-delat-chestnomu-cheloveku-v-rossii).

            In making one’s choice, each Russian must decide what “the so-called Russian Federation” is to him or her. “There are only two basic answers: either it is “my state and my country” or alternatively it is now “the main enemy of the Russian people and the other peoples of Russia.’

            “If you still honor the Russian Federation by Russia itself, and not with a cancerous tumor, on the body of Russia that has grown up,” Savvin says, there is nothing more to be discussed. But “if you realize that the chief and most terrible enemy of the Russian person is the state of the Russian Federation,” then a lot more needs to be considered.

            If a Russian is in the latter category, then he or she must recognize that in Putin’s Russia maintaining “clean hands and an honest name have their price.” There are many in fact, but in “at least a few, you will have to make sacrifices” and in many cases these will not be small but may be very large indeed, the Russian nationalist editor says.

            “The main thing is not to lie to yourself. There has been no opposition in Russia for a long time.” And that means, Savvin argues, that those who want to do something to oppose the Putin regime must either engage in active resistance, a serious step given the likelihood of retribution, or adopt other forms of dissent, which also have costs but lesser ones.

            Emigration for those who oppose Putin remains an option, although it is likely only for a short period more, the Russian conservative says. Putin almost certainly will work to close off that possibility just as Stalin did and do it sooner rather than later. Those who feel they can’t take the risks other actions would lead to should get out while they can.

            There are steps for those who can’t or won’t emigrate but want to act against the Putin regime, possibly in ways that will not entail the most serious consequences for themselves like militant activism but will make clear to others that they are not collaborating with the Kremlin and want to retain or recover their moral purity.

            The first step such people need to take is to “not participate” in anything the regime is organizing that is obviously fraudulent like elections. The second is to break with those who do and make clear why such a step is needed. And the third is to stop listening to the regime and reading its newspapers and instead build up an alternative library.

            “Finally,” Savvin says, “it is impossible not to turn to those who are already within the state system but who have realized that this system is the main enemy of the Russian people and a mortal danger to all free people” and having done so to take steps to try to bring them out and join the opposition.

There won’t be a large number of such people at first; but as their numbers grow, the Russian conservative suggests, the opponents of the regime will strengthen while the regime itself will grow ever weaker. The time is long past when it is enough to sit in one’s kitchen and complain about how bad things are.

Even War in Ukraine for Putin is a Means to the End of His Not Being Succeeded by Someone who will Pursue ‘De-Putinization,’ Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Vladimir Putin’s “super task” is to be succeeded by someone who will continue to rule in his name as Stalin did after the death of Lenin rather than by someone who will turn away from his system and move in new directions as Khrushchev did after the death of Stalin, Gallyamov says.

            The former Putin speechwriter who is now a prominent Putin critic insists that even the current Kremlin leader’s expanded war in Ukraine is a means to that end rather than having the independent and all-important quality for him that is often suggested (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/10989 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/glavnaya-czel-putina-putin-posle-putina).

            This reflects the fact, Gallyamov says, that “Putin is a president of the status quo, not of revisionism. He has no ideals for which he would be willing to take serious risks. Of course, he does not want to appear a cynical egoist, so he likes to throw dust in people's eyes by feigning high aspirations and values … but this is nothing more than a show.”

            The current Kremlin leader “is a revisionist,” he continues, “precisely because he is a guardian of the status quo on the inside. He may redraw borders, dismantled the international order and start wars; but his ultimate political aim is conservative: ensuring that power remains exactly where it now lies.”

            Indeed, “even posthumous greatness is something Putin needs primarily as an insurance policy. In his view, a good successor is not someone who will build an even greater Russia, but someone whose own political survival depends on preserving the Putin pantheon, the Putin elite, and the Putin version of history.”

Russian Banks Require Those Applying for Home Mortgages to Have Insurance against Drone Attacks

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Putin may think that drone attacks aren’t causing all that serious damage on Russia, but Russian banks don’t share that view and are requiring those seeking mortgages for housing in so-called “vulnerable” regions have insurance covering the damage Ukrainian drones have been inflicting.

            According to Kommersant, major banks are now checking to see that the insurance borrowers have or plan to take out includes coverage of damages from drones and their parts (kommersant.ru/doc/8847161 reposted at echofm.online/news/rossijskie-banki-stali-trebovat-strahovat-ipotechnoe-zhilyo-ot-atak-bpla).

            Policies including such coverage cost from ten to 20 percent more than those which don’t, the paper says; but if borrowers don’t have this kind of coverage, the banks are increasing the interest rate on loans they extend by between  0.5 and 2.0 percent or even “refusing” to agree to offer a mortgage at all.

            Such actions by banks are likely a better indication of just how much Ukrainian drone attacks have brought the war home to Russia and how long those with money on the table think how long these attacks will extend into the future than are any upbeat comments by the Kremlin leader to the contrary. 

Putin has Failed to Learn What Jaruzelski Did: Repression Can Win a Battle but It Can’t Win a War, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 18 – In 1989, Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski warned Hungary against introducing martial law because of his own experience in doing so. “Yes, we did it and won the battle by crushing Solidarity but as a result we lost the war” to main the legitimacy of the government.

            That is a lesson Vladimir Putin should be learning but does not yet appear to have done so according to Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter who is now a critic of the Kremlin leader, and the results for his regime are likely to be disastrous as a result (pointmedia.io/story/6a84340f75d0d3346a25cb77).

            According to Gallyamov, Jaruzelski discovered that by imposing martial law he was able to shut down the Solidarity movement, but only at the cost of “destroying a significant part of the legitimacy of the communist authorities. Before the Polish general imposed martial law, Solidarity might have been integrated into “some kind of reformed socialism” but not after.

            Once he had crushed Solidarity, the Polish general eventually recognized, he faced a country in which “millions of Poles viewed power as something kept in place exclusively by force.” Even more he learned that while “the absence of protest” first looked like “a lack of discontent,” it soon became obvious that “it was not the same thing.”

            “Using mass repression,” Gallyamov continues, “Putin managed to solve the same problem that Jaruzelsky once faced: to defeat the structures of the opposition and remove the protest from the streets. He won the battle. But the question now is whether the Kremlin leader is losing a similar war as a result.”

            What everyone must understand, the commentator says, is that “repression  destroys not so much discontent as the opportunity to demonstrate it.” And as a result, “the need to continually resort to coercion undermines previous formulas of legitimacy: it is increasingly difficult to assert that the government rules because society voluntarily supports it.”

            That is what is happening to Putin. He started by claiming that he represented the people by means of democracy but then he proposed another basis for the population to support him: patriotism. “Even if we aren’t democrats,” the Putinists claimed, “we are defending Russia” and “protecting the motherland.”

            But now that Ukrainian drones are hitting Russian cities, Gallyamov says, it is ever more difficult for the Kremlin “to explain what exactly the ability to ensure the security of the country gives the current regime the right to demand unconditional subordination” among the population of the Russian Federation.

            That has left Putin in “a very unpleasant situation.” He destroyed his claim to democratic legitimacy by repression, and his efforts to invoke patriotism as an alternative basis are failing given the inability of his regime “to ensure the very security the population was offered in order to get it to sacrifice its political freedoms.”

            As a result, Gallyamov concludes, now, “Russia has absolutely no need for Putin from any perspective whatsoever, whether democratic or even ‘patriotic,’” a lesson Jaruzelski learned albeit too late to save himself and his regime.  Whether Putin will have better luck very much remains to be seen.

Moscow Warns Regions Any Use of Ethnic or Religious Issues in Elections is ‘Impermissible’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – Moscow’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs (FADN) has sent a memo to all federal subjects reminding them that any use of ethnicity or religion in election campaigns is “not permissible” and that they can use a variety of provisions in Russian law against any individual, group or party that violates that principle.

            According to the Nazaccent portal, the document specifies that it is impermissible “to call for voting for or against a candidate solely on the basis of nationality or make public statements about the inadmissibility of the participation of certain candidates on the basis of their ethnicity or religious affiliation (nazaccent.ru/content/45843-v-fadn-rf-napomnili-o-nedopustimosti/).

            For such actions, which the memorandum that has been distributed in the form of a brochure says are a form of illegal “incitement of hatred” on these grounds, Russian law establishes administrative and criminal liability up to fines of 600,000 rubles, forced labor for up to five years, and imprisonment for as long as six years.

            Russian commentators have frequently suggested that one of the aspects of elections that Kremlin officials are most concerned about is the possibility that candidates or parties will use them to exacerbate tensions between members of Russia’s various religious and ethnic communities.

            But the Moscow authorities have always been careful about how they talk about this possibility given that any such commentaries may have the effect of leading some groups not to avoid using ethnic or religious appeals but rather making it more likely that they will do so by suggesting a strategy such political activists may not have considered.

            This time around, in advance of the September 26 Duma elections, Moscow has limited its declarations on this point to this single FADN memorandum, an indication that the Russian leadership is worried about both the possibility that ethnic and religious issues will be raised and the certainty that any discussion of that possibility could further exacerbate the situation.

Moscow Now Forced to Launch Coordinated Attacks on Ethnic Minorities Lest Those Attacked First Warn Others

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Last December, Russian security officers carried out coordinated raids against activists of the numerically small indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, a reflection of Moscow’s continuing crackdown on non-Russians but an event that highlights a new development especially worrisome to the Kremlin.

            “The timing was deliberate,” Anastasia Anisimova says, because “by starting at exactly the same moment, investigators ensured that he activists could not warn one another or coordinate a response” (correctiv.org/en/latest-stories/international-en/2026/08/17/terrorizing-the-indigenous-russian-repression-against-its-own-nations/ summarized at indigenous-russia.com/archives/49684).

            While Moscow has worked hard to discredit and destroy organizations both inside the Russian Federation and abroad that keep non-Russian groups in touch with one another, it has not been able to eliminate the contacts that activists from these groups have either within Russia or abroad.

            Indeed, as this report makes clear, activists have remained able to maintain ties with one another both directly and via their colleagues who have been forced into emigration to the point that Moscow has had to take this into consideration when it launches new moves against the non-Russians.        

            That Moscow now has to do that gives the non-Russians who are able to maintain such ties greater influence than their individual numbers or even collective size within the population might suggest and likely means that the Russian force structures will increase their efforts to break these links lest they limit the Kremlin’s freedom of action in the future.

            It also means that these links deserve to be followed ever more closely and actively supported by those who study these peoples because they have become a force multiplier for these nationalities, a form of cooperation that the popular fronts of the Baltic countries pioneered at the end of Soviet times and that the Circassians and Ukraine are pushing now. 

Siberia’s Metal and Energy Production Only has Importance When and Where These are Used, Verkhoturov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 18 -- Moscow officials routinely celebrate Siberia’s metal and energy production, Dmitry Verkhoturov says; but those things acquire importance only when they are used to produce something, a pattern that was true in Soviet times when these Siberian “products” were used for military industry in the region but is less the case now.

            Metal and energy “do not mean a lot by themselves,” the commentator on economic issues in Russia east of the Urals says; “they acquire significance only in connection of their rolein the preparation of something very necessary and useful.” Increasing the output of the two without reference to that is meaningless and even counterproductive (sibmix.com/?doc=22493).

            Russian officials got used to thinking and talking in this way during Soviet times when metals and power produced in Siberia were used almost exclusively for military industries and any discussion of these industries was impossible because data about them were invariably classified, Verkhoturov continues.

            Now, however, those discussing how to develop Siberia need to talk about whether there are sufficient industries of this kind left in Siberia to justify the development of metals and energy or whether other industries should be promoted to take their place if they do not now exist, he says.

            But that isn’t happening, Verkhoturov says. Instead, Moscow officials and often those in Siberia as well are promoting the development of mining and energy production as ends in themselves without any discussion of how their output will be used or even if it makes sense to develop them east of the Urals when the need for their “products” is uncertain. 

Moscow Now Using Many Ways to Punish Lawyers who Defend Their Clients Vigorously and Make Other Attorneys Less Willing to Do So, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Over the last five years, the number of Russian lawyers who have been charged with criminal offenses has risen from 80 in 2020 to 133 last year. Such charges attract much attention, but this form of attack on attorneys is only a tiny part of Moscow’s efforts to rein in lawyers and reduce their willingness to defend clients, Maria Ehrlich says.

            Although statistics are not available, the data journalist for Novaya Gazeta says, the government has also succeeded in depriving other lawyers of their licenses and extending the requirement that counsel in an ever larger range of cases have license, something that chilled the legal profession (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/08/17/pokushenie-na-zashchitu).

            Legal chambers, the organizations corresponding to bar associations in Western countries, have fought back; but they increasingly are losing such cases in court and some of these organizations have decided that they must defer to the government on licensing rather than risk being destroyed completely, Ehrlich says.

            In addition to these frontal attacks on the status of lawyers, attacks most common in political cases but ever more often turning up in non-political ones as well, as prosecutors seek to gain convictions more easily so as to set themselves up for promotion in the Russian justice system, she continues.

            But perhaps the largest and most insidious form of repression against lawyers is far less noticeable to the general public, although its impact on those accused of crimes and the possibility that they will get a fair trial is enormous and disturbing to anyone who hopes for justice in Russian court rooms.

            According to a 2025 survey by the Federal Chamber of Lawyers which Ehrlich cites, 72 percent of lawyers said they had been confronted by attempts to persuade them to encourage their clients to plead guilty and 53.5 percent said they had been threatened with reprisal if they actively defended the accused. 

By Repressing Russians at Home, Putin is Causing Ukrainians to Fight Harder against His Aggression, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 19 – To win in Ukraine, Moscow must convince Ukrainians they will be better off if they stop fighting Russian forces rather than continuing to resist, Abbas Gallyamov says; but the rising tide of repression inside the Russian Federation  is leading more Ukrainians to be convinced that they have no option but to continue to fight on.

            The former Putin speech writer who is now an outspoken critic of the Kremlin leader says this is an aspect of Putin’s domestic repression that is rarely discussed but is increasingly talked about (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/10986 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/izbivaya-bezzashhitnyh-rossiyan-putinskie-siloviki-ukreplyayut-reshimost-ukrainczev).

            Every new act of repression by the Putin regime against the population of the Russian Federation gives ever more Ukrainians ever more determination to fight on both because it shows what Russia is like and what their own fate would be if they fail to hold off and defeat the Russian invasion.

            Thus, Gallyamov says, “by beating up defenseless Russians at home, Putin’s security forces are strengthening the determination of Ukrainians to fight on,” a pattern that has become “the strange dialectic of this war” and one that may even decide not just the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine but the fate of Russia itself.

‘Main Geopolitical Outcome’ of Putin’s War in Ukraine May Be More Freedom of Action for Neighboring Countries, Kazakhstan Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Given the losses Russia has already suffered in Ukraine and the likelihood that it will not achieve Putin’s war goals, “the main geopolitical outcome” of the war there may prove to be that “the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe wil have even more space for independent foreign policies,” the Altyn-Orda portal says.

            That is because in their capitals, the independent outlet says, “the Russian army will cease to be perceived as an almost insurmountable military force, and the Kremlin’s ability to impose its decisions on its neighbors will be significantly reduced” (altyn-orda.kz/esli-rossiya-proigraet-vojnu-chto-budet-s-nej-posle-porazheniya-v-ukraine/).

            Thus, Altyn-Orda continues, a military action which Putin began almost five years ago to restore Russian dominance of the former Soviet space is likely to prove to have exactly the opposite effect; and that will be true regardless of whether Russia in face “loses” the war as some are now predicting.

            The portal reaches that conclusion after reviewing what are the three main conclusions Western analysts have drawn: that losses in Ukraine may lead Moscow to become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad, that Russia itself will suffer some territorial losses of its own, or that Moscow will radically change course after Putin leaves the scene.

            In the view of Altyn-Orda, the first may happen but Moscow’s resources at least with regard to foreign actions have been reduced, Russia may lose some territories but will remain a large and important country, and efforts by Moscow to reintegrate in the international community may occur but may or may not prove sustainable.

            Seen from this perspective, Putin’s misadventures in Ukraine may best be seen as another step in the continuing collapse of the Russian empire, something that is all too often in the West viewed mistakenly viewed as something that happens quickly and could be stopped or reversed easily.

As Dire as Ukraine’s Demographic Problems are, They Won’t Restrict Kyiv’s Ability to Field an Army Anytime Soon, Moscow Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Russian commentators frequently point to and with more than a little schadenfreude even celebrate what they hope is the demise of the Ukrainian nation; but Vladimir Kotov, a scholar at the Russian University of Friendship of the Peoples, says that as dire as Ukraine’s demographic situation it, it won’t prevent Kyiv’s ability to field an army anytime soon.

            After surveying the decline in Ukraine’s population since the 1990s, the fall in fertility rates there to well below replacement levels, massive emigration, and the increase in mortality rates as well, Kotov argues that this does not mean that Kyiv will not be able to maintain the size of its military well into the future (ng.ru/vision/2026-08-17/5_9561_ukraine.html).

            Specifically, he says that Ukraine’s “human potential for continuing military actions all the same still remains significant” because the government has reduced the mobilization age and is talking about the possibility of the greater use of women in various parts of the military where they have not been used up to now.

            Kotov’s words are thus a warning to Russians in general and the Kremlin in particular that Moscow can’t count on the demographic collapse of Ukraine to force Kyiv to sue for peace but rather than the Ukrainian authorities despite all their country’s demographic problems can find ways to form and support a significant military force.

Moscow has Cut Poverty Rate in Russia Now from 9.1 Percent to 6.7 Percent by Statistical Sleight of Hand

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Moscow officials and commentators are celebrating what they say has been the halving of the poverty rate in Russia over the last five years to only 6.7 percent. But this decline is largely the result of a sleight of hand by the Russian government’s statistical agency, the To Be Precise portal says.

            This year the portal which investigates Russian statistical data on various questions points out that Rosstat changed the way it counted poverty. Had it used the same approach that it had used earlier, the poverty level would have been 9.1 percent and not 6.7 percent, a decline from 12.4 percent in 2019 but a much less impressive reduction than the one Moscow is claiming (tochno.st/materials/bednost-v-rossii-sokratilas-vdvoe).

            “Until 2021,” the To Be Precise portal says, “Rosstat classified individuals as poor if their income fell below the subsistence minimum—the cost of a minimal basket of essential food, goods, and services. But in 2021, it adopted a new metric: the poverty line,” a threshold set in 2020 to the subsistence level and indexed since that time.” By making this change, the agency was able to claim the greater decline.  

Moscow’s 1520 mm Railway Gage ‘Empire’ Long a Source of Influence Losing Ground to China Inside Russia Itself

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 16 – Moscow officials and Russian nationalists have long referred to the 17 countries – the 12 former Soviet republics, the three once-occupied Baltic states, Finland and Mongolia – which use the Russian railway gage of 1520 mm rather than the international gage of 1435 mm as “the 1520 Empire.”

            Moscow commentator Igor Shumeyko is the latest to do so and like others points that that this special “empire” ties these countries together and sets them apart from others who must change carriages when they cross its border (fondsk.ru/news/2026/08/16/imperiya-1520-rossiyskaya-zheleznodorozhnaya-koleya.html).

            He notes that from the beginning in the 19^th century, Russian leaders have viewed this “empire” as something which helps Russia both economically and in terms of national security and that despite all the political changes in 1991 and thereafter, these countries have remained within it because it is enormously expensive to change the gage of railways.

            Finland and the three Baltic countries have taken some steps in the direction of moving away from the Russian gate to the international one but mostly remain on the Russian standard (euroweeklynews.com/2025/05/07/finnish-railway-gauge-to-be-changed-to-that-of-sweden/ and ft.com/content/0fe9d0fb-23a8-4935-a2e9-2637f444c8ba?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

            The former Soviet republics also remain on the Russian standard and thus allow Moscow to speak of the “1520 Empire,” Shumeyko says. But some of these countries are under pressure from China to lay international standard width tracks within existing Russian standard lines to ease trade.

            But the biggest current threat to this “empire” is from China and it is within the Russian Federation itself.  A decade ago, Moscow bowed to Chinese pressure and agreed to build a international gage track between the Chinese border and a Russian port (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/bowing-to-china-moscow-for-first-time.html).

            And earlier this year, Russia again made a special concession to China on the gage of a new track in the Russian Far East to increase trade and reduce costs of having to change the carriages of trains at the border (tkrus.pro/jd-koleya-china-russia/?ysclid=msxrniep1416903527, объясняем.рф/articles/news/rossiya-i-kitay-dogovorilis-o-stroitelstve-zheleznoy-dorogi/ and railjournal.com/freight/russia-and-china-increase-cross-border-capacity/).

            As Russia gives ground to China on this issue, the other countries which still use the Russian gage undoubtedly will become more ready to do the same thing and for the same reasons. If they do, Moscow may eventually have to stop talking about the “1520 mm Empire” its railroads have helped it build and maintain even when political borders change.

At Least 50 Russian Women who have Gone to Fight for Putin in Ukraine have Been Killed, New ‘Vot-Kak’ Investigation Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 17 – Russian women have joined the army to fight in Ukraine for the same reasons that Russian men have – simple patriotism, getting bonuses and high pay, and being pardoned and then released from prison – as well as to take revenge for the loss of men in their lives; and at least 50 of them have died, the Vot-Kak portal says.

            The number of women involved is not something that Russian officials have been willing to make public, and the Vot-Kak investigation does not provide information on that but rather details the experiences of women in the military with whom its journalists spoke in a 5500-word report (vot-tak.tv/94855630/rossijanki-yhodyat-na-voinu-i-pogibaut).

            Knowing that most Russians in uniform would be reluctant to speak to someone identifying as a journalist especially of an independent outlet, the journalists of the portal represented themselves instead as students of film making, an identity that undoubtedly gave them more access than they would otherwise have had.

            Obviously, the details of what they found are interesting; but their four general conclusions are especially noteworthy: First, Moscow has exploited the same motivating factors with women that it has with men and increasingly sought to recruit women given the losses Russian forces have suffered in Ukraine in the last several years.

            Second, the women are rarely put in women-only units or restricted to a narrow list of jobs but instead integrated into regular army units where men are the majority and treated as far as one can tell much as the men are, assigned to play combat roles on a regular basis and not just serve as nurses or in the rear.

            Third, the data the Vot-Kak investigation gathered show that at least 50 women have died – these include those for whom the journalists have names and death dates – and that the overrepresentation of non-Russian republics and poorer ethnic Russian oblasts and krays is clearly reflected in the list of those who died.

            In addition, the journalists say, Russian women are not only likely to be guilty of the same war crimes as Russian men but they are also likely to become disillusioned with what they are doing and even desert. How large these phenomena are, however, is something this investigation was not able to establish.   

Silting Up of Caspian Irreversible and Littoral Steps Must Adapt to that Reality, Baku’s Senior Official for Water Use Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – The process of the silting up of the Caspian is irreversible and countries along its coastline or using its waters need to adapt to that reality rather than continuing to debate whether this is happening or suggest that nature itself will reverse it, Aliaga Azizov says.

            The head of the State Service for the Supervision of the Use and Preservation of the Water Resources of Azerbaijan puts Baku at odds with some in Moscow who continue to deny the obvious and makes it more likely that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will now feel free to say the same thing (casp-geo.ru/protsess-obmeleniya-kaspiya-neobratim-schitayut-v-baku/).

            Whether Moscow will change course now that someone as senior as Azizov has made this declaration is unclear, as is the question of whether Tehran, which is currently closely allied with Russia on this and other questions, is also up for grabs. But it does suggest that reality is winning even as Russia is taking a beating on this issue.

            According to the Azerbaijani government official, “the level of the Caspian, over the last five years has fallen by approximately one meter, over the past ten years by 1.5 meters, and over the last 30 years by 2.5 meters. This exceeds the speed of the rise of the world ocean by several orders of magnitude.”

A Quarter of Moscow Residents Ready to Move to St. Petersburg, Another Quarter to Russia’s South, and Only a Fifth Say They Won’t Ever Do So, New Survey Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 15 – According to the results of a new survey of Moscow residents conducted by a development company, 27 percent of Muscovites are ready to move to St. Petersburg and its adjoining areas, 23 percent want to move to the southern portion of the Russian Federation, and only 20 percent say they would not move “in principle.”

            This interest in leaving the place many in Russia seek to move reflects both the impact of covid pandemic experiences with distant working, the desire for more space and less congestion among those with experience in the city, and the fact that the cost of living in Moscow continues to rise faster than incomes there, experts say (svpressa.ru/society/article/527558/).

            Large majorities say they are less influenced by the amount of income they can expect than the possibility of having larger residences and less congestion; and of course, those who wistfully talk about moving aren’t necessarily going to depart. Dreaming about leaving is one thing; actually doing it is quite another.

             But the survey found one intriguing pattern that could have a major impact on Russian life in the future: Native Muscovites, those whose parents and grandparents have lived in the city, are far less likely to say they are ready to move elsewhere than are those who have come in recent years.

            The reasons for that are multiple, including the fact that many of the former have far better residences than do the latter given that many of them having housing inherited after the distribution of housing after the fall of Soviet power. But the fact that so many of those who do want to leave are recent arrivals points to something else.

            Not only are recent arrivals in the city more likely to leave because of costs and memories of what life was like elsewhere, but they are certain to return to regions and republics beyond the ring road with negative attitudes about the Russian capital and thus deepen the divide between Moscow and what Muscovites often dismiss as “the provinces.”

Armenia's Pursuit of Equal Treatment for All Members of Russian-Led Groupings Threatens Moscow More than Its Own Exit Would

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 16 – Any individual, group or country which is part of a larger structure created by others which have done so to give only themselves advantages has two options: exit or changing the nature of those structures so that all taking part are treated equally.

            Those seeking exit always attract more attention; but those seeking to transform such structures may achieve more for themselves and for other members and thus represent an even greater threat to the pretensions of the original creators than the departure of one or another.

            This situation and that possibility is highlighted by what Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan has demanded as a condition for Yerevan remaining in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and the impact of his demand on other members of that organization (altyn-orda.kz/eaes-ne-dolzhen-byt-soyuzom-s-privilegiyami-dlya-moskvy-armeniya-potrebovala-ravnyh-pravil/).

            As Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal observes, “Armenia is ever more sharply raising the question of what the Eurasian Economic Union should be: a combination of equal states or a structure where Russian in fact has special possibilities.” He wants Armenia to be an equal, implying that if that isn’t possible, then Yerevan may leave the grouping altogether.

            It would be one thing if Armenia left. That would deprive the union of one member and might lead others to think about doing so. But it would not, as Altyn-Orda suggests, change the nature of the Eurasian Union. It might be smaller but it would still be as now dominated by Moscow.

            By demanding equal treatment for his country and for other members, however, Pashinyan is threatening Russia will the loss of something more than Armenian membership: he is calling for a new deal among the members, one that will give all the non-Russian members greater rights and Russia fewer.

            And if other members move to make similar demands and thus act as Armenia is, that could weaken Russia far more than Armenia’s departure would, given that unless Moscow is prepared to accept new rules of the game which give the others more rights and itself less, it would be more likely to lose influence across the board in the post-Soviet region. 

Scholars Offer Ten Perspectives about Russian Colonialism, Orlova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 14 – In the course of a length essay on “how Russian colonialism works,” Vasilina Orlova says that discussion of Russian colonialism has exploded since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 and that scholars and activists have now offered at least ten perspectives or what she calls theories  about its nature.

            The Belarusian anthropologist who now lives in New York says that it is especially important to understand the nature of Russian colonialism if one is to consider how Russia might be decolonized in the future (wschody.net/okkupacziya-i-dekonstrukcziya-kak-rabotaet-rossijskij-kolonializm/).

            The ten perspectives are:

·       The first focuses on the differences between Russia which expanded by land rather than across the ocean, making it “impossible to draw a clear line between Russia and the colonies” and prompting Russians to view their acquisitions as “’natural parts’ of Russia itself.” Among the leading advocates of this approach are Aleksandr Etkin, Andreas Cappeler and Dominique Lieven.

·       The second is the theory of internal colonialism, which holds that “Russia has been colonized not only along the periphery but also within its own Russian population. Those who hold to this theory suggest that it makes the Russian colonial model “unique among large empires. Among those who have discussed it most frequently is Aleksandr Etkind.

·       The third theory, that of settler colonialism, has grown in influence in the last decade. According to its tenets, “Russian colonization of Siberia, the North Caucasus, Crimea and parts of Ukraine shares many of the classical features of settlement colonialism elsewhere.” Among those promoting this theory are Lorenzo Veracini and Kate Brown.

·       The fourth holds that “the main difference” between the Russian empire and others is “not economic exploitation but rather Russification” and in particular the spread of the Russian language and Russian Orthodoxy.

·       The fifth holds that Russia is an empire which has developed “without a racial ideology “ although as this idea has been discussed, it has been “replaced by the understanding that instead of biological racism, civilizatioinal, religious and cultural hierarchies acted and that the ideas of ‘savagery’ and ‘backwardness’ of the colonized remained.”

·       The sixth theory focuses on the idea that the Russian empire not only was one of constant expansion but that this expansion was “perceived as a natural condition of the state” that could not dispense with this notion lest it collapse itself.

·       The seventh is that Russian colonialism has become so important to its population and elites because it has always been justified not as a form of economic benefit but as a necessary component of providing the state with security and the need for buffer zones between the core people and the rest of the world.

·       The eighth theory holds that Russia is a “hybrid” empire, one that combines elements found in each of the others and is sui generis as a result.

·       The ninth theory regarding Russian colonialism is “apophatic,” that is, it arises from the view that “Russian colonialism does not exist; and if it does, it is essentially cultural and gentle.

·       And the tenth focuses on the idea that the colonizer is the chief victim, that is has been the Russians rather than anyone else who have paid the price for having an empire and that they should be compensated for that fact. 

In Only Three of the 47 Numerically Small Peoples in Russia, Do a Majority Now Speak Their Native Languages, ‘Vedomosti’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – To mark the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, Moscow’s Vedomosti newspaper feature a statistical description of the 47 nationalities Moscow recognizes in the Russian Federation, groups which together number approximately 315,000 or 0.2 percent of that country’s population.

            Among the most significant of the numbers the paper reports are the following (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/08/09/1219585-korennie-malochislennie-narodi).

·       Only three of the 47 of the numerically small indigenous peoples in Russia have a population in which the majority of members speaks the native language of the group. Moreover, four of the five with the highest percentage of native language speakers showed a decline in that figure since 2002.

·       Fifteen of the 47 now have fewer than 1,000 members – a few have less than 100 members -- and thus are at risk of extinction in a generation or so, while one, the Nenets, with 49,800 as of 2021 may be dropped from the list because Russian law specifies that such groups must be smaller than 50,000.

·       Between the censuses of 2002 and 2021, only 13 of these groups increased in numbers, while 29 of them declined, with the five others remaining the same.

·       With only a few exceptions, urbanization is playing a key role in the decline of the size of these nations, whose members are more likely to assimilate to others when they leave rural areas and move into cities.

Forest Fires Now a Political Problem in Russia Because Bloggers Cover Them More Quickly than Officials Do and Set the Terms in Which They are Discussed, Russian Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 14 – Forest fires are rapidly becoming a major political problem in Russia because independent bloggers can get to the scene and report far more quickly than officials do and thus set the narrative in which those fires will be discussed, putting officials increasingly on the defensive, Valery Prokhorov says.

            In an Octagon Media post, the Russian commentator says that this problem is especially glaring in the case of forest fires where officials have been especially slow to react and then come up with an official version they can disseminate and set the terms of discussion (octagon.media/istorii/pochemu_lesnye_pozhary_v_rossii_prevratilis_v_politicheskij_faktor.html).

            Prokhorov, a political scientist who is a member of the Russian Association of Political Consultants, says that officials must respond far more rapidly in order to “reduce the time between the emergence, detection, management decision and public explanation.”

            “The shorter this gap,” Prokhorov says, “the less space remains for sensations, politically charged interpretations of what is happening and the trivial guidance of the shadow of a wicker by idle commentators.” Otherwise, the political weather in Russia will be set not by officials but by bloggers who are more fleetfooted than they.

Putin Can No Longer Hide that Russians are Paying for His War in Ukraine – and that Could Trigger an Explosion, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 14 – Historically, Russia’s rulers “have sought to avoid openly compelling Russians to foot the bill for their imperial adventures” using a variety of means to get money for these or to hide what they are doing, Sergey Shelin says. Putin was able to do that until this year, but his ability to do so in the future is very much in doubt.

            Between 2022 and 2025, Moscow earned more money from oil sales abroad than it spent on the war in Ukraine, the Russian commentator points out and thus could hide from Russians the costs of the war to them (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/14/dengi-na-voinu-rezhim-tolko-seichas-stal-zastavlyat-poddannih-za-nee-platit-a203447).

            But now the costs of the war have risen and earnings from the sale of oil abroad have fallen or at least not kept pace; and the Kremlin has been forced to extract more money from the population in ways that are becoming ever more evident, Shelin says. Precedents suggest this will create a dangerous situation for Russia’s current rulers.

            Because the regime “lacks sufficient oil revenues to continue its aggression,” the commentator continues, “it is therefore tapping into the funds of its subjects,” so far largely in ways that relatively few Russians understand are going to support the war effort. But over time, it has been compelled to coerce ordinary Russians into openly financing the war.

            This year, this pressure will intensify by means of the raising of VAT from 20 to 22 percent and by rising deficits which must be financed and which involve “diverting far more funds from private savings into war loans than even the record three billion rubles that were seen last year.”

            Shelin traces the experience of Russian governments with war financing from the time of the Crimean War. In all cases except World War II which was viewed as an existential battle, these governments have consistently sought “to extract whatever funds a given war needed while resorting to direct taxation of the population only in exception cases.”

            According to Shelin, “the regime’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a war comparable in scale to the Crimean or Russo-Japanese conflicts, but with one crucial difference: there is no end in sight. Unwilling to accept defeat, Putin frames the conflict as an existential struggle … but the average Russian doesn’t believe him on this point.”

            The commentator concludes: “Russia’s imperial history has shown that subjects remain loyal—and even understanding—regarding a regime’s militaristic ventures, provided the regime conceals the sources of funding and does not force them to pay for its campaigns directly.” In that event, the survival of the regime is at risk.

            Either the regime will have to find a way to convince Russians that they are engaged in an existential battle as was the case in World War II, it will have to increase repression to get the money it needs with a backlash in that event all too likely, or it will be compelled to change course in order to save itself.

            Russian regimes over the past two centuries provide examples of all three. What Putin will now do and whether his choice will be sufficient to cover the spending on Russia’s latest imperial adventure very much remains to be seen; but recent trends suggest that the answer to that question is likely to come very soon indeed, Shelin concludes.