Wednesday, March 12, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Putin’s Failure in Crimea



Paul Goble*

            Staunton, March 12 – Russian President Vladimir Putin and his supporters in Moscow and the West are explaining and justifying his invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea in various ways and celebrating the divisions and weaknesses of the West that it has highlighted, but in every case, they are treating it as a geopolitical victory for the Kremlin. They could not be more wrong.

            There are five reasons for what may seem to many a counter-intuitive conclusion, each of which must be kept in mind in the face of the bombast coming out of Moscow and the apologetics in some Western capitals for this latest example of Russian bad behavior and the ensuing arguments for not taking serious actions that would inflict a real punishment on Putin -- even and often because none contemplated could immediately reverse what he has done.
           
            First, by invading Ukraine, Putin has guaranteed the rise of a far more anti-Russian state there than anyone could have imagined only a few weeks ago and the appearance of other anti-Russian states around Russia’s perimeter.  A few may be intimidated by Putin for a time and all would prefer to live in a more cooperative relationship with Russia, but Putin has made that impossible: in his world, Russia’s neighbors must be its clients and subordinates, not free independent countries.

            Indeed, the Kremlin leader has done two things that he had said he wanted to avoid: he has radicalized Ukrainian nationalism which from now on will be far more anti-Russian than it was in the past, and he has created the kind of cordon sanitaire of anti-Russian countries that he and his foreign policy minions routinely rail against. Unless the West is totally supine and tries to force these countries to cooperate with Moscow, he will “achieve” something that is a Pyrrhic victory at most.

            Second, by demonstrating that for him, ethnicity is more important than citizenship, Putin has created problems in the non-Russian countries. He has unintentionally invited nationalists in some of these countries to look askance at ethnic Russians there, the overwhelming majority of whom are loyal to the governments of the countries on whose territories they live.  Putin may be pleased to have tensions between ethnic Russians and non-Russians increase if what he wants to do is to engage in more aggression. But the practical consequence of his actions will be further Russian flight and the increasing ethnic homogenization of the countries of the region.  That will reduce Moscow’s “soft power” influence.

            In doing this, Putin appears to have forgotten if indeed he ever knew that one of the forces that tore apart the USSR was the increasingly large share that members of non-Russian nationalities formed in the union republics.  Instead of learning from that and trying to retain and integrate people who may be predisposed to have a more positive view of Moscow, Putin is doing exactly the opposite.

            Third, Putin is also sending a message to the citizens of his own country that ethnicity is more important than citizenship. On the one hand, that message completely undercuts his earlier efforts to promote a non-ethnic civic nationality (“rossiisky” rather than “russky”) and ensures that the non-Russians who now form at least a quarter of the population – and not the fifth that Putin and his people claim – will feel like second class citizens or worse. Many of them already feel that way; Putin has ensured that the rest will follow.

            And on the other hand, Putin’s ethnicity over citizenship message is already affecting the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation. The outflow of ethnic Russians is likely to continue and even accelerate with many of these republics becoming increasingly homogeneous and thus ungovernable except by the application of force, and the non-Russians in an increasing number of them are likely to become ever more responsible to those who argue that they and their territories have no future in the Russian Federation. To the extent they do so, historians may ultimately record that Putin was not “the in-gatherer of the Russian lands” he so desperately wants to be known as but rather a second Gorbachev who presided over the next round of the devolution of the Russian imperial state.

            Fourth, Putin’s approach in Crimea is already having echoes not only in these non-Russian places but in ethnic Russian areas of the Russian Federation as well.  And these could prove to be an even greater challenge to his rule.  Many Russians do not define Russia and Russian as the Kremlin leader does: they look to different and more democratic traditions, and some are already asking what must be a troubling question for the Kremlin: how come Putin is concerned about the ethnic autonomy of Russians in Crimea in neighboring Ukraine but not about the ethnic autonomy of Russians in Siberia or Novogorod or Ingermanland? To ask those questions is in a certain sense to answer them, and those answers call into question a Moscow-centric state of the kind Putin is so committed to.

            And fifth – and last, of course – Putin’s invasion of Crimea is forcing the West to revise its opinions of the Russian leader and of Russia as well.  This process is not proceeding quickly or without backtracking.  As several people in England told this writer last week, there are quite a few Chamberlains and Hoares and Halifaxes; there are no Churchills. But the failures of the former opened the way to the rise of the latter, although many will object that this is the wrong analogy.

            To date, much of the debate in Western capitals, to the extent that it doesn’t treat Crimea as a small place far away about which we know nothing, has taken the form of accepting a peculiarly Russian version of history of Crimea  or suggesting, as it always the case, that there are so many issues where we are cooperating Moscow that we mustn’t let Ukraine get into the way.  But as Russian aggressiveness and arrogance have continued, more people are coming to see that something must be done.

            That has thrown the debate back to one between those who are pressing for tough measures and those who say that the tough measures wouldn’t be enough or might restart “a new cold war.”  It is almost certain that if Putin doesn’t care about his relations with the West or the future of his country – and there is growing evidence to support both propositions – there is very little that the West can do to force him to retreat from his latest act of aggression. But that is not an excuse to do nothing, nor are complaints that any critical action will restart “a new cold war.”  Such complaints, it should be noted, are always made by those who don’t want the West to do anything regardless of what Moscow does.

            Government officials at least in the United States are routinely told that their job is to give decision makers the broadest range of choices possible rather than leaving such leaders with the option of doing nothing or blowing up the world. Among the literally hundreds of steps that might be taken and taken easily are the following: expanding Magnitsky lists, freezing assets, lifting visas, expelling Russian diplomats, reducing the size of Western embassies in Moscow while increasing them in Ukraine and elsewhere, trips by foreign leaders to the region which go to Kyiv and Tbilisi but not to Moscow, cancelling visas, dropping all talk of a G8 and going back to a G7, and ensuring that any Russian act of aggression be labelled as such on government maps, just as the US did with regard to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, until they recovered their de facto independence in 1991. Some of these ideas are already on the table; all of them and more need to be.

            A half century ago, the great Russian memoirist Nadezhda Mandelshtam wrote that “happy is that country in which the despicable will at least be despised.”  A corollary of that is that countries who are outraged by a violation of law and morality by others must not keep quiet. They have a duty to themselves and to the victims of aggression to speak out. Such statements and actions may not lead to the quick reversal that their authors very much want, but they set the stage for such a reversal, especially when a leader like Putin is taking steps that undermine everything he has said he favors and that make it likely that he and the country he rules are going to find themselves in a far worse position in the future than they did before invading Ukraine.

*I would like to thank those of you who queried me on the gap in Windows since March 1. My wife and I were traveling in England and had only intermittent access to the Internet. We are now back, and I look forward to resuming the series, welcoming as always your comments and suggestions.  

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Proposed Law to Allow Russia to Expand Could Lead to Its Destruction, Murtazin Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 1 – A bill being pushed in the Russian Duma to allow Russia to “absorb and form new subjects,” one that promotes the idea that local referenda can trump international agreements, could backfire on the country and even lead to its destruction, according to a Moscow commentator.

            Writing on the Kasparov.ru site yesterday, Irek Murtazin says that it is clear those behind the measure want to create a legal fiction that would allow them to make an end run around international law and to absorb parts of neighboring states without the agreement of the governments of those states (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5310CD26DBD2A).

            But those backing the measure forget that two can play that game. What will happen, Murtazin says, “if tomorrow a similar law is adopted by China, Japan, or Mongolia, by Ukraine or Belarus? And then across all of Russia, ‘a part of another state’ begins to conduct referenda about unification?”

“If Tyva, for example, wants to combine with Mongolia? A couple of districts of Orenburg with Kazakhstan? Taganrog and Novorossiisk to join to Ukraine? And Smolensk and Pskov with Belarus?”  If any of those things happen, what will the Russian backers of this new measure say?  That is “contradicts international law” given what they have done.

Clearly this measure is being pushed because of a desire in Moscow to spark a civil war in Ukraine over Crimea.  But if Ukraine might be the first victim, “Russia would suffer most of all,” Murtazin says. Doesn’t anyone in the regime understand that? Or do they assume that the world will allow Russia to act in ways it would not allow anyone else?

            But even if those things don’t happen, even if the West continues to defer to Moscow and permit it to do what it would not allow anyone else, Russia will still suffer from this law and its application. It will find it harder to export its oil and gas, and it may very well face serious refugee flows.

            Russians should be thinking about all these risks before adopting such a dangerous piece of legislation, Murtazin says.  One can only add that so should the leaders of the West who need to recognize not only how dangerous this law would be in the short term but how it would reinforce Moscow’s view of international acceptance of Russian exceptionalism.



            Boris Vishnevsky, a Yabloko deputy in St. Petersburg’s legislative assembly, puts the challenge to the West Putin has laid down in even more stark terms.  He says that what is happening in Crimea recalls Hitler’s move into the Sudetenland, where initially German forces were welcomed with flowers (echo.msk.ru/blog/boris_vis/1269148-echo/).

            That leaves open, of course, another and potentially more important question, he suggests.  Will there be a new Munich?
 

Window on Eurasia: Russia Again Living by Lies, Ukrainian Philosopher Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 1 – Vladimir Putin is again teaching Russia to live by lies, 40 years after Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn warned Russians of the dangers to themselves and others of doing so, a Ukrainian philosopher argues in an article that leading Russian publications like “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Polit.ru and Snob.ru have refused to publish.

            On his own blog, Sergii Datsiuk points out that “the lie in Russia is a means of avoiding necessary changes ... it is an attempt to shift responsibility for one’s own mistakes to others in order to whitewash the authorities ... it is dangerous for Russia itself because it generates hatred with no way out ... [and] it is dangerous for the entire world because it divides Russia and the rest of the world (blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/datsuk/53116eef447b1/).

                The fact that Ukrainians like Russians and want to live in peace but Russians dislike Ukrainians and are aggressive toward them, something confirmed by the actions of their respective governments and by various polls, he says, is not a natural or inevitable situation but the result of “Russia’s information war against Ukraine.”

            According to Datsiuk, “to force Russians to hate the Ukrainian people without the use of lies in Russia would have been impossible. And [consequently] Russia began to lie and to conduct a war.” That war consists of several components: trade, information, history, and technology.

            Lying behind Russia’s information war against Ukraine, he continues, is “the unwillingness of Russians in the Russian elite to recognize the right of Ukrainians to self-determination and independence.” But its results would not have been so terrible had there not been compradore elements within Ukraine like Yanukovich and the Berkut.

            But everyone must remember that it is not just former president Yanukovich and his group who bear responsibility for the spilling of Ukrainian blood. Also responsible are Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Kiselyev, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Sergey Glazyev and Dmitry Rogozin.

            “There are the enemies of Ukraine,” Datsiuk says, “whose actions led to human victims,” and we can and must recognize them as such.  But they had the assistance of others in the Russian cultural elite in spreading hatred of Ukraine and Ukrainians, people llike Mikhail Zadornov, Ivan Okhlobystin, Sergey Lukyanenko, and Iosif Kobzon.

            What is happening in Crimea now is “the direct continuation of the information war of Russia against Ukraine, a ‘war of nerves’ which seeks to provoke Ukraine into making a harsh responsible so that Russia can unleash a full-scale war.” If before the existence of this information war was a matter for regret, now it has become “mortally dangerous.”

            Ukraine may be the target of this war, Datsiuk says, but Russia is its victim as well. “Ukraine is not Russia.” And even in the worst times of Yanukovich’s rule, “the lie in Ukraine came from two sources – Russian television channels ... and pro-regime ones.”  Truth defeated them in Ukraine, but in Russia, the lie swallowed up everything.

            One cannot “kill Russia’s lie against Ukraine without killing the lie in Russia itself,” Datsiuk says.

            The Putin regime has updated and modernized the system Solzhenitsyn decried. By claiming it is concerned about the defense of the state and the Russian people, the Kremlin hides its own crimes by spreading lies about other countries and peoples, in this case, Ukraine and Ukrainians. 

That means, Datsiuk says, that “the lie of the Russian authorities about themselves become  less obvious” because it is obscured by the lies Moscow is telling about everyone else.  As a result,”Russia is becoming the generating of hatred in the world.” Many countries have resisted this, including the Baltic states, Georgia and now Ukraine.

“However, hatred in Russia continues to be generated. The hatred which cannot be transferred to another remains in Russia, builds up and explodes it from within.  The lie and hatred will destroy Russia if this doesn’t stop.” But can that happen? Solzhenitsyn’s advice that individuals stop lying clearly isn’t enough. Public intellectuals must speak out.

Datsiuk says that “Russia needs its own Maidan where there is no hatred” and where truth can triumph and its people can think “collectively about their future. “’To Live Not By Lies’ today means not so much to avoid the individual lie but the collective one, the agitationand propaganda communicated by the Russian authorities through television news.”

The Internet isn’t enough; television news is required. But “today there is almost no quality TV news in Russia.”  Instead there is “agitation and propaganda” which promote “a positive image of Russia and its regime,” says Russia is surrounded by enemies, and argues that “the Russian empire is heaven on earth.”

That reflects the rise of the lie to a new level: the Russian elite is lying to its own people.  “This is the Big Lie about the possibility of an Empire.  This is a lie of the Russian elite to itself in the first instance” because that elite “cannot but know that the future does not belong to empires or even isolated states but to trans-national organizations.

But “the Big Lie continues in Russia and destroys all ideas of the future in which there is no place for the Empire.  The vacuum of ideas about the future supports and decorates the Big Lie.”  The only way out is to tell the truth and in the first instance to say and recognize that “there won’t be an empire.” Russia and Russians need  to “seek something else.”

Friday, February 28, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Putin Seeks to Provoke ‘Full-Scale Civil War’ in Ukraine, Illarionov Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 28 – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal, as shown by the various provocations he has arranged in recent days, is not to seize Crimea right now but rather to provoke a civil war in Ukraine that will allow him to gain control over Ukraine by posing as a peacemaker, according to Andrey Illarionov

            Putin “does not want to fight now,” the Moscow economist and commentator says. Rather, he wants for now that others including Ukrainians, Russians and Crimean Tatars do so. That this is Putin’s plan is shown by all the actions he and his agents have engaged in over the last few days (echo.msk.ru/blog/aillar/1268770-echo/).

            Among the elements of this plan, Illarionov are the Russian foreign ministry’s comments, Russian military maneuvers, the seizure of government buildings and airports in Crimea, labelling the secessionist Crimean prime minister “an authoritative actor,” the uncontrolled actions of Russian soldiers and sailors in Crimea, the desecration of the Ukrainian flag, attacks on Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Russian official media, “cynical praise for the Berkut sadists,” the protection of ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, formation of groups ready to go to Ukraine “and hundreds of other facts” as well.

            “Many of these provocations intentionally and demonstratively desecrate the Ukraine state, Ukrainian national symbols and Ukrainian national consciousness,” Illarionov continues, all a reflection of Putin’s hopes that there will be a reaction by the Ukrainian authorities, that this will lead to bloodshed, and that then Moscow can intervene.

Putin’s goal is to provoke and to trigger conflicts of “all against all” in Ukraine, “political conflicts, civil conflicts, and inter-confessional conflicts,” among groups in all parts of Ukraine, the Moscow commentator says. For Putin to achieve his goals, he needs corpses, “the more, the ‘better.’”

Their appearance in turn, Illarionov argues, will lead not simply to civil conflicts but “to a full-scale civil war in Ukraine.” That will allow Putin to argue that Ukraine has been engulfed by “total chaos, collapse and catastrophe,” to claim again as he did in April 2008 that “Ukraine has not succeeded as an independent state,” and to get support for the restoration of stability and order by Russia and its forces.   

What this means for the new Ukrainian authorities is obvious, the Moscow analyst concludes: They must hold out against this Putin attack, “display patience and restraint,” and not allow themselves to be “provoked into a mass suicide” lest they present themselves and their countries as “a desired victim to the neighboring dictator.”