Saturday, January 2, 2016

Uzbek and Tajik Gastarbeiters in Russia Ever Fewer; Kazakh and Kyrgyz Ones Increasing by Small Percentages



Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Most Russian assessments of and reaction to Central Asian gastarbeiters treat those coming in from that region as a whole, but in fact there have been radical differences not only in the numbers from each country but also in the changes in their number over the past two or three years.

            And those differences mean that the impact of the changes in the number of gasarbeiters are hitting the Central Asian countries differently, with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan most heavily affected, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan much less so, and Turkmenistan, which has sent few gastarbeiters to Russia at any point, hardly at all.

            In an article on the “Stoletiye” portal today, commentator Aleksandr Shustov who has followed this issue for some time provides disaggregated data on the numbers from the various countries of Central Asia and discusses the financial and other implications of the changes (stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/migrantov_stalo_menshe_816.htm).

            In 2014 when the economic crisis began, the number of Central Asian gastarbeiters in Russia fell by “an insignificant amount.” During the first 11 months of 2015, however, their numbers declined by 367,000, the Federal Migration Service said, or a total of 8.4 percent according to official statistics.

            The largest declines in 2015 were among those from Uzbekistan (335,000 or 15.1 percent) and Tajikistan (103,000 or 10.3 percent). The numbers from Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan were “almost unchanged,” Shustov says; while the number from Kazakhstan actually rose by 72,600 or 12 percent.

            If one looks at the changes over the last 21 months, the figures and the diversity of directions are even more striking. For this period, the number of Central Asian gastarbeiters decined by 480,000, almost exclusively because of the declines in the number of Uzbeks and Tajiks, 462,000 and 137,800 respectively. The numbers from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan rose.

            These changes are very different from what happened in the economic crisis of 2008-2009, Shustov says. Then there were very small contacts because there were no legal limits on CIS foreigners coming into Russia and the Eurasian Economic Community, with its preferential arrangements, did not exist.

            Countries like Kyrgyzstan which are members of the latter have been able to bounce back quickly in terms of the numbers of gastarbeiters from them in Russia. Countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which aren’t members have not, and they have suffered financial and other losses as a result.

            Three of the five Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – depend heavily on transfer payments from gastarbeiters to support their own economies.  In Tajikistan, these payments account for about half of the GDP; in Kyrgyzstan, “about a third;” and in Uzbekistan, about ten percent.

            Both the decline in the numbers of gastarbeiters and the fall in the value of the ruble – except in Uzbekistan, most transfers are made in US dollars – have led to dramatic declines in the size of these transfer payments and put serious pressure on the economies and governments of the countries involved. And increased unemployment has sparked Islamist radicalization.

            At the same time, Shustov says, Russians have generally benefitted from the departure of Central Asian gastarbeiters. Russians have taken the jobs the former vacated, there have been fewer ethnic clashes, and there has been less radicalization of Muslims inside Russia as the Central Asians have left.

            A recent study by the Eurasian Development Bank, the UN, Moscow’s Higher School of Economics and the Russian Academy of Sciences concludes that in the future, the number of gastarbeiters from Central Asia will increase, Shustov says, but only those countries like Kyrgyzstan which are members of the Eurasian Economic Community are likely to benefit.

            “Neither Tajikistan nor Uzbekistan, which have generated three-quarters of all labor migrants [from that region] as of yet intend to join.”  Unless they do, the balance of Central Asian migrants in Russia will change dramatically against them with consequences both in Russia and in their own countries.


             

Moscow’s Inability to Fund Planned Investments Sparks Discontent in Central Asia



Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Businesses and governments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are angry at the failure of some Russian firms to pay their bills and at the decision of the Russian authorities to suspend long-planned investment projects, including some likely to have important environmental consequences, in those two Central Asian countries.

            The situation in Kazakhstan appears particularly serious, according to media reports, given that many of the projects had been agreed to long ago and confirmed only a few months back and given that some of them involve suspension of plans to work together to save the Ural River (rus.azattyk.kg/content/rossia-priostanovlennye-proekty-v-kazakhstane/27458866.html  and regnum.ru/news/economy/2047912.html).

            Reports that Russian firms were leaving Kazakhstan began to spread last summer, RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service says, when it was announced that Russia’s Lukoil had sold a major portion of its share in Caspian Investment Resources, Ltd, to Beijing’s Sinoec. That firm has five projects in Kazakhstan.

            More critically, on December 8, Moscow announced it wasn’t going to participate in a project it had agreed to with Astana in 2009 to save the Ural River.  While Kazakhstan officials have been worried about that river, Russian ones now say that “no one in Russia is beating concern about the status of the Ural since there is no threat.”

            And five days ago, a Russian construction firm that had been building an airport in Uralsk stopped paying its Kazakhstan partners. The latter have appealed to the Kazakhstan government to take measures to force the Russian firms to pay what they owe, “Uralskaya nedelya” reported on December 28.

            Officials in Kyrgyzstan are also angry at Russia’s decision not to go forward with investment projects it had earlier agreed to. On December 25, President Almazbek Atambayev said that Moscow was now refusing to invest in a project that Vladimir Putin had recently told him would continue.

            “It is obvious,” the Kyrgyzstan leader said, that “in a situation when the Russian economy isn’t growing, these agreements will not be fulfilled.” Putin’s spokesman confirmed that “commercial difficulties and others of a conjunction nature” now require the bilateral discussion of “various” other possibilities.

Moscow Struggling to Coordinate Counter-Terrorist Effort in North Caucasus

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Moscow is finding it increasingly difficult to coordinate the various agencies involved in its counter-terrorist effort in the North Caucasus, and its shortcomings in that regard are “being paid for by the blood” of local residents, according to Rasul Kadiyev, a lawyer and political analyst.

            On the “Kavkazskaya politika” portal, Kadiyev says that the recent events in Derbent where forces which claimed to be part of ISIS attacked and killed some local people “confirm that mistakes in providing security” reflect the difficulties the Russian authorities are having in coordinating their counter-terrorist actions (kavpolit.com/articles/ukaz-22435/).

            As a result, he says, the FSB, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, the Ministry of Defense, its various special groups and regional staffs, the various regional and republic governments, and the Russian Information Monitoring Agency are often working at cross purposes rather than a single team, a pattern that gives terrorists an opening they should not have.

            Although Kadiyev acknowledges that not everything in Russia occurs as specified in laws and directives, he suggests that the evolution of those official actions over the last decade and especially the last month shows that Moscow has still not figured out how to make things work and in fact is introducing ever greater complexities in this sector.

            Vladimir Putin’s December 26 order “on measures to improve the state administration in the area of countering terrorism” (normacs.ru/Doclist/doc/11g7o.html) was issued in order to address some of these issues by “modernizing the National Anti-Terrorism Committee and “the resubordination of ‘the siloviki.’

            But the situation is not only so complicated that no one act could solve all the problems but it is becoming ever more so because of other Russian laws and decrees, Kadiyev says. He gives as an example the September 30 Federation Council approval of Putin’s use of military force abroad.

            That action raised rather than solved “a number of legal and economic questions,” including first and foremost which agencies are in charge of the use of Russian military force against terrorism when the forces are on Russian territories or Russian territorial waters but the terrorists are beyond those borders.

            When the National Anti-Terrorist Committee was set up in 2006 with the FSB director as its ex officio head, no one thought about that possibility, one in which the NAK and hence the FSB, on the one hand, would be competing with the ministry of defense, on the other, Kadiyev suggests.

            But that is now very much the case because “the struggle with terrorists in Syria is headed not by the FSB and not by the NAK but by the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense,” who controls the Caspian Flotilla which struck at the terrorists in Syria from the territorial waters of Russia which fall under the jurisdiction of the NAK.”

            Putin had earlier (on November 18, 2015) limited the NAK in another way when he decreed the creation of an inter-agency commission for blocking the financing of terrorism and put the Russian Information Monitoring agency in charge, even though the leader of that body also is included in the NAK chaired by the FSB director.

            “The question of ‘who is more important’ is not trivial since under conditions of the budget deficit, all organs of power, including the FSB are being forced to optimize their expenses” even as “spending on the armed forces are not being reduced but have become almost the most important.”

            The NAK was supposed to coordinate all this, but the situation has changed dramatically since it was set up a decade ago. “The challenges have changed, [and] instead of open many-hours-long battles have begun to be carried out counter-terrorist operations by means of the introduction of KTOs.”

            That is the reason behind the December 26 decree, but the difficulties of the new situation are reflected in the fact that the new decree has 24 sections compared to only 11 in the 2006 document, a measure of just how complicated the task of coordinating the counter-terrorist operations now have become.

            “The regional system of the organization of the NAK remains in essence what it was,” with operational staffs of the NAK headed by regional leaders of the FSB. “However,” that is not the end of it. In areas adjoining seas, new special staffs have been set up to manage the situation. They are headed by FSB border officials rather than FSB officers working with the NAK.

            Nominally, “the ‘naval’ staff is subordinated to the operational staff of the NAK in each subject. However, by the terms of the [new] decree, they are allowed to conduct counter-terrorist operations only ‘in the internal sea waters adjoining these territories.”  But what this means is far from clear – and conflicts are certain to arise between the NAK (FSB) and the defense ministry.

            Moreover and as always, Chechnya is “excluded” from the rules that govern these arrangements elsewhere.  The unified group of forces there is “under the leadership of the internal forces” of the Russian Federation “but it has a special status,” one that has meant that Grozny has a voice, often a decisive one, in how these forces are deployed.

             The new Putin decree changed this in words and ostensibly brought the situation in Chechnya into line with what it is in the other federal subjects in the North Caucasus and indeed elsewhere in the Russian Federation, but it is unclear whether it has changed the situation on the ground, Kadiyev says.