Tuesday, August 1, 2017

Russian Public Life Today is Not Just a Battle of Individuals but a Struggle of Ideologies, Pastukhov Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 1 – Despite the conviction of many that conflicts among opposition figures are simply battles among individuals, Vladimir Pastukhov says, “an ideological struggle in post-communist Russia not only exists but is proceeding within a long discredited mental paradigm” which explains why Russian history, its reflection, is a vicious circle.

            The recent debates between Aleksey Navalny and Igor Strelkov, the St. Antony’s College historian says, are “the clearest public clash in recent years of all the main Russian ideological trends at the new turn of Russian history,” a clash that involves “not two but three,” the last being the spirit of the Russian liberal opposition (republic.ru/posts/85454).

            “In the final analysis, Navalny and Strelkov appealed not so much to the nationalists … as to the liberal audience. [That is,] they discussed not the nationalist but the liberal agenda.” And “at the center of debates was one single question which has political and economic meaning in Russia – the question about power.”

            Navalny has been criticized for failing to detail his program, but in fact, Pastukhov suggests, duringn the debate everthing that one needs to know about his views on politics in Russia” because “he expressed his attitude toward state power.”

            Pastukhov says that “in Russia there is not and cannot be a political ideology” in the Western sense “because Russia as in the past remains a pre-political society… [Thus] the right-left matrix doesn’t apply to Russia as it was constructed as a derivative involving relations to private property which did not and does not exist in Russia.”

            “Having expressed his attitude toward power,” the Russian historian continues, “a Russiann politician answers the question about his program in an exhaustive way. One needn’t knw anything more about it or him in an ideological sense.”

            According to Pastukhov, there are a total of “three traditional points of view on this sensitive issue for Russia:

            First, there is the patriotic or Slavophile position, whch Strelkov embodies. For those who hold this view, “the powers are a prior good” and justify themselves by existing. “Democracy is not only unnecessary but even dangerous since it is capable of destroying the natural unity of power and the people and become a weapon in the hands of plutocrats as well as the foreign and domestic enemies of Russia.”

            Second, there is the liberal or Westernizer position to which both Navalny and Strelkov appealed. For it, “power is a prior evil: it opposes society its interests are opposed to the interests of society and therefore it must be controlled, contained and forced to act in the interests of society in spite of its egoistic and ‘bloodsucking’ instincts.”

            And third, there is the progressive, that is revolutionary-democratic position.  That is Navalny’s position. It holds that “power by itself is neutral and everything depends in whose hands it is held: if it is in ‘bad’ hands, then it will be ‘reactionary’ and must be opposed; if it is in ‘good’ hands, that is, progressive ones, it must be supported.”

            Put in lapidary terms, Pastukhov says, “the three ruling ideological trends in Russia today can be summarized in the following way: power must be served (the patriots), power must be fought (the liberals) and power must be used (the progressives).”

            At first glance, these appear quite far apart, but they really aren’t as distant from one another as all that. “They have a common platform: the Russian patriots, the Russian liberals and the Russian revolutionary democrats (progressives) recognize the objective inevitability and even necessity of the existence in Russia of a harshly centralized, built from top down, vertically integrated state.”

            In short, they all accept the Leviathan state as a demiurge and vie society as “an infantile youth incapable of any independence and more than that capable of committing a mass of stupidities and even calling forth a universal catastrophe if suddenly they separate themselves from the supervision of the state.”

            The problem is that thinking in this way the liberals have no chance of coming to power except as a result of some cataclysm.  The progressive Bolshevik types do have a change because they seek power above all and will do what is necessary to seize the state. But neither of them or of course the patriots will challenge the autocratic state.

            “Autocracy,” Pastukhov says, “in the final analysis can be extremely varied: Orthodox, communist, anti-communist, corrupt and even anti-corrupt.”  But the fundamental vicious cycle of Russian history won’t be broken until the vicious cycle of Russian thought is broken and Russia adopts “at a minimum” three fundamental reforms.

            First of all, there must be rules that prevent anyone from remaining in power for very long and ensure the circulation of elites. Second, he says, there must be a fundamental decentralization of power. And third, there needs to be a clear transition to a parliamentary republic or “as a variant,” a parliamentary-presidential one.

            Rephrasing a popular political notion in the past, “one can say that “all previous ideologies have put as their goal the modernization of Russian autocracy … now the time has come to demolish it.”  That requires that the opposition come together to get power and only then debate their differences. Worrying about the latter first ensures that it won’t take power. 

            There is a clear example of what is at stake if the two opposition trends don’t come together. That was in Germany in the early 1930s when the two main opposition groups decided their differences were more important than anything else and thus lost out, opening the way to the rise of Hitler.

            Or put another, Pastukhov concludes, “present day Russian politics reminds one of a computer game: in it, there are many levels, and one must not jump to the next level without fulfilling the program of the previous one.”

Putin’s Demographic Policies Making Russia Ever Less Russian, Moscow Experts Say



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 1 – Russian officials say the declining number of working-age Russians may limit the country’s economic possibilities, but experts note the pro-natalist policies Vladimir Putin has promoted have increased fertility rates among non-Russians while doing little to stop them from falling among ethnic Russians, a pattern that is making Russia ever less Russian.

            Official concern about the size of the work force is reflected, Mariya Bezchastnaya of Svobodnaya pressa says, in both the decision of the Russian Central Bank to keep interest rates high and in a report by the economic development ministry about the current state of the Russian economy (svpressa.ru/economy/article/178020/).

                The Central Bank noted that “one of the limiting factors” of Russia’s economic growth is the size of the labor market “where already are being observed signs of a shortage of cadres in particular segments.” To the extent they grow or spread, that will present real problems (cbr.ru/press/keypr/).
           
            And the Economic Development Ministry’s report says that demographic trends mean that unemployment is declining because there are fewer people seeking work even as there is agrowing demand for them (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/07/31/727040-rinok-truda#/galleries/140737493462195/normal/1).

            Both agencies stress that “compensation is [as a result] beginning to grow more rapidly than productivity,” something that will ultimately lead to inflation unless worker productivity goes up.  If economists focus on this danger, demographers argue that “potential inflation is far from the main problem.”

            Igor Beloborodov, the direction of the Independent Institute of the Family and Demography, argues that the growing shortage of workers not only threatens economic growth but will make it impossible for Russia to “maintain its geopolitical position and respected status in the international arena” not immediately but within a few years.

            Frightened by this threat, he continues, many in Moscow are inclined to open the gates to far more gastarbeiters from Central Asia. But that is “an anti-Russian approach” because “in this way we will simply wreck the labor market as a result of dumping” and allow for the emergence of “ethnic monopolies on work places. This is a serious issue for reflection.”

            “More than that,” Beloborodov says, “such an approach will lead directly to the collapse of the country and to ethnic revolutions. If there were causes for a Maidan in Ukraine, including the weakness of the authorities and corruption, then with us, one of these threats is the ethnic factor – and therefore one must approach the issue of migration very carefully.”

            Immigration must be structured so as to correspond with the existing ethnic balance in the country rather than allowing it to undermine that balance, the demographer says.  The same thing is true regarding pro-natal policies.  Those are needed to boost the birthrate and produce more workers, but they too must take the ethnic factor into account.

            Unfortunately, Beloborodov says, that hasn’t always been the case. The pro-natal policies of the government have boosted birthrates overall but not evenly across the country. In predominantly ethnic Russian regions with low birthrates now, these policies have done little or nothing.

            But “in non-Russian republics and regions of compact settlement of representatives of other indigenous peoples of Russia,” these policies have boosted fertility rates. If that trend continues, “it will promote the deformation of the existing demographic situation in our country.”

            “The share of the ethnic Russian and Slavic population will fall, and the existing relationship of various nationalities will be deformed.” Thus, any policy in this area must take ethnicity into consideration, and different approaches should be used in different regions to ensure that deformations don’t take place.

            But if “revolutionary” steps aren’t taken in this area now, Beloborodov says, “we will experience the most serious problems” in the decade between 2040 and 2050.


Russian Empire’s Special Features haven’t Disappeared in Russia Today, Inozemtsev Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 1 – Three specific and even unique characteristics of the Russian Empire in the past have not disappeared in the Russian Federation of today but instead continue to drive both the foreign and domestic policies of the Kremlin, according to Moscow commentator Vladislav Inozemtsev.

            In an essay for the AfterEmpire portal today, Inozemtsev identifies the three and discusses the reasons why these imperial features have not disappeared in Russian life in the same way that they did in the case of Western empires like those of the British, French, and Portuguese (afterempire.info/2017/08/01/3features/).

                First of all, he argues, there is “the unique fact that the center of the imperial power became what was in essence a deeply peripheral oblast: Moscow not only was not a nucleus for t e consolidation of Russian territories during the flourishing of Kyiv Rus but did not even play a significant role in the region dominated by Vladimir, Suzdal and Ryazan.”

            That in turn has had three consequences, Inozemtsev continues: first, it instilled in the Muscovite principality from the outset “a powerful colonizing drive;” second, Moscow’s formerly subservient or “at least ‘junior’” position led it in a “fanatic” way to seek to impose control over the two “’older’ centers of Russian statehood, Novgorod and Kyiv” both of which were linked to Europe; and third, Muscovy’s long subordination to the Mongol Horde gave it the necessary skills to build and hold a continental land empire.

            Second, the Moscow analyst says, the Russian imperial experience strikingly recalls “the expansion of European powers in essence and [even] chronologically but was distinguished from them by its results.”  Like the Europeans, Muscovy started in its imperial direction with what Lorezno Veracini has called “settler colonialism” and moved eastward into Siberia.

            But after a century or so, the European colonies created by settlers had largely freed themselves from the metropolitan center, “but Siberia remained within Russia.” 

            Then, again just as the Western European powers had acted from the beginning of the 18th century, “Russia began an expansion not along the east-west axis but along the north-south one: the Europeans quite quickly divided Africa and South Asia [while] the Russians seized the North Caucasus and Central Asia.”

            In this way, Inozemtsev says, “the logic of the construction of the empire was preserved: even chronologically. In both cases, settlement colonization took place first and then occupation and the establishment of regimes of military dominance without the large-scale resettlement of representatives of the metropolitan center in the new possessions.”

            But despite that commonality, he continues, “Russia turned out to be the only empire in which the second phase of expansion was carried out as an addition to the first and not as its replacement.  As a result, the clear division into center and periphery was lost in contrast to the West European and a completely variegated conglomerate began to be viewed as a single state.”

            And the third distinguishing characteristic of Russian imperialism is and remains that “the great disintegration of the end of the 20th century occurred according to different rules than the imperial collapse in the rest of the world had.”  That reinforced the lack of distinction between colonialism by settlement and colonialism by conquest.

            “As a result,” Inozemtsev says, “within the new country have been reproduced the former contradictions: in it remain part of the historical metropolitan center, the settler colony in the form of Siberia and the recently conquered territories in the North Caucasus which logically do not have any relation to Russia.”

            This in turn means, he continues, that “all the fundamental contradictions of the Rusisan Empire have been preserved in the Russian ‘Federation.’”  It hasn’t been freed of its colonies “politically or economically.” It cannot exist without being an empire regardless of what the country is called.”

            But the settlement of 1991 involved something else that has ensured that the imperial dimension of Russia has continued, and it is this: many regions that Russians view as part of the metropolitan center are now within the borders of other states.  And that means that “there exists and will continue to exist a striving toward fundamental revanchism” to recover them.

            In its behavior toward Chechnya or the Donbass, Inozemtsev says, “Russia has conducted itself not as the Horde but as a typical European state just like France which tried to hold Algeria or Germany which aspired to Alsace and Lorrain.”  But there is a difference and it is critical, the analyst argues.

            “Russia at the very same time continues to preserve a political construction like that of an empire and not of a nation state, toward the building of which it has never tried to achieve. And this construction … is not capable of being transformed either into a nation state or into a federation.”

            Consequently, “efforts at the ‘federalization’ of Russia cannot lead to the formation of a contemporary non-unitary state of the kind represented by the US, Germany or even more Switzerland.” Whether that means it will fall apart in a convulsion or disappear in some other way is something “only time will tell,” Inozemtsev says.