Wednesday, August 2, 2017

‘Russian Civic Nation’ Concept to Be Delivered to Putin Four Weeks Late



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 3 – In yet another indication of controversies surrounding  the concept paper for a new law on  strengthening the unity of the civic Russian nation, Leokadiya Drobizheva says that it will be presented to President Vladimir Putin on August 28 (nazaccent.ru/content/24917-koncepciyu-zakona-o-edinstve-nacii-predstavyat.html).

            That is four weeks later than the August 1 deadline Putin himself set when he called for the drafting of this concept paper and the latest indication that the entire process remains mired in controversy (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/06/civic-russian-nation-now-defined-in.html).

            Drobizheva, who is a member of the drafting group and head of the Center for Research on Inter-Ethnic Relations at the Moscow Institute of Sociology, told the Nazaccent portal that “the conception is practically ready: it has passed through discussion in varioius stages both in the republics and in the federal districts.”

            But she said that discussions continue on the glossary of terms employed in the concept paper and expected to be enshrined in the new law. Among these are “the civic Russian nation,” “civic identity,” “ethnos,” “inter-ethnic accord,” “international relations,” “and others.”  All of these are controversial (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/05/proposed-civic-russian-nation-is.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/03/putin-tishkov-push-to-define-civic.html).   

Putin Elites Want ‘Stalinism without Stalin’ and ‘Repression with a Human Face,’ Rubtsov Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 2 – Russians do not by their nature “love Stalin,” Novaya gazeta commentator Aleksandr Rubtsov says; instead, they “are being taught to love Stalin because the [Putin] regime really is functioning according to this regime prototype and has not found any other legitimation for itself in history.”

            This becomes obvious, he says, if one considers that “genetically and functionally, the Russia of the 2000s arose out of the 1990s” and that Putin and his team “assert that everything good that they began in [the first decade of this century] is in no way obliged to Yeltsinism” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/08/02/73312-stalinizm-bez-stalina).

            As a result, the Putin regime has had to look past “the pit of the 1990s” to a more distant past, but the question has been to just which past.  “As far as ‘cadres’ are concerned, all the persons of the post-Stalin era – Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Andropov, Brezhnev and Khrushchev have been stricken from the record.” 

            “Stalin is the first with whom Putin meets in this retrospective toward the past.  And the past: before him is again a fiasco. Lenin and the great tsars, the victors and the reforms fall away. Somewhere in the shadow of the mustaschioed one looms Ivan the Terrible but only as ‘the Stalin of his day.’”  As a result of this subtraction, Putin is left alone with Stalin.

            There are, of course, important distinctions between the two: Today, “there are no mass purges and bloody rotations, not to mention incidents of sadism … the purge of the political field [under Putin] has become incomparably more humane.”  There are “show trials” but they don’t end in shooting or torture.

            Moreover, Rubtsov says, “the techniques of neutralization of hostile classes have been significantly softened.” Small and mid-sized business “like the middle class as a whole” is gradually squeezed but it isn’t suppressed. And the peasantry isn’t facing wholesale expropriation and dekulakization.

            The methods of “’soft terror’” are employed, but to the same ends: the isolation and ultimate nullification of those the regime objects to.  And this process now is much more severe than it was during Brezhnevite stagnation, Rubtsov argues.  Indeed, one can only call it “Stalinist.”

            “History is like a pendulum,” the commentator continues. “Under Stalin, the class struggle sharped; the enemy was everywhere. In the period of ‘stagnation,’ on the contrary, the internal enemy became ‘ideologically non-existent,’ and prison was replaced by punitive psychiatry with the deportation” of the especially recalcitrant.

            Now under Putin, “the domestic enemy is growing more active with each new victory of ours in the world. Therefore, a new political geography has been established. The state border has been imposed within the country: the opponents of the regime are ‘deported’ politically and broadcast as it were from beyond that border.”

            Putin moreover is “re-Stalinizing branch by branch.” The regime is increasingly hostile to science, art and culture. “The authorities have always viewed scholars as suspicious ‘specialists,’ but now they threaten the scientific community as a class. The professions are being neutralized and people will say: Putin received a Russia with a hydrogen bomb and left it without an academy and without science. [stress added] The same is true for artists and cultural figures.

            Putin’s siloviki “also are reviving traditional values” not in pursuit of blood as under Stalin but for money.  Reversing the events of two decades ago but recalling Stalin’s destruction of NEP, they are dragging back into the state sector all that was productive when it was in the private o

            There has been a similar return to Stalinism as far as the relationship between domestic and foreign policy is concerned, Rubtsov says. “In personalist regimes, foreign policy is subordinate to the main goal of the consolidation and strengthening of personal power.” Anything that doesn’t do that is quickly jettisoned.

            The big difference here, the commentator continues, is that “now the status of power and the meaning of ‘influence’ are much closer to ritual symbolism and the simulacra of propaganda” than to actual events and real power.

            And this pattern highlights something else, Rubtsov argues. If one examines the situation case by case, Russia under Putin is closer to Brezhnevite stagnation than to Stalinism; but if one considers the direction in which things are moving, then “the vector is closer to Stalinism” than to that of Leonid Brezhnev.

            But this is “not the most evil irony: the lightened version of Stalinism in a number of regards is turning out to be freer and softer even than in comparison with the era of the 20th Congress. At least so far.” But if things continue in the direction the Kremlin leader has indicated, that will not long remain the case.
  
          “Putin needs a dictatorship to prepare for war with America just as Stalin did for the preparation of war with Germany.” The model must be repeated step by step in its latest incarnation. That requires moral re-Stalinization and making the original model more attractive in the eyes of the population.

Will New US Sanctions Regime Finally Hit Putin and Those Closest to Him?



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 2 – Western sanctions on Russia up to now have hit the ordinary people of that country, although not as hard as the countersanctions the Kremlin itself has imposed. But the Western actions have done less to affect those closest to Vladimir Putin who, unlike the Russian people, may be in a position to demand he change course or even leave office.

            The Western sanctions regime in response to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has been based on the assumption that if his people suffer, he will change his position. But Putin cares very little about the suffering of his people – indeed, he has hurt them far more by his counter-sanctions than the original sanctions did.

            Moreover, as ever more polls show, Russians even though they have been impoverished at least in  part by the sanctions/counter-sanctions combination are adapting to their new reduced circumstances and at least as ready as they were earlier to support Putin and his regime (znak.com/2017-08-02/eksperty_konstatiruyut_chto_rossiyane_privykli_k_krizisu_i_stali_bolee_dovolnymi).

                The sanctions regime to date did not hit Putin’s core supporters: the oligarchs and the super-rich whose position his regime has made possible. Indeed, new information shows that Russia’s billionaires became significantly richer in the first half of this year (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=598172C1AD868).

                The new US sanctions law that President Donald Trump signed into law today promises to change that because it calls for investigations in the wealth and holdings of Russia’s wealthiest, something that would be at least a nuisance and in the view of some would strike at Putin “personally” (nv.ua/opinion/piontkovskiy/kak-sanktsii-ssha-udarjat-lichno-po-putinu-1583825.html).

                That, of course, assumes that the measure will be implemented as its backers intended, but Trump has been anything but enthusiastic about a law that ties his hands and makes it far more difficult to achieve the rapprochement with Russia that he suggested during his campaign he wanted to pursue.

                And thus it should surprise no one that some lawyers and businessmen are already discovering “loopholes” in the law that might be used to allow individuals or corporations to escape what the authors of the measure appear to have intended, as Russia’s RBC news agency reports today (rbc.ru/economics/02/08/2017/5980a5289a794754fb147bc2).

                It analysts point out that the new law has a provision that wasn’t in the original draft. That provision provides that the government can issue “routine” licenses to companies to do business with Russia if that “does not introduce essential change in the policy” of the US toward Russia.

            RBC cites US lawyers as saying that this change “leaves to the president real freedom to issue license which permit actions which otherwise would be subject to punishment” and that the measure does not provide any means for those who object to any such grants to appeal them except via the federal courts.

            That in turn means that the Trump Administration could issue licenses under this law which would allow certain Russian figures to fly under the provisions of the act in their dealings with the United States and thus feel less pressure from the new measure than many now are assuming.