Friday, August 4, 2017

Putin Doesn’t Understand All Regimes Aren’t Like His – and No One in the Kremlin Will Tell Him, Malashenko Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 4 – “Vladimir Putin and his entourage confuse Russian-American relations with Putin-Trump relations,” Aleksey Malashenko says, because the Russian president assumes that all leaders have the power to do what they want as he does – and no one in the Kremlin can or will tell him otherwise.

            In an interview with Kazan’s Business-Gazeta, the Moscow commentator says that Putin “apparently considers that all states are the same and that everywhere there is a chief who does what he wants in the same way [the Kremlin leader] himself does in Russia” (business-gazeta.ru/article/353496).

            In Putin’s view, Malashenko continues, “it is sufficient [for him] to speak with Trump and everything will be decided. But he completely fails to consider that in the US there is an entirely different political system, and although Trump can decide about a great deal, all the same, he can’t decide everything.”

            If one enters into “Putin’s logic,” everything becomes clear. Putin “hasn’t gone beyond the limits of his worldview. This recalls an episode during Khrushchev’s visit to the US in the 1950s.  Some women stood on the path of his motorcade with a sign condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary.”

            “Khrushchev got angry and accused Eisenhower that he had put her up to this,” but the US president replied that “there is freedom in America. Khrushchev didn’t believe that but noted that such hokes would have been impossible without his permission.”  Putin “lives in his own world, [and] each of our politicians is gradually beginning to live” in isolation as well.

            Obviously, there must be people in the Kremlin who do understand, Malashenko says; but what is striking is that “those who are in Putin’s entourage cannot explain this to him or are afraid or do not want to,” given that Putin “loves to have one-on-one meetings with foreign leaders.

            He does not understand that in other countries, leaders and their staffs view these meetings as just part of the normal course of business rather than something always more significant than that. Moreover, they do not view the expulsion of diplomats as something nearly as important as Putin appears to believe.

            According to Malashenko, Putin does not have a lot of good options to respond to US sanctions not only because Russia is relatively weaker – indeed it is strong only in military terms and really only in nuclear ones – but also because Russia is not the Soviet Union. Its population will not tolerate things that the Soviet people did.

            But in several respects, Putin even benefits from the latest round of sanctions. On the one hand, he can use them to justify cutting back spending on various domestic projects and blame the West for that.  And on the other, he can play up divisions between the US and the Europeans, something he is already doing.

            Because of this imbalance and because the Russia of today is not that of the 1990s, relations between the US and Russia are at the lowest point since the Korean war, Malashenko says. “Even the [Cuban missile] crisis was not so critical.” Moreover, the specific nature of Donald Trump and the still unresolved impact of the collapse of the USSR add to this mix.

            Nonetheless, the Moscow analyst says, relations between the two countries have bounced back before; and one can hope that they will again.

Russians Fencing Themselves Off from the West and from Each Other, Commentators Say



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 4 – Russia is fast becoming “a land of fences” in which “the unpredictability of the authorities, the stratification of society, and the absence of any defense of private property is making people ever more cautious and closed off from one another,” according to five Russian observers with whom the Rosbalt news agency spoke.

            This walling off, the agency’s Tatyana Khruleva says, is both “physical and mental.” As soon as an individual has sufficient money, he will “begin to erect ‘walls’ … between himself and those who stand lower on the social latter. And some of them even break away from the entire country by choosing to emigrate” (rosbalt.ru/russia/2017/08/03/1635879.html).

            Philosopher Maksim Goryunov argues that people shut themselves off from others because they “do not trust the space in which [they] are situated. If I feel that it is aggressive and dangerous … I will seize a tiny bit of land and establish there my own zone of security and comfort.”

            In one sense, he continues, “these Russian fences are like the Dutch dams.” The Dutch seized land from the sea; and Russians are seizing territory “meter by meter from the surrounding environment which toward them is extremely aggressive,” not only environmentally but socially and politically.

            Because the common space is so “uncomfortable,” Goryunov says, “Russians as quickly as possible seek to return to their yard where everything is rational and in order.” It is of course possible that the surrounding space will become more orderly and then people won’t need such fences, but “certainly this will not be in our time.”

            Petr Bychkov, a political psychologist at St. Petersburg State University, points out that wealthy people in all countries try to separate themselves from others “but all the same not to the degree they are doing so in present-day Russia.” The country’s “difficult history” has made progress in this regard much slower.

            In Russia, he says, “the process of enrichment as a rule takes place very rapidly: if yesterday an individual was nothing, then today he may be in a position to avoid a 1.5 million US dollar house with an enormous fence.” And he may want to have that fence because he is aware that he could lose everything overnight.

            This also explains why Russians are so reluctant to invest in their own country, Bychkov says. But he adds that “the Asiatic mentality” of Russians is also at work. As Nicholas Berdyaev noted, Russians combine in themselves “an insane submissiveness and faith in God with an unrestrained propensity to revolt and atheism.”

            On the one hand, he continues, “we speak about the need to strive to democracy so that every voice will be heard.” But on the other, “the Asiatic mentality dictates that power must be untouchable.” This unstable combination leads to the desire to “close oneself off” from everyone else in at least a small space.

            And there is an additional factor at work: “Even if an individual earned his wealth absolutely honestly, if he is surrounded by poverty and devastation, he of course will close himself off” for self-protection.  Thus, the cause for fences and walls is “not in people as such bt in the conditions in which they are forced to live.”

            Political scientist Grigory Golosov says that Russia is in this regard in fact quite typical of other countries with poor but rapidly developing economies.  Until the level of interpersonal trust rises as it has in Western countries, people who gain any additional wealth feel threatened by those around them. 

            For things to change, he argues, Russia must reduce social and economic inequality and come up with reliable measures for the protection of private property, something the country as of yet lacks.

            Aleksandr Konfisakhor, a political psychologist, says that it is universally true that wealthy people seek to separate themselves off from others, although they usually do it by the selection of the places they go rather than by erecting walls.  In Russia, however, they prefer walls and fences because “no one feels himself secure” physically or economically.

            “Unfortunately,” he adds, “I do not think that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant changes for the better. Russians have a completely different psychological type: we never seek to bring others up to our level. On the contrary, it is the norm to show that you are rich and successful” compared to these others.

            And Sergey Shelin, Rosbalt’s observer, says that “the striving to separate oneself from everything around is completely natural in our unnatural circumstances.”  Fences and walls provide a certain sense of protection from a broader world in which there is no such sense available.

            He suggests that the reason for this does not lie in the authoritarian system alone. “An authoritarian order is all the same order. It forces all including bureaucrats and policemen to live within certain frameworks. But we do not have such frameworks,” and instead, we build fences and walls.

            “One sociologist quite usefully called our regime ‘a state of the bosses,’” one in which the bosses do what they want” within the limits of their particular possibilities.  That worked when resources were large but as resources are becoming ever more restricted, each of them feels himself to be a potential target from whom everything could be taken.

            And Shelin concludes: “Many of those who know partially or completely are leaving Russia are hardly critics of the political regime, they aren’t poor, and they aren’t people who have suffered a career collapse. They simply find things here ever less comfortable and more horrific.”

            “Such a system is our know-how,” the observer says. “That is how we distinguish ourselves from a large part of the world, and it is a system where changes for the better simply aren’t anticipated.”

Putin’s Health Care Optimization Sends Russian Mortality Rate Higher, Economics Ministry Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 4 – Yesterday, a remarkable thing happened. Russia’s economic development ministry explained the rise in mortality rates in Russia by pointing to the consequences of the cutbacks in health care there that have been imposed by what Vladimir Putin euphemistically calls health care “optimization.” 

            To explain the five percent rise instead of the planned decrease in mortality rates among Russians, the ministry in a 105-page report pointed to precisely the changes in Russian health care that have occurred because of the significant cutbacks in funding and closing of facilities Putin has sponsored (government.ru/media/files/i0d1XvJka1R0C7eEgp2p5nHHhbnHyVH8.pdf).

            Specifically, it said that “in connection with the low rates of activity of the primary link of health care in the early diagnosis and treatment … the delayed hospitalization of patients with serious problems … [and] the untimely appeal of the population for medical help, an increase in the category ‘deaths from all causes’ (per 1000 population)” rose from 12.3 to 12.9.

            In calling attention to this, the Newsru agency says that Rosstat had recently released statistics which suggest that the mortality rate will be even higher this year. During the first five months of 2017, 111,800 Russians died, more than twice as many as did in the analogous period of 2016 when 41,600 did (classic.newsru.com/russia/03aug2017/mortality.html).

            The news agency also recalls that in January, Russia’s health ministry said that it was revising its projected mortality rate figures upward and its life expectancy projections downward for the year ahead (classic.newsru.com/russia/26jan2017/unhealthyministry.html), thus directly contradicting Vladimir Putin’s recent upbeat statements.

            And the outlet also notes that the Health Foundation just a few months earlier drew a direction connection between the rise in mortality rates in Russia and reductions in the number of hospitals and hospital beds available to the population, again challenging the Kremlin’s  claims in that regard (classic.newsru.com/russia/21oct2016/stat.html).