Saturday, May 1, 2021

Kremlin Foolishly Gave Navalny a Platform and He Used It Effectively, ‘SerpomPo’ Telegram Channel Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – Russia has a long and distinguished history in which defendants have exploited their appearance in court to speak not so much to the judges and juries as to the nation, a pattern that has convinced most Russian rulers that it is the better part of wisdom not to give them that opportunity.

            But today’s “stupid Russian powers,” the SerpomPo says, are giving imprisoned opposition leader Aleksey Navalny precisely that opportunity; and because the Kremlin appears to be planning to bring even more charges against him in the future, it appears likely that Navalny will have many more such chances (t.me/SerpomPo/9811).

            “An intelligent power would do everything so that people would forget about its political opponent,” the channel continues. But “a stupid one thinks up ever new occasions in order to remind people about him and give him a tribune from which to speak.” That’s good news for him, for his supporters and for Russia, but it is anything but good for Putin and his regime.

            Here is what Navalny said to the court this time (znak.com/2021-04-29/sud_otklonil_apellyaciyu_navalnogo_po_delu_o_klevete_na_veterana). It won’t be forgotten not only by the Russian people but by their increasingly repressive government.

            “I want to say, my dear judge, that your king has no clothes, and already it isn’t just one young boy shouting about this but millions of people. Twenty years of incompetent rule have led to this: the crown is slipping from his ears and his lies are on television. We have spent trillions of rubles but out country continues to slide into poverty.

            “It shouldn’t surprise anyone that economists say that one must call the last years, the lost decades. I sit in a prison colony in an oblast center in Vladimir, 200 kilometers from Moscow, with not one good road and with people earning 30,000 rubles (400 US dollars) a month even though this is the 21st century.

            “Your naked king wants to rule to the end. He has seized ever more power and wants to rule without any limit. If that happens, the lost decade will be replaced by a stolen decade.

            “The naked king realizes he can’t do anything about this and frantically seeks for something smacking of holiness to appropriate and steal. He does this with the victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. He seeks to take ownership of this and trades on it right and left.

            “That’s what this case is about: it is about how your naked king stole the banner of Victory and tries to make it into a thong for himself. But in fact, all your power is the power of those very occupiers and traitors. Indeed, you are all traitors. You together with the naked king are carrying out a plan to seize Russia and turn Russians into slaves from which all their wealth and prospects will be taken.

            “You have been implementing this plan. And as a result, our population is shrinking by the millions. {Turning to the judge, Navalny says] Stop interrupting me. What I am saying is what this case is all about. [And you must remember, he continues] No matter how hard you try to steal the Victory from the people, you will not succeed.

            “Your honor, stop interrupting me. I know why you are doing this: you know that all of this is true and that my words in fact are remarkably kind considering that you are traitors and an occupying power. Your occupation administration has been quite successful because you have been robbing our people of what is rightfully theirs for 30 years.

            “That’s all I wanted to say!”

Kremlin’s Mishandling of 20 Million Contract Employees May Lead Them to Protest, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – “A new class of the dissatisfied” is arising in Russia, the contract employees or self-employed who are discovering that their status may be helping businesses to profit by cutting their tax burdens but that the people in this status are going to be left with only the smallest of pensions or none at all, Yekaterina Lazareva says.

            The URA news agency journalist spoke with Sergey Khramov, the general inspector of the Union of Trade Unions in Russia about this. He says his organization has already received thousands of complaints from those businesses have forced off the payroll into the status of contractors (ura.news/articles/1036282262).

            Businesses give such people a choice: either “accept the new conditions,” a higher salary but without benefits like vacations and medical insurance “or lose their jobs.” The higher salaries attract many to begin with, but the lack of basic social supports rapidly turns them against this system, one that has been promoted by the Kremlin since 2019.

            Other experts with whom Lazareva spoke, including Moscow analyst Mikhail Delyagin, economist Vasily Koltashov, and commentator Konstantin Kalachev, agree that this is a problem, although the last argues that the protests among the roughly 20 million of these people are likely to be social rather than political.

            They point out that firms benefit from the contractor system, regional governments aren’t suffering immensely from the lack of contributions from the self-employed, and the Kremlin has even made the number of such people “one of its criteria of the effectiveness of governors.” The more contract workers there are, the higher the governors’ ratings.

            Out of this mix of motives, the contract workers are likely to be the big losers; and as they recognize this, they are likely to take to the streets, adding their number to the protesters who are already there. 

Kremlin Faces Far Larger Opposition Now than in Soviet Times and More Often Uses the Courts for Vengeance, Zolotukhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – There are two fundamental differences between repressions in the last decades of Soviet power and those now, Boris Zolotukhin says. In Soviet times, the powers were confronted by only a handful of people; now, they are openly opposed by hundreds of thousands. And in Soviet times, repression was driven by ideology; now, it is often used for personal vengeance.

            Zolotukhin rose to prominence for defending Soviet dissidents in court when he could and behind the scenes when  he had to, something he was forced to do after the Soviet authorities expelled him from the official legal profession for speaking on behalf of the those who protested the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/04/28/potrebnost-poseiat-strakh-a-zakon-orudie-lichnoi-mesti).

            In his view, the senior defense attorney says, “the basic distinction of that time from now is that the current instruments of persecution of protesters hare arisen as a result of the scope of the protest movement in Russia and the tasks of the powers that be in their struggle with it.”

            In the 1960s and 1970s, the dissidents were “a small group.” As a result, the authorities did not have to worry about repressing large numbers of people. “Today, the number of demonstrators can reach hundreds of thousands, and there is a great need to sow fear among the population.”

            The Russian authorities now are seeking to achieve this by the only possible way, “massive repressions, including the conviction of the innocent.” The range of punitive measures today is thus far “wider” than was the case at the end of Soviet times, Zolotukhin continues.

            “In the USSR until 1966, the main weapon for persecution those who thought differently was primarily Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code which banned ‘anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation.’” Charging dissidents with this required that prosecutors show they were trying to undermine or weaken Soviet power.

            But the dissidents of that time made clear that this was not their goal. “They only insisted on the observation of laws, the Soviet constitution and human rights. Their slogan was brilliantly simple: ‘Observe your own Constitution.’” They thus got support not only from Western human rights activists and governments but also from communist parties in the West.

            The protests of those parties played a role in forcing the Soviet powers that be to adopt a new paragraph of the criminal code, Article 190-1 in 1966 which called for punishing “the dissemination of intentionally false and slanderous information shaming Soviet statehood and the social order.”

            As a result, Soviet prosecutors could charge and convict dissidents without having to show that they were undermining and weakening Soviet power, Zolotukhin says. “At the same time, repressive measures were softened by the use of exile,” an option not readily available to the Kremlin now given the numbers of people taking part in protests.

            The defense attorney says that another “distinctive feature” of Russian repression now is “the use of criminal repressions against personal opponents,” something that further degrades the law and the courts by reducing investigations and trials “into instruments of personal revenge,” a trend that only contributes to the further growth of protest.

‘Return of Former Russian Lands as Moscow’s Protectorates Only Matter of Time,’ RUSSTRAT Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – “The return of former Russian lands as protectorates of Moscow is a question of time,” according to the RUSSTRAT Institute of International Political and Economic Strategy. Russian businesses need new markets, and the geopolitical influence of the US is “slowly but steadily declining.”

            At the same time, the new RUSSTRAT report says, “current realities do not allow the direct application of the experience of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.” Instead, “an absolutely new approach is needed” (russtrat.ru/analytics/26-aprelya-2021-0018-3992 and iarex.ru/news/80780.html).

            “All former post-Soviet republics are experiencing at the present time a most difficult socio-economic situation.” The Baltic countries have already lost a third of their population, and their economies are in deep recession because Russia has shifted its trade from their ports to Russian ones.

            Ukrainian industry is in trouble, and only Belarus is an island of stability, although in Minsk, mounting problems with the government mean that the situation there will not get worse only if Moscow continues its aid, something that requires the closer integration or even complete union of that country with Russia.

            “Already now,” RUSSTRAT continues, “Russian military, industrial and political power exceeds by many times over that of the post-Soviet borderlands, [and] if the situation isn’t changed, then already ten to twenty years from now, the former republics will shift from being marginal countries to ‘a wild field.’”

. The analytic center is “confident” that the only hope these countries have is “a strategic partnership with Moscow” and that the United States for its own reasons is likely to agree “with such a development of events.”  The US wants to focus on environmental issues and so it is ready “in exchange” to give Moscow control over “the post-USSR.”

That outcome was demonstrated, RUSSTRAT says, by Washington’s haste in seeking a meeting with Putin after Moscow deployed massive force on the border with Ukraine.

            In the wake of that development, the Kremlin must analyze the situation in all the former Soviet republics in order to decide where to move next. Moscow could decide to target Armenia, Belarus or “Ukrainian Novorossiya.” But as soon as it does so and takes action, the rest of the space will fall into Moscow’s orbit “quite quickly.”

 

Infections in Moscow Rise Sharply, Sparking Widespread Fear Despite Improvement Beyond Ring Road

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – Over the last 24 hours, registered coronavirus infections in the Russian capital rose dramatically even though the figures for the rest of the country have remained relatively stable or have even fallen, sparking fears among officials and the population of a new wave of the pandemic

            On the one hand, such fears are entirely justified. In the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, Moscow led the way in infections and if numbers there are rising again, there is good reason for concern that the situation now could repeat that past. But on the other, these fears reflect the Moscow-centric way of thinking that affects Russian officials.

            When Moscow is doing well and the rest of the country is falling behind economically or any other way, those in the center and many foreign observers who seldom look beyond the ring road assume everything is fine. When the reverse is true and Moscow is doing badly, such people assume that all of Russia is doing badly even when that is not the case.

            Today, Russian officials reported registering 9284 new cases of infection and 364 new deaths from the coronavirus over the last 24 hours. All of the increase from the day before came in Moscow where the number of infections jumped to more than 3200 for the first time in months. Elsewhere increases were matched by decreases (t.me/COVID2019_official/2862 and vtimes.io/2021/04/29/v-moskve-chislo-zabolevshih-kovidom-za-sutki-previsilo-3000-vpervie-s-yanvarya-a4779).

            The pandemic continues to ebb and flow across Russia, with some regions increasing restrictions in advance of Russian Easter and the May holidays and others reducing them or eliminating them altogether (regnum.ru/news/society/3250801.html,  regnum.ru/news/3256817.html  and regnum.ru/news/3256512.html).

            A new poll finds that half of all Russians believe the places where they work are doing a good job in defending them against infections (regnum.ru/news/3256843.html), but anecdotal reporting suggests that many children are suffering from misapplied masks and other limitations being used incorrectly (https://ura.news/articles/1036282234).

            A majority of Russians believe that vaccination is an effective means of fighting the coronavirus, but many are choosing not to get the shots out of fear, ignorance or a belief that the government isn’t telling them the truth (regnum.ru/news/3256892.html, regnum.ru/news/3256917.html and iarex.ru/articles/80771.html).

            Others who want the shots can’t get them because of logistical problems. Regional officials are trying to overcome this problem by offering rewards to those who get vaccinated (regnum.ru/news/3256517.html).

But one analyst says that the whole problem can be solved if Moscow declares there is a shortage of vaccine. In that event, Aleksey Firsov says, all Russians will want to get it because they will see it as forbidden fruit which by its very nature must be “sweeter” (regnum.ru/news/3256954.html).

On the economic front, two-thirds of Russians say they plan to improve their skills or even acquires ones that will allow them to change jobs after the pandemic is over (bcg.com/publications/2021/decoding-global-trends-reskilling-career-paths).

Meanwhile, in other pandemic-related developments in Russia today,

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he had no knowledge of any plans to extend the already-lengthened May holidays further even though some federal subjects are doing so to allow for religious holidays (regnum.ru/news/3257138.html).

The health ministry said that the share of Russians who are maintaining a healthy way of life has fallen dramatically since the beginning of the pandemic. They are eating less well, drinking more, and exercising less (https://regnum.ru/news/society/3250801.html).

Friday, April 30, 2021

Passion for Uniforms among Officials Outward Manifestation of Putin’s Chekistocracy, Petrov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – Ever more officials are putting on uniforms to stress their loyalty to the state and its core structure, the FSB, Nikolay Petrov says in an interview during which he argues that Vladimir Putin has not created a militarized state as some assume but rather “a chekistocracy” in which uniforms too matter.

            Uniforms not only set officials apart from everyone else but reflect the ranks within the bureaucracy so that those who wear them and those who see those in uniform will now how close to the center of power, Vladimir Putin and his chekists, the bearer actually is, the Higher School of Economics researcher says (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/04/28/voiti-dvazhdy-v-odnu-i-tu-zhe-chk).

            Uniforms, he continues, is only “an external manifestation” of this system; “but there is its internal essence and that is more serious. When the economy is stagnating, attachment to the state and state financing and budget flows means one is relatively well off. Therefore, every agency seeks to stress how important its role is by “such semi-military categories.”

            Petrov says that it is “no accident that the word ‘siloviki’ is one of the ones which our great and powerful Russian language has given to the world.” But it is a mistake to think the siloviki have taken power because they are controlled from top to bottom by the FSB and its branch agencies, that is by the chekists.

            When Putin came to power, he relied on two groups: former KGB officers with whom he had served and the St. Petersburg city administration where he had worked. When the numbers of the latter thinned, he turned increasingly to the former, a ramified corporation which proved capable of filling all necessary positions to ensure his power.

            “Today,” Petrov continues, “we have two mega-verticals: one, as in Soviet times, the chekist, and the other, the Presidential Administration and the structures subordinate to it.” But unlike in Soviet times when the KGB and the CPSU were competitors, now, the FSB controls the Presidential vertical. It itself is beyond any outside control, barring intervention by Putin.

            Today, the FSB has subordinated to itself all the siloviki; and its view of the world, one in which the intelligence agencies of other countries behave as it does, has serious consequences. It means that its denizens really believe that the CIA can do anything. And that makes charges now against Russians as “foreign agents” something “far beyond a figure of speech.”

            For those with this mindset, it means exactly what it says, Petrov stresses.

            In today’s Russia, “the FSB has such status that if it says that someone is a murderer, then any court, regardless of any circumstance, will agree with this” because the FSB is in a position to define what is the national interest and making such a charge means that it is in “the state’s interest” and must be obeyed.

            Before 2014, it may have been reasonable to speak of liberals and hawks within the FSB and its tentacles. But now, the liberals have been sidelined in no small measure because in the 1990s, they “acted like Bolsheviks.” That is, they considered that the more freedom of action they had the better, and others have taken that same position and moved forward.

            Of course, the Chekists in Russia are far from perfect and have given Putin many reasons for being upset with them. He has even been disappointed in his inability to use them for “the resolution of complicated tasks. But they have coped with the task of preserving his power.” And as a result, “today, they are the main pillar of the regime.”

Threat of Major Russian Military Operation against Ukraine and West hasn’t Disappeared, Felgengauer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 28 – Despite Russia’s much ballyhooed withdrawal of its land forces from the Ukrainian border, the threat of a major Russian military operation against Ukraine and the West more broadly has not disappeared, Pavel Felgengauer says. Not only can the troops quickly be turned around, but Russian naval and air power is still in position for an attack.

            In an interview taken by Rosbalt journalist Aleksandr Zhelenin, the independent Moscow military analyst says that not only is there a continuing threat against Ukraine but there is also a very real danger that any Russian military actions there could lead to a broader war between Moscow and NATO countries (rosbalt.ru/world/2021/04/28/1899640.html).

            Indeed, Felgengauer continues, recent statements by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggest that Moscow blames the West for Ukraine’s standing up to Moscow and therefore part of the problem any new aggression against Ukraine would be designed to eliminate.

            Many who see Russia’s withdrawal of forces from near the Ukrainian border as a turning point forget, the military analyst says, that Moscow did exactly the same thing in 2008 in the North Caucasus. It staged exercises, withdrew its troops a short distance, and then turned them around to invade Georgia.

            Felgengauer says he is not in a position to give probabilities about a new war but in his view, “the most dangerous” time during which such a war could begin will be “the second half of May.” If NATO backs Ukraine and Russia attacks NATO aircraft or ships, there is a chance that there could be “an escalation all the way up to nuclear war.”

            Both the buildup in Russian naval forces in occupied Crimea and in the Black Sea suggest that part of such a Rusisan offensive would be a landing operation near Odessa and Mykolaev. Even without reinforcements, Moscow has the capacity to land some 10,000 marines in this location.

            But as large a force as that is, he continues, the major line of Russian attack will be from the north, from Belgorod, Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts in order to exploit what Moscow sees as weaknesses in Ukraine’s right flank. The Russian military can send in three armies along that axis, two or which are guards’ units.

            Their task will be to “surround on three sides and then destroy the Ukrainian army,” an action that recalls what happened in the Ilovaysk district in 2014 but at a much larger scale. The Ukrainian army is better prepared than it was seven years ago, but it is “not very prepared for the mobile war” the Russians have planned.

            Felgengauer concludes by repeating that “the threat of war seems to [him] very serious. However, at any stage of the conflict its de-escalation via direct negotiations is possible. Nobody seriously wants to cross the nuclear threshold.”