Monday, May 3, 2021

Putin Failed to Achieve His Three Goals in Ukraine Because He’s Not Ready to Launch a Major War, Polish Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Moscow’s open movement of forces toward the Ukrainian border this spring was intended to achieve three goals, but because it was never intended as the beginning of a thrust that would lead to a major war between Russia and the West, Vladimir Putin failed to achieve any of his three goals regarding Ukraine this time around, Jerzy Targalski says.  

            In 2014, Putin used stealth to advance Russian forces toward and into Ukrainian territory; but this time, the Polish defense analyst says, he flaunted what he was doing in the expectation that such a display of force would be sufficient to achieve his goals. It wasn’t and he didn’t (polskieradio.pl/397/7836/Artykul/2725777,Политолог-об-эскалации-ситуации-на-границе-с-Украиной-Путин-проиграл-на-всех-фронтах).

            First of all, Putin wanted to use his actions as a test of the new US president and to find out whether Joe Biden would support Ukraine or cave. Washington didn’t cave. In fact, Biden’s proposal for a meeting with Putin, while the Kremlin leader may have welcomed it at one level, worked very much against Russia’s plans.

            It significantly strengthened the position of Ukraine, Targalski says, because it meant that talks about Ukraine were going to involve the US and the UK facing off against Russia rather than France and Germany who would likely be more willing to compromise with whatever Moscow wants.

            Second, Putin wanted to force Kyiv to agree to the Steinmeyer plan for elections in the Donbass. Such elections, in which Russian citizens would vote and the OSCE would supervise, would in Putin’s plan lead to the reincorporation of the Donbass into Ukraine but as an entity more loyal to and controlled by Moscow.

            That would have weakened Ukraine beyond recognition. And because his bluff didn’t work and the Americans didn’t back down, Kyiv continues to refuse to consider such an arrangement, a second defeat for the Kremlin in this round, the Polish security and defense analyst continues.

            And third, Putin had as his goal the sowing of fear and panic among Ukrainians in the hope that they would force Kyiv to accept Moscow’s conditions in order to avoid a major war. But buoyed by Western support, the Ukrainians organized to resist so that Putin and his associates would know that any invasion would cost him dearly.

            “I consider,” Tagalski says, “that Putin lost on all three fronts.” Had Putin been prepared for a major war, he might have been willing to pay such a price. But it is clear that he “does not intend to set off a full-scale war now.” Hence when his bluff failed, he pulled back, yet another defeat but not one he planned for.

Putin Doesn’t Have a Grand Design, Pastukhov Says; Instead, He’s Reacting to Events and has Become Their Prisoner

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Many profess to see what the Putin regime is doing now as transformational, as a fundamental and planned shift from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, Vladimir Pastukhov says. But in fact, what is going on represents “a continuation of Putin policies of the past via new methods modified because of changed circumstances.”

            Putin and his leadership team do not think in grand “metaphysical” categories: they “simply resolve current problems within the framework of the logic to which they are accustomed.” They act in primitive ways, more reactive than creative and approach things directly rather than in a complex way (mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/politicheskij-lokdaun/).

            But precisely because they do not have a plan, the men in the Kremlin may discover that an action they have taken to address one problem may soon compel them to take more actions and that they will thereby create a trend which makes it look like they have a plan when in fact they are prisoners of events, Pastukhov continues.

            The present upsurge in repression arose from the events in Moscow in the summer of 2019 when the Kremlin felt that a second revolutionary wave was building. (The first ended in 2011-2013),” the London-based Russian analyst says. Since then, the situation developed with more repression leading to more protests leading to more repression.

            What the regime wants to do makes good sense from its perspective, he suggests. It wants to keep any revolutionary activity within acceptable limits and not allow it to grow to the point that it might set off a sustained chain reaction. How much repression it uses depends on the regime’s evaluation of the situation at each moment.

            According to Pastukhov, “the trigger for the paranormal outburst of repression now observed was an accidental chain of events which began with the risings in Minsk and continued with the hysterical attempt to kill Navalny” followed by the regime’s incarceration of him when he didn’t die but instead returned to Russia.”

            “But the presence of a trigger is not an all-embracing explanation.” For that one has to look elsewhere, and Pastukhov suggests that the Kremlin acted as it did because it had a ready-made model for behavior: the lockdown it imposed on Russians because of the coronavirus pandemic.

            “The idea of a lockdown as a universal means of struggle with any infection, including revolutionary ones, seemed to many in the Kremlin a productive one,” the analyst suggests. It represented “a specific Russian variant” of the slogan ‘stay home, be safe.’” And thus, “to interrupt the transmission of the revolution, it was decided to put society under quarantine.”

            The logic is compelling, but there is a problem: a lockdown against a virus ends when the virus dies out or people decide to ignore it. Those who impose a lockdown against a revolutionary infection can’t afford to ever let it end. Instead, they must employ more and more force to ensure that people stay home and stay safe.

            What that means is that the Kremlin almost certainly will apply ever more force not because it has a model of a totalitarian state it wants to build but because it has chosen a tactic that forces it to use ever more force at the risk of losing control of the situation, Pastukhov continues.

            At some point, something will happen that will destroy this lockdown and the regime with its repression will collapse remarkably quickly. Society won’t be sorry to see it go, but the process is going to involve much violence first by the state and then by both the state and society, and it is thus something best observed from a safe distance.

Putin’s New Repression Uniting Groups Never Allied Before

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – A powerful sign that Vladimir Putin’s new wave of repression is not working is that it is uniting groups that were never allies before, joining together in the first instance liberal protesters and the newly poor who long have been the Kremlin leader’s most reliable supporters and leading groups at odds to consider cooperation in resistance.

            If the regime is to survive, Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter says, it must change course or it will unite so many people against it that it will have created a situation like the one in Belarus where almost the entire population stands against the ruler if not yet the regime as a whole (newizv.ru/article/general/01-05-2021/yuliy-nisnevich-i-abbas-galyamov-chto-stoit-za-volnoy-repressiy-protiv-nedovolnyh).

            The best way for the Kremlin to avoid that disaster, the commentator continues, is to begin an operation to put a successor in place, remembering that if the individual chosen is not irretrievably unpopular, he or she will be able to gain support even from those who now oppose the regime as a whole.

            That will prevent the formation of a countrywide opposition that Russia’s force structures won’t be able to cope with because each of their incompetent applications of force will not lead to the universal intimidation they seek but rather further anger people and lead them to seek alliances with others who feel the same way about the regime.

            Prague-based regionalist writer Kharun Sidorov says that the linking up of liberals and the new poor, a unification of political and economic anger, is not the only thing that is going on. He points out that what has happened to Navalny and his staffs is not unprecedented. Moscow has done the same to others (idelreal.org/a/31225095.html).

And he suggests that while sometimes Moscow’s repression of this or that group has led to its fragmentation and disappearance, on other occasions, it has led to a new set of alliances. And he suggests that now the Free Russia Forum despite all its limitations may serve as “a united front of the banned.”

Achieving that won’t be easy or quick, but the stakes are now so high, Sidorov argues, that groups which often have looked askance at each other because of their differing views are likely to begin to consider that they had best cooperate under the principle that if they don’t hang together, they will hand separately. 

More Russians Now Fear Return to Mass Repression and Official Arbitrariness than at Any time Since 1994, Levada Center’s Gudkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, says his institution’s surveys show that 52 percent of Russians now fear a return to mass repressions and 58 percent are worried about growing arbitrariness by officials, figures that are currently both the highest since 1994.

            This rise, he tells Elena Polyakovskaya of RFI’s Russian Service, is a product both of the actions of Russian officials in response to protests and growing concerns about the current state of life in Russia and a loss of hope about the future (rfi.fr/ru/россия/20210501-страхи-как-реакция-общества-на-действия-власти-лев-гудков-об-исследовании-левада-центра).

            The level of fear is greater “among less educated, older and those living in the provinces,” Gudkov says, and especially those who depend “on federal television and the information which they receive from it.” At present, “television frightens people” by its constant talk of an international conspiracy against Russia.

            “The promotion of fear and the creation of enemies and conspiracies against Russia,” the sociologist continues, “raises all the complexes of a Soviet type which are more strongly manifested among elderly and less educated people who remain more firmly connected with Soviet culture and the Soviet past.”

            Moscow is promoting such fears because it leads such people to rally round the Kremlin in opposition to them, but “at the same time, in the subconsciousness” of the population, it is creating other feelings. Russians “very much respect force and the demonstration of force” but at the same time, these things elevate the level of fear people have as well.

            The level of fear now in Russia is least in Moscow “where the share of educated people is much greater. Among the working population of the capital, more than half consists of people with higher educations.” In the provinces, however, things remain much as they did in Soviet times regarding fears, phobias and so on. At least they are “much more strongly expressed.”

            There is no direct correlation between the pandemic and its economic consequences and these fears, Gudkov continues. They have far more to do with wars and the threat of wars as in the case of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine after 2014. Now people are worried about new threats of war and their fears about what that will lead to are going up as well.

             The Levada Center director says he expects these fears to remain at a high level at least for the next year because the powers have blocked the public space in which they could be critically examined and thus eased. Instead, Russians hear only the Kremlin’s suggestion that they live in a besieged fortress.

            And what that means is this: the Kremlin benefits from such fears but only up to a point. When the fears it promotes take possession of the Russian populace, at least some of its members in the absence of public discussion expand their fears from those the regime approves of to those it doesn’t – and in the first instance toward itself.

            That too works for the regime, Gudkov concludes, but again only up to a point and only for so long. 

           

Patriarch Kirill Warns Against Tyranny in Russia, Recalls He was Asked to Be a Political Leader

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – This week, Patriarch Kirill who has been much criticized for his typically slavish following of the Kremlin’s dictates made two remarkable statements: he warned against a shift to tyranny among leaders of all kinds in Russia, and he recalled that 30 years ago, some deputies asked him to become a political leader.

            On his program, The Word of the Pastor, on Moscow’s First Channel television network, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church warned against the temptation among leaders, political, civil, and religious, at all levels in Russia and elsewhere to behave in a tyrannical way (1tv.ru/shows/slovo-pastyrya).

            “The exercise of directing functions, which sometimes requires among other things placing limits on the freedom of others cannot be accompanied by personal pride and self-exaltation.” If that happens, the church hierarch says, “then power becomes tyranny.”

            On the same program, Kirill said that the church must not take part in political struggles because in such a case, it risks “losing its authority and becoming a divisive force among the people.” That softened his remark less than a week ago that in the early 1990s, various Russian deputies asked him to “head the opposition” in Russia (ura.news/news/1052482331).

            Russians aren’t used to hearing such arguments from the Moscow patrairchate’s leaders. And not surprisingly, Kirill’s words have sparked speculation as to what is going on. Andrey Nesmiyan, who blogs under the screen name El Murid, provides one of the most thoughtful of the initial reactions (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=608E2E485BC13).

            He argues that whatever ideological message Kirill appears to be sending, the churchman’s words in fact reflect a deeply held set of practical considerations. The patriarch fears that the redivision of property now going on in Russia among the competing groups around the Kremlin may soon touch the church, one of the largest property owners in Russia.

            Because the economy isn’t growing, these groups can defend themselves and increase their incomes only by “expropriating the expropriators,” and at least some of them who don’t believe in God or have any moral scruples are now greedily eyeing church property. Kirill wants to prevent them from doing so by suggesting such property grabs open the way to tyranny.

            Nesmiyan is almost certainly right that this explains why Kirill has spoken out this past week as he has, but that doesn’t mean that the powers that be in the Kremlin or the Russian people will limit their reading of his remarks to what caused Kirill to make them. And to the extent that either views them more broadly, that will have serious consequences.

            If the Kremlin decides that Kirill is showing too much independence of mind and even threatening the regime’s single power vertical, it will likely take actions to put him in his place. But if lower-ranking priests and the population view his words as really being against tyranny, that may make it far easier for Russians to support the opposition to Putin’s authoritarianism.

Kazakhstan De-Russifying in Two Ways, Observers Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Kazakhstan is de-Russifying in two ways, only one of which has attracted much attention. Russians have been leaving that Central Asian countries in enormous numbers opening the way for Kazakhs to become the predominant nation in a republic where until a little over a generation ago they did not have a plurality.

            But at the same time, and in a development that may have more profound implications, the ethnic Russians who remain in Kazakhstan are changing. They are no longer “Russian Russians,” some Moscow observers say. They have become “Kazakh Russians,” a distinctive group which sees itself as different from Russians elsewhere.

            On the one hand, that suggests that in Kazakhstan today, the Kazakhs rather than the Russians are increasingly influential in determining the values of the Russians, a pattern that may be greater there than in many other post-Soviet states but is found elsewhere and that suggests the linguistic-based identity Putin has been counting on may be far weaker than he imagines.

            And on the other, and equally important, this means that Kazakhstan is on its way to becoming ever more Kazakh and less Russian not just because there are fewer Russians but because the Russians who remain, converging as they are on Kazakh values, are not exercising the integrating power they did as recently as a generation ago.

            Petr Svoyk, a Kazakhstan economist, says that on the basis of his own experience he can say that Russians in Kazakhstan remain somewhat Soviet and somewhat Russian but that “ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan are not Russian Russians but already Kazakh Russians” (pravda.ru/world/1614473-russkie_v_kazakhstane/).

            His own family, he says, consists of Kazakhs as well as Russians, adding that he himself having spent so long living among Kazakhs is both a Kazakh and a Russian. Language isn’t the dividing line because Kazakhs speak Russian, but the two cultures are converging with Russians now becoming more like Kazakhs just as Kazakhs in the past became more like Russians.

            There are ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan who insist that they are only Russians, but the number who recognize that they are Kazakh Russians is rising. For them, that identity rather than a narrowly ethnic identity is the future, Svoyk says.  For most, however, they are part of a country which “lives in two worlds.”

            “We have remained a product of the Soviet system: it hasn’t disappeared. Perhaps it is not always visible, but we remain part of it.” At the same time, “we are part of the Western economy and we would not want a return to the past.” Hence the drive to change the alphabet so as to set ourselves apart.

            And this means something else, he says. Even those in Kazakhstan who are oriented toward Russia have as their hero “not Putin but Navalny.” They don’t want to go back to what was as the current Kremlin leader seems to but rather to move toward the future. Fortunately, those who feel that way and those who don’t aren’t in particular conflict.

            “We are no Ukraine, thank God,” Svoyk says.

            A second article in the Moscow media this week makes a similar point but from a different direction. Writing in Vzglyad, Natalya Makarova and Andrey Samokhin say that Kazakhstan, including its ethnic Russians, is becoming ever less Russian precisely because the government there has allowed things to develop naturally (vz.ru/world/2021/5/2/1096791.html).

            Nazarbayev and his successor have not tried to force Kazakh down the throats of Russians or prevent Kazakhs from continuing to speak it. As a result, the two journalists say, language has not become the dividing line and source of conflict that it has elsewhere; and there has been convergence instead of conflict.

            De-Russification is really happening, they acknowledge. Ethnic Russians are leaving Kazakhstan, and Russians who remain are learning Kazakh. But Kazakhs are continuing to speak Russian and to view Russia as the place to go for higher education. As a result,  the two groups can talk to each other and are becoming increasingly similar. 

Moscow More Focused on Selling Vaccine Abroad than on Expanding Its Availability at Home

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – The Russian government has shown far greater concern in promoting sales of its vaccine abroad than on expanding its availability inside Russia, a new study finds. In Russia’s major cities, the vaccine is widely available; but in many places, there are shortages or none at all (dw.com/ru/kommentarij-paradoksy-rossijskoj-vakcinacii/a-57366214).

            But even where the vaccine is available in Russia, there is now an alarming rise in the number of infections. Today, almost half of the 9270 new infections registered in the last 24 hours came from Moscow, St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast alone, with 3208, 737, and 649 cases respectively (t.me/COVID2019_official/2875).

            Officials, worried that the long holidays Vladimir Putin has ordered will make things worse, have started a campaign to get people to wear masks and maintain social distancing and even to stay in their homes under the slogan “the coronavirus doesn’t take a holiday” (regnum.ru/news/society/3258922.html).

            Also worrying is the fact that Rosstat reports there have been 460,000 excess deaths in Russia since the start of the pandemic, far more than the government’s coronavirus monitoring center has reported as victims of the pandemic (110,000). Fortunately, the monthly totals are declining to expected levels (rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/aidA9DmD/edn03-2021.htm).

            Russian sales of the vaccine to those former Soviet republics which have close relations with Moscow (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) continue strong because people there, Moscow says, “trust Russian vaccines more” than those produced elsewhere (kp.ru/daily/27271/4406334/).

            One interesting development: At a time when Moscow is dividing the countries of the world into friends and enemies of Russia, Russians instead are dividing them into those which are “sick” and those which are “healthy,” because Russians are most worried about whether they can travel to any particular place (rosbalt.ru/world/2021/05/01/1900114.html).