A Recipe for More Conflict: Yerevan Rejects Corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan; Baku Insists on It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 31 – The flurry of statements emanating from Yerevan and Baku in recent days shows that Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have very different understandings of what is contained in the November and January declarations some have described as peace agreements and that the danger of renewed military conflict has not passed.

            Armenian Vice President Mger Grigoryan and acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed that there is no agreement for any corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan across Armenian territory. Both said that neither declaration calls for creating any corridors when transportation links are restored (ng.ru/cis/2021-05-31/1_8161_armenia.html).

            But Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev spoke about “the inevitability” of such a corridor, the promise of which was and remains a key reason why Baku agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire at a time when Azerbaijani forces were on the brink of a complete victory over Armenian ones in Qarabagh.

            On the one hand, this difference in opinion is a difference about the meaning of the reopening of the transportation links for the two sides, with Armenia viewing them as limited to transport and guarded by Russian peacekeepers and Azerbaijan as seeing them as a step toward something broader and deeper and under Azerbaijani control.

            But on the other hand, it is only one of the ways in which the two sides are still far apart, differences that make further progress problematic on all issues as they are invariably interconnected and the role of outside players including Russia, Iran, France and the United State more fraught with difficulties as well.

            That can be seen in discussions following the dispute beginning two weeks ago over whether Azerbaijani forces had crossed into Syunik/Zengezur or not, a conflict that arose because the borders between the two countries have never been delimited and Soviet-era maps are in conflict.

            Armenia appealed for Russian help to force the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces and to get a demarcation process started in that limited portion of the international border between the two countries. And Iran said that any change in the borders that deprived Iran of direct contact with Armenia would be the crossing of “a red line” as far as Tehran was concerned.

            Russian President Vladimir Putin called his Azerbaijani counterpart and secured an agreement that this dispute and others would be “resolved exclusively by political and diplomatic methods,” which Moscow later specified to mean the formation of a tripartite commission with Russia as mediator to address the border question in Syunik/Zengezur.

            But in the days that followed, Armenia and Azerbaijan traded words about the violation of the border by forces of the other, leading Pashinyan to call for the “synchronous” withdrawal of forces from the borders and the insertion of “international observers from Russia or the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (the US and France).”

            The Armenian prime minister subsequently clarified that it would be possible to have both Russian peacekeepers and observers from other countries of the Minsk Group after we begin the process of demarcating and delimiting the border.” But commentators suggested Yerevan only wants Russians there as peacekeepers at least in the immediate future.

            Baku in contrast accepts the idea of a tripartite commission on the border, although it has indicated it wants to discuss the entire border rather than just the Syunik/Zengezur portion, a problem for Yerevan given its views on Qarabagh, because it wants to open the transportation corridor to Nakhichevan as quickly as possible.

            And the Azerbaijani side continues to talk about this reopening of the transportation links as the opening of “a corridor,” something with much more far-reaching implications and a prospect Moscow, Yerevan, and Tehran oppose. In short, there is every reason to be concerned that there are likely to be more clashes rather than fewer in the coming weeks. 

           

 

Stalin’s GULAG was ‘Economically Ineffective’ and Demographically Disastrous, Staf Says

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 31 – While most Russians view the GULAG as horrific, they generally accept the official line that it transformed Russia from an agricultural country into an industrial powerhouse and that it played a key role in the development of the Soviet defense industry that allowed the USSR to defeat Hitler.

            As a result, polls show, many now are inclined to support proposals by the Putin regime to restore the use of prison labor in places where the market cannot attract sufficient workers in order to promote the future development of the Russian Federation economically and geopolitically.

            But calls for using Russian inmates now the way GULAG prisoners were in the past ignores the fact, Vladislav Staf of the Moscow Higher School of Economics says, that the GULAG was far less effective than the use of “free” labor would have been and was viewed as such by Stalin’s own officials (kavkazr.com/a/gulag-socyalnyi-lift-nkvd/31281976.html).

            Their judgment was reflected in the fact that “immediately after the death of Stalin,” they began to dismantle the system, not because they found it morally abhorrent because of the deaths and suffering it cause but because it was “economically ineffective,” was not promoting growth, and was in fact introducing problems that could have been avoided.

            Stalin-era officials recognized as some Russians today do not, he continues, that the GULAG did not by itself make industrialization happen. Instead, it destroyed agriculture and the future demographic development of much of the country, led to the rise of cities that had no economic justification, and involved many “giant” projects that were never profitable or finished.

            The only real “beneficiaries” of the GULAG were those hired to be guards. But even they did not always get the benefits they expected. Many died on the job, and many more were themselves repressed by the Stalinist state machine, the historian says, yet another reason for their heirs not to want to restore the GULAG.

            Russia today is pockmarked by GULAG projects that were never completed or that, if they were, have proved unnecessary or even harmful. Cities were built in places that had not economic justification, and regions which did produce food were depopulated and remain at risk of losing even more people.

            “There are entire cities and settlements which either have died out or are dying out because it turned out that they weren’t adapted to a market economy,” Staf says. “The most obvious example is Vorkuta which now is the city in Russia which is dying out the most rapidly.”

            Stalin and other leaders could point to giant construction projects, but few could respond then although many should recognize now that these projects did not achieve the goals the regime said it was pursuing let alone the goals the country needed, the historian adds. Anyone thinking about restoring the system should remember that.

            The GULAG was not just a moral disaster; it was an economic and demographic one. And any plans to restore it even in part will likely have similar consequences. 

‘Bitter Truth’ is that Russia’s Vaccination Program has Failed, Doctor Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 31 – A comparison of Russia’s vaccination effort with those in other countries made by scholars for The New England Journal of Medicine compels the conclusion that “the bitter truth” is that Moscow’s program has failed, according to a Russian doctor (https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/204637).

            Moreover, Russians have concluded that their medical care system isn’t working. As more of them came into contact with it because of the pandemic, complaints about the situation in Russian clinics and hospitals rose by 37 percent last year over the year before (newizv.ru/news/society/31-05-2021/v-2020-godu-na-37-3-vozroslo-kolichestvo-zhalob-patsientov-na-rabotu-medikov).

            Russian officials reported 8475 new cases of infection and 339 new deaths from the coronavirus over the last 24 hours, both figures down from the day before as the pandemic continued to hit St. Petersburg and some regions hard while ebbing elsewhere, including in Moscow (t.me/COVID2019_official/2998 and regnum.ru/news/society/3277253.html).

            Moscow renewed air service to and from Austria, the UK, Hungary, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritius, and Morocco, but kept the suspension in effect with Turkey and Tanzania until at least June 21 (regnum.ru/news/3284377.html and regnum.ru/news/3284370.html).

            Meanwhile, Russian health officials warned people not to get the EpiVakKorona shots at the same time they were getting botox injections (regnum.ru/news/3283817.html), the Palestinian Authority approved the use of Sputnik-Lite (sputnikvaccine.com/rus/newsroom/pressreleases/odnokomponentnaya-vaktsina-sputnik-layt-odobrena-v-palestine/), and Russian parliamentarians remain divided on whether and how much to force Russians to get vaccinated (regions.ru/news/2629814/).

Nicholas II’s Propensity for Hyper-Centralization Led to Khodynka Field Disaster, Historians Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 30 – In what some may see as a warning to Russia’s current ruler, historians suggest that it was Nicholas II’s propensity for centralizing everything in his hands or those of his immediate entourage which led to the Khodynka field disaster at the time of his coronation.

            Today marks the 125^th anniversary of the Khodynka field disaster when thousands of ordinary Russians trampled each other, many to death, as they tried to get trinkets that were being handed out to the population as part of ceremonies surrounding Nicholas II’s coronation (aif.ru/society/history/tragediya_hodynki_i_nikolay_ii_kakie_processy_upustil_posledniy_imperator).

            This tragedy which helped give rise to Nicholas’ sobriquet of “bloody” was brought about, historians say, because of the new tsar’s desire to centralize everything in his own hands rather than allowing parts of the government bureaucracy with more expertise and experience to handle many matters.

            At the time of the coronation of Nicholas II’s father, the tsarist government also distributed trinkets to the population, but there was no problem because then this action was overseen by the governor general of Moscow who knew something about handling mass meetings.

But in advance of his own coronation, Nicholas II decided that the entire process should be managed by his household ministry which didn’t. The result was a disaster that prompted the tsar himself to reflect that he had been born under an unhappy star and that his own future was anything but bright.

 

Moscow Must Work to Attract Ethnic Russians and Not Just Workers from Former Soviet Republics, Shustov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 30 – Moscow has just celebrated the arrival of the one millionth compatriot in Russia, Aleksandr Shustov says; but despite that, it is increasingly obvious that the entire government program in this sphere needs to be changed, redirected from countries where there are few ethnic Russians to those where there are large numbers.

            Otherwise, the Rhythm of Eurasia journalist continues, the share of ethnic Russians in Russia will decline rather than increase, exactly the reverse of what the compatriot program was designed to achieve. Moscow must change its focus to countries where there are still large numbers of ethnic Russians and seek to attract them (ritmeurasia.org/news--2021-05-30--programmu-pereselenija-rossijskih-sootechestvennikov-nado-srochno-menjat-54866).

            Except for the pandemic year of 2020, the program has attracted more than 100,000 people to Russia each year; but most of those who are returning are “not Russians or even Ukrainians and Belarusians but the native population of the Asiatic countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.”

            What is of particular concern is that “the leaders of resettlers are countries where there are almost no Russians” left, places like Tajikistan and Armenia. Rather than seeking to attract those who remain there, most of whom are old and don’t want to move, Moscow must focus on places where there are still sizeable ethnic Russian communities.

            These include Kazakhstan where there are 3.5 million ethnic Russians, Uzbekistan with 750,000, Kyrgyzstan with 341,000 and Azerbaijan with 119,000, Shustov says. If Moscow focuses on those, more ethnic Russians will come to Russia, helping solve its demographic and not just its economic problems as is the case now.

            “The main goal” of the compatriot program “must become not providing for the needs of regions as far as the workforce is concerned but compensating for demographic losses.” But tragically, the Russian government has stopped maintaining statistics on the ethnic composition of compatriots so Moscow doesn’t even know how deep a whole it has dug for itself.

            “For a long time,” Shustov concludes, “the Russian authorities did not seek to stimulate the repatriation of ethnic Russians from CIS countries because it considered them as an instrument of its influence in these states. But the significant worsening of the demographic situation doesn’t leave the country with any other choice.”

For Northern Sea Route to Operate Year Around, Moscow Needs Railways and Roads in North, Shepitko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 30 – Global warming has made it possible for ships to pass along the Northern Sea Route ever more months of the year with less assistance from icebreakers, but the route will not become truly a year around one until Russia constructs railways and highways paralleling it, Taisiya Shepitko says.

            The director of the Institute for Road Construction at Russia’s Transportation University says that progress in that direction is being made with her institution contributing innovative technologies including the laying of insulation layers on top of permafrost soil (vtimes.io/2021/05/29/kak-vizhat-neft-izo-lda-po-nauchnomu-a5305).

            These layers prevent the transmission of heat into the ground and the melting of the permafrost in ways that lead to subsidence and the collapse of railways, highways and airport runways that happens when the ground begins to melt, Shepitko says. In the use of such technology, Russia in general and her university are world leaders.

            “The Northern Sea Route is the Arctic’s transportation artery, but it has one major drawback: ports that freeze in the winter. The Russian icebreaker fleet, of course, is the largest in the world, but scholars have now come up with some unexpected ideas” about the ports this fleet has to clear each year. That would involve building undersea tunnels from the ports to beyond the ice near the shore.

            That would free up icebreakers for use along the route, but it will be a long time before such “an innovation” can be put in place, Shepitko continues.

            Her university has long been involved in helping to plan for transportation projects in the North. It helped build a railway to gas fields and now is working on the revival of the Stalin-era northern route which was supported to extend to Igarka but now is planned to go only half as far and end for the time being at Korotchayevo.

            “The immediate task,” she continues, “is to link up the two railroads of the Northern Main Line, the Northern and the Sverdlovsk and then develop it further to the north and to the east.” That will allow for the economic development of the region and promote Russian national security by supporting Moscow’s Arctic projects.

           

 

Ingush Prisoner Involved in Hunger Strike at Saratov Oblast Camp

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 30 – Ingush Timur Tumgoyev was one of 40 prisoners at the Balashov corrective labor camp in Saratov to take part in a hunger strike this past week to protest the conditions under which they are being kept and the abuse they are suffering. Although the strike quickly ended, it is a reminder that Ingush protesters won’t stop even after being jailed.

            Sergey Sleputkhin, Tumgoyev’s lawyer, said his client had decided to strike because of physical abuse on the part of the guards, the theft of his personal possessions, and the poor quality of the food (fortanga.org/2021/05/zaklyuchennye-zashili-sebe-rty-urozhenecz-ingushetii-ob-usloviyah-soderzhaniya-v-tyurme/).

            According to local activists who visited the camp, these were not the real reasons. Instead, the prisoners objected to being required to shave their beards and other prison rules and were sent to punishment cells as a result. It was these activists who reported that the strike had quickly collapsed.

            Some of those engaged in the strike, Sleputkhim said, but apparently not Tumgoyev, cut themselves as part of the protest. These prisoners then ended the action because that had left them in desperate need of medical attention something their jailors said would be provided only if the prisoners ended the strike.

            Another Ingush activist, Magomed Bekov, said he had received a note from Tumgoyev who said that “about ten” of the prisoners had “sowed up their mouths” to express their conviction that nothing they said would be listened to by the powers that be. They asked him, Bekov said, to ask Moscow to intervene because the Saratov jailers remain unresponsive.

            Meanwhile, Magomed-Bashir Ozdoyev was sentenced to eight months in a general regime camp for his role in the March 2019 protest in Magas. But because of time served in a pre-detention center, he will be released in two weeks (fortanga.org/2021/05/magomed-bashir-ozdoev-prigovoren-k-vosmi-mesyaczam-lisheniya-svobody/).

            That continues a disturbing trend in Ingushetia. People are kept in detention for so long that they have been punished before any judgment has been reached against them, a completely illegal and unconstitutional arrangement that is nonetheless standard operating procedure in Russia sometimes in Moscow but almost always beyond the ring road.

            And more details leaked out about a clash between Chechen siloviki and Ingush environmental activists earlier this week. The Chechens detained the Ingush near the Chechen border, confiscated their telephones, and burned their car and documents, but the Chechens remain unpunished (kavkazr.com/a/31274311.html).

            The Ingush authorities are looking into the matter, but neither Chechen nor Russian ones apparently have been willing to do that.