Four Azerbaijani Experts Highlight Complexities of Border Delimitation Talks with Armenia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Baku and Yerevan are far apart on what should be the starting point for discussions designed to lead to the delimitation and demarcation of borders between their two countries not only in the Syunik/Qarabagh sector but more generally. Baku favors using Soviet military maps while Armenia backs Russian topographic ones.

            Moreover, the two countries disagree on another important precondition for such talks: Armenia has long said that discussions about borders can occur only after the two countries recognize one another, while Azerbaijan has insisted that each must recognize the territorial integrity of the other before border talks begin.

            What these differences mean, of course, is that the issues of delimiting and demarcating borders are hostage to larger questions of recognition and the status of Armenians in Azerbaijan’s Qarabagh region, questions that may make any movement on this front in the tripartite commission Baku, Moscow and Yerevan have agreed to problematic.

            Today, the Kavkaz-Uzel news agency produces the results of interviews it conducted with four leading Azerbaijani experts about the issues involved (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/364527/). Their remarks help clarify both what the thinking about this now is in Baku and what the two sides will have to reach agreement on before setting the border issue.

            First, Mekhman Aliyev, director of the Turan news agency, points out that it isn’t the case that there was only one map of the region prepared by the Soviet General Staff as Armenia has suggested. There were numerous maps it prepared of various scales, and those with the most detail have long been viewed internationally as defining borders.

            (Aliyev’s remarks clarify the debate so far about Soviet maps – see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/05/soviet-era-maps-in-conflict-with-one.html – and explain why Putin’s FSB is trying to seize all Soviet-era military maps now in private hands lest they spark conflicts --windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/03/fsb-launches-campaign-against-those-who.html).

            The Turan editor says that “delimitation is only a process of making the borders more precise.” The UN already has recognized the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the administrative ones between the two republics as they existed before 1991. That simply must be accepted by all parties, Aliyev argues.

            Moreover, he continues, “the mutual recognition by Azerbaijan and Armenia of the territorial integrity of each other must precede the process of delimiting and demarcation of borders.” Aliyev further asserts that the Soviet maps were mentioned at the November 2020 summit which led to the ceasefire as the foundation stones of any future accord.

            Second, Sulkhaddin Akper of the Euro-Atlantic organization in Azerbaijan, says that there were many maps of the border region in Soviet times but not all are equally authoritative. Moreover, because the republic borders then were administrative rather than state institutions, that led to some confusion.

            It happened, he continues, that “residents of Armenia could use pasture land in Azerbaijan and that on the maps, these pastures were designated as Armenian. But on the official, administrative-political maps, the borders were designated differently.” The latter maps must be the basis for establishing the state borders now.

            How this could work, he says, was illustrated by the way in which Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation dealt with a problem on their border. Residents of two villages in northern Azerbaijan wanted to join the Russian Federation. Baku and Moscow agreed that they should be given the choice as individuals rather than collectively.

            That meant that they could either remain where they were and take Azerbaijani citizenship or move individually to the Russian Federation and accept Russian citizenship in the process. “The majority preferred the second option, and Azerbaijan and Russia peacefully resolved the problems of delimitation and demarcation at the border.”

            Baku will insist on this principle in its talks with Armenia, Akper says.

            Third, Tofiq Zulfugarov, a former Azerbaijani foreign ministry, points out that “delimitation means not the definition of borders but their clarification.” He notes that “administrative borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia as between other republics of the former USSR were defined in the 1950s and 1960s.”

            “After the disintegration of the USSR,” he continues, “the borders between the former republics became inter-state borders.” And it was true everywhere that delimitation and demarcation talks started with Soviet maps as the basis for agreement. At the same time, the former minister says, “Azerbaijan has the moral right to advance territorial claims on Armenia.”

            And four, Farkhad Mirzoyev, a Baku specialist on international law, notes that the borders drawn by the Soviet government “were set on the basis of the widely used principle of international law, uti possidetis juris, which continues to function regarding the international borders of the now already independent states.”

Migrant Workers Continue to Leave Russia in Large Numbers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – During 2020, the number of migrant workers in Russia fell from 10.3 million to 7.1 million. In the first five months of 2021, their numbers continued to fall and now stand at 5.66 million, according to a study conducted by the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service and the Gaidar Institute (kommersant.ru/doc/4838308).

            The greatest declines during the pandemic period have been among citizens of Ukraine and Moldova whose numbers have fallen by roughly half, 53 percent and 51 percent respectively. Migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus have declined by smaller amounts. But workers from the EU have fallen to their lowest level in the past decade.

            Russian officials today registered 8832 new cases of infection and 394 deaths from the coronavirus, with the greatest increases being in Moscow and St. Petersburg but with spikes at various places across the country forcing officials to extend or reimpose restrictions (t.me/COVID2019_official/3006, regnum.ru/news/society/3287593.html  and regnum.ru/news/society/3277253.html).

            The healthcare ministry officially registered for use a new medication developed by the Federal Medical-Biological Agency that will improve the treatment of those who have become infected with the coronavirus or who have been exposed to it (iz.ru/1172671/2021-06-02/v-rf-zaregistrirovali-preparat-dlia-lecheniia-vyzyvaemoi-koronavirusom-pnevmonii).

            Belarus has approved for use the Russian Sputnik-Lite vaccine, and Vietnam has reached an agreement with Moscow to produce the Sputnik-5 vaccine in that country (regnum.ru/news/3287773.html and regnum.ru/news/3286491.html).

            Scholars from the Higher School of Economics told the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Moscow ranked second only to Singapore among cities of the world in maintaining its economy during the pandemic (polit.ru/article/2021/06/02/moscow/). The scholars praised the combination of restrictions and openings that the city practiced.

            Meanwhile, in other pandemic-related developments in Russia today,

·         Fifty-five percent of Russians said they do not fear the coronavirus any more, 24 percent said they had been infected and recovered, but of those, fewer than one in three was officially diagnosed, a Levada Center poll found (levada.ru/2021/06/02/koronavirus-2/).

·         The Moscow Patriarchate reported that 165 of its religious leaders had died after becoming infected with the coronavirus (regnum.ru/news/society/3286644.html).

·         And a Russian medical expert said that the pandemic may reduce life expectancy among Russians who have been infected by up to ten years (rosbalt.ru/piter/2021/06/02/1904696.html).

Moscow Funding Poor whose Support Kremlin Needs rather than Poor who Need Support, World Bank Data Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – Like some other governments around the world, the Russian powers that be are providing support not so much to those among the poor who need it most but rather to those groups within that category whose support the regime needs. As a result, those who need help most often aren’t getting it and find themselves slipping deeper and deeper into poverty.

            On the basis of World Bank figures, Russian economists have concluded that “the system of social support in the Russian Federation does not set as its goal the support of ‘the poor.’ Instead, it sets as its goal the support of ‘the needy,’” not in their own terms but in terms of how much they are needed by the powers (newizv.ru/article/general/01-06-2021/spasi-sebya-sam-tsel-sotsialnoy-podderzhki-v-rossii-eto-pomosch-ne-bednym-a-nuzhnym).

            What that means is that even  though Russia spends more on social supports than do many other governments, it has not and indeed does not intend to reduce poverty as such but only the hardships among those groups of the population which either support it already or who can be encouraged to do so by such support.

            According to the latest World Bank report, “in the Russian system of social support, unlike those of many other countries, assistance to the lowest income categories of the population is not a priority.” Moscow helps those with lower incomes who support it rather than the poor as such. As a result, poverty has not been cut as much as the Kremlin has promised.

            Indeed, in Russia, “the poor are becoming fewer only on paper” because most social support payments are going not to them but to those with slightly higher incomes who are the chief backers of the incumbent regime. They may benefit but only at the price of intensifying the poverty of those below them.

            Unless the system is fundamentally reformed, the World Bank figures suggest, there will in fact be more poor Russians in the future than there are now even though the regime will spend more money and report reductions in poverty on a continuing basis.

Russia’s Size and Economic Model Mean It Will Collapse in a Generation Unless Depopulation Slows, Health Ministry Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – Russia is the largest country in the world, has few people in many of its regions, and has adopted an extensive approach to economic development, Oleg Apolikhin says. As a result, if it is unable to slow or stop the current trend toward depopulation, it will face collapse in 20 to 30 years.

            The chief specialist on reproductive health at the Russian health ministry says that that makes demographic change not only a problem for the society but also a very powerful challenge to the national security of the country (profile.ru/society/health/oleg-apolihin-esli-my-ne-ostanovim-depopulyaciju-strany-cherez-20-30-let-nas-zhdet-kollaps-871866/).

            The population is declining because deaths exceed births and older people for the first time ever in Russia form roughly the same share of the population as younger ones. Because the older ones don’t work and because the Russian economy depends on new inputs rather than greater efficiency, that puts a burden on the young and depresses the economy.

            And young people are ever less inclined to have children because they are increasingly shaped by consumer psychology which leads them to ask what benefits them directly rather than indirectly via helping the country as a whole, Apolikhin says. Russian men are exercising an even more depressive effect in this area than women.

            In recent decades, the gap between sexual debut and marriage has widened and is now almost ten years. For that decade, young Russians have sex but without any intention or desire to have children. The attitudes formed during that period also extend into married life and people put off or even decide not to have children ever.

            Russians are beginning to become sexually active ever earlier, and they are marrying later. Consequently, even pairs who want children are having them much later. In the 1995-1999 period, the average age of mothers at the time of the appearance of a first child was 20.9 years. In 2015-2017, it had risen by more than five years to 26.1.

            Among other things, that means there are fewer years left for people to have more children; and the likelihood that women or men will suffer from problems affecting their fertility only increases. Women over 35, for example, are not only less fertile over all but likely to suffer from more diseases that make pregnancy problematic.

           

Given Ban on Equating Hitler and Stalin, Will Russians Start Comparing Putin and Lukashenka? Shtepa Asks

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – The Russian Duma is moving toward the adoption of a law that will make any equation of Hitler and Stalin and their respective totalitarian regimes a crime. That involves real problems for Russia today. But a more fundamental question, Vadim Shtepa says, is whether Russians will date to compare Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

            Within their respective countries, the editor of the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal says, these two leaders have “in fact constructed totalitarian regimes having suppressed all opposition. One ‘fuehrer’ poisons his opponents with chemical weapons while the other in piratical fashion seizes civilian aircraft” (epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/93575169/vadim-stepa-kas-on-voimalik-samastada-hapet-ja-leelist-venemaal-saadab-hitleri-ja-stalini-vordlus-peagi-vanglasse in Estonian; region.expert/equate/ in Russian).

            Communism and Nazism, of course, had different “ideological roots,” while Putinism and Lukashenka-ism have common ones, but the totalitarian nature of both pairs has turned out to be “very similar,” Shtepa says. And that makes comparing Putin and Lukashenka potentially even more dangerous for Russians than comparing Putin and Hitler.

            That is limited only by the fact that Russians fought a war against the latter foreign ruler and that in their experience, “the further into history World War II recedes, the louder the victory in it is celebrated,” just one of the paradoxes that the Russian regime and the Russian people must continue to face.

            Another, the regionalist writer says, is while “Russia declares itself to be ‘the main victor over Nazism, the current Kremlin powers that be ever more actively borrow Nazi ideas and attributes,” including the development of a leader cult and the celebration of “’the glorious past’” of their respective nations, both seen as guarantors of future victories.

            Because of the war, the Kremlin is generally able to keep these similarities out of the glare of publicity; but because there has not been a war with Belarus, the regime faces a more difficult challenge. For Russians, Lukashenka is a totalitarian dictator. If they draw parallels between him and Putin, that will create a challenge far more difficult for the regime to meet.

 

Putin Seeking to Force West to Behave as He Does to Protect His Power, Skobov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – Vladimir Putin is not only moving toward totalitarianism at home but is seeking to force Western countries to act as he does with respect to the Internet lest Russians who move abroad are able to undermine his regime from there, according to Russian commentator Aleksandr Skobov.

            Neither of these realities is fully recognized in the West, Skobov continues. On the one hand, “analysts have begun to speak about the uniqueness of the Putin regime which has been have to secure its continuity in power under conditions of unprecedented information openness and freedom” (graniru.org/opinion/skobov/m.281867.html).

            Those who make that argument failure to recognize that his regime is “prepared to tolerance expressions of disagreement and the dissemination of alternative information only as long as the Internet was viewed as an insignificant and marginal information periphery.” Then, the Kremlin began to crack down there as well.

            And on the other, even when these analysts do note Putin’s moves against the Internet inside Russia, they do not focus on a related and potentially more dangerous move on his part: his efforts to force Western governments to restrict the Internet so that this international medium cannot be used against him.

            “Authoritarianism was and remains incompatible with freedom of speech,” Skobov points out. “In any case, over the long term. Either authoritarianism will kill freedom of speech or freedom of speech will kill authoritarianism.  Authoritarian regimes know this and therefore always will seek to kill freedom of speech.”

            As the Putin regime moves from “’the political demobilization’” which served it in the past to “’political mobilization’” which it wants now, in which loyalty alone won’t be enough but mass participation and expression of support will be required, it is moving to suppress freedom in this sphere.

            According to Skobov, “the authoritarian social contract according to the formula ‘you don’t get involved in our affairs and we won’t in yours’ has been torn up.” Instead, “Putin’s Russia ever more clearly is acquiring the characteristics of a classical totalitarian and fascist dictatorship.”

            It is attacking the remaining “little islands of freedom” across “a broad front,” often taking as its model the behavior of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Up to the present, many analysts have ignored that reality as well, the Russian commentator continues.

            “For far too long, Europe has viewed Putin’s ‘antics’ as the rough edges of an immature democracy which will disappear on their own as democracy develops and assumed that they will pass more quickly, the more actively Putin’s Russia is enmeshed in multilateral ties with the democratic world.”

            And thus many in the West have failed to see that what is going on is something very different from that, that what is happening in Belarus and in Russia is not some system on its way to democracy but rather a monster on its way back to totalitarianism and worse reaching out to demand others accept it and its rules.

            “Putin and his Lukashenka cannot avoid multilateral ties with the developed democratic world: they live as parasites on these links. It is precisely these ties which allow them to maintain relative social stability. But they carry with them a threat” not only to their own populations but to the political and social systems of the West.

            As ever more opponents of the two regimes moving toward totalitarianism have come to the West and used the Internet to speak to their own peoples, these “new dictatorships inevitably will seek to spread their repressive practices onto the democratic world,” undermining it to protect themselves.

            These regimes “will not only force the governments of the West to silent recognition of their ‘right’ to punitive operations beyond their own borders, including kidnappings and murders. They will force the Western government to introduce their own limitations on free social activity.”

            According to Skobov, “they will force the introduction of self-censorship by international internet companies and social networks, using both financial carrots and financial sticks in order to protect themselves” while destroying democracy elsewhere. The West must not only recognize this threat but do everything it can to block it.

            It “must really isolate the source of this dangerous infection” rather than allowing it to spread because only this can force the new dictatorships to begin to remake themselves within a democratic world.” Cooperating with these dictatorships in this area gives them a victory and the West a defeat that neither deserves.

 

For Russians, World Remains a Bipolar One with the US the Other Pole, Levinson Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – The Russian government may talk about multipolarity and the growing importance of China and Europe, but polls show that for Russians, the world is once again bipolar with the two key countries being their own and the United States and relations between them including both hopes for cooperation and fears of conflict, Aleksey Levinson says.

            For Russians, the relationship between Russia and the US inevitably contains both negative and positive elements, the Levada Center sociologist says. “The negative dominates [their thinking] but without the positive, the negative wouldn’t appear so clearly” (vtimes.io/2021/06/01/nasha-glavnaya-strana-a5345).

            What is most striking perhaps is that surveys show that most Russians evaluate the relationship as good or bad, with the more extreme positions of very good or very bad being held by only small groups of people, something that allows the shifting back and forth between the two groups in the middle.

            In the first years of Putin’s rule, Russians who felt relations were good outnumbered those who thought they were bad two and three to one. Because of the Georgia war, by 2014, they had come into rough balance. And then with Crimea, the pattern shifted fundamentally, Levinson says.

            As he has often argued, Russians celebrated the annexation of Crimea not so much because Russia had regained something for itself but because “Russia under the leadership of Putin had acted as Russians though only great powers like the for example the United States does without regard to world public opinion.”

            But still Russians generally prefer that relations with the US be cooperative because all but a small group of them understand that a conflict with the US is not a conflict like with Ukraine because it carries with it the risk of a nuclear war and thus mutual destruction. At present, they expect deterioration but hope for something else.

            “This is ‘the popular prognosis,’” Levinson continues. “It to a significant degree depends both on how people read the will of those on top in media reports and how to a certain degree it reflects their own hopes and orientations” which have continued far longer than any specific Kremlin policy.

            New poll show that only four percent of Russians want a serious conflict with the US and only eight percent more want a break in relations. In short, these are marginal positions. Most Russians don’t want either the one or the other. About a fifth of all Russians instead want Russia to flex its muscles but do so in ways that don’t risk a real conflict.

            Russians are happy enough to talk about “’repeating’” past victories and take pride in their country’s military power, but these things are “more for themselves than for [the United States].” And that is even more the cases among those of more education and higher position who understand what could happen otherwise.

            Sixty percent or more in some categories of Russians want cooperation with the US, the sociologist says. But they understand by cooperation American acceptance of what Russia is doing. Thus, for them, the Trump Administration was almost ideal: it didn’t challenge Moscow on key things and it was thus “ours” for Russians in a fundamental sense.

            But now that period of semi-euphoria has passed, and while a majority of Russians want cooperation with the West, a greater share of these wants minimal cooperation rather than something more wide-ranging, a reflection of dashed hopes in the past and expectations that the future isn’t going to be any easier.