Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 15 – In addition to the problems arising from a shortage of police, Moscow criminologists point to two major “risks” of an upsurge in crime in 2025 with “the greater problem being from the growth of religious extremism” but also the return to their home areas of Russian veterans who unlike in past wars have kept together while fighting.
Profile journalist Igor Trifomov explores both of these risk, emphasizing that the violence of Islamist groups in Dagestan against Christians and Jews was what many criminologists believe is the opening round of such attacks (profile.ru/society/operativnyj-dissonans-v-kakih-sferah-mozhno-ozhidat-rosta-prestupnosti-v-rossii-1648894/).
Indeed, he cites local experts as saying that while outside observes may not consider that episode “so significant, the professionals are convinced that this is only the beginning” given the rise in Islamist training in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan and the increasing hostility of Muslims to Christians and Jews more generally.
But Trofimov says that veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are another source of worry among criminologists. On the one hand, many of them are coming back with more weapons than was trues after Afghanistan and Chechnya; and on the other, not only are some of them previously released criminals but they have served together and returned together.
Because of that, he says, many of these individuals feel themselves beyond the reach of the authorities because they have now formed organized criminal groups that draw both on their experiences in Ukraine and their earlier experiences in such groups before going to fight in Putin’s war.
Sunday, January 19, 2025
Islamist Extremism, Veterans Returning from Ukraine Threaten to Increase Crime in Russia, Moscow Criminologists Say
Rosstat Changes Way It Calculates Inflation to Hide Price Increases
Paul Goble
Staunton, Feb. 15 – There are a variety of ways a government can hide inflation: It can stop releasing data, it can lie, and it can change the way its statistical arm calculates inflation, dropping from the list on which price rises are calculated those items which have increased the most and including others that have increased less.
Rosstat has adopted all these tactics, but it has found that the first two are often counter-productive: If the government doesn’t release data, independent analysts do and sometimes offer figures even higher than reality; and if it lies, critics are often able to call attention to that, undercutting faith both in those figures and in government statements as a whole.
Consequently, Rosstat has increasing changed the mix of items it includes in coming up with inflation statistics, dropping items like airplane tickets, analgesics, alcohol, and multi-vitamins, the prices of which have gone up the most and inserting their place things like filling teeth, whose prices haven’t (ehorussia.com/new/node/32090).
This statistical sleight of hand works better because at least the data are consistent within the tables offered and so many people will be inclined to believe what the authorities are saying – despite the fact that they can see around them that prices for many goods are going up far more rapidly than Rosstat is now saying.
Buddhist Community in Russia and Its Leadership Sharply Divided about War in Ukraine
Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 15 – Since Vladimir Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s Buddhists, most of whom live in Buryatia, Tuva and Kalmykia, have been as divided as other Russians about that war, with some protesting and others going to fight (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/russias-buddhists-as-deeply-divided-on.html).
But more than other faiths in the Russian Federation, this division about the war has affected the leadership of the Buddhist communities because they are not part of a single hierarchy and because Moscow is concerned about a faith which the Kremlin views as having its real leadership abroad, something that makes divisions inside Russia more politically sensitive.
As a result, Moscow has continued to support the leader of the Buryat Buddhist community who is pro-war but has forced the leader of the Kalmyk one to resign and flee abroad, although some say that the latter’s comments about China may be equally important (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/kremlins-dismissal-of-kalmyk-religious.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/01/kalmyk-buddhist-leaders-ouster-as-much.html).
But Moscow’s continued financing of the Buryat Buddhist leadership and the fact that the Kalmyk organization largely finances itself and has opened an office in Moscow where it can work with some in the Russian government mean that the conflict is far from over (themoscowtimes.com/2025/01/13/full-support-or-quiet-resistance-ukraine-war-splits-russias-buddhists-a87585).
The authoritarianism of the Buryat leader and his closeness to Putin have had the effect of alienating many Buddhists including in his native republic, and the greater independence and greater consistency with anti-war attitudes common among Buddhists has attracted some of the Buryats as well as many beyond Kalmykia.
The situation may soon reach a boiling point, with some in Moscow believing that even Buryat Buddhists are working too closely with the Mongols (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/02/moscow-again-fighting-pan-mongolism.html) and others suggesting that another Buddhist republic will be the first to declare independence (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/06/tyva-will-be-first-republic-in-russia.html).
Obviously, the Kremlin has other more pressing issues to deal with than divides within a faith followed by only about one percent of the population of the Russian Federation and now knows that if it supports an authoritarian leader too strongly it may end by driving still more people away from itself.
Friday, January 17, 2025
‘Russian Community’ Claims One Million Followers and Now has Branches in Former Soviet Republics
Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 14 – The Russian Community, a Black Hundreds-style Russian nationalist group which attacks immigrants and other minorities while working hand in glove with Russian propagandists and force structures to prevent dissent now claims more than one million followers and has opened branches in Armenia and Kazakhstan.
That increasing reach makes it a force to be reckoned with not only inside the Russian Federation but abroad and means that its leaders are working hard to present themselves as the obedient servants of the Kremlin in all things lest their growing power spark reprisals against the group (prosleduet.media/details/russian-obchshina/).
(For background on the group, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/russian-community-organization-and-its.html windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/extremist-russian-community-now-active.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/another-black-hundreds-group-revived-in.html, and jamestown.org/program/russian-community-extremists-becoming-the-black-hundreds-of-today/.)
West Must Take Five Steps Now to Encourage Members of Russian Elite to Break with Putin and Flee Abroad, Lea and Taskin Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 14 – Between 1953 and 1990, more than 1200 members of the Soviet elite fled abroad, individual actions that Western governments supported because they calculated that this would weaken the communist regime in Moscow, Aaron Lea and Borukh Taskin say. But under Putin, almost no members of the elite have fled.
While most of the reasons for that are to be found inside Russia and the special relationship its elites have with the regime, at least some reflect a change in attitude in Western countries which no longer encourage such cases of flight even though that would weaken Putin and thus serve their interests (themoscowtimes.com/2025/01/14/why-arent-russias-elites-fleeing-putin-a87612).
The two international experts on Russian elites suggest that Western countries should take five steps now in order to lead more members of the elites in Russia to conclude that they would be welcome in the West and could continue their careers there while waiting for regime change in Moscow. Those five steps include:
• First of all, “the West must construct policies that support the freedom of Russians to seek sanctuary in the West rather than continuing to exist in criminal Russia.” That will require political will as “the world changes too quickly to wait for the bureaucracy.
• Second, they suggest, “mechanisms should be created to integrate Russian elites who have left for the West into the daily agenda of the coalition countries,” including ensuring that they will be able to keep part of any capital they bring out with them.
• Third, “a large number of NGOs, charitable foundations, think tanks, mass media and high-tech startups where Russian emigres can find employment as board members, sponsors, supervisory board members, consultants, etc., should be created.”
• Fourth, “we should consider involving carefully selected high-class managers and investors from Russia in the formation of at least investments, crypto-asset circulation and fiat cross-border payments betwwoeldgeeen the countries they have chosen to live in.”
• And fifth, “a NATO-monitored integration service should be created for the departed sisloviki and others with sensitive knowledge.”
“We believe there is a significant potential for splitting Putin's elites, creating conditions for their flight from Russia and integration into Western civilization and subsequent return to a future democratic Russia. This window of opportunity will not always exist and the mechanisms supporting such a split must be discussed at the highest levels and created now,” Lea and Taskin say..
Moreover, they argue in conclusion, “if this is not done immediately, Russia’s elites, driven behind the new Iron Curtain on both sides, will continue to support Putin's power from within. Proposals aimed at dividing and fragmenting the Russian establishment … will not have the desired effect.”
All Chechens Fighting on Side of Ukraine Want Independence for Their Republic, Grozny Political Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 14 – All Chechens now fighting for Ukraine want independence for their own republic, regardless of their differences over what kind of a republic that will be, according to a Grozny political analyst speaking on condition of anonymity (kavkazr.com/a/chechnya-posle-voyny-rossii-s-ukrainoy-kto-boretsya-za-nezavisimostj/33269533.html).
“I think,” he continues, “that already now they are forming plans at the ideological, political and informational level as well as studying and analyzing the experience of Ukrainian social and political movements under conditions of war” given the likelihood that they will have to fight other pro-Moscow Chechens in the future.
According to the political analyst, “it is difficult to say when they will be able to achieve their goals or even if they will in the foreseeable future be able to realize them in their homeland. But their efforts undoubtedly will be useful,” especially if the Putin regime collapses as quickly as did the Asad regime in Syria.
He and other Chechens say that they flocked to Ukraine’s side not only because they wanted to fight Russia but because Kyiv in October 2022 declared Ichkeria to be “a temporarily occupied” land, a step very close to de facto recognition of a state that the Putin regime suppressed two decades ago (kavkazr.com/a/verhovnaya-rada-priznala-nezavisimostj-ichkerii/32089610.html).
Despite What Kremlin Wants People to Believe, Millions of Russians Oppose the Ruling Minority in Moscow, Podrabinek Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 14 – Because Russia has no elections, honest sociology or a free press and because of government repression which keeps many from acting on their feelings, no on knows precisely how many Russians are opposed to Putin’s autocracy, Aleksandr Podrabinek, a former Soviet dissident and now rights activist in Moscow says.
But anyone who walks the streets of a Russian city and looks beyond the propaganda posters can see that there are millions who oppose the regime which has guns and power but represents only a tiny minority, he continues (svoboda.org/a/obraz-gibloy-rossii-aleksandr-podrabinek-o-tvortsah-illyuziy/33263349.html).
Presenting the opposition as a tiny minority of marginal figures is a time-tested method of Russian rulers who know that the best way to keep people from acting on their feelings is to atomize society and convince people that no one shares the views that they have, Podrabinek says.
Worse by atomizing society for that purpose, the Putin regime like its predecessors has convinced Russian émigré opponents of the regime that they know the situation inside Russia better than do those who actually live there and that there is little or no chance for Russia to become a free and democratic country.
By arguing that position, the émigré opposition in effect serves those it says it is fighting, something, Podrabinek says, will become ever more obvious when the Putin regime is overthrown and the archives of its security services are opened.