Thursday, February 27, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Crimean Events Could Lead to Dissolution of Russia, Satarov Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – Any further destabilization of Crimea could easily become “the first step toward the rapid disintegration of Russia” and mean that Vladimir Putin will pass into history not as he imagines as the leader who put a stop to its disintegration but rather as “the terminator of Russia,”  according to Georgy Satarov.

            As picked up from his Facebook page by NR2.ru, Satarov who is the president of the INDEM Foundation, says today that it is not clear who is behind the current efforts to destabilize Crimea but that whoever it is by sowing the wind will reap a whirlwind in return (nr2.ru/moskow/486788.html).

            The Moscow analyst says that in his view there are “at a minimum, three equally plausible explanations.”  The first is that what is going on is part of Putin’s program to restore Russian domination over Ukraine or at least over a portion of it.  This may seem absurd, but it wouldn’t be a first for Putin, Satarov says.

            The second possibility is that what is happening is the work of “Russian force structures who do not agree with Putin.”  Such people could have various goals. One would be to promote Putin’s program but in ways he might be reluctant to follow. Another could be the playing out in foreign affairs of an internal political struggle that could isolate Russia and lead to a “criminal-police dictatorship” and “the overthrow” of the Russian president.

            And the third possible explanation, according to Satarov is that what is going on is the work of “local Crimean ‘hawks’ who want to put before the Russian authorities a fait accompli.” Their goal, he says, would be the establishment of an independent state “under the aegis of Russia” much like Abkhazia or South Osetia.

            But whatever the explanation for the current exacerbation of tensions, he argues, the real threat of the current evolution of events in Ukraine’s Crimea will be far broader and could lead to “the accelerated disintegration of Russia” and to the designation of Putin as “the terminator” rather than the savior of Russia and the Russian people.

Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Uncertain How to Connect with Rising Generation, Sociologist Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – Kremlin strategists now recognize that the themes of stability and modernization will not allow them to connect with the rising generation in Russia as such ideas did in the last election with slightly older people, but they have not yet figured out what themes they will try to use, according to an expert at the Public Opinion Foundation.

            In an article on Slon.ru yesterday, Larisa Pautova says that the Kremlin’s uncertainty in this regard reflects the fact that generational change is taking place increasingly quickly in Russia and that the new generations are different from the ones immediately before them but similar to some earlier ones (slon.ru/russia/novoe_brezhnevskoe_pokolenie-1062007.xhtml).

            Pautova suggests that young people who do not remember the Soviet era are reacting to the new authoritarianism of the Putin regime in a very different way than the slightly older group who do and who as a result are more inclined to back the modernizing ideas associated with Dmitry Medvedev.

            The sociologist says that she uses the term “generation” in a quite arbitrary fashion to distinguish various cohorts among the young.  She calls those who finished school between 1977 and 1984, the Suslov generation; those who did so betweeen1985 and 1991, the Gorbachev generation; those who did between 1992 and 1999, the Yeltsin generation; those beginning in 2000, the Putin generation; and “graduates from 2010 to 2014 ... the Medvedev generation.”

            The Suslov generation “didn’t believe in Soviet ideals and felt sharply the need for freedom.” Its Gorbachev successor not only felt that need but achieved it. Both these cohorts have thus felt bad about the increasing authoritarianism in Rusia because it has “taken away the feeling of freedom and the possibilities with which they lied in their younger years.”

            Those who entered adulthood as the Yeltsin generation were very different from their predecessors. They suffered from the crises of those years, and members of this cohort “highly value comfort and relative stability.” Consequently, they are much more supportive of the current regime.

            In a certain respect, Pautova says, “this generation recalls the Brezhnev one of 1969-1976 which grew up in the post-war period” and benefited from the relatively well-off “’golden 1970s.’”

            But now a generation is emerging which does not particularly remember the turbulence o the 1990s, she says. For them, either Putin or Medvedev has always been president. And they take relative economic stability as a given. Consequently, this generation, like the Suslov one, is appalled first and foremost by the rampant consumerism and cynicism” of many Russians.

            In saying this, Pautova continues, two qualifications are in order.  On the one hand, far too little is known about this generation to justify as sweeping conclusion.  And on the other, the new generation is deeply split between the 20 percent who follow public events and the 80 percent who only want to focus on their own lives.

            In research conducted last year, she says, 51 percent of young people in Russia between 18 and 30 said they were not keeping track of developments in Ukraine and were largely indifferent to them and to what is going on in other neighboring countries, despite the attention such events get in the state media.

            Pautova nonetheless believes that the new generation may make a difference. She cites the findings of her colleague Olga Kryshtanovskaya who found growing dissatisfaction with the existing political system in Russia not among young people in the capitals but also in the regions as well.

            “It is completely possible,” she suggests, that this generation will have its own ideas about how the authorities need to be changed.” And she gives as an example research findings showing that “among young people, Zhirinovsky is very popular and chauvinist attitudes are in general growing.”

            But how actively such young people will pursue these goals remains an open question.  Many of them are actively involved in social networks where they create and even experience “the illusion of activity” with “likes and reposts replacing genuine action.  An individual pushes a button and it seems to him that he has done something, but this is not so.”

Window on Eurasia: Russians Increasingly Nostalgic for Soviet System, Poll Finds



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – An increasing share of Russians say they are nostalgic for the Soviet system with the number indicating that they support for democracy and free markets or the political system they now live under has fallen in recent years, according to the results of a new poll by the Levada Center.

            Asked whether they would like to live in a “Soviet” political system, in a Western democratic one, or in one like the current Russian one, 39 percent said they favored the Soviet one, up from 29 percent in 2012, and 19 percent said the current Russian one, down from 36 percent in 2008. Twenty-one percent favored democracy (svpressa.ru/society/article/82947/).

            Fifty-four percent said they favored a planned economy; only 29 percent, down from 48 percent in 1992 said they backed a free market economy. On the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal yesterday, Svetlana Gomzikova reported the explanations three Moscow experts give for this turning away from democracy and free markets and back to the Soviet system among Russians. 

            Yury Latov, an economist at the Plekhanov Russian Economic University, says that this pattern reflects the human tendency as people get older to view the past in rosy tones while forgetting the darker aspects of earlier times and to assume that the grass is greener wherever one is not.

            Both of these tendencies are exacerbated as the model in question recedes in time. Moreover, he says, such attitudes reflect the unwelcome fact that “over the last 20 some years, we have not been able to build an effective model of a market economy.”  That failure too helps to explain why Russians look back with nostalgia to the Soviet system.

            If Russians remembered the Soviet past more accurately or if they were able to be transferred back there by a time machine, Latov continues, they would quickly ask to be returned even to Russia’s far from perfect political and economic system because they would see that as bad as it is for many, it is better for most than was the Soviet one.

            Mikhail Neyzhmakov, the head of the Moscow Center for Political Research of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements, says that the attitudes revealed by the latest poll reflect changes in the information environment in which Russians live.

            “Our citizens today live in a completely different information environment” than did they or their parents. In the 1990s, the Russian media stressed what was wrong with the Soviet past; now this “tonality has changed” and the Soviet past is presented as more favorable.  Given their current problems, many Russians thus assume it was better.

            Another factor at work, Neyzhmakov suggests, are the comments of those who are opposed to the Putin regime.  They attack it so sharply that many Russians are inclined to believe that the Soviet system must have been better, even though few in the opposition would want them to reach that conclusion.

            But the underlying cause of this nostalgia, he concludes, is that democracy is something very new for Russians and that many of them are supporters of a “paternalistic” system that takes care of them.  That leads to an idealization of a system that did so, however poorly, and means that support for paternalism will continue for a long time regardless of the state of the economy.

            And Academician Oleg Bogomolov suggests that for Russians, an “ideal model” would include “equality, justice, and a socially oriented economy.”  That is what Russians want, “but this is not the Soviet model,” whatever they believe.  Instead, it is a mixed economy one that could be described as “a slightly modernized NEP [the New Economic Policy of the 1920s].”

Window on Eurasia: Ukraine is as Ukrainian as the Russian Federation is Russian



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – Despite the frequent appearance of maps showing a large swatch of Ukraine being ethnic Russian, Ukraine in terms of the ethnic composition of its population is almost exactly as Ukrainian as the Russian Federation is Russian. Moreover, none of Ukraine is defined as an ethnic autonomy while nearly half of the territory of the Russian Federation is.

            As Rashit Akhmetov, the editor of “Zvezda Povolzhya,” points out in the new issue of his Kazan weekly, 77 percent of the population of Ukraine consists of ethnic Ukrainians according to the latest census.  In the Russian Federation, 80 percent of the population consists of ethnic Russians (no. 7, February 27, 2014, p. 1).

            Given various problems with the censuses especially in Russia where various experts have suggested there was an over-count of several million ethnic Russians (along with an over-count of slightly fewer non-Russians in the North Caucasus), that puts the two countries in a statistical dead heat as far as ethnic homogeneity is concerned.

            Moreover, Ukraine does not have even nominally ethno-federalism: its only autonomy is Crimea which is explicitly defined in non-ethnic terms. Russia in contrast has 21 autonomous ethnic republics, and before Vladimir Putin began his amalgamation program, they formed 53 percent. Now, they form slightly less than half of the territory.

            Consequently, if Moscow and Western commentators who routinely draw a picture of Ukraine as if it were almost equally and deeply divided between a Ukrainian center and west and a Russian east were to prepare analogous ethnic maps for the Russian Federation, the latter country would look to be a better candidate for coming apart than is Ukraine. 

                At present, Akhmetov points out, there are seven million ethnic Russians in Ukraine alongside 41 million ethnic Ukrainians. And in the eastern parts of the country where many assume ethnic Russians dominate, ethnic Ukrainians do in most. Thus, 70 percent of the population of Kharkhiv oblast is ethnically Ukrainian, and 57 percent of Odessa oblast is as well.

            It is true, the Kazan editor acknowledges, that the eastern oblast overwhelmingly vote for the party of power, just as ethnic Russians in Russia tend to do. But the ethnic Russians in both places will do so even if the party of power changes.  As soon as one party of power loses to another, this portion of the population will follow.

            “In the USSR,” he recalls, “there were 16 million communists,” but their power and their support disappeared “over the course of three days.”

            “The myth of the pro-Russia orientation of the eastern oblasts of Urkaine is one thought u by Moscow propaganda,” Akhmetov says.  These regions “are not seeking to unite with Russia,” and not just because 70 percent of the population of these regions is ethnically Ukrainian.  It is because “they want to live in Ukraine” and not in Putin’s Russia.

            It is certainly true, he continues, that ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine do not like what Moscow is describing as “fascists” and “bandits.” But neither do Ukrainians. And the Kazan editor says that he ‘suspects that there are more fascists in Russia today than there are ‘Banderites’ in Ukraine.

            Akhmetov’s own republic, Tatarstan, he says, has been interested in European integration since the 1990s. Indeed, that republic’s president at the time, Mintimir Shaymiyev declared that his strategic goals was “to transform Tatarstan into a model European region of Russia.”

            According to the editor, “the first steps of the ‘Europeanization’ of Russia are completely possible in Tatarstan. The republic should receive the status of ‘a free European political zone,’” and it should be possible to locate certain European institutions in Kazan, such as a branch of the European Human Rights Court.

            Russia would benefit from this, Akhmetov argues; it will not benefit and will be harmed “by a confrontation with Europe.”

            But the Moscow media suggest that many in the Russian capital do not understand this and do not recognize that it cannot rely on force or its own Black Hundreds organizations and hope to both remain in power and to modernize the country.

            If Putin changes course at home and in relations with Europe, he could become “a major historical figure like Peter the Great.”  But if he does not, the future for him and his country – and one should add the countries around it and the world – will be far, far bleaker.