Monday, May 30, 2022

Ossetian Blogger Fears Residents of Russia will Recognize What Putin is Doing Too Late to Stop Him

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – An Ossetian who blogs under the screen name “Angry Iron” says that he does not understand Ossetians who back Putin’s war in Ukraine and fears that they and others in Russia like them will not come to their senses until after the GULAG and all the other repressive features of the Soviet Union are restored.

            His words capture the hopes and fears of many who are beginning to see the light about what Putin is about (t.me/angryiron/906 reposted at idel-ural.org/en/archives/isnt-it-fascism-to-rent-apartments-in-the-russian-federation-only-to-slavs-why-do-indigenous-peoples-have-even-more-reasons-not-to-support-the-special-operation-than-everyone-else/):

People who back Putin in what he calls the “fight against Nazism” in a war against a foreign country don’t want to notice what’s going on at home, real domestic fascism? Or have you been used to it?  … Learn to think critically. And if you begin to think critically, you will become afraid of what the bald man (Putin) has done.

Don’t think that with the economic blockade everything will be like it was in the Soviet Union and we will build communism.  The botox-lover (Putin) is surrounded by oligarch-thieves, to whom, as 2014 showed, he has given enormous funds to keep himself afloat. What about ordinary people? Don’t you remember Medvedev’s “there is no money, but don’t give up”.

Talk of “we survived the 90s and will survive again” has no basis other than stupidity and shortsightedness. Now we find ourselves in international isolation, while in the 1990s we had a market that was absolutely open to any kind of supply, and people could go to Poland and bring something to sell.

Shall we hope for China? If China will supply anything, it will be at exorbitant prices, and most likely by smuggling … Chinese businesses do not want to risk their world markets for the sake of the crazy dwarf (Putin), especially because purchasing power of the ruble has fallen to unprecedented levels and will continue falling.

And we have absolutely nothing of our own. Even for oil and gas production foreign equipment is used.

Another argument against ‘wet dreams’ about the USSR restoration is the example of such countries as Iran and North Korea. Have these countries progressed much during the period of isolation? Not at all. Poverty reigns there and there is a complete lack of prospects for the future.

Very soon common people, now salivating in defense of the old maniac (Putin), will realize that they are even poorer. That all the money would go to support the army, the police, and propagandists. Construction projects are already stopping, prices in stores are going up, financing is starting to rapidly decline, because we need money for new tanks, and one tank costs so much that it could support the budget of the republic for a month.

In the past, everyone comforted themselves with the mantra “the main thing is that there is no war. But aren’t our loved ones dying in war now?

All these factors indicate that once again the government is lying, lying about being ready for sanctions, lying about fighting Nazism, lying about a “military operation”. But most people do not understand this, digesting the propaganda mush in their heads and believing that all around are enemies.

They will realize something only when they have nothing to eat, and when they go out hungry into the streets, they will be beaten by well-fed cops, and then tried by well-fed, fat judges. But it will be too late to do anything. And if we return to the USSR, it will be a poor country without any prospects for our future or the future of our children.

‘Finlandization’ as Policy Choice Now ‘in Dustbin of History,’ Grani Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – During the Cold War, Finland maintained its own social, economic and political system by not doing anything that could anger its eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union, a policy that not only acquired the name “Finlandization” but also has become a favored recommendation by some in the West for other countries faced with similar challenges.

            But now that Finland, together with historically “neutral” Sweden, has applied for membership in NATO, that policy has come to an end in the country which gave it its name, along with neutrality elsewhere in the face of Russian aggression, according to the editors of the Grani portal (graniru.org/Politics/World/Europe/m.285159.html).

            Today the voices of the most inveterate promoters of cooperation with Russia are being drowns out by others who recognize as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas recently put it that “peace cannot be the final goal if it means that aggression pays off” (twitter.com/kajakallas/status/1524382478173188103).

            “Experts are unanimous,” Grani says, “that Sweden and Finland will not only go under the nuclear umbrella NATO officers but will be donors to European security … Now, the Baltic Sea will become completely a NATO body of water; and NATO policy makers will be in a position to think even more broadly about security issues far from its core concerns.

            But what is most important, the portal suggests, is that people of good will will stop telling the Ukrainians who are fighting for their lives that Finlandization is a good idea and that the Ukrainians should respond to Russian aggression by adopting that policy rather than continue to fight for their right to control their own fate.

            Although the editors of Grani do not raise the point, the end of neutrality they do speak about also applies to those governments on the territory of the former Soviet space who are trying to adopt the same strategy Finland did in the past, an approach most often known as “a balanced foreign policy.” In the age of Putinist aggression, that is not a viable option.

            Such countries will have to make a choice; and one can only hope that the West will provide them with sufficient support that they will be able to make one that will benefit themselves and their nations rather than put them under the yoke of the Kremlin once again. 

Stalin’s Deportation Forced Ingush to Adopt Endogamy, Dzaurova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – For most of their history, Ingush married other Ingush or members of other nationalities with little or no preference to their own nationality and language; but Stalin’s deportation forced them to adopt endogamy as the only way to ensure the survival of their nation and its language, Ingush ethnographer Tanzila Dzaurova says.

            According to the Magas scholar, Stalin’s deportation of her nation was “directed not so much at the physical destruction of the people as at its assimilation” to other, larger nations like the Russians or the Kazakhs, a fact seldom reported but clear from the historical record (etokavkaz.ru/obshchestvo/desyat-voprosov-pro-ingushei).

            After the Ingush were deported to Central Asia, she continues, the Soviet authorities issued a special order that “anyone of them who married a Kazakh or a Russian would be freed from the status of a special settler and would receive all the privileges of the local population.” That threatened the survival of the Ingush nation, and so community elders took steps.

            The teips declared that “until we become larger, let us form families only with other Ingush, Dzaurova says. And in the years since, even after the return from deportation, “Ingush do not so much condemn inter-ethnic marriages as prefer to form families with members of their own nationality.”

            The Ingush ethnographer’s report challenges the general view that Stalin’s deportations were intended to destroy the nations involved physically. It suggests that in fact the Kremlin dictator was pursuing a far more sophisticated policy of destruction by assimilation, a policy that his successors have continued.

            And consequently, there is every reason to believe that endogamy is likely to become stronger as the Ingush nation becomes smaller and that other smaller peoples may shift to that pattern not because it was part of their historical tradition but in response to the assimilationist challenges from the Russian authorities.

Virtual Front Every Bit as Active as Real One in Putin’s War on Ukraine, Belovodyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – Although it has attracted less attention than conventional battles on the ground between the Russian invaders and the Ukrainian defenders, the virtual front between the two is every bit as much as intense as the other, with Moscow calling it “a massive cyberoperation against our country” and Kyiv labeling it “the first cyber world war.”

            In an article for The Daily Storm, journalist Daniil Belovodyev surveys what each side has done, a task complicated to some extent by wartime secrecy and the element of deniability that invariably exists in this kind of conflict (dailystorm.ru/rassledovaniya/unikalnaya-myasorubka-hroniki-pervoy-mirovoy-kibervoyny).

            What he shows is that “while forces of the Russian regular army have advanced deep into the territory of Ukraine, in virtual space, Russia has been forced to occupy a defensive position,” with Moscow struggling not only to counter particular attacks but to come up with the organization of new administrative arrangements to organize this defense.

            Belovodyev also documents the ways in which the Russian authorities have reached out to criminal groups to help them in their defense of the country against Ukrainian cyberattacks, an approach that has further integrated the political and criminal worlds in the Russia of Vladimir Putin. Ukraine in contrast has reached out to the international community for assistance.

            Perhaps the most intriguing finding of the journalist’s investigation is that both Moscow and Kyiv to impose some order on their efforts in this area have had to go public with information that permits those who want to follow the course of this virtual battle to do so, thus tearing apar the veil of secrecy normally thrown over military operations.

‘Silovikization’ of Russian Politics Intensifying, Kolesnik Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – No non-Russian language has an equivalent word for silovik, even though what that term refers to – people in the force structures – exists in many countries, but the silovikization of Russian life has gone further than anywhere else and so it is appropriate that this Russian term remains Russian, Natalya Kolesnik says.

            The senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of Sociology says that Russia does not show any signs of what researchers refer to as a military autocracy, “but one of the factors which has promoted the growth of the silovikization in society is the active penetration of representatives of the force structures in civil institutions” (gorod-812.ru/ne-silnaya-vlast/).

            The employees of the force structures, the siloviki, currently form 3.5 percent of the total number of Russians employed in all forms of activities, “approximately four times greater than the number of siloviki relative to total population in developed countries,” the sociologist continues.

            But what is most important is not their number but their penetration of institutions not normally viewed as part of the force structures. Since Putin came to power, they form about 25 percent of all the political elite of Russia; and as much as 58 percent of the entourage of the president. Both figures, Kolesnik says, are continuing to rise.

            One of the segments of the elite where their numbers are increasing especially rapidly is the corps of governors. The dominance of the siloviki among governors in the North Caucasus has long been the case, but this group is now expanding its presence among governors across the entire country.

            To some extent, Kolesnik suggests, Russia is just a more extreme case of what is  happening in many places. She cites the late Juan Linz as concluding that in recent decades the military has expanded its role to domestic affairs and now focuses on “internal wars” and not just foreign ones.

Trial of Ingush Policemen who Refused to Obey Orders to Disperse March 2019 Protest Finally Begins

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – After repeated delays, the trial of 12 Ingush policemen who refused to obey orders to use force to disperse a protest in Magas in May 2019 has finally begun. The policemen who were fired after the incident continue to insist on their innocence, and their lawyers say that the authorities have no case but are likely to get convictions anyway.

            As in the case of the Ingush Seven against the leaders of that protest, the authorities appear to be drawing out this case as long as possible, delaying its opening and then declaring long intervals until future sessions – the next will be on May 25, apparently hoping that passions will cool.

            But this case is if anything more of a problem for the powers than the other because it involves the power structures themselves. If police refuse to obey orders to suppress protesters, that is a far greater challenge to the authorities in Magas and Moscow that are those who actually take part in demonstrations.

            Moreover, the testimony the defense is likely to offer will only highlight the fact that the police refused to act lest the protest dissolve into bloody violence and that it was their political masters in the republic and in Moscow that apparently wanted that or were at least prepared to accept it.

            That will deepen the divide between the people and the authorities and leave the former more alienated and hostile to the latter than they are even now. (On this case, see fortanga.org/2022/05/nachalos-rassmotrenie-dela-ingushskih-policzejskih-pytavshihsya-predotvratit-nasilie-na-mitinge/ and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/376131/.)

Russian Police Now Using Upsurge in Bomb Threats Against Anti-War Protesters

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – Telephone bomb threats in Russia have become so common that Russian police are exploiting the situation by charging potential protesters with being behind them, a tactic that allows the authorities to hold such people even without evidence for 48 hours and thus disrupt their ability to organize demonstrations.

            This tactic, which has been documented over the last two weeks in St. Petersburg, is easier for the police to use than to open criminal cases against protesters and effective in that it gets those who want to protest out of the way without imposing real burdens on investigators and the legal system.

            (For interviews with the victims of this tactic and with anonymous officials who confirm this is what they are doing, see fontanka.ru/2022/03/05/70489001/, paperpaper.ru/kak-siloviki-izobreli-i-oprobovali-no/#stk-3 and meduza.io/feature/2022/05/14/politsiya-peterburga-pridumala-novyy-sposob-izolyatsii-aktivistov-nakanune-mitingov-ih-ob-yavlyayut-podozrevaemymi-v-telefonnom-terrorizme-i-zaderzhivayut-na-48-chasov

            As a tactic, this approach may serve the police well; but as a strategy, it may come back to haunt the authorities more generally. That is because it is likely to lead ever more Russians to view all bomb threats as the work of the anti-war underground even when they are not and thus conclude that popular resistance to Putin’s war in Ukraine is even greater than it is.