Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 15 – The economic
crisis at the time of the collapse of the USSR forced Moscow to relax its
traditional hyper-centralization of all aspects of life and cede more powers to
the regions and republics. Now, the same process and for the same reason is
beginning again, something all republic leaders should be alive to, Tatar
historian Rafael Khakimov says.
And that possibility means that they
should focus on the opportunities they failed to take advantage of 25 years ago
so that they will be able to respond more adequately if greater freedom for
republics and regions again becomes possible, according to the former advisor
to Mintimir Shaymiyev, the first president of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Khakimov, who has long been among
the most thoughtful advocates of genuine federalism in Russia, makes these two
interrelated arguments in an interview with Ramazan Alpaut for the Kavkazr
portal (kavkazr.com/a/poteryaet-li-moskva-status-tsentra/28231691.html)
and in an article in Kazan’s “Business-Gazeta” (business-gazeta.ru/article/334361).
At
least in modern times, Russia has always been over-centralized, with not only
political power but also economic and transportation arrangements organized to
maintain the centrality of Moscow. But there have been times when economic problems
have forced the center to reduce this centralization in the hopes of getting the
country’s economy moving again.
Today
appears to be one of those times. Not only has Moscow allowed the North Caucasus
republics to develop their air connections with each other and with other
regions without going through the center, but some in the Duma are urging more
fiscal federalism (znak.com/2017-01-14/regionam_predlozheno_vernut_pravo_imet_svoi_nalogovye_sistemy).
Khakimov notes that
hypercentrallization is “an inheritance of the Soviet union when everything was
done through Moscow.” But even today there is little chance of quickly changing
that even if everyone can see that the regions and republics would become
stronger as a result and the country as a whole would thus benefit.
What are needed, he argues, are “transportation
hubs” to link regions and republics together, although there is currently a
great deal of debate as to whether the hubs should be created first to promote
economic ties or the regions should seek to development these ties as the basis
for the emergence of the hubs.
Tatarstan both because of Moscow’s
insistence and its own choice has chosen the second approach: “we will open
such flights but out resources are limited.” That is how Moscow wants it
because its control over transportation networks gives it control over the
economy and the opportunity to extract even more resources from the regions.
Those at the center are very much
aware that “if they lose this, then Moscow will become simply a region and not
the center” it is and want to remain. But history suggests that Moscow will give
ground to the regions and republics whenever there’s an economic crisis. It did
so “at the end of the 1990s when Yeltsin didn’t know what to do” and it is
beginning to do so again.
The regions and republics need to be
ready to seize any such opportunities, Khakimov says, and the best way to do
that is to examine “the missed opportunities” they failed to take advantage of
in the 1990s and to consider “what could have been done better” in order to
make better choices now and in the future.
“The historical opportunities for
the selection of a path of development are always limited by the political,
economic, financial and cadres situation. It is of course possible to
fantasize,” but that won’t help unless one has the necessary resources
available and ducks in line to do something, the former Shaymiyev says.
But “at the same time,” he continues,
“there exist moments of historic choice when the course of history depends on
you.” Tatarstan faced several of those
moments. When Kazan got the opportunity
to control its own economy, it had the chance to become an oil exporter and no
more, a choice Russia as a whole made.
“In Moscow they supposed that the market
woud solve all problems,” Khakimov continues, “but we on the other hand
listened to the opinion of the guys from Harvard who showed with the help of
graphs the danger of dependence on raw materials alone.” That led Shaymiyev to focus on high
technology instead.
In 1996, Kazan even developed a
plan, identified “for internal use” as “Tatarstan after Oil,” to guide this
process, something that has been the foundation of all the successes the Middle
Volga republic has had since that time.
But that doesn’t mean that Tatarstan and its leaders were always right,
the historian notes.
“History knows the phenomenon of
missed opportunities. Had there not been the Islamic revolution of Uzbek Khan, capitalism
would have arisenwith us in the 14th and 15th centuries
as t did in the south of Europe. Had Lenin lived longer, then Russia most
likely mmost have gone along a social democratic path,” and not become the
dictatorship Stalin imposed.
Kazan made the right choice to push
quickly for building the Kul Sharif mosque. Had it waited, it probably wouldn’t
have been able to do it at all. But it was slow to move toward the Latinization
of its alphabet and lost the opportunity to do so for some time, especially
since Moscow has prohibited it as a violation of the Russian Constitution.
“What then is the historical lesson
here? This was a missed opportunity.”
Had Tatarstan moved more quickly, it might have succeeded and the West
would have been shown an example of “Russian pluralism,” something that would
have been better for Tatarstan and for Russia as a whole.
Consequently, Khakimov concludes, “the
study of missed opportunities gaves us a chance to make fewer mistakes in the future.”
No comments:
Post a Comment