Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 24 – Drawing analogies
between Putin’s United Russia Party and the CPSU has become the most banal and
at the same time the most deceptive activities, Oleg Kashin says, because between
the superficial similarities, the current Kremlin dictator has completely
reversed the roles of the ruling party and the state apparatus.
In Soviet times, he points out, the CPSU had a real corporate sense of itself and dominated the facade known as the state; in Putin's time, however, United Russia has no collective sense or ability to dominate the state. It is controlled entirely by that state instead
(publizist.ru/blogs/33/16821/-)
(publizist.ru/blogs/33/16821/-)
Comparing the two parties nonetheless is a temptation many fall for, the Moscow commentator says. “The Soviet communists
voted unanimously; the United Russia party members do the same. The communists
greeted their leaders with ovations; the United Russia ones do the same; the communists
talked about milk production and foreign policy, and so does United Russia.”
“How could one fail not to compare the one
with the other?” Kashin asks rhetorically .
But such a comparison, he argues, is “not only cheap but inexact and unjust.”
United Russia “is not simply not the CPSU but it is its opposite, and the
similarity of certain external manifestations only confuses things.”
The CPSU from Lenin’s time to almost the end of
Gorbachev’s was “as Stalin precisely described it a kind of crusader order, an
almost religious organization” initially based on fanaticism and then on
corruption but one which “maintained its sectarian structure, iron discipline
and independent essence,” the commentator says.
That “permitted the party structures over the course
of the entire Soviet period to subordinate to itself the weak and almost in all
regards decorative state to itself, Kashin says.
“With the United Russia party members, everything is
strictly the reverse: their organization is a decorative structure which
imitates a political party in the interests of a self-sufficient and
expansionist state power.” It has none of the behind the scenes structures that
allowed the CPSU to play the role that it did.
In fact, Kashin continues, “even in comparison with
other semi-virtual and Kremlin-controlled systemic parties, United Russia looks
paler than any other.” The KPRF, LDPR and others, “including the
non-parliamentary parties, have at least limited opportunities for independent
action and negotiation with the powers that be. United Russia doesn’t.
It is thus “the most unpolitical, the most fake and
the weakest” of all Russian parties. It has no “I.” And in this it represents “the
VIP version” of the exchange Russians are said to have made with the
government, giving up any chance to influence policy in exchange for access to
resources.
In “the best case,” United Russia follows the orders
of the Kremlin; in the worst, its members are charged with crimes. As a result,
future historians may describe it as “the most horrific political anomaly of the
Putin period, a party which gives the impression that it exists” when it in
fact doesn’t.
Were United Russia to “suddenly disappear,” this
would have no consequences; and its existence in this form appears to reflect
Vladimir Putin’s distrust of any organization or structure that might take a
position independent of his own and thus opposed to him. He has subordinated everything
else; with United Russia, he has “done the same thing with the Russian ruling
class.”
With United Russia’s help, the Russian bureaucracy
and those beyond it who are close to the Kremlin have had all ambitions
stripped away and even the sense that the nobility had in tsarist times and the
nomenklatura did in Soviet times that it has “any of its own rights and
interests.”
Under the Putin system, “the Russian elite cannot
have its own interests, and possibly that is why United Russia exists,” Kashin
says. It “reduces those who could have
been a real ruling class to the role of a speechless and applauding mass.”
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