In Wake of Defeat in Ukraine, Putin Likely to Bring War Home to Russia Itself, Yerofeyev Says

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 15 – As his defeat in Ukraine becomes ever more likely and as he retains the capacity to defend himself against a palace coup, Vladimir Putin almost certainly will bring the war he launched abroad back to Russia and direct it against the Russian people in order to save his own position, Sergey Yerofeyev says.

            The US-based Russian analyst suggests that Putin will shift his attention from the Ukrainians and focus instead on “his chief enemy, the Russians” – or mor precisely on “all those who are against him” for whatever reason (reforum.io/blog/2022/10/15/kak-vojna-v-ukraine-mozhet-perejti-v-vojnu-v-rossii/).

            “This war is already going on; the question is only its degree or as some politologists like to say of its hybridity, or in the growth of the number of active Putin opponents,” Yerofeyev says. But there is now a high probability that Putin is preparing to dispatch the army and other siloviki against Russian cities, given that he can’t stop fighting even if he loses in one place.

            Undoubtedly Putin would refer to this effort as “a counter-terrorist operation” and blame the Ukrainians and the West for what is taking place; but it will be more massive than any Russia has seen before and likely resemble the trial balloon effort Putin has already put in place in Belarus.

            How much resistance there will be is a matter of speculation, although mobilization has the effect of putting more guns into the hands of the population. At present, “events are accelerating and Putin is losing what has been his main weapon, the gradual heating up of the frog rather than tossing him into boiling water.”

            Before announcing mobilization, the Kremlin leader had managed to avoid a radical shock to the population because of his decision to invade Ukraine; but how he has crossed that Rubicon. However, he will certainly use lies and euphemisms to “mask the transfer of the war to Russia’s own territory.”

            The Kremlin leader, the commentator says, will have to avoid declaring martial law because that “by definition” implies the possibility of defeat. He will need to present the threat as quite large and thus requiring major moves but “at the same time as marginal,” lest he admit that there is already a civil war going on or that “some Anglo-Saxons are already present.”

            To gain some short-term successes, “Putin will have to eliminate the remnants of all civil and economic structures” because “for him, the main danger at least at first will not be open armed uprisings but the structure of the Russian bureaucracy.” That is the backbone of the country and if it begins to crack, he knows he is finished.

            “It may sound paradoxical,” Yerofeyev continues, “but it is Putin’s open war against the Russians as a modern nation of the future that may give them a chance to redeem themselves for what Russia is doing in Ukraine whether they become a confederation or not and rid Northern Eurasia of Russian imperialism and the threat of new nuclear blackmail.”

            If the Russian people stand up and successfully defeat Putin’s war against them, he argues, that could happen even though at present, “such a scenario seems no more likely than a palace coup.” But history teaches that such things are possible and while the human costs in the short term would be high, the long-term benefits would be far greater.

            Because “Putin’s resources to maintain himself in power now exceed the costs of his defeat in Ukraine,” Yerofeyev says, “it is unlikely that it will be possible to avoid a war inside Russia.” What Russians and others need to think about now is how to keep it as short and as bloodless as possible.