Monday, December 8, 2025

Violence along Tajikistan-Afghanistan Border has Many Causes and Involves Many Countries

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – Three outbreaks of violence along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border took place at the end of November, the first two between Tajik border guards and Taliban militants from Afghanistan and the third involving a drone attack from Afghanistan against a gold field in Tajikistan, as a result of which three Chinese workers died.

            There has been violence off and on along that border for some time, and the latest round appears to reflect all the issues that have triggered such clashes in the past: water shortages likely to intensify as a result of Afghanistan’s new reservoirs, anger about Chinese workers in the region, and the interest of Russia in promoting closer ties between Moscow and Dushanbe.

            Because detailed information on the clashes is now available and because the number of potential causes and possible participants is so large, reporting about them is both scanty and contradictory, a pattern that precludes any final judgment as to what took place and why. There are just too many possibilities.

            Among the most useful reports highlighting this diversity are cronos.asia/centralnaya-aziya/tadzhikistan/border-tjk-afg-2025, stanradar.com/news/full/58819-kto-stoit-za-napadeniem-na-grazhdan-kitaja-na-prigranichnyh-territorijah-tadzhikistana.html, orda.kz/zoloto-pjandzha-iz-za-chego-streljajut-na-granice-tadzhikistana-i-afganistana-i-pri-chem-tut-kitaj-409842/, timesca.com/tajik-border-guards-clash-with-taliban-fighters-along-afghan-border/ and scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3334409/3-chinese-citizens-killed-tajik-afghan-border-clash.

Moscow Promises Response to Faroe Islands’ New Ban on Russian Fishing Ships Entering Its Ports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – The Faroe Islands, a Danish territory which enjoys broad autonomy, has banned ships operated by two Russian fishing companies from entering its ports, a dramatic increase of its 2022 restrictions on Russian shipping in its waters and a step that the Russian foreign ministry says it is considering what steps to take in response. 

            On December 3, the parliament of the Faroe Islands autonomy voted 17 to 12 to take this step; and the islands executive branch imposed it two days later (cfts.org.ua/news/2025/12/05/farerski_ostrovi_zaboronili_zakhoditi_do_svokh_portiv_sudnam_rosiyskikh_kompaniy_85179).  

            Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova said that Moscow was now considering how to respond, noting that the Russian government had not taken any steps three years ago when the Faroes government joined most but not all of the EU sanctions regime against Russia (rg.ru/2025/12/04/zaharova-prokommentirovala-prisoedinenie-farerskih-ostrovov-k-sankciiam-protiv-rf.html).

            Because of the importance of fishing to the Faeroes economy, its government has been less willing than Copenhagen to take harsh measures against Russian actions in the past, something Moscow has played on as it has in other islands in the northeastern Atlantic like Svalbard and Aaland.

            That has raised the specter that Moscow might try to use these islands for an initial military move against NATO, and the Faeros’ new decision suggests that that threat is prompting the governments of these islands to move closer to that of the governments of the states of which they are a part.

            For background on these islands, their relations with Moscow since 2022, and the risks of their becoming targets of a Russian military move, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/with-trump-again-talking-about.html and the sources cited therein.

Central Asian Diasporas in US Increasingly Organized and Active

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – Compared to the attention the Ukrainian, Armenian, and Baltic diasporas in the US received, the smaller and newer diasporas of the five Central Asian countries still attract relatively little, although their numbers and activities, including political and lobbying efforts are growing, Asia Today reports.

            As is true of other diaspora groups, the US census shows far fewer members of these groups than their leaders claim, the result of partial assimilation and the possibility that some of the members of these groups are in the US illegally, the regional news agency says (asia-today.news/05122025/7329/).

            But they are clearly growing in size and increasingly forming their own organizations to take part in broader public life, including political life, in the United States, Asia today says; and consequently, they already deserve more attention from scholars and activists than they have received.

The Uzbek diaspora is the largest. Its leaders estimate that there are now as many as 250,000 ethnic Uzbeks in the US, far more than recent census have shown. They have two important organizations, and they have begun to attract the attention of some American politicians, including the newly elected mayor of New York city.

There are approximately 50,000 Kyrgyz in the US, most of whom are concentrated in major cities, where they have formed a Kyrgyz Social Center to support community activities and participate in public life. Therea re some 100,000 Kazakhs, who are also concentrated in major cities.

The Tajik diaspora in the US is much smaller, approximately six thousand in all, but it has created two broad organizations, the Tajik Community in the USA and the Tajik American cultural Association (TACA). The Turkmen diaspora is very small and maintains close ties with the Turkmenistan embassy in Washington. 

Opposition Parties in Karelia Walk Out of Parliament to Protest ‘Hegemony’ of United Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – Russia’s so-called “systemic” opposition parties, those which are able to elect deputies to parliaments at one or another level, seldom display much courage in Moscow, but in federal subjects far from the capital, they are increasingly speaking out against what some call “the hegemony” of United Russia, that country’s ruling political party.

            The latest and in some ways the most radical of these moves had taken place in Karelia where deputies who are members of opposition parties walked out of a session of parliament  after United Russia refused to have a discussion of their proposed amendments to the budget (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/v-karelii-deputaty-parlamenta-usli-s-zasedania-v-znak-protesta-protiv-gegemonii-edinoj-rossii/441843).

            KPRF, Just Russia and Yabloko deputies walked out after United Russia used its position in the parliament to block any discussion of the 73 amendments to the 2026 budget that the three had proposed. After a rules committee said they should all be rejected out of hand, United Russia leaders of the parliament said discussion of the entire measure should not exceed 50 minutes.

            In response, representatives of the three walked out; but that did not prevent United Russia and its allies in the LDPR, Pensioners’ Party and New People group from approving the budget without any of the amendments that the three protesting groups had insisted should be included.

            Despite this failure, the opposition groups won a victory of sorts: They demonstrated that they and not the United Russia bloc is on the side of the population and its needs rather than automatic supporters of the optimization efforts that the Kremlin has insisted on in order to have money for Putin’s war in Ukraine. 

Efforts to Restore Traditional Values Not Integrated into Modernity Invariably End in Disaster, Russia’s ‘Open Expanse’ Telegram Channel Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – Many governments around the world are promoting what they call a return to traditional values, but few of them recognize the most important fact about such efforts: Unless traditions are integrated into modernity, the Open Expanse telegram channel says, they will prove a disaster as has already happened in Cambodia, Afghanistan, China and Iran.

            In places where people feel that change has come to quickly, they often look back to the past and to traditional values as a refuge, the telegram channel says. And governments often make use of this especially if they are ideologically conservative in the first place (t.me/openexpanse/26608 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6932D20E55019).

            What many of the peoples and governments forget is that “the traditional world is not an idyllic space of ‘eternal truths’ but a specific social formation: patriarchal families, harsh hierarchies, low mobility, an agrarian economy, dependence on natural cycles and an enormous amount of labor by hand.”

            In that past, Open Expanse says, “the family was large not because of these values but because children provided free labor and helped the family to survive. Morality then was strict because the survival of the community depended on it. And life then was not hurried because speed was impossible.”

            “But now, humanity lives in a world which is maintained by intensive energy flows, global logistical chains, mass education, the most complex professional specialization and cities where a large part of the population and the economy is concentrated.” Returning to a traditional social structure while preserving the current level of life is “impossible.”

            Nonetheless, in radical ways or less radical ones, those who have tried to do just that have demonstrated that such a course was and is “not simply a utopia. It became [and will become again] a catastrophe,” as Cambodia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and other countries who have adopted radical methods in the pursuit of that goal have shown.

            Meanwhile, “attempts at social traditionalism in Europe and the US, where conservative forces are trying to return ‘the old order,’ by limiting immigration or restoring the ideals of the classical family, look a little less dramatic. But even here the same logic holds: rhetoric returns the symbols but doesn’t change the structures.”

According to Open Expanse, “the main mistake of forced traditionalism is that it attempts to replace modernization processes with moral prescriptions. But morality is a consequence of the material order, not its cause. The family changes because the cost of raising children and the role of women have changed.”

“Society becomes individualistic because the infrastructure allows individuals to live independently. Culture becomes flexible because instant communication exists in the world. It is impossible to restore the old order without destroying the new structures. And the destruction of new structures is always a path to crisis”

The telegram channel continues: “A return to traditions becomes an instrument of power in places where power is afraid of or ceases to see the future. Under the guise of tradition, censorship is strengthened, dissent is suppressed, freedoms are restricted, and competence is replaced by ideology.”

            And Open Expanse concludes that “tradition, transformed into a tool of political control, ceases to be tradition. It turns into a ritual, a decoration, a gesture, a dogma. And a society that tries to live within such a dogma gradually (and over time, with increasing speed) loses its ability to develop.”

            In sum, “preserving traditions is possible – but only as an internal source of energy, and not as a social regulation. Traditions can inspire, but they cannot govern an industrial society. They can be an integral part of identity but not a substitute for modernization mechanisms. They can support values, but not dictate their rules to the economy or demography.”

Ever More Russian Soldiers Wounded in Ukraine – So Putin Stops Publishing Data on Invalids

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec.  5 – Stalin infamously said “no person, no problem.” Putin has pursued that policy in part, but far more often, he has adopted an analogous position, clearly believing that if he orders disturbing data not to be published, then the problem will go away because coverage of it will become more difficult and less widely known.

            The current Kremlin leader has adopted that approach on a variety of issues since he became Russian president and has done so ever more often since his war in Ukraine has featured so many developments that he would prefer not to be covered. The latest result of this approach is that Moscow has stopped publishing key data on invalids.

            As a result, the To Be Precise investigative portal says, “now it is unknown just how much government funding is going for the treatment of invalids and [what may be even more significant] how many adults first received invalid status in 2024” (tochno.st/materials/rosstat-perestal-publikovat-cast-dannyx-ob-invalidnosti).

            The Russian government’s Social Fund, which in the past has been the most important place for data on invalids, stopped publishing data in May 2023, and figures posted on its website then covered only the fourth quarter of 2022, the end of the first year of Putin’s war in Ukraine.

            Its data and those of other government outlets offered global data but none divided into categories which would allow anyone to know exactly how many Russians had become invalids as a result of combat in Ukraine. But there is one indication of that still available: the number of Russians gaining the status of invalid fell by two-thirds from 2004 to 2021 but has risen since.

Sunday, December 7, 2025

‘Gay Conversion Therapy’ Alive and Well in Putin’s Russia, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 4 – Gay conversion therapy, something human rights groups and the United Nations has described as a form of torture, is alive and well in Putin’s Russia given the Kremlin’s anti-LGBT campaign and the fact that polls show that one Russian in four believes that gay people are “sick” and in need of medical treatment.

            According to a survey conducted last year, there are at least 12 LGBT “rehabilitation centers” in various parts of the Russian Federation where inmates are kept in isolation, “forced to undergo ‘spiritual rehabilitation,’ take medications, undergo hypnosis, and even be subjected to violence,” Novaya Gazeta says (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/12/04/a-cure-for-wellness-en).

            Officials at the Initiative for the Prohibition of Conversion Therapy in Russia (https://bctir.org/) say that there are some 16 other such institutions on their list and that the total number of such places in the Russian Federation today “is likely to exceed 30,” a number that reflects the support they have from the Putin regime. 

            The total number of victims of this unethical and immoral process in Russia is unknown, but it is certainly in the hundreds if not more, and the existence of these “hospitals” not only tortures those who are confined to them but casts a dark shadow over all LGBT people in that country because of the threat that officials can send such people to them.

On Anniversary of Franco’s Death, Russian Extreme Right Group Reverses Anti-Fascist Slogan of Spanish Civil War and Declares ‘We Shall Pass’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 4 – During the Spanish Civil War, anti-fascist groups, including many who were allied with the Soviet Union, went into battle with the slogan “They shall not pass.” Last month, on the 50th anniversary of the death of fascist leader Francisco Franco, an extreme right Russian group reversed that and told like-minded people in Spain, “we shall pass.”

            This group of Russian extremists, the Brotherhood of Academicists, not only is promoting an expansive view of Russian power and providing its members with military training but is reaching out to radical right groups across Europe (publico.es/politica/ultras-rusos-entrenamiento-paramilitar-figuran-invitados-cumbre-neofascista-domingo-madrid.html).

            At the end of September, the Brotherhood joined members of the Russian Society of the Two-Headed Eagle, which is supported by Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev who heads the Tsargrad media corporation and has close ties with both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin (publico.es/politica/ultras-rusos-entrenamiento-paramilitar-figuran-invitados-cumbre-neofascista-domingo-madrid.html).

            According to Novaya Gazeta, this is only the latest of an increasing number of contacts between fascist groups in Russia and fascist groups in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, contacts that at least on some occasions have enjoyed the support of Russian officials even though they have not attracted much attention (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2025/12/04/oni-proshli-im-dali-vizu).

            Whether this Moscow-supported neo-fascism will be more successful there and elsewhere in Europe than its earlier anti-fascist assistance remains to be seen, but the fact that the Kremlin now is taking a page from a Stalin-era playbook to promote an opposite outcome to the one it suffered at the end of the 1930s certainly deserves more attention. 

For Russians Under 30, Most Significant Book is Orwell’s ‘1984’; for All Russians, It’s Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 4 – The Russian Field polling agency, at the request of Aleksandr Asafov, a member of the Social Chamber, surveyed Russians on which books were in their minds the most significant for them. The differences between Russians under 30 and those older than that are striking.

            Those under 30 listed George Orwell’s 1984 first, followed by Tolstoy’s War and Peace, the Harry Potter books, Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, the Bible and the Constitution. For Russians as a whole, the top spot was occupied by War and Peace, followed by Ostrovsky’s How the Steel was Forged and Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita (kommersant.ru/doc/8251546).

            For Russians as a whole, Orwell’s anti-utopia was fifth, largely the result of young people putting it first. In 15th place was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s GULAG Archipelago; and in 17th place was the Koran, with one percent of all Russians naming the former and only 0.3 percent of all Russians the latter.   

Russia Now has Third Highest Divorce Rate in the World, Sparking Debate on What Can Be Done

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 5 – The percentage of marriages in the Russian Federation that end in divorce is approaching 80 percent, according to Moscow experts, a figure that puts that country third among the states of the world and is sparking a debate on what if anything can be done to reverse it, Elena Rychkova says.

            As often with social problems in Russia, the Nakanune journalist says, officials and politicians have generally concluded that the most effective means is through the use of law, insisting that those thinking about divorce go through psychological counseling and pay fines if they go ahead with divorce anyway (nakanune.ru/articles/124159/

            But these legal measures do not appear to be working, Rychkova says, because they often can do little to solve either the personal or social problems that have  led to the breakdown of marriages – and that unless those are addressed, the number of divorces will likely increase and hence the number of children born continue to fall.

            Psychologists report some success for those who agree to counseling, but they note that those who agree to such a procedure voluntarily are certainly among the relatively small percentage of Russian couples who want to save their marriages but need a little help if they are to do so.

            Religious figures and sociologists now view the rising divorce rate and what can be done about it differently. The religious place the blame on the fact that unlike in the past when most Russians married very early and had little life experience, now, most marriages take place much later when individuals have had a chance to learn more about life.

            The sociologists in contrast say that the breakdown of the traditional Russian community at the end of tsarist times and the collapse of the social supports for family life, including free kindergartens and the like in Soviet times is to blame. Doing anything about either at least for the foreseeable future seems unlikely, and so divorces will grow whatever else Moscow does.

            That will push down further the birthrate, these experts suggest, and make Putin’s call for boosting fertility rates almost impossible to achieve anytime soon if ever.

Saturday, December 6, 2025

With New Tax Arrangements, Kremlin Sacrificing Regional Interests but Likely to Hurt Residents of Moscow as Well, 'The Insider' Says

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – The new tax arrangements adopted in mid-November are already creating “serious problems for Russia’s regions” because they mean that even more money will flow not to them but to Moscow, a shift that will lead to rising prices in the first instance in remote areas, Berta Shapiro of The Insider portal says.

            That is the latest installment of the Kremlin’s decision to “sacrifice regional development, business, healthcare and education” so as to have enough money for Moscow to continue to fight Putin’s war in Ukraine. But in a twist, this latest move will harm residents of the capital and other megalopolises as well (theins.ru/ekonomika/286985).

            That is because field audits of business and regional payments of the increased VAT taxes will be conducted in Moscow and St. Petersburg not by local tax inspectors but from tax officials who are based in other regions. That will increase the number of inspectors in the capitals and reduce the opportunities businesses and officials there have to bribe them and get lower rates.

            At present, the number of legal entities per tax inspector in Moscow is “hundreds of times as high” as in places like Khanty-Mansiisk. Bring tax inspectors in from the regions will reduce this imbalance and likely include some regional representatives who will be all too glad to punish residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

            The new arrangements will mean that Moscow will get more money, the federal subjects less, and the population will pay as prices continue to skyrocket and businesses fail and as regional governments responsible for education and healthcare no longer have the money they need to support these services. 

Permafrost Melting Damaging Key Infrastructure in Russian North, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 4 – The accelerating melting of the permafrost which underlies two-thirds of the Russian Federation has already led to damages in up to 80 percent of the houses and other buildings there and put at risk “thousands of kilometers” of oil and gas pipelines on which Moscow relies, the To Be Precise portal says.

            But despite that, the Kremlin does not make any mention of this problem in its Arctic strategy document for the next decade. Instead, it treats global warming as something that will benefit Russia in general and the Russian North in particular (tochno.st/materials/kak-v-rossii-taet-vecnaia-merzlota-obieiasniaem-na-grafikax).

            Despite some regional and corporate efforts to correct the situation, the investigative portal continues, the problems arising from the ever more rapid melting of the permafrost layer are going to increase and the amount of money needed to respond to them is going to rise exponentially.

            More than 80 percent of the housing stock in the Russian North was build before 1999 and none of that made provision for the impact of the melting of the permafrost and the consequent shifting of foundations. Of the limited amount built since that time, only a small proportion has included special features to defend against permafrost melting.

            As a result, buildings in many places in the North are in trouble: 80 percent in Vorkuta, 55 percent in Magadan, 35 percent in Dikson, 22 percent in Tiksi, and nine to ten percent in Yakutsk and Norilsk. One estimate suggests that by 2050, Russia will have to spend seven trillion rubles to correct these problems in the cities there.

            More immediately worrisome is the way in which the melting of the permafrost is undermining pipelines and even rail lines in Western Siberia. The consequences of this trend are no so great that LukOil, for example, has refused to investigate potential new fields because they are in areas where the permafrost is melting especially quickly.

            But so far, as the new Arctic Strategy Document for the next decade makes clear, the Kremlin has taken refuge in the predictions of some that global warming will work to Russia’s advantage and that Moscow need not do anything special yet in response to what is happening in the northern half of the country. 

Vice Governors and Limited Public Space Play Key Roles in Putin’s System, Morozov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – Horizontal Russia posed ten “naïve” questions to Aleksandr Morozov, a Russian political scientist. Among the many interesting answers he gave, those concerning the role of vice governors in Russian federal subjects and the maintenance of a limited public space are especially noteworthy.

            Vice governors in Russia’s federal subjects play a variety of roles, he says. Among them are “people from the ranks of political technologists who try to solve problems using tools familiar to them and by means of connections in Moscow” (semnasem.org/articles/2025/12/03/desyat-naivnyh-voprosov-o-ritorike-kremlya).

            But, Morozov continues, “there are also people with roots within the security forces who rely on their acquaintances in that environment.” The local FSB directorate and representatives of the FSB’s Second Service, which monitors anti-government activity.” Each of these groups has its own interests and way of reporting.

            The political scientist says that “it is advantageous for representatives of the security forces in the regions to present the situation that suggest any protesters were being manipulated by subversive elements seeking to destabilize not just the region in question but also the country as a whole.”

            To that end, they begin to investigate the organizers in order to speaking figuratively find their connections with the United States. The civilian administration of the region as to take this into account because they must decide which is more advantageous – quietly suppressing the conflict or being rewarded for exposing it.”

            It is also the case, Morozov says, that the Kremlin has a compelling interest in maintaining a limited public space in which people can try out ideas. On the one hand, this allows Moscow to test which rhetorical schemes are working and which are not. And on the other, it helps clarify the difference between real opponents and those who differ only a little.

            “If your native fails or is strange,” Morovoz says, “you still remain in the game – you’re just moved aside a little; but if you express disloyalty, then you have problems. And that is why the Kremlin maintains the so-called public sphere. It isn’t the public sphere of democracy, but it exists” and helps the Putin regime control the situation.

Growing Water Shortages in Central Asia May Soon Force Evacuation of National Capitals There, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 2 – Water shortages, the result of combined poor water use, loss of water in transit and growing populations may soon force the countries of Central Asia to evacuate their national capitals, according to Sobir Kurbanov and Eldaniz Gusseinov, two regional specialists at Britain’s Nightingale Institute.

            They say that none of the countries is there yet but that all are on a trajectory that will make such a dramatic step necessary unless they take immediate steps to reduce water losses or find ways to get more water to their populations (nightingale-int.com/central-asian-capitals-risk-a-tehran-moment-without-urgent-water-reform/).

            Most water in Central Asia comes from two river systems, both of which are declining in volume because of global warming. And most of the water in the region goes to agriculture where up to 40 percent of the irrigation water “disappears before reaching the fields,” Kurbanov and Gusseinov say.

            As a result, they continue, Central Asia loses more water than it uses and far more than the average of other countries around the world. That means that Central Asian countries “now face growing shortages, deteriorating aquifers, salinized soils and shrinking wetlands.” The death of the Aral Sea is the most visible of the impact of these trends which are now hitting cities.

            Consumption of water in these cities is unsustainably high: In Europe, city residents use on average 144 liters of water a day; but in Central Asia, the consumption is far higher – and in Tashkent in particular, it peaks at 400 liters a day, largely because water use remains unmetered and the population continues to grow.

            This situation has moved from a problem to a crisis because the amount of water flowing from Afghanistan into Central Asia is falling rapidly. When the Afghan dam and canal system is completed, it will divert away from Central Asia roughly a third of the Amu Darya’s flow, good for northern Afghanistan but a disaster for Central Asia.

            Failure to work together and both reduce water use and find new sources “will set off a chain reaction with profound geopolitical consequences. Health problems and poverty will all increase in rural areas, sparking an enormous increase in migration into the major cities and especially the national capitals.

            They call on the countries of the region to take four steps: improve the efficiency of water use, shift away from hydropower, stop high-rise residential construction in the major cities, and “move cement and coal-based industries away from cities to cut pollution.”

 

Friday, December 5, 2025

Putin’s War in Ukraine has Created a New and Very Different Ethnic Russia Diaspora in Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 2 – In 2022, 400,000 Russians fled to Kazakhstan and many observers predicted they would create enormous problems for that Central Asian country. But now roughly three-quarters have moved on to other countries or returned to Russia, and the 100,000 ethnic Russians who have stayed now form a new and very different diaspora, Igor Klevtsov says.

            In an article in The Times of Central Asia, the Russian journalist says that despite initial fears, the original mass arrival “did not damage Kazakhstan’s economy” and that those who have remained are making a valuable contribution to it (timesca.com/how-the-russian-relocation-wave-reshaped-kazakhstans-economy/).

              The influx of Russians “brought not only capital but also the consumption habits of Russai’s megacities.” Their wealth pushed up housing prices and led to the gentrification of major Kazakhstan cities, but their skills both directly contributed to the economy and became a model for Kazakhs.

              There is some tension between indigenous Kazakhs and the new Russian diaspora over jobs, but the attitudes of the ethnic Russians who remain are very different than many might have expected. Many are learning Kazakh, “not just as a practical necessity but also as a gesture of respect.”

              This sets the new Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan apart: “Unlike earlier migration waves marked by colonial overtones, today’s arrivals tend to reject imperial narratives and express respect for local culture.” They are increasingly well-integrated and “a significant share” of them are likely to remain in Kazakhstan even after Putin’s war in Ukraine is over.

Nearly 90 Percent of Russian Government Infrastructure Projects Currently Not Completed on Budget or on Time, Accounting Chamber Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – Vladimir Putin and his regime often announce major transportation projects, and all too often those announcements and the time of completion and budget are treated as if they are a certainty. But a new Accounting Chamber study finds that almost 90 percent of government infrastructure projects aren’t completed on budget or on time.

            Moscow’s announcements of its plans typically receive widespread coverage, but the failure of contractors to meet deadline and stay on budget does not. As a result, it appears to many that the situation with regard to infrastructure construction is much better than it in fact is (ng.ru/economics/2025-12-03/1_9393_documentation.html).

            These failures to meet announced goals are hitting both projects Moscow has identified as “projects of the decade” and local jobs such as the reconstruction of bridges in small settlements without which residents numbering in the hundreds of less are forced to suffer for months or even years. 

            Frequently, Nezavsimaya Gazeta says in reporting the Accounting Chamber study, after great projects have been announced, “it suddenly turns out that construction is impossible” at anything like the initially advertised costs because problems at the site make any such project “impossible” from the very beginning.  

            Such problems continue to arise, the Chamber says, because Moscow is currently funding only one percent of the inspectors at sites that Russian law requires, something that means local political figures report that everything is fine because no one is doing the monitoring needed to tell them differently in a timely fashion.

 

Thursday, December 4, 2025

After War in Ukraine, Moscow will Strengthen Its Position within Its Sphere of Influence but That Sphere Will Be Smaller,’ Beijing Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Zhou Bo, a retired PLA colonel and now a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy, says that once the war in Ukraine ends, Moscow will strengthen its position in what it defines as its sphere of influence but that that sphere will become smaller than it was before 2022.

            The Chinese security analyst and commentator made that comment in the course of a South China Morning Post article about great power relations and the Taiwan issue (scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3334626/taiwan-complicated-issue-way-out-simple-ex-pla-colonel-zhou-bo).

            Not surprisingly, given Moscow’s increasing dependence on Beijing, Moscow media have picked up on precisely this point, one that many Russians will read as an indication that China believes almost any outcome of the Russian war will be at best mixed for the Russian leadership and may be worse than that.

            On the one hand, Zhou Bo’s argument suggests that many in Beijing believe that Moscow will recover some if not all of the influence it has lost during the war in the former Soviet space. But on the other, it also means that from China’s point of view, Moscow is not going to be the world power with influence across the globe that Putin clearly seeks. 

            If the Chinese analyst is correct, that would likely mean that Moscow would dramatically increase its attention to the former Soviet space, a move that could bring it into conflict with other powers but that elsewhere Moscow would see a continuing decline of its positions, a trend that could allow China as well as others to try to fill the void. 

Russian Children asked to Make Amulets Ostensibly to Protect Russian Soldiers in Ukraine But in Fact to Unite Population Behind Putin’s War There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – Schools across the Russian Federation are now asking children to come up with home-made amulets ostensibly to be sent to Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine and protect their lives, Aleksandra Arkhipova says; but in fact, this campaign is a way to force children and their parents to identify with Putin’s war.

            According to the independent Russian anthropologist, this reflects “a new Russian reality” in which children are being asked to do even more than their parents to show their loyalty to Putin’s policies (t.me/anthro_fun/3712 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/novaya-normalnost).

            The word “amulet” itself is significant, Arkhipova continues. “It became widespread after 2022” for some as something magical but for most “’a handmade item for the front,’” that in many cases likely hasn’t even been sent to its supposed addressees but that reinforces “the one-sided emotional connection between children and soldiers.”

            This is not the first time the Russian anthropologist has discussed this issue. In 2023, she commented on reports that Tuvan leaders were sending amulets based on Baron Ungern, the anti-Soviet leader in Mongolia during the Russian civil war (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/amulets-which-saved-baron-ungern-from.html).

            At that time, she suggested that amulets were being used as part of an effort “to show that this war is not for territory, not for a land corridor to Crimea, but rather a holy and even divine war,” one in which the Kremlin wants people to become convinced that “God is on the side of Russia.”

Migrants from Central Asia in Russian Federation Deeply Split along Ethnic Lines, Kotkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – Most Russian discussions about migrant workers and their families in the Russian Federation treat them almost as an undifferentiated whole, Kirill Kotkov says; but in fact, they are deeply split along national lines, do not like one another, and “to speak crudely, they are dividing Russia up into spheres of influence.

            The head of the St. Petersburg Center for the Study of the Countries of the Far East says that those who have come from Uzbekistan work primarily in the service sector while thse from Tajikistan work instead in construction, an arrangement that “is creating favorable conditions for the appearance of organized criminal groups” (svpressa.ru/society/news/492608/).

            These nationally distinct immigrants, Kotkov continues, thus represent not just a threat to Russians, especially if they number more than five percent in any city or region, but also to each other as they struggle to expand their positions in the Russian economy in the course of competing for work.

            In his remarks, Kotkov does not address another aspect of this situation: the experiences of these various national segments of the Central Asian migrants now in Russia may make them more nationalistic and thus become a problem for relations in their home countries when they eventually return there.

            A decade ago, Russian and Central Asian scholars pointed to the way in which migrants from Central Asia were being radicalized in Islamic terms by their experiences in Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/gastarbeiters-in-russia-contributing-to.html  and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/11/isis-finds-it-easier-to-recruit-central.html).

            That trend has received relatively less attention in recent years, but Kotkov’s observations suggest the ethnic radicalization of such migrants has replaced that earlier phenomenon and may prove to be an even larger problem for the Russian Federation now and for the countries of Central Asia in the future. 

Tuesday, December 2, 2025

Putin’s Latest Tax Reform May Deprive Russians in Rural Areas of Pharmacies, Their Last Source of Medical Assistance

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – In the name of “optimization,” the Putin regime has closed hospitals and medical points in many rural areas, arguing that there simply aren’t enough people served there to justify the state’s maintenance of these facilities. Now a Putin tax reform may deprive rural residents of their last source of medical assistance, the pharmacies.

            At the end of November, the Kremlin leader signed into law new requirements that small businesses pay VAT at much lower thresholds than in the past and hire bookkeeping staff to ensure that that all taxes owed are paid (moscowtimes.ru/2025/12/01/v-soyuzfarme-predupredili-o-massovom-zakritii-aptek-iz-za-povisheniya-nalogov-a181524).

            But this new arrangement is likely to force many pharmacies located in rural areas to close because their profit margins are so small. Maria Litvinova, director of the Pharmacy Union, which unites some 4,000 pharmacies in 47 regions, says the future of public health in the regions depends on having the new law modified with respect to pharmaceutical outlets.

            That is because rural Russians, who no longer have easy access to doctors and medical care, have come to depend on pharmacies to keep themselves healthy. If the pharmacies are forced to close, this group of the population will lose than possibility and diseases and deaths will both increase significantly.

Even Traditionally Pro-Russian Kyrgyzstan May Turn Away from Moscow, Dubnov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Moscow is rapidly losing influence among the countries of the former Soviet space to the point that even those countries like Kyrgyzstan which traditionally have been among the most pro-Russian may turn against Moscow in the future given its increasingly nationalistic course and ability to find support from other outside powers.

            That is the conclusion of Arady Dubnov, a Russian commentator who specializes on Central Asia, and who implies in a new article that the time when that will happen in Bishkek may be sooner than anyone now suspects (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/4072-аркадий-дубнов,-политолог,-эксперт-по-центральной-азии).

            He notes that in the newly elected parliament, there will not be any ethnic Russians, something that is “completely logical given that the Russian community [in Kyrgyzstan now] does not exceed three percent of the total population.” Moreover, deputies are required to know Kyrgyz, a rarity among even that three percent.

            At present, Dubnov continues, “a significant number of the urban population of Kyrgyzstan, especially among those who are older, knows Russian well.” And for that reason among others, Bishkek has “traditionally been the most, if you like, ‘Russia-centric’ in Central Asia.”

But, he says pointedly in conclusion, that is “for the time being” and not something Moscow can count on as something that will always be the case. 

As Result of War in Ukraine, West has Achieved Its Main Goal Regarding Russia, Kalashnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 2 – Whatever Ukraine may have to give up as a result of Russia’s invasion, the West has already achieved its “main goal” with regard to Russia by blocking Moscow from restoring the empire, Maksim Kalashnikov says. Indeed, in many respects, Russia has “already lost” this fundamental geopolitical game.

            “The long and bloody slaughter” in Ukraine has meant that the West’s “greatest fear, the recreation of a Russian empire” won’t happen, the Russian futurologist and security analyst argues because this “sea of blood” has divided Russians and Ukrainians for a long time to come (t.me/roy_tv_mk/17698 reposted at izborsk-club.ru/27614).

            The war has led “to the ‘Banderization’ of even the most Russian regions of the former Ukrainian SSR, something Bandera never dreamed of [and] has ignited mutual hatred” given that the areas Russian forces have occupied have “turned into a zone of ruins, devastation, criminalization and humanitarian catastrophes.”

            “From the West’s perspective,” Kalashnikov argues, “at a time when globalization is collapsing and the world is splitting up into new imperial blocs, Russia has thus lost the chance to create its own imperial federation. Economically, it is exhausted and has failed to industrialize, enormous resources for development having been squandered in a positional war.

            Indeed, he says, “this loss of resources for development is comparable to the devastation of Rus’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.” And “that is why the Western enemy believes it has dealt us a terrible strategic blow,” one that leave Russia with no options except to become a junior partner of the West in the struggle with China and allow the West to develop Russia economically for its own purposes.

            What must be remembered in all this, Kalashnikov says, is that the West “doesn’t care about Ukraine.” It is concerned only with countering the potential revival of a new Russian empire. Given that, “Russians have only one path for survival,” one that involves a new wave of industrialization and the formation of an alliance with Iran and India.

 

Monday, December 1, 2025

A Decade from Now, Central Asian Migrant Workers Now in Russia will Return to Their Homelands to Retire, UNICEF Study Says

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – Central Asians have been leaving their countries to work abroad because their populations are growing more rapidly than their economies, according to a new UNICEF study, Generation – 2050 in Central Asia. But a decade from now, those now working in the Russian Federation will be returning home to retire.

            Their return will thus place a new burden on the countries of the region, as governments scramble to come up with adequate pensions for this group of citizens. This burden will be all the greater because birthrates will be slowing and so the number of workers relative to retirees will decline (bugin.info/detail/budushchee-v-rukakh-molodezhi/ru).

            The UNICEF study also says that the number of Central Asians will rise from 84 million now to 112 million in 2050, twice the number there in 2000, but that population will be very different from the one there now. It will be older and more urbanized as well as more interested in industries that produce goods and services and not just in the export of raw materials. 

Returning Veterans Already Imposing Huge Burdens on Medical and Psychological Services of Russia’s Federal Subjects, Bashkortostan Data Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – The Russian government does not want to release data about or even discuss in general terms the burdens that the return of as many as 700,000 veterans will impose on the Russian Federation as a whole.  But information is coming in from various federal subjects. Among the most instructive are numbers from Bashkortostan.

            That Middle Volga republic, which as of now as suffered more deaths from Putin’s war in Ukraine – some 8,000 – than any other federal subjects, now faces an enormous set of burdens on its medical and psychological facilities (idelreal.org/a/v-bashkortostane-svyshe-8-tysyach-uchastnikov-voyny-i-chlenov-ih-semey-poluchili-putevki-v-sanatorii/33607855.html).

            Among the most suggestive are the following:

Approximately 2700 veterans have returned to Bashkortostan so far, of whom, the republic leadership says, “almost 700 of whom” have suffered wounds which have left them with various handicaps (t.me/idelrealii/43182).

More than 8,000 veterans and their family members have been given free access to sanitariums in the republic, with the number rising from 1676 in 2023 to “more than 3,000” now. Any massive return of veterans will increase that number significantly (bashinform.ru/news/svo/2025-11-28/bolee-8-tysyach-boytsov-svo-i-ih-rodnyh-ozdorovilis-v-sanatoriyah-bashkirii-4485721).

Approximately 2500 veterans and members of their families have received psychological counseling during the first nine months of 2025. Of these, 392 were treated for PTSD (t.me/DrRakhmatullin/2652).

If one extrapolates these figures to the Russian Federation as a whole, the burdens veterans are going to impose on the medical and psychological services of the federal subjects and ultimately Moscow are going to be truly enormous, yet another aspect of Putin’s war that will cast a dark shadow on Russia for decades to come.

Sunday, November 30, 2025

Even Jailors and Senior Investigators are Fleeing Russia in Droves, Romanova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – Perhaps the most surprising group of people to be leaving the Russian Federation over Putin’s war in Ukraine are his jailors and senior investigators, precisely the people who could be expected to enthusiastically back the Kremlin dictator’s policies and approach.

            But according to Olga Romanova, founder of the prisoner rights organization Sitting Russia, the trickle of such departures before 2022 has now turned into “a flood” with many of these supposed bulwarks of the Putin regime choosing to vote with their feet and leave the country (pointmedia.io/story/6929a586e657f59b666dce76).

            Not surprisingly, there are no official statistics on the number of such departures; and Romanova doesn’t provide any unofficial ones. But the anecdotal evidence she does provide suggests that the trend she points to is real, if seldom commented upon, and may create problems for the Kremlin both at home and abroad.

            At home, Moscow may find it hard to recruit replacements for such people; and abroad, Russia may discover that former jailors and investigators will be a key source to document the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as the broader category of victims of the Kremlin’s repression. 

To Boost Shipbuilding, Russia’s Transportation Ministry wants to Ban All Ships Older than 40 Years from Entering Russia’s Harbors But the Results are Likely to Be Disastrous

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Nov. 27 – Russia’s transportation ministry has come up with a draft law that would ban all ships older than 40 years from entering Russian harbors, a measure intended to stimulate shipbuilding in a country where 70 percent of its merchant ships are more than 25 years old with many far older.

            The measure would allow ships aged 30 to 40 years to enter harbors but only if they paid additional tolls.  Experts say Russian yards couldn’t build enough ships fast enough to compensate and that if the measure passes, shipping costs would go up by 45 percent or more (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/11/27/1158444-mintrans-predlozhil-ne-puskat-v-porti-grazhdanskii-flot-starshe-40-let, ru.thebarentsobserver.com/mintrans-rossii-predlozil-zapretit-zahod-v-porty-dla-staryh-sudov/441505 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-yards-cant-build-replacements.html).

            And this points not only to the problems that increasingly infect Russian development but also means that people along the Northern Sea Route and in other distant parts of the Russian Federation will face higher prices at best and likely shortages of key goods as well in the coming years. 

Russians Today More Satisfied by Their Lot Primarily Because Kremlin has Given Them Way to Channel Internal Aggression, Gudkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Surveys show that over the past few years, Russians have become more satisfied with their lot, the result, Lev Gudkov argues, primarily of the Kremlin’s skill in giving them a way to channel their internal aggression by attacking minorities at home and Ukraine abroad and thus allowing them to recover the sense that Russia is a great power.

            The Levada Center pollster says that as a result, the dominant attitude among Russians has changed from one that reflected the view that “it is difficult to life but it is possible to hold on” between 1994 and 2019 to “everything isn’t so bad; it is possible to live” (urbietorbi.online/contents/9 reposted at levada.ru/2025/11/26/paradoksy-massovoj-udovletvorennosti-mneniya-i-nastroeniya/).

            As that more positive assessment has become dominant, the formerly dominant one of despair has declined precipitously. In 1998-1999, 61 percent of Russians said that it was not possible to continue to live as they were doing. Today, Gudkov argues, the share of Russians who feel that way is down to five percent.

            He points to five changes which explain this: a decline in poverty, price increases for raw materials, the rejection of the heightened expectations many had in the 1990s for improvement overnight and “the stabilization of live under conditions of a new and authoritarian regime” which has allowed Russians to express their anger and feel themselves to be a great power.

            According to Gudkov, “the collapse of the basic system-forming institutions of Soviet totalitarianism … did not affect other crucial institutions of this system, including the political police, the army, the courts and education and thus did not lead to the liberalization of mass consciousness.”

            As a result, most Russians have retained “an authoritarian structure of consciousness,” with people expecting although not demanding from the state “primarily an improvement in their standard of living, protection from arbitrary actions by the bottom of the bureaucracy and criminals, but not seek freedom and political rights.”

            Over the last decade, he continues, “the return to great power rhetoric, to the struggle with ‘color revolutions’ and against ‘a fifth column,’ confrontation with the West after the Baltic republics joined the EU and NATO were thus greeted by ‘society’ with understanding, relief and approval.”

            This popular response helps to explain the return of authoritarianism. It is not just about the actions of Putin and his regime but about the response of the still authoritarian Russian people to what he is doing and approval of both a more aggressive foreign policy abroad as in Ukraine and a more repressive one at home against migrants and other minorities.

Chaos Theory Now Operational Basis of Putin’s Foreign Policy, Barbashin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 25 – Most analyses of Putin’s foreign policy suggest that it is driven by the desire to create a multi-polar world in which Russia will occupy a special place, but in fact, Anton Barbashin says, the real operational basis of his actions is the chaos theory that experts in the Valdai Club have been pushing for more than a decade.

            These experts argue that the world has entered a new period of chaos, “the natural and inevitable phase which follows the collapse of established ‘centers of gravity’ before a new and stable system of alliances, institutions and norms has emerged, the analyst who works as editor of The Riddle portal says (ridl.io/ru/svideteli-haosa/).

            As presented by the Valdai Club, this theory has five key postulates: First, “the old world cannot be restored” and those who try to do so are doomed to futility. Second, chaos by its very nature is “fundamentally unmanageable,” allowing those who act most rapidly and with the fewest constraints can make the most progress.

            Third, in this new world, “every actor is ultimately on his own,” forced to rely on himself alone and necessarily prepared to make rapid changes in the partners selected. Fourth, “morality and ethics no longer have a place in politics” either at home or abroad. And fifth, war is the natural condition of this phase and therefore “military power is the guarantee of survival.”

            The chaos theory, Barbashin concludes, “performs a triple function: it records the already accomplished changes in the rule of Russian foreign policy, it supplies them with an intellectual explanation, and it creates a broad context within which further unprincipled foreign policy steps appear logical and justified.”

Saturday, November 29, 2025

Northern Sea Route Fails to Deliver Enough Coal to Chukotka, Forcing Military Settlements to Close and Meaning Residents Face a Cold Winter without Heat

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 22 – The new governor of Chukotka recently told Putin that his region was developing so well that it was in a position to help support Ukrainian regions Moscow has occupied, but in fact, the situation in the most distant region of the Russian Federation is close to collapse, with neither coal nor food being delivered in sufficient quantities for survival.

            This crisis has emerged for two reasons, local experts say. On the one hand, there is still too much ice in the eastern portions of the Northern Sea Route for transit of ships without the use of icebreakers, and Moscow prefers to use what icebreakers it has to handle ships carrying raw materials for export and to assist its Chinese ally.

            And on the other, the newly installed governor and his staff have utterly failed to understand to how to make use of the short summers not only as far as ships are concerned but regarding the delivery of goal and fresh fruits and vegetables from ports to inland villages and settlements (veter.info/posts/wU2LlJvu6Hbg).

            This year, ships delivered only one-third of the amount of coal needed to heat the homes of Chukotka residents and an even smaller fraction of fruits and vegetables, something that has sparked fears of a long cold winter and resulted in empty store shelves and skyrocketing prices when such foodstuffs are available.

            Chukotka’s 40,000 residents are already suffering: the region has the highest rate of alcoholism in the Russian Federation, and that rate is likely to increase still further this winter. Many are likely to come down with other illnesses and even die because of the failure to deliver coal and food because of Moscow’s preferences and the incompetence of Chukotka’s leadership.

            But for observers from beyond the borders of Chukotka, the most dramatic consequence of this collapse in the deliveries of coal for warmth and fruits and vegetables for the diet of its residents lies elsewhere: Russian military encampments are closing down, as can be seen from pictures provided by the Veter news agency. 

Russia Doesn’t Have Enough Psychologists and Return of Veterans from War in Ukraine will Overwhelm the System, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Some practicing psychologists say that as many as 10 percent of all Russians are suffering from psychological problems. There aren’t enough psychologists to treat them, and those who are practicing are about to be overwhelmed by the return of veterans from the war in Ukraine who suffer from PTSD and other problems.

            A debate has broken out about what to do. A senator has proposed introducing a state test to ensure that all those who call themselves psychologists are in fact professionals; but many psychologists say that such a bureaucratic step will push many of those now working out of the profession and make the situation even worse (nakanune.ru/articles/124133/).

            According to them, Russia is not anywhere close to have the number of psychologists needed in schools and firms, given how widespread psychological disturbances have become since the covid pandemic and more recently because of Putin’s war in Ukraine. And they are profoundly worried about what the return of veterans from that war will mean.

            These psychologists are calling on the government to train more psychologists rather than focus on weeding out unqualified ones and say that the defense ministry must take the lead because it has the money and its personnel are likely soon to become one of the heaviest new burdens on the system.

            If more psychologists are not trained and put in place, these practitioners suggest, the problems for Russian society as a whole will grow; and the costs of dealing with such difficulties will be far higher than the training and hiring of psychologists now. 

Moscow’s Anti-LGBT Laws Sparking Lively Growth in Underground Art Exhibitions Like Those in Soviet Times

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Between the death of Stalin and perestroika, artists who did not follow the state-approved socialist realism cannons regularly staged underground exhibits of their work in apartments and offices, Now, with the current Russian government’s anti-LGBT laws and policies, gay artists in Russian regions are doing the same.

            Art festivals for LGBT artists in Moscow and St. Petersburg have attracted some attention, but often more from the authorities and ationalist groups than from the broader public. But beyond the ring road, LGBT artists are increasingly active, according to a 4500-word report by the Horizontal Russia portal (semnasem.org/articles/2025/11/26/podpolnyj-kvir).

            There such exhibits are not only an act of protest against the increasingly dead hand of Moscow traditionalists but a means by which LGBT people can come together and develop a sense of solidarity, as well as reaching out to others who are simply interested in the latest artistic trends. 

Many Russian Companies aren’t Paying Workers Because Russian Government isn’t Paying Its Bills

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – As Putin’s war has continued, the number of workers who are owed wages by their employers has risen, not to the level of the 1990s but enough to be worrisome. But in general, most Russian reports on this have blamed the firms themselves or on other companies which owe them money for the problem.

            But an investigation by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service finds that a significant part of the problem has been caused by the failure of Russian government firms to pay what they owe in a timely fashion, a sign that the government itself is among the leading causes of this problem (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2025/11/24/1157368-biznes-predlozhil-resheniya-dlya-problemi-s-zaderzhkami-oplati-kontraktov-goskompaniyami).

            As this source of the problem of unpaid wages become widely known, many who are suffering because they have not been paid what they are owed are likely to blame the government and not just their employers and the government’s war in Ukraine, a trend that could spark more opposition to Putin and his war.