Russian Officials Now Paying Bounties to Individuals, Groups and Firms which Get Others to Sign Up for Military Service

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Moscow has taken another step to ensure that enough Russians sign up for military service in Ukraine by launching programs in numerous federal subjects that pay bounties to individuals, groups and firms which get others to sign up for military service, the Vyorstka news service reports.

            While not as large as the bonuses offered to the men themselves, these payments are significant – from 5,000 to 350,000 rubles (50 to 3500 US dollars) – and individuals may multiply their earnings to getting more than one man to sign a military contract (verstka.media/kak-rossiyane-zarabatyvayut-otpravlyaya-drug-druga-na-voinu).

            In April, such payments were being made in at least nine federal subjects (verstka.media/dobrovolci-svo-verbovka); but the program appears to be effective and has likely  been extended to others, leading to a thriving business of bounty hunters who view such arrangements as a useful way to boost their incomes.

            But more important than that, a program of this type highlights just how many difficulties Moscow is having in filling the gaps lost by its mounting losses in Ukraine, losses that according to some estimates now total more than a million killed and wounded – and also Putin’s propensity to believe that money alone can solve the problem of recruitment.

Falling Water Levels Forcing Moscow to Dredge Rivers and Ports across Russia, Turning to China and Iran while Struggling to Build More Dredging Ships

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Drought, climate change and increased human use of water from Russia’s major rivers is forcing Moscow to dredge ever more rivers and ports from one end of the country to another and, given the shortage of its own dredging ships, to turn to China and Iran for help.

            Because Russia is far more dependent on its rivers for transport than almost any other country and because it hopes to use its ports to expand its contacts with others, Moscow has long been committed to keeping its rivers open for navigation. But since the disintegration of the USSR, two-thirds of the internal waterways open for shipping have ceased to be.

            Most of that decline has been since Putin took power (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html), and Moscow has responded by turning to China and Iran to keep the remaining rivers navigable (jamestown.org/program/iran-joins-china-in-dredging-russias-volga-river-further-solidifying-anti-western-axis/).

            A year ago, the Russian government committed itself to expanding its domestic dredging fleet (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/moscow-may-finally-be-about-to-confront.html); but there is less evidence to suggest that it has made much progress in that result and many reports suggesting that ships and barges can use ever fewer parts of its rivers (portnews.ru/news/373765/ and sudostroenie.info/novosti/45390.html).   

            Those reports have reached a crescendo in the last few weeks as the summer begins and dredging work takes off. For examples of the problems Moscow faces, see zol.ru/n/3ecb7, https://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/v_komi_nachalis_dnouglubitelnye_raboty_na_reke_vychegde.html, korabel.ru/news/comments/v_ob-irtyshskom_basseyne_nachalos_dnouglublenie_sudovyh_hodov.html and korabel.ru/news/comments/v_komi_nachalis_dnouglubitelnye_raboty_na_reke_vychegde.html

            The focus of Moscow’s efforts not surprisingly are on the Volga-Don Canal and the port of Astrakhan on the Caspian where falling water levels are preventing the use of the facilities of both for naval ships as well as merchant carriers (ast.mk.ru/social/2025/06/06/v-astrakhanskoy-oblasti-proydut-meropriyatiya-po-dnouglubleniyu-sudokhodnogo-kanala.html, astrakhan.kp.ru/online/news/6409990/ and portnews.ru/news/377951/.)

            Dredging operations in Russia and the increasing problems Moscow faces in keeping its rivers open seldom gets much attention in the West, but the absence of rail and highway networks mean that if Russia loses the ability to use its rivers for navigation, it will face major security and economic problems ahead. 

Moscow’s Claim that Domestic Wines Now Dominate Russian Market Latest ‘Potemkin Village,’ ‘Versiya’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – The Russian agricultural ministry’s claim that 58 percent of the wines Russians now buy are domestic is the latest example of “Potemkin village” type fraud, according to journalist Kira Remnoyova of the Versiya news portal. The real figure is far lower and the problems of Russia’s wine industry far greater. 

            The reasons for that conclusion are readily admitted by those who work in the wine industry. What Moscow is asking people to believe is that Russia has produced more wine even though the harvest from its vineyards has fallen this year because of bad weather and other problems, she says (versia.ru/rossijskoe-vino-ne-sovsem-rossijskoe).

            That has led wine producers to import grapes via the gray or black market and then label the wines as being completely Russian even though many of them are produced only with the use of grapes from abroad. That is illegal, but Moscow looks the other way because it is happy to claim a victory in import substitution.

            According to the rumor mill in the wine industry, Remnoyova says, much of the wine labelled as being from Russian-occupied Crimea is in fact produced with grapes imported from Kazakhstan which currently aspires to being a major producer of grapes for wines that will be made and sold in other countries.

            Moreover, people in the Russian wine industry say that the current federal project to boost grape and wine production by 2030 almost certainly will not be achieved whatever claims the Russian agricultural makes to the contrary, claims that will please Russian propagandists but do little for Russian consumers.

Moscow Project to Clean Up the Volga and Lake Baikal has ‘Failed’ Despite All the Money Spent, Officials Concede

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Despite all the money spent on the much-ballyhooed national project to clean up the Volga River and Lake Baikal, that effort has “failed” with only a tiny proportion of its stated goals -- perhaps as little as four percent having been achieved -- according to experts, Duma members and even senior officials in the Russian government now concede.

            That failure which leaves many Russians without the clean water the Kremlin had promised and them as well without the food resources the river and the lake had supplied has now been documented by Novyye Izvestiya (newizv.ru/news/2025-06-10/sryv-natsproekta-dengi-na-ochistnye-na-volge-i-baykale-potracheny-vse-rabotayut-4-437044).

            What makes this investigation so important is that it again calls attention to the more general problem that when Putin declares something a national project, everyone can be sure that much of the money allocated for it will flow into the pockets of his friends and allies rather than going to achieve its stated purpose.

Telegram Channels Not as Secure from FSB’s Prying Eyes as Many of Its Users Believe, ‘Important Stories’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Since the Telegram channel was created a dozen years ago, many Russians have shifted toward it out of the belief that this chat and messaging ap is far more secure than any other internet service, a reputation the company’s founder Pavel Durov has carefully cultivated.

            But an investigation by the Important Stories portal concludes that the electronic infrastructure on which Telegram channels are based suffers from serious vulnerabilities that the FSB or other intelligence services can easily exploit (istories.media/stories/2025/06/10/kak-telegram-svyazan-s-fsb/).

            Despite claiming that all his electronic infrastructure for Telegram is outside of Russia, Durov owns and thus cooperates with many companies of whom that is not true. Consequently, those who can gain access to the latter can gain access to the former, something that has been documented in court cases in the West.

            And while there is little evidence that the FSB has gained access to the content of messages, there is overwhelming data showing that the Russian intelligence service has enough to identify users and the likely content they are viewing, thus giving the FSB the whip hand in dealing with those opposed to the regime.

In New Threat to Non-Russians, Moscow Wants to Stop Calling Their Languages ‘Native’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – The Russian government has come up with draft legislation it hopes to push through quietly that will require schools to stop calling the languages non-Russians speak “native” and instead refer to them only as “languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation,” a change that many fear will lead to the further downgrading of both languages and peoples.

            The ministry which oversees public education made this proposed change in April (regulation.gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=156568); and Tatarstan’s Milliard.Tatar portal documented opposition to it among parents, officials, and experts (milliard.tatar/news/ty-kak-nerodnoi-eksperty-trebuyut-obsuzdeniya-pravok-v-zakon-o-yazykax-narodov-rossii-7640).

            The opponents believe that if non-Russian languages, in contrast to Russian, are no longer called “native,” then it will be easier for officials to argue that they aren’t essential and can be dispensed with in schools, continuing a trend that Putin has been promoting for almost a decade and reiterated his support in a speech on May 5.

            In his remarks at that time, the Kremlin leader said that schoolchildren in the Russian Federation are currently overburdened with courses and that some should be eliminated. Not surprisingly, many non-Russians believe that the change in nomenclature for non-Russian languages will put them on the chopping block.

            Their fears were heightened when Putin said at that time that “Russian should be the native language for all” residents of the Russian Federation. Experts from around the country and some members of the Duma have spoken out against this change because it will almost certainly have the effect of reducing the amount of education in non-Russian languages.

            And many of them further believe that cutting back even further on the study of these languages which Putin has made voluntary already will strike at the non-Russian national identities themselves, leading to massive Russianization and Russification and the further homogenization of the population.

Opposition to Subsidizing Teenage Pregnancy Grows and Russian Regions Cut It Back

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Yet another program, promoted by the Putin regime, is being scaled back and may end entirely because of popular opposition. That involves paying subsidies to ever-younger teenage girls who give birth, something many object to because at least some of the young women are now having children to get government money rather than to start families.

            For background on this program, which Moscow has operated through the regions, and the opposition it faced from the start by some demographers and hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/rf-regions-promoting-teenage.html and jamestown.org/program/many-russians-outraged-by-government-promotion-of-underage-pregnancy-to-boost-birthrate/.

            In the last few weeks, officials in some reasons have been cutting back this program and some appear to be on the brink of cancelling it altogether given this opposition (nemoskva.net/2025/06/09/galya-u-nas-otmena-vlasti-regionov-kotorye-obeshhali-platit-beremennym-shkolniczam-i-studentkam-zadumalis-nad-sokrashheniem-spiskov/).

            Officials in Omsk Oblast have placed restrictions on just who can get the money including that the young women involved must live and study in that region to get money from it, an indication that some of the young women may be going from one region to another in the hopes of getting more funds.

            In St. Petersburg, a member of the legislative assembly called for ending the program for any minor lest the government create even more problems for children and itself by encouraging young women to have children long before they are in a position to take care of them (t.me/shtannikovazaks/299).

            And the authorities in Altai Kray said that they would give priority to university-level students rather than anyone still a pupil in schools because in their view, such aid must help “young student families” rather than just produce more babies, some of which may end up as orphans (asfera.info/news/129354-stali-izvestny-priciny-po-kotorym-nacali-vyplacivat-posobia-beremennym-ucasimsa?utm_source=chatgpt.com).

Failure of Russian Employers to Pay in Timely Fashion Rises to Worst Level Since 2021

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 -- A problem many associate with the 1990s has now returned to the Russian Federation with a vengeance -- the failure of companies to pay wages and salaries on time. Such indebtedness of companies to their employees has risen to nearly 1.5 billion rubles (15 million US dollars), 3.4 times more than was the case in 2021 and affection 7200 workers.

            Those are the official figures released by the Russian government’s statistical arm, Rosstat (ehorussia.com/new/node/32807). The real numbers are almost certainly greater all the more so because Rosstat does not accurately report on the situation in smaller firms (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/biggest-problem-with-rosstat-economic.html).

            Construction firms are the most often guilty of failing to pay workers and contractors, according to labor union experts. And what makes that especially dangerous is that it can create a cascading and expanding problem: when a large firm doesn’t pay on time, its contractors are often forced into bankruptcy and forced to lay off their workers. 

Three Factors Explain Why There are Environmental Protests in Some Russian Regions but Not in Others, HSE Study Concludes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – On the basis of an analysis of 1896 environmental protests in the Russian Federation between 2007 and 2021, researchers at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics say that three factors determine which regions protest and which ones don’t and help explain why regions that may appear quite similar behave so differently.

            First of all, they say, regions are more likely to respond to a specific action rather than to a problem that has been growing over time. Such events act as “triggers” and send people into the streets. Second, some governors are more ready to use repression than others; and those that do face fewer protests (kedr.media/explain/soprotivlenie-mozhet-uvenchatsya-uspehom/).

            And third, the HSE investigators conclude, poorer regions who are asked to help solve the problems of wealthier ones are especially likely to go into the streets to protest. Thus, plans to establish dumps in the Russian north for trash from Moscow have been especially powerful in generating protests.

            The study says that indigenous numerically small peoples are at the very top of this list because “their way of live is closely connected with the environment. Their main types of economic activity to the present remain fishing, hunting and reindeer herding. Moreover, their faiths and folklore” is based on the links between nature and people.

            But ethnicity is not the only such force. Strong regional or other communal identities can also play this role. The scholars give as an example protests in Voronezh Oblast against nickel mining. There, Cossacks played a key role streeting the links between the world around them and Cossack national traditions.

            The HSE researchers also suggested that the theories of American sociologist Sidney Tarrow on the cyclicity of protest are relevant in Russia and point to the ways in which protests have ebbed and flowed across all categories.  And they end by concluding that the war in Ukraine is giving rise to “a new form of ecological protest.”

            This involves videos by Russian soldiers in Ukraine highlighting environmental problems in their home areas that they send to officials and fellow citizens even while remaining on the front lines. (For background on the trend of which this is a part, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/soldiers-in-russian-army-in-ukraine.html.)

            The HSE study said that many of the protests succeeded in whole or in part, with one of the authors suggesting that is only one case where environmental protests cannot hope to succeed: in those cases, where what the protesters want stopped or done instead touch on the interests of Putin or his friends. 

Even the Furniture Circassians Use Contributes to Their Longer Life Expectancy, KBR Researchers Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – New research by scholars at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University finds that the cultural code of the Circassians – the Adyge Khaze – the clothes they wear, and even the furniture they have traditionally used contributes to longer life expectancy -- including an unusual number of centenarians among them.

            The North Caucasus is famous for the number of people who live to great age, and many have offered their theories as to why that is so. (My personal favorite is a cartoon showing an older North Caucasian in traditional dress who, when asked how he has lived so long, replies that it is because he has never criticized the state.)

            But now scholars at the KBR University have offered a more scientifically-based explanation. They say that “an enormous role” is played by their cultural traditions, which include behavior, dress and even furniture (kbsu.ru/podrazdelenija/fakultety/meditsinskij-fakultet/news/uchenyj-kbgu-vyvel-formulu-dolgoletija-iz-tradicionnogo-byta-adygov/).

            The researchers say that perhaps the most important of these factors is the cultural code of the Circassians, which urges harmonious relations among people, respect for the elderly, patience and even minimalism in behavior. But other factors are at work including clothing that leaves much of the body free and furniture.

            According to these medical investigators, the stools and low tables Circassians traditionally use discourage people from sitting too long at meals and thus helps them avoid obesity and other diseases. The experts said that they recommend that members of other nations follow these same traditions. 

Central Asia has Just 250 Think Tanks, Most of Which are Small and Don’t Issue Many Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – The five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia have a total of approximately 250 think tanks, they are small, averaging no more than 12 people each, prepare only about 17 reports a year, and only one of them, KISI.kz, is in the top ranks of the Global Go-To Think Tank listing.

            That means, the Stanradar.Com portal says, that most Central Asians who want analysis have to turn either to think tanks abroad, few of which cover their region adequately, or to Central Asia media. Often such people have to rely on often problematic social media alone (stanradar.com/news/full/57582-stanradarcom-sozdaet-smysly-dlja-tsentralnoj-azii.html).

            This is a serious problem not only for experts and officials in these countries but for experts elsewhere who seek to understand what is taking place in these five increasingly important countries at the crossroads of east-west and north-south trade and communication corridors. 

Moscow Must Do More to Save Company Towns Because They’re Where Many Defense Plants are Located, ‘Profile’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – As Russian has shifted to a war economy, the country’s monogorods as cities built around a single major industry are known have become more important because they are where a large share of Russia’s military industry plants are located. To attract enough workers, these plants want to save the company towns despite Moscow having largely given up.

            The factories are opening schools, medical points, and other infrastructure that had disappeared over the last several decades in order to try to keep younger residents from fleeing to the cities. That has helped some, Pyotr Sergeyev says, but there are some things only the government can do (profile.ru/dk/ugmk/prityazhenie-maloj-rodiny-kak-promyshlennye-predpriyatiya-borjutsya-s-ottokom-trudovyh-resursov-iz-monogorodov-1713742/).

            And he warns that unless Moscow changes course and begins to pay more attention to the problems of company towns and invests more money in infrastructure there, either the plants in these cities will have to recruit more workers from abroad or go under, either of which could make it impossible to meet military industry goals.

            The Putin regime has assumed that if it gives these companies more contracts, they will be able to raise wages enough to hold local Russians and attract more to these towns. But studies have shown, Sergeyev continues, that such an approach won’t work: Unless the company towns develop infrastructure and comfortable housing, young people will continue to flee.

            Failure to make such investments, Sergeyev says, will make it impossible to meet defense industry goals. Indeed, that sector may soon collapse unless the Kremlin recognizes that higher pay will not solve the problem and that it must devote more resources to infrastructure -- or revive the hated Soviet system of assigning graduates to their first work places.

Soldiers in Russian Army in Ukraine Involved in Protests at Home Even Before Demobilizing – and Some are Sparking Ethnic Conflicts in the Ranks

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – Russian commanders have tried without success to confiscate smartphones from their subordinates because the latter are not only getting news from home but sending video clips back home not only to keep their families up to date but also to put take pressure on officials at all levels.

            The soldiers protest about all the issues that agitate their families and friends at home and often appear in military fatigues with guns, implicitly or not so implicitly threatening to use force on their return to force officials to act. Because they are soldiers, commanders are reluctant to punish them; and officials at home are more likely to make concessions to them.

            Aleksandr Leonidovich, a journalist for Novaya Gazeta, says that such protests by soldiers in Putin’s invasion force are one of the last places where Russians can protest with the expectation that they won’t be punished for their effort and may even succeed in achieving their goals (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/06/07/urbanisty-s-avtomatami).

            He provides numerous examples of what the soldiers have protested, where they are from, and how successful they have been. But one event he recounts should shake the Kremlin even if it does not appear to have succeed, given that a Bashkortostan protest by soldiers from there generated a counterprotest by other soldiers.  

            The full text of Leonidov’s coverage of this event is below:

“In Bashkortostan, environmental protests are closely intertwined with national ones. In January 2024, clashes between citizens and the police occurred in the region, caused by the trial of local oppositionist and environmentalist Fail Alsynov. The "Baimak case" appeared, under which 82 people were subjected to criminal prosecution.

“On January 17, the second day of protests in the Bashkir city of Baymak, a video appeared on YouTube: a group of masked men with machine guns, the letter "Z" carved into the butt of one of them, read a text in Bashkir in support of Alsynov. (youtube.com/watch?v=dvR_hLPFQ3M&t=9s).

“The video is preceded by a threat in Russian: ‘if you do not stop going against our people, our fathers and mothers, we are leaving our positions and coming to you. If you want war, you will get it!"

“On the same day, an alternative video appeared online. A large group of armed people calling themselves "SVO" fighters from Bashkortostan fires machine guns into the air and delivers a speech condemning "extremists from banned organizations who are intoxicating, deceiving our residents and trying to get them to rally" in support of Alsynov. The armed men offer to send Bashkir nationalists to their unit so that they can "re-educate them and teach them to love their homeland."

“The head of the Committee of the Bashkir National Movement Abroad, Ruslan Gabbasov, told Novaya Gazeta Evropa that the Bashkortostan authorities are not panicking from the demands and even threats of armed men. On the contrary, in some cases they are being forced to publicly apologize.

“’Just recently there was a similar story. Now in the Abzelilovsky district of the Republic of Bashkortostan there are unrests of local residents regarding the upcoming development of the Kyrktytau ridge and the construction of a mining and processing plant there. Fighters from this district, fighting in the "SVO", recorded a video message asking not to touch Kyrktytau. A few days passed and a new video message appeared where they apologized and said that they were misled” (https://t.me/rg_bashkort/7256).

Pro-War Bloggers Tolerated Now but Won't Be Once War Ends, Filippov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Russian bloggers who support the war in Ukraine routinely make statements that would get them in deep trouble if they opposed the war, Ivan Filippov says; but while they are tolerated now, they will be among the most promptly repressed once the war ends because the Putin regime will then have no room for such people.

            According to Filippov, a Russian writer who studies the Z community, the reason for both is simple: Their statements now help control the military and remind Russians things could be worse if others were in charge, and their continuing existence after the war ends is incompatible with the regime’s nature (holod.media/2025/06/10/poche (u-vlast-terpit-z-blogerov/).

            No authoritarian regime – and Putin’s is unquestionably that – can long tolerate those who act independently and at odds with it for very long unless there is a compelling reason to do so. The war in Ukraine gives the Kremlin leader one such reason; but when that is removed, those who have benefited from his tolerance no longer will be able to do so.

Russian Community Only Allows People of ‘Slavic Appearance’ Enter Yekaterinburg Agency without Having to Wait in Line

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – Exactly a year ago, members of the Russian Community organization marched through Yekaterinburg declaring that the city should be “only for the Slavs.” On the same date this year, they did not just march but blocked the entrance to the city’s migration agency and allowed in without standing in line only those of Slavic appearance.

            This is yet another indication that the Russian Community vigilantes now feel that they can act with impunity and may even enjoy the support of the authorities given the anti-immigrant messages the powers that be have been sending (t.me/itsmycity/43717 and sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2025/06/d51739/).

            But this action highlights something else as well which may be even more fateful: the Russian Community doesn’t distinguish between non-citizen immigrants and citizens of non-Slavic nationality. This group has thus crossed the line that threatens to deepen the divide between Russians and non-Russians, a dangerous development indeed.

            That is all the more so because the Russian Community now has branches in almost every federal subject and city in the country and under Putin at least can be counted on to spread this poison not just the Urals but across the Russian Federation (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html).

Putin’s War in Ukraine Threatens Survival of Soyots who were Beginning to Recover from Soviet Repression

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – Between 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated and 2022 when Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine, the Soyots, a numerically small Turkic people in Buryatia, acquired a written language, resumed the reindeer herding that they had practiced for centuries, and looked to the future with confidence.

            But from the very first day of Putin’s expanded war, those hopes were crushed as ever more young Soyot men were dragooned or attracted into service in Russian forces fighting in Ukraine only to die there (sibreal.org/a/nas-vsego-gorstka-kak-voyna-v-ukraine-unichtozhaet-soyotov-iskonnyh-zhiteley-sayan/32975796.html).

            The 2021 Russian census counted just over 4,000 Soyots and so the deaths in Ukraine have hit the community hard because as they say, one Soyot is not six degrees of separation from another but one and so every loss affects the entire community, especially given that those who have died were expected to be the fathers of the next generation.

            Other nationalities in the Russian Federation have suffered more deaths and perhaps even a higher percentage of those than the Soyots, but the facts that this nation consists of such tightly interrelated people and that it was staging a remarkable recovery from past oppression means that the Soyots have lost something especially precious: their hopes for a national rebirth.

            For that reason if for no other, the Soyots and the reasons they have lost hope deserve to be remembered.

Russian Cities Want to Introduce Robotic Bureaucrats Because They Work Faster and Never Asks for Pay

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – As artificial intelligence and robotics have advanced in recent years, ever more Russian cities have been focusing on whether they can do away with a sizeable portion of their large and expensive staffs and use robot-bureaucrats instead. Now one of their number, Blagoveshchensk in the Far East, has become the first to do so.

            According to officials there, the robot bureaucrats work “48 times more rapidly” than the human ones they have replaced and, while expensive to begin with, cost little to operate and save money over time (nemoskva.net/2025/06/09/rabotaet-v-48-raz-bystree-deneg-ne-prosit-v-blagoveshhenske-zapushhen-pervyj-robot-chinovnik/).

            Similar programs are being discussed in a variety of cities across the Russian Federation, programs that currently enjoy the support of the Kremlin (fontanka.ru/2025/04/17/75352451/) although they are likely to anger those made redundant by this change. Indeed, such robot bureaucrats may spark another round of labor unrest in some places.

Drying Up of Caspian Hitting Kazakhstan Hardest among Caspian Littoral States, Astana Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – The drying up of the Caspian Sea is already hitting Kazakhstan hardest among the five Caspian littoral states – who also include Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan – forcing Astana to strengthen its navy, dredge access routes to its ports, and deal with new land that the sea has receded from.

            And that trend is likely to continue, Kazakhstan ecologists and government experts say, because the northern portion of the sea will likely continue to see its water level decline faster and its seabeds silt up more quickly than the southern portions of the sea (casp-geo.ru/obmelenie-kaspiya-kazahstan-mozhet-postradat-bolshe-vseh/).

            These differences in the rate of the drying up of the Caspian also are certain to force both Russia and China to change their plans for trade routes both north and south and east and west on that body of water and thus have an outside influence on the world beyond the borders of the littoral states.

              For background on the steps Astana has already taken to cope with the drying up of the Caspian, see jamestown.org/program/caspian-sea-drying-up-forcing-coastal-countries-to-respond/, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/caspian-seas-declining-water-levels.html; windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/07/northern-sections-of-caspian-sea.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/declining-water-levels-in-caspian-plus.html.

And for details on the way in which these steps and others have changed the naval balance on its surface, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/kazakhstan-navy-demonstrates-growing.html, jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-rapidly-moving-to-become-dominant-naval-power-on-the-caspian, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/03/kazakhstan-conducts-major-naval.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/kazakhstans-navy-takes-delivery-of-36th.html.

Crimson Wedge in Kuban, Despite Russian Acts of Genocide, has a Ukrainian Future if Kyiv Helps, Activist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – Yevhen Bursanidis-Seletsky, a co-founder of the movement for the independence of Kuban, says that despite Russian acts of genocide, the Crimson Wedge as Ukrainians refer to that region, very much has a Ukrainian future if Kyiv will devote more attention to the situation there.

            And there are compelling reasons for the Ukrainian state to do so, he continues because “if a Ukraine without Crimea is like a car without headlights, then a Ukraine without Kuban whether as part of the Ukrainian state or as a confederal ally is like being a car without doors” (abn.org.ua/en/history/malynovyi-klyn-past-present-and-future/).

            Russians acts of genocide and repression against ethnic Ukrainians in the Kuban have reduced the number of people there who identify as Ukrainians, but these moves by Moscow and Russian society as a whole have not extinguished the sense most people in the Kuban have of being linked to Ukraine.

            Kyiv was not able to do much in Soviet times and chose not to take action in support of Kuban Ukrainians and other wedges in the current borders of the Russian Federation because it wanted to show itself as a good international citizen that could not be accused of interfering in what Moscow viewed as its internal affairs.

            But Putin’s attack on Ukraine in 2014 and his expanded invasion of that country launched in 2022 and continuing to this day have changed the situation. Kyiv is now paying more attention to the Ukrainian wedges within the borders of the Russian Federation. If it follows this up with action, Bursanidis-Seletsky says, both those regions and Ukraine as a whole will benefit. 

Support of Ukrainian Churchmen Major Reason Kirill Became Moscow Patriarch, New Book Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 8 – A new book on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church from Gorbachev’s time to the present says that the support of Ukrainian churchmen who viewed Kirill as more liberal regarding Ukrainian autocephaly was a major reason that he was chosen to be patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.

            The book, With the Best of Intentions. The Russian Church and the Authorities from Gorbachev to Putin (in Russian; Moscow: 2025) by Kseniya Luchenko, thus calls attention to the paradox that Kirill’s initial success may very well have led to his most serious defeat and may cause him even more trouble in the future.

            Novaya Gazeta, which jointly sponsored the book with the Straightforward Foundation, publishes an excerpt that makes this clear (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/06/08/kak-kirill-stal-patriarkhom-i-kakuiu-rol-v-etom-sygrala-ukraina). The paper promises to publish more, potentially equally revelatory excerpts in the future.

            According to the book, Kirill had the reputation of being pro-Ukrainian, even making what proved to be a failed effort to learn that language and suggesting that he would be quite ready to become head of a possibly autocephalous Ukrainian church, something anathema to his opponents in the election.

            In the 2009 election, of the 198 church hierarchs, 55 were from Ukraine and another 46 from other countries. They thus formed more than half. And of the 711 participants in the broader Local Council, only 44.8 percent were citizens of the Russian Federation (web.archive.org/web/20141209172152/http:/sobor09.ru/participants/297/).

            The Ukrainian hierarchs and the non-Russian participants voted overwhelmingly for Kirill given the Russo-centric position of his opponent. As a result, he was elected to head the Russian church, where he subsequently adopted a Russo-centric position himself, a shift that some of his supporters considered a betrayal.

            The chapter published by Novaya Gazeta traces the back and forth before and during the election not only among the hierarchs but also among Council participants in detail, with the votes in each. But the message is clear: Kirill won because he was viewed as pro-Ukrainian, something that Putin and his regime have not forgotten or forgiven.

 

Biggest Problem with Rosstat Economic Data Not Falsification but Failure to Collect Representative Samples in Key Sectors, Rybakova Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 6 – That the Russian government’s statistical arm engages in outright lies is no surprise, but the biggest problem with Rosstat data is not so much falsification as the failure to collect representative samples in key sectors, a pattern that distorts its data sets on prices and on employment among others, Tatyana Rybakova says.

            The Russian economic commentator points out that “Rosstat gathers data from across Russia, but it only receives information from relatively large companies. Smaller firms often lack the capacity to complete the agency’s extensive questionnaires; and they face no real penalties for failing to do so” (theins.ru/ekonomika/281573).

            That skews inflation and employment figures because smaller firms typically are forced to raise prices more than larger ones whose size allows them greater ability to negotiate and fix prices and because smaller firms suffering from the impact of inflation are more likely to let workers go than are larger ones where such action would be more politically sensitive.

            Thus Rosstat reports less inflation and less unemployment that ordinary Russians experience, again not because it is falsifying the data but because it isn’t making a good faith effort to collect all the data needed to make accurate reporting about these sensitive figures possible.