Tuesday, February 11, 2025

Except for Submarines, Russia’s Northern Fleet Highlights Growing Gap between Moscow’s Ambitions and Navy’s Resources, Norwegians Say

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 7 – In its latest threat assess ment, the Norwegian Intelligence Service says that the Russian navy, except for its submarine arm, is increasingly struggling between Moscow’s ambitions and the navy’s resources and is often forced to choose between missions and maintenance.
    At its home ports, Russian warships “are filing up, staying in the dock ever longer and typically are serviced by equipment that doesn’t work,” the report says (thebarentsobserver.com/security/northern-fleet-faces-wide-gap-between-ambitions-and-resources-intel-report/424194).
    Scheduled refittings, the report continues, are “years” behind schedule, with some ships, like the Russian navy’s only aircraft carrier now likely not ever to return to service despite repeated promises that it will go to sea in the near future.
    According to the Norwegians, the only exception to this pattern is the submarine service. There ships are coming online at a speed not seen since the Brezhnev period; and they are being services and armed promptly.  

Monday, February 10, 2025

Far Fewer Russians who Left in 2022 are Returning than Putin Claims and Earlier Studies Suggested

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 7 – Only 10 percent of Russians who left in 2022 because of the war have returned to their native country, according to the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service, a figure lower than the roughly 20 percent the European Institute in Florence reported and far lower than the 50 percent Putin has claimed and that many have reported as gospel.
    According to the new study based on an online poll that also tracked where those who left have gone first and then settled, some 650,000 people left the Russian Federation in 2022 (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2025/02/07/1090699-v-rossiyu-vernulis and actualcomment.ru/uekhavshie-iz-rossii-ne-vozvrashchayutsya-2502070947.html).
    While such a survey is not without its problems, it is certainly no more problematic than the Florence investigation; and it is certain to cast doubt on Putin’s claim and spark more worries about how his war in Ukraine has accelerated the brain drain from a country that can ill afford that.  

Novels Offering Alternative Histories for Russia Extremely Popular Among Russians and Useful to Regime

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – Many have commented on how the Putin regime has rewritten Russian history, but far fewer have noticed something else: Russians are snapping up books that offer completely alternative stories about key events in history that had things gone differently then, everything afterwards would have been entirely different.
    Sergey Medvedev of Radio Liberty says that the popularity of such alternative histories reflects the trauma Russians have suffered because of the three major events of the 20th century in that country – the 1917 revolution, Stalinism and World War II, and the collapse of the USSR (svoboda.org/a/roman-s-popadantsem-/33300518.html).
    And he cites one observer, Dmitry Nekrasov of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe who says that he has identified 600 such novels in Russia, compared to only 30 in all other countries combined. Nekrasov adds that the absence of a clear plan for the future makes interest in alternative versions for Russia more interesting as well.
    There are many consequences of this interest in alternative histories but perhaps the most serious is the willingness of many Russians to accept new versions of the past offered by Putin and his regime, versions at odds with what they had thought was the case but far less radically different than the alternative history novels they regularly read.

Sunday, February 9, 2025

To Fill Its Depleted Ranks in Ukraine, Moscow Now Planning to Draft Those with Venereal Diseases and Mental Problems

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – To fill the ranks of its invasion force in Ukraine, Moscow has already been using convicts, something that did not happen before 2022 when Putin launched his expanded invasion. Now, it is planning to take in as soldiers those who would have been excused from service earlier because of venereal diseases or mental problems.
    A proposal to do that has now been published on a government website for purposes of discussion (regulation.gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=153279), and many Russians, especially those with husbands or sons in the military already, are outraged by the idea (newizv.ru/news/2025-02-04/zdorov-goden-v-armiyu-pozovut-s-venericheskimi-i-psihicheskimi-boleznyami-435794).
    Despite this anger and despite the problems for health in the Russian military and unit cohesion, this proposal is likely to be approved, yet another indication of the problems Moscow is having in filling its depleted ranks in Ukraine and its willingness to use men it would have excused from service in the past.

Central Asia Needs Help to Exploit Its Critical Mineral Reserves, Meirkhanova Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – Central Asia has large reserves of critical minerals that could help power its economic development, but so far, it has failed to overcome problems with exploration, extraction, and processing, according to Aruzhan Meirkhanova, a researcher at Astana’s National Analytic Center.
    To achieve breakthroughs, the countries of the region will need significant outside help, she argues; but unless the countries themselves take action to ensure that they are full participants in this process, what could become “a lasting blessing” could easily become “a resource curse” (carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/central-asia-crm-offers).
    “Modernizing exploration is a crucial first step, Meirkhanova says, noting that most maps are based on Soviet-era explorations and that Kazakhstan spent more on exploration in 1990 alone than it did  for the total amount it spent between 2003 and 2023” (dprom.kz/geologorazvedka/natsionalnaya-geologicheskaya-sluzhba-kazahstana-rabota-po-vospolneniyu-msb/).
    But that is only the first step, she continues. The Central Asian countries must address problems involving extracting including shortcomings in their institutional frameworks, inconsistent tax regimes and lack of ability to control environmental impact of mining (documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099081823001539573/pdf/P17674501063760b08b290a4ae6547845d.pdf).
    And they must overcome problems in processing so that they can get full value from their reserves rather than being paid by other countries only for unprocessed ores (unctad.org/news/critical-minerals-boom-global-energy-shift-brings-opportunities-and-risks-developing-countries).
    China has been the dominant outside player up to now, but Western countries are increasingly active – and their appearance has given the Central Asian countries new opportunities to play one outsider against another in order to advance their own national interests.

Residents in 30 Federal Subjects Take Part in ‘Thanks to Navalny’ Action of Their Own

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – Supporters of Aleksey Navalny plan to assemble in Moscow on Feb. 16, the first anniversary of his death in a Russian prison camp, to say thank you to the late Russian politician for his contributions and to pledge their support for implementing the ideas he put forward.
    But many people beyond the capital’s ring road who would like to participate simply can’t, and so an Altai poet, Artyom Sakharov, urged people in the federal subjects to take part by sending toys or pictures of toys to regional groups.  Approximately 150 in 30 federal subjects have now done so (semnasem.org/news/2025/02/05/zhiteli-30-regionov-pouchastvovali-v-akcii-spasibonavalnomu).
    Russian siloviki have taken such a hard line against such activism outside of Moscow that many people have been afraid to deliver the toys in person but instead are sending scanned images to the Navalny groups, Sakharov says. About a third of the 150 who took part chose that approach.
    But even this figure is impressive for three reasons: the campaign in the regions received little attention, many in the regions disagree with Navalny’s stance on federalism, and the risks of taking action far from Moscow are far greater because there is far less chance that Western journalists or diplomats will cover what goes on.   

Russian Government’s Failure to Support Villages and Roads Linking Them to Urban Centers is ‘Above All’ an Attack on Country’s Ethnic Minorities, ‘Free Idel-Ural’ Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – The Russian government’s refusal to maintain facilities in villages or to build roads linking these population centers to urban centers is not only destroying the rural way of life in that country but is “above all” an attack on Russia’s ethnic minorities, according to the Free Idel-Ural portal.
    That is because, the portal says, in many republics, non-Russians dominate villages and thus maintain their language and identity there whereas once such people are forced to move to cities dominated by ethnic Russians, they lose both (idel-ural.org/archives/chynovnyky-v-chuvashyy-nazvaly-neeffektyvnym-stroytelstvo-dorog-v-malonaselennye-punkty/).
    Consequently, Putin’s “optimization” campaign is not just about saving money but about destroying non-Russian minorities and forcing their Russianization and ultimate Russification, an attack which must be recognized and opposed, the portal which works to defend non-Russian groups in the Middle Volga says.
    What is striking, the portal continues, is that officials are now openly admitting that they don’t see it as economically efficient to build roads linking villages to urban centers let alone maintain medical and other services in villages. As Chuvashia head Vyacheslav Borisov said recently, “we don’t have enough resources to tackle al this at once.”
    But behind that “economic” argument is a Russification agenda, Free Idel-Ural says; and no one should be deceived into thinking that is not the more important factor not only in Chuvashia but in the Russian Federation as a whole.

Russian Officials Should have the Power to Refuse to Register ‘Strange’ Names, Children’s Ombudsman in Tatarstan Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – Irina Volynets, the children’s ombudsman in Tatarstan, says that Russian officials should have the power not to register names that they consider to be strange or likely to cause problems for the children as they grow older and that registration offices should employ linguists and psychologists to make this determination.
    Her idea is attracting attention not just because its adoption would give the Russian authorities further power to homogenize the country but also because it might be used against non-Russian names that the powers that be don’t approve of (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-02-04/v-rossii-predlozhili-sozdat-reestr-razreshennyh-imen-dlya-novorozhdennyh-5315607).
    That would become more likely if Volynets’ proposal were to grow into a list of names that the authorities would permit and thus exclude other names that parents might choose, the likely consequence of allowing the registration offices to make decisions about which names would be permitted and which banned.  

Russia’s Multi-National and Poly-Confessional Character Doesn’t Make It Unique or Give It a Competitive Advantage, Silantyev Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 5 – Roman Silantyev, an outspoken critic of Islam who is closely tied to the Russian Orthodox church and is rumored to be close to the Russian security services, argues that multi-national and poly-confessional character of the Russian Federation doesn’t make it unique among nations or give it any competitive advantage.
    His argument against this idea -- which is enshrined in the Russian Constitution and regularly cited by Putin and Kremlin ideologists -- is clearly intended to further undermine such official support as there is for both and thus open the way for new attacks on non-Russians and non-Orthodox faiths (vz.ru/opinions/2025/2/5/1312945.html).
    The reason that Silantyev makes this argument is that many people, including Kremlin loyalists, maintain that Russia’s numerous nations and religions set it apart from other countries and give it a comparative advantage in dealing with others and thus should be celebrated rather than be a source of concern.
    But by making this argument, Silantyev clearly hopes that others in Moscow will drop any references to these features of the Russian population and that they will then be more willing to insist as he does that the Russian Federation is an ethnic Russian country with minorities and an Orthodox Christian one with minorities rather than something else.
    If that becomes the dominant view – and Putin and his entourage have been moving in that direction – it will remove one of the most important ideas that has acted as a partial constraint on attacks against ethnic and religious minorities who will thus be reduced to marginality rather than seen as an essential element of Russian life.

Saturday, February 8, 2025

Stepashin Says Stalin Made a Major Mistake in Annexing Western Ukraine, But Other Russian Historians Dissent

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 4 – Western analysts have long debated whether Stalin made a major mistake in annexing the Baltic countries, western Belarus, Western Ukraine and Moldova after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact assigned those areas to the Soviet Union as part of Moscow’s sphere of influence.
    Some argue that this action helped Moscow to prevent Japan from joining Germany in an attack on the USSR and that it helped Stalin win the war by forcing the German army to begin its initial advance far further from major Soviet cities, while others suggest that by absorbing these regions, Stalin inserted a delayed action mine under the Soviet Union that blew it apart in 1991.
    Soviet and more recently Russian historians have generally approved the action either because they have until recently denied the existence of the secret protocols involved or because they focused on the tactical issues of the start of the war rather than the social and political consequences of absorbing anti-Moscow territories.
    But now the debate has been joined seriously. Speaking at a conference this week on the 80th anniversary of the Yalta Conference, Sergey Stepashin, a former Russian prime minister, said that by absorbing Western Ukraine, Stalin has committed his “greatest error” (vz.ru/news/2025/2/4/1312734.html).
    Speaking as a military man, Stepashin says, Stalin’s action prevented Moscow from having the time to “establish a new line of defense.” But even more than that, the Soviets annexed areas that contained anti-Moscow and anti-Russian populations who later allied with the Germans and worked to destroy the Soviet Union.
    Now, he suggests, Western Ukrainians have spread their anti-Moscow and anti-Russian views to the rest of Ukraine, something that would not have happened had Stalin not absorbed them and their territory. Consequently, Stalin’s mistake continues to echo across the region with negative consequences.
    Other Russian historians have already responded with sharp attacks on Stepashin’s position (vz.ru/news/2025/2/4/1312776.html). But it seems clear that this is just the beginning of a larger debate, one that may very well affect the Kremlin’s approach to redrawing Ukrainian borders in the course of a potential peace deal.


Russian Scholars will be Forced to get FSB Approval for Contacts and Cooperation with Foreign Colleagues, if Government Bill Passes

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – Under the terms of a new law the Russian education and science ministry has cleared, the FSB will have the power to approve or disapprove any plans by Russian scholars to cooperate with their foreign colleagues, Vedomosti reports on the basis of statements by two sources “close to the government.”
    In recent years, the FSB has intervened to block various cooperation efforts, but the new measure will not only formalize that role but make it more likely that Russian scholars will be more isolated from contacts with scholars abroad than at any time since Soviet times (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2025/02/03/1089832-sotrudnichestvo-potrebuet-soglasovaniya and thebarentsobserver.com/news/fsb-tightens-control-over-russian-science/424042).
    According to the bill, which is almost certain to be passed and will go into full effect by the end of this year, the FSB must be “informed of any kind of cooperation or contact that Russian scientists have with colleagues abroad” and that the Federal Security Service will have the power to cancel in defense of Russia’s “intellectual sovereignty.”
    Given the risks of punishment, Russian scholars are likely to feel compelled to get approval in advance rather than only informing the powers that be after the fact, a truly chilling step toward the total isolation of Russian scholarship from their colleagues abroad and one that will hamper Russian intellectual life in a wide variety of ways.  

Pro-Kremlin Telegram Channel Calls for Sending Just-Released Ingush Seven Activist to Fight in Ukraine

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 4 – The travails of the Ingush Seven activists who were sentenced to prison for organizing demonstrations against the handing over of Ingush land to Chechnya aren’t ending with their release from prison, Now that one of their number, Bagaudin Khautiyev, is out, a pro-Kremlin telegram channel is calling for him to be drafted and sent to Ukraine.
    In the past, Russian officials have often brought new charges against those who have been released from prison in order to keep them from continuing their dissident activity; but now they have more convenient method, forcing them to serve in Ukraine from which they may not return alive.
    Khautiyev appears likely to be the first Ingush activist who will be treated in this way. (On his release, see fortanga.org/2025/02/ingushskij-aktivist-bagaudin-hautiev-osvobodilsya-iz-kolonii/; on the call that he be sent to fight in Ukraine, see t.me/s/rozyskri and fortanga.org/2025/02/proverit-na-mobilizacziyu-rupor-ingushskih-silovikov-otreagiroval-na-osvobozhdenie-politzaklyuchennogo-bagaudina-hautieva/).
    If in fact Moscow succeeds in sending Khautiyeva to fight and die in Ukraine, it is likely that the Russian authorities will use this method elsewhere in the Russian Federation to remove from the scene more permanently and quite possibly with fewer protests against such actions those who have protested against its policies.  
    Human rights groups both inside Russia and beyond its current borders need to speak now about the risks Khatiyev faces. Any failure to do so may very well cost him and others not just their freedom but their lives.  

Putinism, ‘an Unstable Isotope,’ Now Decaying into Its Component Parts, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – Putin by fighting in Ukraine “reconciled” two hitherto unreconcilable camps, that National Bolsheviks who wanted a Soviet Union and the Black Hundreds who wanted no Ukraine at all, Vladimir Pastukhov says; but as the war continues, this division is undermining both Putinism as an ideology and political stability in Moscow.
    Putin was able to unite these two groups precisely because he did not announce or at a minimum was never clear about exactly what he wanted from the war, the London-based Russian analyst says; but now that there is talk about ending the conflict, the question of what he wants is central (t.me/v_pastukhov/1378 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=67A0EA8C3FAB9).
    And because that is happening, both the unity of Putinism as ideology and the unity of his political system in general is increasingly at risk given that Putinism has always been “an unstable isotope” ready at the first opportunity to “decay” into it component and in many cases competing component parts.

Mari Followers of Traditional Religion Expanding Their Formal Organizations -- and Promoting Both Nationalism and Democracy

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – The Mari, a Finno-Ugric nation in the Middle Volga most of whose members are followers animism, are now engaged in the establishment of new structures that will help them ensure the survival not only of their religion but their nationality and democratic traditions as well (mariuver.com/2025/02/03/mtr-birskogo-rajona/#more-80467 and birskpress.ru/news/natsionalnye-proekty/2025-02-02/v-birskom-rayone-poyavitsya-organizatsiya-traditsionnoy-mariyskoy-religii-4105419).
    This is the second wave of such organizational efforts and seems likely to follow the earlier one in the 1990s when the advancement of the traditional faith played a major role in promoting Mari nationalism and Mari democracy. (On those interrelationships, see Victor Schnirelmann, “’Christians! Go Home’: A revival of Neo-Paganism Between the Baltic Sea and Transcaucasia,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 17:2 (2002) 197-211.)
    What makes this latest report of broader import is that all too often analysts dismiss animist groups as rural and backward-looking when in fact they may be the hearths on which the flame of democracy can spark. That is what happened with the Mari in the 1990s, and it appears to be what it happening with them again in the 2020s.


Karelian Legislative Assembly Backs Plan to Create Online Translation Function for Karelian Language

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – The Karelian language, spoken by only a tiny fraction of the population of Karelia and the only titular language of a non-Russian republic in the Russian Federation that is not the state language of that federal subject, may be about to get a big boost, something that could spark a new growth in Karelian nationalism there.
    Members of the republic’s legislative assembly have come out in support of a proposal by scholars at the Karelian Scientific Center to establish an online translator for Karelian (mariuver.com/2025/02/03/kareljskomu-jazyku-byt-v-cifre/ and karelia-zs.ru/presssluzhba/novosti/deputaty_podderzhali_ideyu_sozdaniya_onlajnperevodchika_karelskogo_yazyka/).
    If this proposal is realized, it will require the compilation of a far more complete Karelian dictionary and that in turn will help save the language, even if some who now speak it will use the translation service to make use of Russian in their public lives, the obvious intent of at least some of those who are backing the idea.
    And such an effort as well as the new dictionary itself will likely slow the demise of Karelian and allow it to become a more important focus of the Karelian national movement. (On Karelian nationalism, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/after-moscow-labelled-them-foreign.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/02/karelian-activists-to-mark-centenary-of.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/04/moscows-russification-policies-not.html.)

Mironov Wants Moscow to Follow Trump and Give Russian Names to Arctic Ocean, Franz Joseph Land and Svalbard

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – Sergey Mironov, a Duma deputy noted for his ultra-nationalist positions, says Russia must learn from what US President Donald Trump is doing and give Russian names to the Arctic Ocean, Franz Joseph Land and the Svalbard archipelago to reflect Russia’s importance in the Arctic.
    The leader of the Just Russia-For Truth Party says that the Arctic should become the Russian Arctic Ocean, Franz Joseph Land, which does belong to Russia, should become Lomonosov Land, and the Svalbard archipelago, which belongs to Norway, the Pomor Island (t.me/mironovonline/11529 and thebarentsobserver.com/news/extremist-lawmaker-wants-to-rename-svalbard/424048).
    Other Russians have also picked up on Trump’s plan to rename certain geographic locations, but Mironov is the most prominent among them – and his call has the potential to exacerbate growing tensions in the Arctic by introducing yet another source of disinformation and confusion there.
    But this Russian nationalist proposal, like to many others, may backfire on Moscow.  If the Kremlin puts the Pomors on the map in the way Mironov proposes, that will almost certainly give new energy to the Pomor national movement which has been growing in the Russian North and further fracture what Moscow defines as a united ethnic Russian nation.
    For background on the Pomors, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/04/pomor-lands-not-yet-proud-catalonia-but.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/optimization-means-liquidation-pomors.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/11/pomors-seen-in-moscow-as-ethnic.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/06/in-russian-north-official-ethnic.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/03/in-north-some-ethnic-russians-again.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/10/pomor-nation-building-in-1990s-shows.html  and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/pomor-movement-creating-second-ukraine.html.

Friday, February 7, 2025

Regional Ombudsmen Stopped Defending Political Rights Long Ago and Now aren’t Defending Social Rights Except of Those Fighting in Ukraine, ‘New Tab’ Study Finds

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – Regional officials responsible for the defense of human rights, commonly referred to as ombudsmen, stopped defending political rights long ago and since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine in 2022 have been ever less willing to take up issues of social rights except for those involving soldiers fighting in Ukraine, Dmitry Shishkin says.
    The “New Tab” journalist reaches that conclusion after examining more than250 annual reports of these officials for the period  2021 to 2023 and talking to ombudsmen about their experience in handling more than 600,000 appeals during those years and others earlier (thenewtab.io/pravila-igry/).
    Shishkin says that ombudsmen have concluded that they can do little or nothing to defend the political rights of Russians and that their role in defending social rights of ordinary citizens is limited as well except in the case of protecting soldiers, something the Kremlin prefers that they focus on.
    What this means is that offices set up more than two decades ago in which so many placed so much hope have been gelded, but this trend may backfire: Not everyone will be pleased with this latest indication that in Russia, veterans of the war in Ukraine are a protected species at least in comparison with everyone else.

Wednesday, February 5, 2025

Moscow Patriarchate’s Plan to Canonize Suvorov Outrages His Non-Russian Victims, Sidorov Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has a long history of canonizing Russian military figures of the past, but its decision to begin the canonization process for Aleksandr Suvorov is deepening the divide between Russians and non-Russians against whom he carried out acts of genocide, Kharun (Vadim) Sidorov says.
    For Russians, Suvorov is a hero of Russian efforts to fight Napoleon, but for the Nogays, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Crimean Tatars and many others, he remains first and foremost the organizer of genocide against them during his campaigns to expand the empire, the Charles University scholar says (idelreal.org/a/kanonizatsiya-suvorova-i-tserkovnyy-militarizm/33297664.html).
    At a time when most churches have elected to condemn genocidal actions, the Moscow church has chosen the opposite route, celebrating one of the worst criminals in that regard to as to boost the status of a Russian national military hero, an action that will offend both non-Russia activists and non-Russian officials (lenta.ru/news/2021/06/21/suvorov/ and ru.krymr.com/a/pisma-krymchan-zagnivaushij-simvol-russkogo-kryma/29982591.html).
    That even officials in these republics oppose the deification of Suvorov means that the Patriarchate in its effort to be even more Russian nationalist than the Kremlin leadership may be creating serious problems for Moscow civil and religious, problems that may mean that the Presidential Administration will intervene to prevent declaring Suvorov a saint.

Yandex Announces Plans to Add Kabardin-Cherkess and Karachay-Balkar Languages to Its Translation Function

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – The Yandex news agency has announced that it is working to create an electronic translation system for the Kabardin-Cherkess and the Karachay-Balkar languages, a move that may undermine both Moscow’s efforts to divide the Circassian and Turkic languages and the two remaining binational republics, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia.
    The fact that Yandex is talking about a common Kabardin-Cherkess language and a common Karachay-Balkar one will at a minimum encourage the Circassian and Turkic nations involved to see themselves as common peoples rather than as the Soviets insisted, a vision that may lead one or the other or both to step up efforts to redraw republic borders.
    That possibility is strongly suggested by Khachim Zheligashtov, head of a group called the Circassian Renaissance who says that a beta version of this translation service will go online soon (nazaccent.ru/content/43479-v-yandeks-perevodchik-dobavyat-kabardino-cherkesskij-i-karachaevo-balkarskij-yazyki/).
    While this effort currently enjoys the support of officials in the region, it may quickly lose the backing of Moscow once officials in the Kremlin recognize the problems they will be exacerbating if not creating by what is one of the more open challenges of the results of Stalin’s ethnic engineering to appear in the last few years.
    Indeed, once officials in Moscow take notice, it is likely that they will kill this project. But even if they do, the fact that it was announced and then may be put on hold by Moscow will have political consequences both for Circassian and for Turkic groups in the Caucasus and their larger co-ethnic groups beyond the borders of the former Soviet space.  

Kremlin Efforts to Revive Soviet-Style Writers Union Won’t Work, Pryanikov Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 3 – Kremlin efforts to revive the basic principle of the Soviet-era Writers Union in which writers will be well paid in exchange for writing what the regime wants won’t work, Pavel Pryanikov says. That approach didn’t work even at the end of Soviet times and there is even less reason to think it can be revived and work effectively now.
    Just as Putin has used cash to buy himself an army for his war in Ukraine, the commentator suggests, the Kremlin leader now wants to use cash to buy off the creative intelligentsia and in the first instance Russian writers (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-02-03/pavel-pryanikov-eto-ne-srabotalo-v-sssr-ne-srabotaet-i-segodnya-5314065).
    But that tactic did not work in the final decades of Soviet power, Pryanikov says; and there is even less reason to think it will work for Putin and his regime now.  At the end of Soviet times, writers who had willingly collected money from the Soviet state, “even the most faithful ones, directed to the camp of the vacillators” and in fact helped destroy the Soviet Union.
    A clear example of this, the commentator continues, is the case of Valentin Rasputin who generally stayed within the limits the Soviets set in order to collect his money but became the first to declare at the Congress of Peoples Deputies that Russians were fed up with feeding the periphery, the USSR should die, and an “’independent’ Russian Federation” should be set up.
    What agenda for writers could today’s Kremlin set? And how could they get Russians to read their books?  There are lots of competitors on the Internet and so “today it would be more profitable not to publish anything from such state writers but to pay them for their silence” because “the main thing is that they do not defect to the enemy’s camps.”
    Trying to get them to sell Putinism not only will not work but very likely will backfire when those asked to do so decide they can make more by crossing over to the camp of the opposition, Pryanikov says.

Since Start of Expanded War in 2022, Russians have Increasingly Turned to Fortune Tellers and Witchcraft, Statistics Show

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – Since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russians have increasingly turned to fortune tells and other forms of witchcraft to help them cope with the increasing uncertainty in their lives, spending increasingly vast sums on such services, a trend Russian sociologists say shows no sign of easing.
    In the Moscow Times, journalist Dmitry Petrov provides some statistics regarding just how much money is now going to these black arts and the observation of independent Moscow anthropologist Aleksandra Arkhipova on why this is happening in Russia today (moscowtimes.ru/2025/01/31/rasteryannaya-rossiya-magiya-voina-i-z-kultura-a153860).
    In 2024, Petrov reports, Russian spent 2.4 trillion rubles (24 billion US dollars) on such services, more than four percent of what they spent on food. A year earlier, they paid witches two trillion rubles (20 billion US dollars), “twenty times more than they spent on visits to psychotherapists.”
    Visits to websites of astrologists, numerologists and fortune tellers rose 38 percent over the last year, and the average time spent on visits rose by 19 percent. Moreover, Ivanov reports, “more than half of Russians often study horoscopes, a quarter believe they have encountered magic, and more than 30 percent are ready to visit fortune tellers.”
    He continues: “In 2024, Russians spent 1.9 billion rubles (19 million US dollars) on fortune telling cards at Ozon and Wildberries,” more than twice as much as they spent on such things two years earlier. And the numbers continue to rise: in December 2024, Russians spent 129.5 million rubles, 18 million more than in December 2023.
    Independent anthropologist Arkhipova offers an explanation: “a belief in witchcraft … is characteristic of a culture of pessimistic conformist, people who do not go against the system and who justify their lack of action by saying that there are secret rules and that these rules must be followed,” a position many Russians now freely acknowledge.
    But there are other factors at work too, she says. Among these are a sense of confusion and powerlessness and the loss of confidence in the world around them at a time of “chaos and madness.”

Promoting Tver Karelian Culture Alone, as Russian Authorities Nominally Do, Won’t Keep That Nation from Dying Out, Activists Say

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – A debate has broken out among the remaining Tver Karelians, an ethnic community in the Tver Oblast of the Russian Federation that a century ago numbered 140,000 but now has fewer than three thousand members, over how to save and possibly revive that nation.
    Tver Karelian officials, supported by Moscow and other Russian officials, believe that cultural activities are enough and have been seeking to suppress other Tver Karelians who argue that only the restoration of some state formation like the one which existed briefly at the end of the 1930s is required.
    The latter acknowledge that culture is important but argue that it is not enough for a nation to survive and that both political structures and control over the economy of a particular territory are needed. If a nation doesn’t have both of those, it will die out, first by losing its language and then its identity however many cultural festivals are organized in its name.
    A report by journalist Aleksey Ivanov in The New Tab portal is important because it provides a rare glimpse into just how strong such feelings are among numerically smaller peoples that Moscow and many others assume will soon be completely absorbed by the ethnic Russians (thenewtab.io/narod-fantom/).
    At the same time, this article is a reminder that Moscow’s current support for cultural activities instead of real autonomy for non-Russians is a cover for a new assimilation drive and not a support for non-Russians. Or if it is a support, it is like the support that the noose gives a hanging man.
    But this Russian strategy may not work as the authorities expect. It is likely that at least some of those who are attracted to Tver Karelian culture by fairs and celebrations will begin to ask larger questions and conclude that their only hope for the future is political and economic autonomy or even independence.
    If that proves to be the case, then this will be yet another example of the unintended consequences of Putin’s policies.  

Tuesday, February 4, 2025

Kadyrov Working to Create Chechnya-Controlled Muftiate in Ingushetia

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 1 – Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov has made no secret of his hopes to absorb Ingushetia and perhaps portions of Dagestan into his republic. He has already compelled Magas to hand over 10 percent of Ingushetia to his control and has supported the Batal-Haji Sufi order in Ingushetia that is now in open conflict not only with Magas but Moscow as well.
    Now, the Chechen headman has launched a new effort behind the scenes to subordinate Ingushetia to himself and his republic. According to Fortanga, he is working behind the scenes to create a muftiate that he will control and that will control Muslim parishes in Ingushetia (fortanga.org/2025/01/v-ingushetii-mozhet-poyavitsya-novyj-muftiyat-podkontrolnyj-vlastyam-chechni-istochniki/).
    What makes this report especially disturbing is that it suggests the current government in Ingushetia, which has long had a troubled relationship with the republic’s muftiate (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/ingushetia-only-federal-subject-whose.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/08/ingushetia-elects-mufti-even-though-it.html) is now working hand-in-glove with Kadyrov, something that will further undercut support for Magas and Moscow.
    The independent Fortanga news agency says that it has two sources for this story, one that has not been reported by any of the official news agencies in Magas, Grozny or Moscow. The details the sources provide, however, strongly suggest that this report is true although they do not show that any agreement on a Chechen-dominated muftiate in Ingushetia is about to be signed.
    One of the sources, unnamed, says that “the idea about the opening of a new administration for Muslims belongs to the leadership and certain instructors of the Ingushetia Islamic University” and that the idea is backed by officials at the North Caucasus Federal District, including Adam Shakhidov, an advisor to Kadyrov.
    This source adds that Makhmud-Ali Kalimatov, head of Ingushetia, has been informed  about these plans.
    The second source, also unnamed, says that backers of the plan have met recently in Egypt where representatives of the Ingushetia Muslim community have indicated that they expect administrative and financial assistance from Chechnya, given that Grozny several times earlier had tried to influence the MSD of Ingushetia so as to influence Magas.

Sunday, February 2, 2025

Russia’s Population has Declined for Seven Years in a Row, Rosstat Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – Rosstat, the Russian government’s statistical arm, concedes that the population of the Russian Federation has fallen for the seventh straight year and that immigrants now compensate for only two-thirds of that amount (moscowtimes.ru/2025/01/31/rosstat-konstatiroval-sokraschenie-naseleniya-rossii-sedmoi-god-podryad-a153916).
    Examining these figures and the Russian government’s response to them, independent Russian demographer Aleksey Raksha makes five key points which help to explain why the situation may be even worse than Rosstat suggests it is and why Russian government efforts to counter it have been so ineffective (t.me/RakshaDemography/4280):
1.    Abortion restrictions and bans “do not increase birthrates.” That hasn’t happened in other countries and won’t happen in Russia whatever the Duma and  the Kremlin think.
2.    University students give birth to “about 0.5 percent of all children” in Russia, a share so small that the Kremlin’s focus on this group and providing it with money to have children won’t have the result the country’s rulers want.
3.    The fertility rate in Russia continues to fall and now stands at just over 1.4 children per woman per lifetime, far below the 2.2 needed to maintain the current level of population.
4.    Rosstat did not include Chechnya or Crimea in its 1999 assessments and so its conclusions about Russian population changes understate the level of decline over the last quarter of century.
5.    None of the tactics the regime has adopted to boost the birthrate have worked or are likely to do so in the future.  

Kremlin’s Efforts to Boost Birthrate Failing Largely Because Potential Parents Think Conditions in Putin’s Russia are Getting Worse, El Murid Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – The Kremlin keeps comes up with new programs to boost the birthrate – including paying women for having children, banning abortions in private clinics, and restricting contraception. But all are falling short because worsening conditions of life under Putin have reduced the readiness of Russians to have children, Anatoly Nesmiyan says.
    Nesmiyan, who blogs under the screen name El Murid, concedes that the declining size of the cohort of women in prime childbearing age groups plays a role; but he argues that the impact of repression and uncertainties under Putin is having a far larger impact (t.me/anatoly_nesmiyan/23260 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=679BA0E86F52E).
    Russians who might otherwise be giving birth aren’t because they don’t want to bring children into a world where they can’t predict what life will be like for any offspring, El Murid continues; and that factor is going to continue until Putin radically changes course or leaves the scene.
    “Considering that a break in the clouds is not now visible and there thus remains a firm conviction that the future will be only worse,” the blogger says, “normal people are taking normal decisions to wait and not to condemn their child to that nightmare into which the ruling regime has transformed the country.”
    There are many indications that what El Murid is saying is true, including a new study of decisions by Russian university students not to have children just published by the Horizontal Russia portal (semnasem.org/articles/2025/01/28/my-praktikuem-vozderzhanie-ili-ya-uhozhu-v-lesboseparatizm-pochemu-studentki-ne-hotyat-rozhat-dazhe-za-bonusy-ot-gosudarstva).
    That study highlights the fact that young Russians are also postponing having children because they believe they will have a better life for themselves and their children if they invest time and money now not on the start of a family but only after they have established themselves in their careers and have adequate housing.

50,000 Russians have Moved to China, Some for Business, Some to Marry, and Some to Live Comfortably in Retirement, New Academy of Sciences Study Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – Approximately 50,000 Russians now live in China, some for business reasons, some to marry, and some to live comfortably in retirement, a number that is increasing about 11,000 each year, according to the Federal Sociological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
    Their number, while growing, remains significantly below that of the estimated 500,000 Chinese who now live permanently in the Russian Federation, a reflection of both the difficulties involved of moving into China and the desperate need for workers in the areas east of the Urals where the Russian population is declining (ng.ru/economics/2025-01-30/1_9182_china.html).
    Russians moving to China tend to have higher educational levels than Chinese moving to Russia, something that both reflects and intensifies the differing economic trajectories of the two countries at the present time, the study reports.  If this trend continues, Russia will face even more economic difficulties in the future.

Khakass Council of Elders Says ‘Without a Language, There Won’t Be a Republic’

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – Khakassia, a republic situated between Krasnoyarsk Kray and the Altay Republic in which ethnic Russians form more than 80 percent of the population, has seldom attracted much attention for anything except possibility that Moscow may amalgamate it with a larger ethnic Russian region. But that may be about to change.
    The Council of Elders of the Khakass People has denounced the Abakan government for its failure to support more Khakass language instruction in the schools and elsewhere and declared that regional officials must recognize that “without a language, there won’t be a republic” (babr24.com/kras/?IDEas s=271646).
    The republic leadership has responded that it has followed federal policies and is spending massively to provide Khakass language instruction within those Moscow guidelines to the population, but the Council of Elders says that the Khakass language is dying because few feel it has much of a future.
    In fact, Abakan has gone beyond even what Moscow requires by renaming Khakass language publications to separate them more clearly from the Turkic languages of which Khakass is one (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/03/name-change-of-khakass-newspaper.html).
    And given the ethnic imbalance in the republic, the regional government is likely to continue that approach, although now there is a very real possibility that the Council of Elders may start speaking out more clearly against such moves, a development that could lead to broader protests about language there.  
    One aspect of the new protest by the Council of Elders is especially noteworthy. Its members are pointing out the obvious to the predominantly ethnic Russian government in the republic: if that government allows Khakass to die, the Council is suggesting, government officials could see their positions disappear along with the republic.
    And such an argument may be persuasive, especially in a republic that has been resisting amalgamation for some time already (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/08/kremlin-looks-ready-to-re-start.html and https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/03/five-ways-non-russian-republics-can.html).

20 Percent of Judge Slots in Russia Now Vacant, Supreme Court Statistics Show

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – Russia faces a large and growing shortage of judges, the result of low salaries, bureaucratic screening, and burnout, officials in the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of Russia say. As a result, 6500 judicial positions are currently unfilled – or nearly one in five.
    Given that the Putin regime uses the courts to give its repressive moves the appearance of legality, that puts a strain on the judicial system, making it more difficult to hold trials in a timely fashion  and encouraging judges to do what they can to shorten proceedings in anyone case so they can get on to others.
    The situation appears especially dire in the North Caucasus (akcent.site/novosti/38678) where the courts are being asked to make judgments about the regime’s moves against ethnic and religious movements; and unless the shortages are overcome, the Putin regime may find itself forced to use more extra-judicial means to achieve its ends.

Saturday, February 1, 2025

Russians Don’t Know Their Own Country and Plans for New School Subject about It Won’t Help, Yury Dolgoruky Telegram Channel Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – Moscow is returning to the school curriculum in Russia of a 34-hour course on the Foundations of the Spiritual and Moral Culture of the Peoples of Russia in order to overcome a rising tide of inter-ethnic tension. The motivation is fine, the Yury Dolgoruky telegram channel says; but the problem is far larger and has more consequences.
    The broader problem that the country needs to address is that Russians know far too little about their country and about the other peoples who live in it; and addressing that requires a far larger effort than any single course can provide (t.me/s/yuradolgoruk reproduced at rosbalt.ru/news/2025-01-31/telegram-kanal-yuriy-dolgorukiy-my-ne-znaem-svoyu-stranu-5312683).
    The author of the telegram channel says that in his experience, “people living in Astrakhan have little idea about the geography of Siberia, confusing it with the Far Eas; people in Omsk want to know whether one must get a visa to visit North Ossetia; and those in the Urals believe that Stavropol is located somewhere on the border with Central Asia.”
    Those are “real cases” from his personal experience, he continues; and they show that “we don’t know our country, a longstanding and systemic problem that isn’t going to be solved solely within the framework of relieving inter-ethnic tensions because the origins of this problem are far deeper and the consequences far more serious.”
    Indeed, reducing the issue of knowledge about the country to the question of how its peoples relate to one another can have the effect of both addressing those problems and acquiring more knowledge about Russia as such, exactly the opposite effects that those behind this new program say they seek.

Putin’s Healthcare Optimization Program has Closed 14 of the 17 Psychiatric Clinics Open in Moscow a Decade Ago

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 31 – To save money on healthcare and make it available for military aggression, Putin a decade ago launched what he calls his “optimization” program. That has led to the closure of clinics across the country and has even hit psychiatric treatment centers in Moscow, traditionally the last place to suffer from Kremlin initiatives.
    Ten years ago, there were 17 psychiatric hospitals in Moscow; now, there are three; and the stress has shifted from providing comprehensive treatment to providing outpatient services. As a result, observers say, many of those who have passed through the system are now exiting it worse off than they were at the start (svpressa.ru/blogs/article/447809/).
    What makes the situation especially bad is that the three remaining hospitals are not full service and patients often have to go long distances to get the various kinds of treatment they need. Many elect not to do so and thus are far worse off than they were before Putin went looking to save money on treatment for some of Russian society’s most vulnerable.  

Friday, January 31, 2025

Turkmenistan Still Neutral but Meaning of that Status is Evolving, Volkov Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 30 – Turkmenistan, known for its constitutional commitment to neutrality, is still neutral but the meaning of that status has changed as Ashgabat has become increasingly active internationally, according to Vitaly Volkov, perhaps Moscow’s leading commentator on that little known country.
    Ever more countries are interested in developing ties with Turkmenistan, he says; but few of them, including Russia and the United States, are in a position to  move Ashgabat as far as they would like. They each can get some of what they want on specific projects but not a wholesale alliance of any kind (stanradar.com/news/full/56683-tak-li-nejtralen-nejtralnyj-turkmenistan-intervju-s-vitaliem-volkovym.html).
    The reason for that, Volkov continues, is the interrelationship between the way in which Turkmenistan is ruled and the foreign policies it adopts. Much of the political landscape of Turkmenistan is divided among family members of the ruler and so any dramatic move across the board is thus extremely risky for the current constellation of power.
    The current president would like to change that, but so far, the Russian observer says, he has not been able to do much in that regard. Unless that happens, Ashgabat may become even more active internationally but it isn’t likely to move into one camp or the other but remain neutral, albeit neutral in ways very different from what it was earlier.
    For a discussion of what the current Turkmenistan ruler is doing in the security area and how this by itself is leading to a changed understanding of neutrality in Ashgabat, see jamestown.org/program/turkmenistan-expanding-military-to-support-its-increased-international-activity/.

‘Diversity within Russian Opposition Ends with Gender and Doesn’t Include LGBTQ People or Ethnic Minorities, Maladayeva Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – “Most Western donors have a very Moscow-centric view of Russia,” and “diversity within the Russian opposition” extends only to gender and does not include either LGBTQ people or ethnic minorities, according to Viktoriya Maladayeva, a Buryat activist who has now formed a group, the Indigenous of Russia,” to unite minorities and change these views.
    The activist who formed but then left the Free Buryatia Foundation when the group failed to back Buryats and now lives in exile says she “created Indigenous of Russia with a mission to unite Russia’s Indigenous peoples, raise awareness about their struggles and advocate and promote their rights” (themoscowtimes.com/2025/01/28/activist-viktoria-maladaeva-uplifts-russias-indigenous-peoples-with-power-of-unity-a87762).
    Those involved in this effort, Maladayeva continues, not only want to protect and advance their rights but also to know our “true history” and control “our own historic lands.” But at present, we “know so little about each other” that “one of our goals is to increase mutual understanding and learn about each other’s problems and dreams.”
    Last year, the group prepared a documentary about the international struggle of Queer indigenous people (themoscowtimes.com/2024/08/27/documentary-explores-the-intersectional-struggle-of-queer-indigenous-people-in-russia-a86124); and it is now preparing a second about residential schools Moscow used to Russify the indigenous peoples of the North.
    The group – whose activities are chronicled at instagram.com/indigenousofrussia/  -- would like to do more but at the present time lacks the resources to do so, Maladayeva concludes.

Only Three Groups in Russia Benefiting from War and Both They and Amounts of Money Involved Smaller than Most Imagine, Researcher Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – Only three groups have benefited from Putin’s war in Ukraine – soldiers and their families, workers in the military-industrial complex and business owners – but these groups are smaller and the amounts of money they’re receiving less than is commonly assumed, a researcher speaking on condition of anonymity says.
    As a result, the war has done little to change Russia from one of the most unequal countries in the developed world; and once it ends, he says, the situation may even get worse in that regard, forcing the government to change its approach or increase repression still further (meduza.io/en/feature/2025/01/28/the-end-of-the-war-will-herald-far-more-challenges-for-the-regime-than-the-war-itself).
    Some of Russia’s wealthiest people have indeed “gotten a lot richer” because they were able to divide “productive assets that were effectively abandoned by Western companies;” and that in turn allowed Putin to win their continued support. But presumably if the war ends, so too will that possibility.
    Among Russia’s more numerous and much poorer strata, even those who are benefiting are spending in ways that have only a small multiplier effect. And if peace comes, that will disappear. As a result, income inequality will become worse, and social discontent will emerge in Russia.
    As a result, the observer concludes, Russia “might actually become more repressive – have to become more repressive – if the war  ends or if the war continues, just as a way of keeping a handle on things,” hardly the outcome most other observers and activists are now talking about.  

Fewer than Four Percent of All Newborns in Russia in 2023 were Children of Foreigners, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – Many Russians fear that their nation will be displaced not only by the influx of migrant workers but by births among that group and thus support harsh measures to block more migrants from coming and the children of migrants from remaining in the Russian Federation.
    But their fears are not supported by statistics, demographer Aby Shukyurov writes in a report for the To Be Precise portal. In fact, while the number of children of parents at least one of which was a foreigner in fact doubled between 2019 and 2023 to 50,000, that number represented less than four percent of all newborns in Russia (tochno.st/materials/v-2023-godu-inostranki-rodili-v-rossii-50-tysiac-detei-eto-pocti-v-dva-raza-bolse-cem-v-2019-m-no-menee-4-ot-vsex-novorozdennyx).
    While there are problems with these data sets, the demographer says, noting that the citizenship or nationality of fathers is often not listed, the facts are that more than 80 percent of the children born in the Russian Federation in the most recent year for which statistics are available were the offspring of two citizens of that country.
    Consequently, the frequently expressed alarm about the supposed threat of “the replacement” of ethnic Russians by migrants and their children is completely unjustified both for the country as a whole and even for particular cities where the number of immigrants and their offspring are more numerous.  

Today’s ‘Russian Community’ Differs from Tsarist Era’s Black Hundreds Only by Its Lack of Stress on Anti-Semitism, Anti-Fascist Activist Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – “The only thing that distinguishes [today’s Russian Community] from the Black Hundreds is the absence of anti-Semitism or at least the lack of emphasis on it,” according to a Russian Anti-Fascist activist speaking on condition of anonymity. “The place of Jews is taken by migrants from Muslim countries,” and the Russian Community supports Israel.
    The two groups, although separated by more than a century, share a common “anti-communism, commitment to Orthodoxy, and radical loyalty to the state and to Putin personally,” and embers often say that the most important thing is that there not be any revolution” in Russia, he continues (posle.media/ih-obedinyaet-tyaga-k-nasiliyu/).
    That is just one of the points the activist makes in a wide-ranging discussion of the state of far right groups in Russia over the last several years. He argues that the key distinction between street-gang neo-Nazis and the Russian Community is generational” and that the two often work together.
    The street-gang neo-Nazis, he says, are mostly teenagers while the Russian Community is made up primarily of people over 30. But both are committed to sparking a race war between ethnic Russians and others, and so the finer points of ideology are less important to both than this common goal.
    (For background on the Russian Community, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/russian-community-organization-and-its.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/extremist-russian-community-now-active.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/another-black-hundreds-group-revived-in.html and jamestown.org/program/russian-community-extremists-becoming-the-black-hundreds-of-today.)

‘Men in North Caucasus have a Few More Rights than Women But No One is Free,’ Rights Activist Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – That women in the traditional societies of the North Caucasus are subject to repression by men, their families, and society as a whole is universally acknowledged, but Saida Sirazhudinova points out something that is often ignored: while men in that region have a few more rights than women do, “no one is free.”
    Men are often told whom to marry, what careers they can pursue, and where they can live, the rights activist says; and in some respects, this situation is getting worse. In Soviet times, marrying someone of a different nationality was encouraged. Now, families and society pressure men against doing so (okno.group/ультраджигитовая-маскулинность-сво/).
    Because women in the North Caucasus are treated so much worse than men there, she and other specialists say, the repression North Caucasian men feel is often ignored. But it is very real given the power of family and society pressure on the fundamental choices that men like women should have the right to make on their own.
    These experts make two other points which are important but again often ignored. On the one hand, older women who often dominate families are among those working hardest to oppress both men and women; and on the other, Islam often helps to liberate both men and women because it allows for inter-ethnic marriage and a broader choice of careers.
    That is not to say that the intensification of Islam in the region over the last two decades has been positive in every respect, these experts says; but it is to note that Islam can help break down some of the traditional values and practices at the root of the mistreatment of both women and men in the North Caucasus.  

Kostroma Renames Hospital for Inventor of Soviet-Era Punitive Psychiatry’s Concept of ‘Sluggish Schizophrenia’

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – The oblast psychiatric hospital has been renamed for Andrey Snezhnevsky, the founder of Soviet-style punitive psychiatry and the inventor of the notorious term, ‘sluggish schizophrenia,’ that was never accepted by psychiatrists in other countries but was used by Moscow against dissidents in the last decades of Soviet power.  
    Snezhnevsky began his career in Kostroma but in 1938 he moved to Moscow where he established the Soviet school of psychiatry. He eventually served as head of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (t.me/akalitin/905 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6797350C8DCEF).
    This horrific move is entirely appropriate at a time when Putin is expanding the use of punitive psychiatry across Russia and is doing so in particular outside of Moscow to avoid attracting Western attention. (On that, see jamestown.org/program/putin-expands-use-of-soviet-style-punitive-psychiatry-across-russia/ as translated into Russian at  region.expert/psychiatry/).

Thursday, January 30, 2025

Almost Five Million Russian Aged 14 to 35 Now Don’t Study or Work, Youth Agency Head Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 28 – According to the most recent statistics, for 2023, 4.7 million Russians between the ages of 14 and 35 neither study nor work, Grigory Gurov, the head of the Russian Agency for Young People. That means that every eight young person in the country “doesn’t see his or her place in society and has dropped out.”
     Officials refer to such people as the NET Generation, that is, people “not in employment, education or training, Yevgeny Chernyshov of the Nakanune news agency says, adding that experts say that such people have no interest in work or study but are only concerned with having a good time (nakanune.ru/articles/123085/).
    What is worrisome, the journalist continues, is that the share of young people who aren’t integrated into society more closely is much higher than their share in the population as a whole, 13 percent as compared to nine percent; and the situation may be getting worse: of the 1.6 million school graduates, only 0.7 percent have found or chosen to find work.  
This phenomenon of non-working and non-studying young people is relatively new, Gurov says; and while the government has programs to combat it, there is a real danger that if young Russians don’t go to work by age 30, they will remain a generation of Oblomovs their entire lives.
What makes these figures especially critical now is that were these young people to go to work, the need for immigrant labor would be far less and the ability of the government to raise an army far easier than is now the case. But the fact that the government is now focused on this suggests there will soon be new moves to integrate young Russians in the work force.

Wednesday, January 29, 2025

Russian Courts Seek to Reduce Ability of Juries to Find Anyone Innocent

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 25 – Russian judges find fewer than one percent of the defendants before them innocent, while juries now find roughly a quarter of those whose cases they hear not guilty. That pattern has alarmed the Russian authorities who have adopted a variety of strategies to reduce the chances that juries will return so many not guilty verdicts.
    The most common and the one that has been used the longest is to restrict the number of criminal cases held before juries with officials arguing that they can’t find enough Russians to serve on juries or to appeal jury decisions to higher courts where they are often overridden, Yekaterian Trifonova says (ng.ru/politics/2025-01-26/1_9178_jury.html).
    But such methods have proved insufficient to reduce the number of not guilty findings by juries, the Nezavismaya Gazeta politics reporter says; and so the authorities have now adopted other tactics, including having judges deny defense lawyers the opportunity to present alternative versions of the case before the jury.
    Such methods seldom get the coverage that the more blatant forms of intervention do, but they are an increasingly part of the toolbox the authorities draw on to prevent juries from finding people innocent and thus calling into question just how many more Russians are being railroaded into guilty findings.
    Trifonova’s article is important because she calls attention to something that few reporters Russian or international often include in their reporting about Russian jurisprudence and a reminder that Putin’s efforts to use the simulacra of law are being undertaken here as elsewhere to subvert law and justice.

Prilepin Equates Enemies of Soviet Power with Enemies of Russia, Deepening Divisions among Russian Nationalists who Support Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – In the Putin era, there has always been a deep division between Russian nationalists who support the Soviet past and those who view the Soviet system as an enemy of the Russian nation almost as dangerous as “the Anglo-Saxons.” But now this division has deepened and likely made the two sides irreconcilable.
    Zakhar Prilepin, a Russian nationalist writer who views the Soviet Union favorably, has equated those Russian nationalists who don’t as “enemies of Russia” and published a list of them, even though many of the latter are prominent supporters of Putin’s war in Ukraine (dzen.ru/a/Z5M-TkKySTiC_A-3). svoboda.org/a/rasstreljnyy-spisok-natsionalisty-protiv-zahara-prilepina/33289542.html).
    His attack has outraged many who have voiced their views (svoboda.org/a/rasstreljnyy-spisok-natsionalisty-protiv-zahara-prilepina/33289542.html). But more important than that, it has divided the most vocal supporters of Putin’s war, something that the Kremlin leader will find it far more difficult to overcome.
    Indeed, by allowing the attack, Putin has weakened his own position as those who agree with Russian nationalists who don’t like the Soviet past are likely to find it far easier to speak out against Prilepin who appears to be articulating the Kremlin leader’s position on this point and perhaps ultimately on others as well.

Kazan Officials Want to Set Up a Republic Personals Service so Tatars can Find Tatar Partners and have More Children

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan 26 – In Gorbachev’s times, personals columns begam to flourish in Soviet youth newspapers; and one of the signs that the friendship of the peoples he and other Moscow leaders talked so much about was coming to the end was the appearance of posts in which individuals said they were looking for partners from particular nationalities.
    Usually, those making such requests indicated that they wanted to meet someone of the same nationality as themselves, although not always. There were some striking cases in which Russians and others said they wanted to meet Jews or Germans, perhaps because they believed that if they married members of those groups, they could escape the USSR.
    Since the demise of the Soviet Union, personals columns have continued to appear but with less obvious political messages. However, that may be changing. Officials in Tatarstan want to establish a republic “acquaintance agency” so that Tatars can meet Tatars, marry and have more children (nemoskva.net/2025/01/27/v-tatarstane-chinovniki-hotyat-sozdat-respublikanskoe-agentstvo-znakomstv/).
    This builds on earlier efforts in which Tatarstan officials have sought to boost marriage rates among Tatars by matching them at polling stations or at skating rinks (t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/23714  and t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/39394) so as to boost the marriage and fertility rates of Tatars as Moscow is demanding.
    But while such programs at least for the time being enjoy Moscow’s support to the extent they increase the number of marriages and children, they may have the effect as their predecessors in the 1980s did of intensifying ethno-national identities, exactly the opposite outcome to the one the Kremlin favors.  

Tens of Thousands of Russian Wounded Waiting for Prosthetic Devices

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – Putin’s war in Ukraine has left at least 100,000 Russian soldiers invalids, of whom a minimum of half have undergone amputations and need prosthetic devices. But the Russian economy is incapable of providing them on a timely basis and tens of thousands of Russian soldiers wounded in battle must wait months to be fitted with them.
    That is just one of the damning findings Vyorstka journalists Ivan Zhadayev and Olesya Gerasimenko offer in their investigation into the state of prosthetics in the Moscow hospital responsible for treating the most seriously wounded with artificial limbs (verstka.media/reportazh_iz_tsentra_gde_proteziruyut_voyennykh_vernuvshikhsya_s_fronta_bez_ruk_i_nog).
    Russian government statistics do no break out those who need prosthetics as a result of the war from all those requiring them. But the two journalists report that demand for prosthetics grew “no more than seven percent annually” between 2013 and 2022, it jumped by 42 percent in 2023, the first full year of the war.
    And the Russian government which celebrates those who fight, are heavily injured or die for it in Ukraine hasn’t kept up. Those needing prosthetics have to wait months if not years for such devices, something that is leading to ever more bitterness among the veterans and likely among their relatives as well.
    One wounded veteran waiting for prosthetics went to war in 2022 when as he says “patriots” did rather than those who have been paid up to a million rubles (10,000 US dollars). He is still waiting. And while some of his fellows are still super patriotic, others are increasingly critical of Putin and the war.
    The Kremlin leader likes to talk about “unexploded bombs” which can threaten Russia. But he seems oblivious that by failing these men after having led them into this unjustified and criminal war, he is planting one under Russian society and indeed under himself.  

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

Moscow Authorities Forced to Proceed Cautiously against Batal-Haji Sufi Order Because of Its Strength, Observer Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – Ingushetia’s Batal-Haji Sufi order is too large and too well-connected for Moscow to proceed against its members in the way it has done with other Islamic groups the Putin regime views as supportive of or otherwise connected to terrorist acts such as the killing of senior officials, Islam Kartoyev says.
    When the FSB wants to come down hard on other Islamic groups, the blogger who himself was once a member of the  Batal-Haji order says, it typically arranges to kill them rather than bring them to trial (kavkazr.com/a/novye-glavnye-terroristy-bratstvo-batalhadzhintsev-iz-ingushetii-i-ubiystvo-generala-kirillova/33287519.html).
    But when the Batal-Haji order is involved, even the FSB has to proceed with caution because the order is too large, too rich and too well-connected even for Putin’s secret police to do otherwise, an indication of just how tenuous and weak Moscow’s rule in Ingushetia and even neighboring republics has become.
    According to Kartoyev, the membership of the order is between 15,000 and 20,000, and each of these is required to hand over to the leadership 10 percent of all income. “Among the members of the sect,” he continues, “are major businessmen, heads of industrial enterprises and so on.”
    That gives the leadership of the Batal-Haji enormous financial power, and it uses that to buy off police and security officials and to ensure that its members are treated well by the authorities, something few other social groups are in a position to do, Kartoyev reports on the basis of his personal experience.
    And that is effective in staying the hand of the authorities even when the victim of the crime is a highly placed official. The powers that be may still go after those involved but it won’t kill them and will likely treat them better in confinement than would be the case with those not members of such a group.
    One reason the authorities do so, Kartoyev continues, is that they know that even if they jail a significant number of Batal-Haji members, an even larger number of the followers of this Sufi order will remain free and ready to act on the orders of their leaders against the police or the FSB.
    That is a manifestation of real power, the kind that has led others to suggest that in Ingushetia at least, this Sufi order is now “a state within a state” and not some marginal group the Putin regime can do with whatever it likes (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/batal-haji-sufi-order-in-ingushetia-new.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/moscow-attacks-ingushetias-batal-haji.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/kadyrov-raising-military-unit-based-on.html).

Broken Windows Theory Explains What is Going On in Russian Cities, ‘PolitSovet’ Suggests

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – There are three kinds of social problems in Russia; those that are typical of all industrialized and urbanized societies, those that are unique to Russia, and those that are common to industrialized and urbanized societies but have a different set of consequences in Russia.
    The third kind is the most interesting but its existence is often ignored. Yekaterinburg’s PolitSovet portal provides a useful counterweight to that in a discussion of the failure of police to do anything about people who park their cars illegally on sidewalks in the central portion of that Siberian city (politsovet.ru/83177-teoriya-razbityh-okon-v-centre-ekaterinburga.html).
    Drawing on James Q. Wilson’s theory of broken windows which holds that small violations of public order lead to a general worsening of the criminological situation, the portal’s authors say that drivers in Yekaterinburg are providing a potential confirmation of that theory’s conclusion.
“Some time ago,” they write, “drivers for some reason decided that they could park on sidewalks. At first, only a few did so; and then when it became clear that no one would stop them or punish them, the sidewalks in the central part of the city were finally transformed into parking lots.”
Initially, some drivers who knew what they were doing was wrong hid their license plates, but very soon, they stopped doing so once it became obvious that the chances of their being punished were close to nil, a decision that was hastened because these cars were in the elite districts of the city and not in poorer areas.
“What conclusions should residents observing this picture draw?” PolitSovet asks rhetorically. “First, that no one is looking after order in the center of town. Second, that pedestrians in Yekaterinburg are second class citizens compared to drivers. And third – if ‘the best people of the city’ are openly violating the rules, then why shouldn’t everyone else?”
If Wilson’s broken windows theory is correct, the writers say, “then after a time, the absence of order regarding parking should lead t a general decline in order in the center of the city. We will observe to see whether this rule is confirmed,” they promise.

Kremlin Launches Program to Transform Political Strategists into ‘Social Architects’

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – The Presidential Administration has announced a competition to get political strategists, increasing unneeded because of the declining number of competitive elections, to serve as social architects who can design special programs for particular socio-economic groups (социальныеархитекторы.рф/).
    Some 3,000, driven either by economic necessity or a desire for preferment, have applied, and an initial group of five will be chosen and provided with special training (meduza.io/feature/2025/01/24/chem-zanyat-polittehnologov-v-strane-gde-pochti-ne-prohodyat-vybory-v-kremle-nashli-otvet-sotsialnymi-proektami-v-regionah).
    According to Meduza, the Kremlin views this program as both a means to retain the loyalty of these people and a way of compiling an accurate list of them if things should develop so that competitive elections will emerge and political technologists will be needed to advise and guide campaigns.
    But some observers fear that this effort will fall short both because of the very different skills needed for social architects and because of the reluctance of regional officials to spend large amounts of money on such people from Moscow. Thus, there may be a show of activity but very little in the way of a mass campaign.
    Nonetheless, this is an intriguing example of the Kremlin’s recognition that its own policies have rendered some people no longer needed and that it must take steps to find them employment lest those left without their former work crystallize into groups supporting or even forming a new opposition.

Monday, January 27, 2025

By Acquiring Greenland, US would Become ‘Arctic Player Equal in Size to Russia’ and Trigger Conflict with Moscow, Yevstafyev Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 24 – US President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the US should acquire Greenland from Denmark would dramatically change the balance of power in the Arctic and set the stage for new conflicts between Washington and Moscow, according to Dmitry Yevstafyev, a Moscow defense analyst and commentator.
    “Today,” he says, “America is not a player in the Arctic” and is included as an Arctic country only because its state of Alaska border that sea. But, he continues, “America’s Arctic infrastructure is quite poor compared even to Canada,” something that would have to change if the US annexed Greenland (ura.news/news/1052880245).
    And in that event and also because of American interest in developing the natural resources of Greenland, Yevstafyev adds, “America thus becomes the primary competitor in the struggle for the Arctic,” a new situation which makes direct conflicts between the two countries more likely.

Sunday, January 26, 2025

Unlike Stalin, Putin will Leave Behind Not a Strong State but Only ‘Ruins,’ Shelin Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 22 – In a new book, Amusing Russia. 228 Answers, Sergey Shelin argues that Vladimir Putin is concerned only with himself and his own survival and as a result is not so much building a new political system as destroying its existing institutions. He will thus leave behind him not a strong state as Stalin did but only “ruins.”
    The murder of Muamar Qaddafi shocked Putin and led him to conclude that the West was after him and that he must do everything possible to save himself regardless of the consequences for Russia or for the international system, the Russian commentator says (severreal.org/a/posle-putina-ostanutsya-razvaliny-228-otvetov-na-vse-voprosy-o-rossii/33283990.html).
    That fear, Shelin continues, has put Putin on a very different trajectory than Stalin followed despite the frequent comparisons with the late Soviet dictator that are often made. “Stalin,” he writes, “adapted the state system of the USSR to himself and then worked to protect it.”
    “Putin in contrast hats the state institutions of the Russian Federation” as constraints and has “managed to destroy them all.” That has consequences for the future: “After Stalin, a totalitarian dictatorship remained; after Putin, only ruins will be left” with the need to rebuild almost everything.
    According to Shelin, “Stalin viewed the USSR as his ceation, but Putin looks at the Russian Federation as an instrument for his hobbies. All his feelings and interests are focused on himself. All his feelings and interests are focused on himself. That is why his state adventurism knows no bounds: he is not responsible to anyone for anything not even in his imagination.”
    Putin’s exclusive focus on himself is not unique to Russian leaders, but it is an extreme form of that disease and one that shows what can happen when institutions designed to limit such people instead are destroyed by them and then have to be rebuilt from the ground up, Shelin’s book suggests.  

Northern Fleet Newspaper Blames Mothers and Wives or Large Russian Losses in Ukraine

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 22 – Na Strazhe Zapolyarya, the newspaper of Russia’s Northern Fleet, says that the wives and mothers of Russian servicemen talk too freely about where there husbands and sons are fighting, information Russia’s enemies collect and then use to target and kill them.
    Consequently, the paper says, these Russian women bear part of the responsibility for the deaths of their loved ones (vk.com/rednsz?w=wall-93188324_291429 reported at thebarentsobserver.com/news/mothers-and-wives-must-take-part-of-blame-for-big-losses-military-newspaper-argues/423635).
"You, my dear mothers and wives, provide the exact whereabouts of the warriors and thus take part in the killing, not only of your own men, but also other soldiers,” the paper says. “You provide the positions of the training fields, whereupon Himars are fired. You provide not only directions, but also villages and streets, whereupon drones fly."
And the military paper calls “for the punishment in court of the ones that provide information about Russian servicemen to the Ukrainian side."

Holidays are Deadly for Russians, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 23 – Every year on average, 17,000 more Russians die on holidays, especially New Year’s and birthdays, than do on all other days, according to an investigation by To Be Precise journalists Alena Manuzina and Anastasiya Larina. Excessive alcohol consumption is the primary but far from the only cause.
    Others have called the New Years-Christmas holiday week “the most fatal” one of the year, while experts have described it as “ten days of horrors” when Russians encounter “the most terrible enemy – themselves” (tochno.st/materials/kazdyi-god-10-tysiac-rossiian-umiraiut-ot-prazdnikov-eto-izbytocnaia-smertnost-obieiasniaem-otkuda-ona-beretsia).
    And commentators have done so for Russia because the impact of holidays on death rates is far higher there than in other countries. Manuzina and Larina point out that the upsurge of deaths on holidays in Russia is four times as large as in the United States and multiples of other countries as well.
    Every year, they write, 14 percent more Russians die over the January holidays than do at any other similar interval of time the rest of the year. And the more prominent the holiday is, the more the upsurge in deaths. Russians don’t celebrate the Day of Russia and the Day of National Unity and deaths don’t go up around those holidays.
    The primary cause of this is alcohol consumption, the two investigators say; and increased alcohol consumption leads to more murders, 80 percent of which in Russia are committed when the perpetrator is drunk, and suicides when alcohol consumption increases the likelihood that unhappiness will turn into despair.

Saturday, January 25, 2025

Ukraine at Risk of ‘Somalization’ if West Suddenly Ends Aid to Force Talks, Moscow Analyst Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 22 – Russian analysts are beginning to focus on what may happen as the West pushes both Russia and Ukraine to reach a settlement on the war, with some expressing alarm that the process itself could produce consequences that few are focusing on and that no one should want.
    One Russian analyst who has focused on these possibilities is Iosif Diskin, an economist at the HSE, who says that if the West suddenly cut off assistance to Kyiv to force it to reach an agreement, that could lead to “the Somalization” of Ukraine and “trigger a new phase” in the conflict (mk.ru/politics/2025/01/22/nazvan-trigger-kotoryy-zapustit-novuyu-fazu-ukrainskogo-krizisa.html).
    Without Western assistance, Kyiv would lose much of the leverage it has over various places and institutions across Ukraine, Diskin suggests, and that could lead to warlordism and the spread of uncontrolled violence not only within its borders but across them into other countries, exactly the opposite of what those pushing for talks and an agreement presumably want.

Friday, January 24, 2025

Putin’s Orders about Shipbuilding Aren’t Being Carried Out, Patrushev Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 22 – In what sounds like the justification for a purge if things don’t change soon, Nikolay Pastrushev, the presidential assistant who heads the Maritime Collegium, says that Putin’s order aren’t be carried out in the shipbuilding branch aren’t being carried out and the sector’s systemic problems aren’t being resolved.
    He made his remarks at a meeting of educational institutions and shipbuilding industry enterprises in St. Petersburg and his words may be little more than a manifestation of Patrushev’s frustration and tendency to express his opinions in the most dramatic way possible (eadaily.com/ru/news/2025/01/23/patrushev-porucheniya-prezidenta-ne-ispolnyayutsya-sistemnye-problemy-ne-reshayutsya).
    But given Patrushev’s position as one of Putin’s closest confidants and the all-too-obvious problems of Russia’s shipbuilding sector which is under increasing sanctions, his words may point to a purge there that could rapidly broaden into a broader attack on officials across the board. Indeed, it is possible that that is exactly what Putin wants people to conclude.

In Chukotka, Moscow Replaces Independent Whaling Group with Puppet One in Name of National Security but Destroying Way of Life of Indigenous Peoples

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 22 – Putin’s increasing repression is so widespread that it is typically described in broadbrush terms, something that has the effect of hidings its insidious nature and the very specific negative consequences it has not just for well-known dissidents but entirely unknown groups of people.
    That makes a report by Cherta journalists Lana Pulayeva and Anastasiya Martynov about how the Russian state first destroyed an NGO that sought to help the native peoples of Chukotka restore whale hunting 20 years ago and then put in its place a totally government-controlled entity that did the state’s business rather than the people’s (cherta.media/story/kitoboi/).
    Local officials working with the FSB took this step, the journalists say, on the pretext of defending national security: the independent NGO had received a grant from the University of Alaska and thus became in the eyes of the Russian powers that be “a foreign agent” that had to be driven out of existence.
    The group the state authorities put in its place was made up not of peoples directly affected by the whaling industry but by officials who could be counted on to do what Moscow wanted. In this case, it worked to promote the dispatch of indigenous peoples to fight in Ukraine rather than help those peoples maintain their ancient economic practices and survive.
    Palayeva and Martynova describe how this occurred, with the state using a step by step approach recalling the famous story about how the frog was cooked after the water in which it was placed was gradually warmed to the boiling point. That is what is happening to the people of Chukotka who are now disappearing faster, people say, than the Arctic species they have hunted.

Secularist and Democratic Ichkerian Army Taking Shape in Ukraine

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 20 – When the people of Chechnya began their struggle for independence at the end of Soviet times, their leaders were committed to a vision of a secular and democratic country. When the West didn’t back them, some of them turned to Islamist radicals further alienating many. But now, the Chechens are changing again.
    In Russian-occupied Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov has installed a kind of pseudo-Islamic state that imposes many of the dicta of the Muslim faith as state policy. But despite the assumptions of many that Chechens are Islamist, assumptions Moscow has encouraged, a new generation is arising that is fighting for the original ideals of democracy and secularism.
    This remarkable and transformative idea has received little attention, but Akhmed Zakayev, head of the exile Chechen Republic Ichkeria government, explains how it is happening and why (kavkazr.com/a/v-ukraine-my-stali-organizovannoy-strukturoy-ahmed-zakaev-o-svobodnoy-chechne-i-rezhime-kadyrova/33282063.html).
    He points out that in contrast to the first generation which fled Chechnya after the Russian advance and often fell under the influence of Islamist groups in the Middle East, the new generation of Chechens living in Europe, some 400,000 in all, have been shaped by Western institutions and values.
    They have gone to Western universities and absorbed Western values, and some of them have now formed five battalions of a Chechen force to alongside Ukrainians against Russian aggression. This force, which has come into existence in Ukraine, is the foundation of forces which will restore the original ideals of the Chechen movement.

Wednesday, January 22, 2025

With Assad’s Ouster, Moscow Set to Lose Important Church Ally in Orthodox World

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 18 – Assad’s ouster not only is likely to cost Russia its military bases in Syria but also to drive from office the leader of the Antioch Patriarchate who had distinguished himself both by his pro-Assad positions and his support for the Moscow Patriarchate regarding Ukrainian autocephaly and Putin’s war in Ukraine.
    Now with Assad and his Russian supporters gone, Syria’s Antioch Change Movement has called for the resignation of Patriarch John X who in its view had “sullied himself” by collaborating with Assad and  Putin” (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/01/18/antiokhiia-posle-asada).
    The Movement is likely to be successful given that John X has many enemies in Syria given that he and Assad changed church rules so that he could be elected in the first place, he failed to investigate the murders of senior churchmen, and he slavishly followed Damascus and Moscow in his policies.
    John’s removal will affect the 500,000 Christians in Syria, but more than that, it will echo across the Orthodox world, not only because there are roughly three million more Antioch Christians in other countries but because the Antioch Patriarchate ranks third among the ancient Orthodox patriarchates, behind only Constantinople and Alexandria.
    Up to now, the Antioch Patriarchate has been the Moscow Patriarchate’s most reliable ally in Moscow’s dispute with Constantinople. Now, the Russian church won’t be able to count on a similarly close ally in the future – and that likely means the ROC MP will be more isolated in the Orthodox world than at any time since the death of Stalin.
    That in turn will mean that the ROC MP will have less to offer the Kremlin and that it will feel compelled to follow ever more closely Putin’s nationalist and imperialist line.

‘Russia isn’t the USSR, Ukraine isn’t Finland, and Putin isn’t Stalin’ – Shelin on Why Old Models of Conflict Resolution Won’t Work for Ukraine

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 17 – In talk about what kind of a deal Russia and the West might make about Ukraine, many are looking back to Finland and other conflicts where settlements were reached between Moscow and the West in Soviet times. But that is a mistake, Sergey Shelin argues.
    The situation is too dissimilar because “the Russian Federation is not the USSR, Ukraine is not Finland, and Putin is not Stalin,” according to the Russian commentator. The latter difference is especially important because of Putin, the Ukrainian conflict is existential (moscowtimes.ru/2025/01/17/starie-primeri-ne-podoidut-rf-ne-sssr-ukraina-ne-finlyandiya-a-putin-ne-stalin-a152557).
    “In my opinion,” Shelin says after reviewing each of the clashes from the past, “no one should count on the implementation in 2025 of any of the settlement schemes from the past and constantly being discussed. The talks being organized by Trum apparently are destined to involve the banal surrender of Ukraine, reach a dead end, or go off in some unconventional direction.”
    Indeed, he continues, “nothing for example prevents Trump from personally guaranteeing Putin’s personal security and promising that he will not allow anyone to touch him. Maybe this is the key to all the problems. But Putin likely proceeds from the fact that Trump as president is not eternal while he, Putin, is.”
    “But there are many ways to play on personal obsessions,” Shelin concludes, “and some of them may work.”


Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 17 – In talk about what kind of a deal Russia and the West might make about Ukraine, many are looking back to Finland and other conflicts where settlements were reached between Moscow and the West in Soviet times. But that is a mistake, Sergey Shelin argues.
    The situation is too dissimilar because “the Russian Federation is not the USSR, Ukraine is not Finland, and Putin is not Stalin,” according to the Russian commentator. The latter difference is especially important because of Putin, the Ukrainian conflict is existential (moscowtimes.ru/2025/01/17/starie-primeri-ne-podoidut-rf-ne-sssr-ukraina-ne-finlyandiya-a-putin-ne-stalin-a152557).
    “In my opinion,” Shelin says after reviewing each of the clashes from the past, “no one should count on the implementation in 2025 of any of the settlement schemes from the past and constantly being discussed. The talks being organized by Trum apparently are destined to involve the banal surrender of Ukraine, reach a dead end, or go off in some unconventional direction.”
    Indeed, he continues, “nothing for example prevents Trump from personally guaranteeing Putin’s personal security and promising that he will not allow anyone to touch him. Maybe this is the key to all the problems. But Putin likely proceeds from the fact that Trump as president is not eternal while he, Putin, is.”
    “But there are many ways to play on personal obsessions,” Shelin concludes, “and some of them may work.”


Tuesday, January 21, 2025

Moscow Patriarch Believes His Church Can Regain Following It Lost in 2022 Only By Becoming More Pro-War, Dubrovsky Says

Paul Goble    
    Staunton, Jan. 17 – When Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine, Dmitry Dubrovsky says, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate lost many of its parishioners because “even pro-war, pro-Putin ones did not expect the fierce pro-war rhetoric the church offered.”
    Such attitudes and the flight from the Moscow church they have produced has created a behind the scenes conflict within the church, the Russian sociologist who now teachers at Charles University in Prague says, and there is “real tension growing within the church” (svoboda.org/a/rusofobiya-po-putinski/33278107.html).
    What is striking and perhaps somewhat unexpected is how the head of the church, Patriarch Kirill has decided to respond. He appears to believe that “the only way out of this … is to rally around Putin even more closely,” despite the fact that this may drive more believers away and leave his hierarchy ever more a tightly controlled appendage of the Russian state.

Sunday, January 19, 2025

Islamist Extremism, Veterans Returning from Ukraine Threaten to Increase Crime in Russia, Moscow Criminologists Say

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 15 – In addition to the problems arising from a shortage of police, Moscow criminologists point to two major “risks” of an upsurge in crime in 2025 with “the greater problem being from the growth of religious extremism” but also the return to their home areas of Russian veterans who unlike in past wars have kept together while fighting.
    Profile journalist Igor Trifomov explores both of these risk, emphasizing that the violence of Islamist groups in Dagestan against Christians and Jews was what many criminologists believe is the opening round of such attacks (profile.ru/society/operativnyj-dissonans-v-kakih-sferah-mozhno-ozhidat-rosta-prestupnosti-v-rossii-1648894/).
    Indeed, he cites local experts as saying that while outside observes may not consider that episode “so significant, the professionals are convinced that this is only the beginning” given the rise in Islamist training in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan and the increasing hostility of Muslims to Christians and Jews more generally.
    But Trofimov says that veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are another source of worry among criminologists. On the one hand, many of them are coming back with more weapons than was trues after Afghanistan and Chechnya; and on the other, not only are some of them previously released criminals but they have served together and returned together.
    Because of that, he says, many of these individuals feel themselves beyond the reach of the authorities because they have now formed organized criminal groups that draw both on their experiences in Ukraine and their earlier experiences in such groups before going to fight in Putin’s war.  

Rosstat Changes Way It Calculates Inflation to Hide Price Increases

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Feb. 15 – There are a variety of ways a government can hide inflation: It can stop releasing data, it can lie, and it can change the way its statistical arm calculates inflation, dropping from the list on which price rises are calculated those items which have increased the most and including others that have increased less.
    Rosstat has adopted all these tactics, but it has found that the first two are often counter-productive: If the government doesn’t release data, independent analysts do and sometimes offer figures even higher than reality; and if it lies, critics are often able to call attention to that, undercutting faith both in those figures and in government statements as a whole.
    Consequently, Rosstat has increasing changed the mix of items it includes in coming up with inflation statistics, dropping items like airplane tickets, analgesics, alcohol, and multi-vitamins, the prices of which have gone up the most and inserting their place things like filling teeth, whose prices haven’t (ehorussia.com/new/node/32090).
    This statistical sleight of hand works better because at least the data are consistent within the tables offered and so many people will be inclined to believe what the authorities are saying – despite the fact that they can see around them that prices for many goods are going up far more rapidly than Rosstat is now saying.