Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 18 – Those in
Moscow who want to re-integrate the Soviet space face the same problem that
Lenin and Stalin debated just prior to the formation of the USSR and with fewer
resources to pay the price to any of the independent former Soviet republics
that such a new super state would require, according to a Moscow political
commentator.
In an essay posted on KM.ru yesterday,
Sergey Chernyakhovsky says that today as in 1922, those who want to
re-integrate the former Soviet space are divided between some who like Stalin
want the non-Russians to be absorbed into the Russian state and others like
Lenin who are prepared to create a new federation of nominally equal parts.
But neither group, the commentator
suggests, recognizes just how high a price Russia would have to pay to achieve
these goals, a price that is all the higher not only because few want to give
up state independence but also because Moscow has been high-handed in dealing with
those like Belarus that do seek integration (www.km.ru/v-rossii/2012/12/17/situatsiya-na-territorii-bsssr/699811-za-integratsiyu-postsovetskogo-prostranstv).
Ever
since the end of the USSR, there have been discussions aobut re-integrating the
former Soviet space, Chernyakovsky notes, and he predicts that such discussions
“wil break out with new force if only because soon will be marked the 90th
anniversary of the formation of the USSR” which took place at the end of December
1922.
Anyone forming such a new state must
do so within the onfines of the four basic types of state – federation,
confederation, empire or a unitary (national) state, he suggests, although the
choice is limited for Russia and its neighbors because even if one insists that
all the components are equal, it is so manifestly clear that they are not.
Consequently, the Moscow analyst
insists, “the very same problem, which confronts Russia in defining the forms
of state re-unification today on the space of the USSR, confronted” the leaders
of Soviet Russia “at the time of the formation of the USSR from the former
provinces of the Russian Empire.”
And that problem was behind the
famous difference of opinion between Stalin and Lenin on what to do.The former
wanted the other republics to join the RSFSR as subjects of its federation,
while the latter backed “the formation of a new Union state based on the equal
union of these republics.”
Even though the second option left
Russia as “one of four (and then 15)” republics despite its size and
importance, and even though Lenin was a backer of unitarism above all, the
founder of the Soviet state was confident that a new union would allow the
republics to come together more quickly and Russia’s position would “all the
same” allow it to “lay the leading role.”
“Russian national patriots” do not
fully understand the situation, Chernyakhovsky continues, simultaneously
demanding sovereignty for themselves thereby “provoking the division of the
single state” and declaring that “in the event of re-integration, Russia will
have to feed dozens of these republics.”
And others, “who understand the need
for the restoration of the whole and support re-integration processes,
nonetheless continue to insist that
Russia not enter into any union of equals but adance as a precondition the
inclusion of the republics within its borders.”
According to Chernyakhovsky, the question
of whether to re-unite is not really open: The majority of Russians are for it,
movement in that direction is both “natural” and “normal,” historically the
move toward larger states is “more or less” understandable, and the benefits of
doing so are “understood by the majority of the representatives of the ruling
elite.”
But the second question is both
immediate and fateful, just as it was in 1922: how should Moscow behave given
that Russia “which in fact is larger and wealthier than the other republics”
would be so “recognize its equality with the other parts and thus diminish
itself.” But if Russia insists on including the others as unequal, the latter
are unlikely to agree.
But Russia is compelled to find a
way to unite them because Russia needs it more than the others both objectively
and subjectively given its purposes and thus “must propose such conditions for
unitifcation which will result in the republics uniting with it being in a more
favorable position than they were when ‘independent.’”
If Moscow wants unity on the basis
of inclusion rather than union, then it will have to “pay not only for unity as
expensive as that will be … but also for the attributes of statehood that the
others will lose.” In fact, he says, “it will be necessary to pay more for the
inclusion of any country into the Russian Federation than to unite with it on
the basis of equal rights.”
That means that if Russia wants to
achieve its goals, it will have to “make concessions” greater than many expect,
especially since there are so many different countries around it, all of whom
have to a greater or lesser extent profited from independence psychologically
if not always economically.
Clearly not everyone in the Russian
capital understands this dynamic. Otherwise, they would not continue to behave
as they have with Belarus in ways that represent “a manifestation of the very
same complexes of Russian patriots which led to the dismemberment of the USSR”
twenty years ago.
And Moscow’s approach to Belarus,
whatever Russia’s leaders say, represents an obstacle to any larger unification
projects because non-Russian leaders will conclude that they have no reason to
re-unite with Russia “because it will not pay these republics for any
manifestation of good will but on the contrary wil try to extract from them political and economic
payment for re-unifcation.”
Such reflections, Chernyakhovsky
concludes, will lead them in “a completely logical” manner to “begin to
seekother allies and other centers of integration.”
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