Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 13 – Twenty-two
years ago today, as all independent investigations have confirmed, Soviet
forces shot and killed 13 unarmed Lithuanian demonstrators at the Vilnius
television tower, an event that galvanized the independence movement in that
Baltic republic and triggered drives for independence from the USSR elsewhere.
But at the time of those events and
shortly thereafter, pro-communist and pro-Soviet writers came up with an
alternative explanation: they insisted that the Lithuanian Sajudis movement had
organized the entire event as a provocation to the point of having its own
operatives shoot and kill their fellow Lithuanians.
And some of those have even insisted
that this conspiracy was part of a broader plot involving Vytautas Landsbergis who
supposedly saw such a step as a necessary precondition to establishing a “fascist”
and anti-Russian regime in Lithuania and even the United States which
supposedly wanted a distraction as it moved to attack Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
The most hyperbolic of these
conspiracy theories have fallen as a result of their own internal inconsistencies –
Landsbergis is no fascist and Washington’s Desert Storm campaign in fact limited its
response to Moscow’s actions in Lithuania – but others have enough plausibility
for some to discredit Lithuania’s drive to recover its de facto independence
and its subsequent policies.
Such conspiracy theories about the
Vilnius events of January 13, 1991, would be of limited interest were it not
for two things. On the one hand, they continue to circulate among some writers
in the Russian capital. And on the other, the thinking of Soviet leaders that
stood behind them, if not the specific details, appear to be informing Moscow’s
policy now.
On Friday, the portal of Moscow’s
Strategic Culture Foundation featured a 1500-word article by Nikolay
Malishevsky that repeats most of the claims against Lithuania, Sajudis, and
Landsbergis by the conspiracy theorists and provides what he says is proof of
all of them (www.fondsk.ru/news/2013/01/11/litva-rastoptannaja-pravda.html).
Malishevsky,
who has recently written articles about the mistreatment of Russian adoptees in
the US and suspicions about the “real” story behind the 9/11 attacks on the
United States, says that he has written this article because the Lithuanian
authorities are planning to bring to court anyone who denies their events of
January 13.
In
doing so, he suggests, “the Lithuanian law enforcement organs and prosecutors
are ignoring or intentionally minimizing numerous facts and the testimony of
witnesses” about an event now more than two decades old that Vilnius has not
been able to bring any of “the murderers” involved to justice. (On this, see http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1612081.html).
But
despite such Lithuanian efforts to promote what he says is its falsified
version of the events of 1991, “the truth about the provocateur nationalists
shooting from the roofs of houses located opposite the television tower at
people assembled below with automatic and hunting weapons has nonetheless found
a way” to those who want to know.
Clearly,
the Moscow commentator continues, “the truth is something terrible to murderers
and provocateurs,” a group he argues consists not of officials in the Soviet
force structures but of members of the Lithuanian national movement and the
Lithuanian government today.
In
like manner, Malishevsky says, that latter group which does not want to admit
the truth about January 13th does not want to acknowledge that “what
happened in 1940 was not an occupation but the incorporation of Lithuania into
the USSR with the complete agreement of the Lithuanian authorities, only one of
its leaders then fled abroad.”
Another
article underscores why the survival of such views among current Russian
leaders about what happened at the end of Soviet times is potentially so
dangerous. The Tolkovatel’ portal says
that “many of the methods of struggling against the opposition proposed by ‘the
hawks’ in 1990 are being carried out by the authorities today” (ttolk.ru/?p=15217).
The portal draws that conclusion
only after offering numerous selections from archival records of the
discussions of the senior Soviet leadership at that time, discussions that
featured both those who were prepared to reach out to the opposition and those
who were prepared to do whatever was necessary to avoid doing so.
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