Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 6 – “Russianness” is
a “synthetic category,” one in which the father of a family can be Mordvin, the
mother a German, and the children ethnic Russians, a reflection of the floating
quality of identity in that country, government policies, and personal choices,
according to a leading Moscow ethnographer.
In an interview with Postnauka.ru,
Sergey Sokolovsky, a senior scholar at the Institute of Ethnology and
Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the editor of the “Etnograficheskoye
obozrenie,” says that as long as nationality is defined by self-identification,
it will vary among both Russians and non-Russians (postnauka.ru/talks/24076).
He points to the fact that “from
census to census in Russia, the numbers [of people identifying with one or
another nationality] change so significantly that you can’t explain this by
demography alone.” Oftentimes, he says,
it reflects personal choices about which identities give them the most
benefits.
Thus, for example, the Moscow
ethnographer reports, “certain Komis are becoming Nentsy because the Nentsy are
allowed to go on a pension five years earlier, have the right to bear and
acquire weapons several years earlier than do the Komi, have benefits in education,
and so on.” Consequently, one should not speak about any permanently fixed
identities.
That brings Sokolovsky to the more
general problem of the definition of national minorities. The Russian government does not have one, he
points out, and most Russian scholars simply rely on the Council of Europe
Framework Convention on Minority Rights which defines such a minority as any
group with less than 50 percent of the population on a given territory.
But that presents problems for the
Russian Federation given its asymmetric federalism, the ethnographer says,
because in the national republics, the titular nationality may or may not be
the most numerous but it sees itself as having the right to dominate whatever
other groups think, while in the country as a whole, ethnic Russians are the
majority and all others minorities.
A further complexity, Sokolovsky
says, exists “when we consider the hierarchy of power. The dominating group is the one which,
participating in normal democratic procedures can impose its choice and thus
guarantee its interests in the course of referenda, direct voting and the like.
A minority does not have that resource.”
As a result, he continues, as
various countries have found, it is necessary to introduce “compensatory
mechanisms” so that minorities are able to be protected.
Lacking an official legal definition
of “national minority,” Sokolovsky says, Russians typically speak of “ethnic
minorities.” The difference is that “the term ‘national’ means that in general
only citizens of the country are included” and not migrants from other
countries who retain citizenship there.
“In this sense,” Sokolovsky says, “there
is no difference between Ukrainians and Tatars” if both are Russian Federation
citizens. “The difference is only in
their actual interests and demands.
Ukrainians inside Russia typically do not demand language rights. [But]
the situation with the Tatars is quite different.” Tatar leaders want
Tatar-language schools even if parents do not.
Many parents,
including some Tatars and many more ethnic
Russians, oppose such schools because they feel that the time devoted to
Tatar language instruction is reducing time spent on other courses that will be
more valuable for their children after graduation. And some of them have gone
to court to defend their interests.
Moreover, even those who want Tatar
language schools face a problem: it is difficult to find or prepare teachers
and textbooks for such classes. That requires money “and not just political
pressure. The politicians do not take
all these circumstances into account,” Sokolovsky says.
The ethnographer
concludes his interview with two more general but equally interesting and
important observations: On the one hand,
he says there are five characteristics of national minorities: cultural
distinctiveness, relative size, lack of dominance, group solidarity, and
citizenship in the country in which they live.
On the other,
the ethnographer notes that only the term “people” (narod) has survived in
Russia from the Soviet-era collection of terms, “narodnost,” “natsiya,” “natsionalnost”
and “narod.” What he calls the “Stalinist
trinity” of the other three “are used today only by scholars of extremely
advanced age” and reflects a long-discredited Marxist view on history.
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