Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 12 – Moscow no
longer has the funds or access to foreign investment to promote either growth
or equalization in Russia’s regions and instead has opted for a regional policy
within the country based on geopolitical considerations and fears of Russia’s
possible disintegration, according to a Moscow State University geographer.
In today’s “Vedomosti,” Natalya
Zubarevich says that any country, including Russia, can give priority to one of
three things in its regional policy: stimulating development, equalizing
incomes and growth, or investing in this or that region out of geopolitical
calculations (vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/35854761/geopolitika-irazvitie-regionov).
The balance among these three can
change and in Russia over the last two decades it has changed and changed
fundamentally. In the first ten to twelve years after the collapse of the USSR,
Moscow focused on promoting equality although it lacked the funds and structures
to make that happen.
Then, when the rise in oil prices
gave the center more money to play with, Moscow focused on promoting growth in
one or another region. But its success in doing so was limited by “the barriers
of the Russian institutional milieu.” Over the last five years, as the center’s
income as declined, Moscow’s policies increasingly have reflected geopolitical
and security concerns.
Thus, Zubarevich says, Moscow has focused
on Kaliningrad, the non-contiguous Russian region in Europe, the North Caucasus
with its restive nations, and the Far East, an enormous underpopulated region
next door to China. More recently, it has announced plans to put enormous sums
of money into newly-annexed Crimea.
While Moscow has not achieved all
its goals, it has certainly redistributed transfer payments to these four
places, the geographer says, and she provides statistics showing just how much
money is flowing or is supposed to be flowing to them as opposed to the rest of
the Russian Federation.
The Russian central government does not have the
resources to engage in geopolitical equalization, given declining income and the
unwillingness of foreigners except possibly for China to invest massively in
the regions, and consequently, it has adopted a policy of “geopolitical stimulation.” But here too there are real limits, the
geographer says.
Because
businesses in Western countries are ever less willing to invest in these
regions because of sanctions, the burden of developing the regions falls
increasingly on Moscow, again except in the Far East where China may be willing
to do so, even though Beijing’s role there raises geopolitical concerns of its
own.
Faced
with these limitations, Moscow chose to create gaming centers and special
economic zones. The first does attract new money, but the second works only “if
it is not geopolitical.” That is, special economic zones wherever they are set
up must be able to attract outside investment. In the current environment, that
isn’t happening and won’t anytime soon.
After
all, Zubarevich says, “who will invest in Crimea if there are no favorable
factors of development and subsidies can be received only when investments are
of sufficient size?”
Given
this trap that they now find themselves in, Moscow officials have adopted yet
another strategy of regional development: give special subsidies to everyone
and hope for the best. But what that
means, the geographer says, is that the center is setting itself up to fail by
creating a new kind of black hole into which government resources will go
without returns.
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