Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 18 – Demography is
destiny, many analysts say, but their opponents insist that that is true only
in the very long term. But occasionally, as in Russia today, demography is
destiny in the most immediate and direct sense, a reality that many refuse to
acknowledge and that limits Moscow’s ability to deal with the current crisis.
As Yekaterina Mereminskaya points
out in an article in “Gazeta,” “Russia came to the crisis with unresolved
demographic problems which now can turn into catastrophic ones.” The low
birthrates of the 1990s and the collapse of immigration mean that it will not
have enough workers to ensure import substitution (gazeta.ru/business/2015/01/15/6376785.shtml).
Meriminskaya cites the words of
Tatyana Maleva, the head of the Institute of Social Analysis and
Prognostication of the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service, to the
effect that “Russia is in the first stage of a demographic catastrophe,” one
that is not only unprecedented but that is not reflected in official government
statistics.
The Russian authorities are proud of
the low level of unemployment in the country, but they fail to see that this
means there are no reserves to deal with two huge problems: the size of the
cohort entering the workforce is far smaller than that leaving it and
immigrants are no longer going to make up the difference, Maleva says.
That will have systemic
consequences, she continues, but today, “the problem of the labor market is not
in the level of employment but in the combination of the growth of unemployment
in some oblasts and a shortage of labor in others,” the result of shorter work
weeks in the latter.
This contraction has already begun
in the financial sector and the media and is spreading to retail trade and
housing as well. What it should mean, of course, is that mangers should become
workers, but that isn’t happening, or that more rather than fewer immigrant
workers should be allowed in.
But just the reverse is happening,
Maleva points out. “According to the Federal Migration Service, 70 percent
fewer migrants arrived in Russia during the first nine days of 2015 compared to
the number for the same period in 2014.”
And their failure to come is already hitting communal services in cities
“from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.”
Moreover, this is
occurring on the backdrop of the problem of the aging of the population of
Russia. In place of the retiring generation is arriving, in Malev’s words, “the
tragically small” generation of the 1990s, who not only are few in number but
do not want to become workers at the bench.
“Independently
of the crisis, the price of oil, and the ruble exchange rate, the labor market
in Russia is entering a very complicated phase, one that is deep, lengthy, and
involves a long-term decline in the size of the economically active
population,” Maleva says. This is something,
she adds, that “no one in the world has ever passed through.”
Vladimir Mau,
the head of Maleva’s academy, adds that “now is departing the last generation
capable of working in producing and is arriving a generation which in principle
does not want to work in production. And the government must be ready for this
shift – possibly by increasing programs for adults.”
But that is far
from the only demographically driven problem Russia faces, both say. Although
it is not fully reflected in the statistics because Rosstat does not count medicines
in its price index, the rising cost of imported medicines is pushing down the
standard of living in Russia and will continue to do so as the population ages
and needs more of them.
That in turn
will contribute to the explosive growth in the share of the population in
poverty. According to Maleva, 12 percent
of Russians can be counted as poor now, but that figure is likely to rise to
23 percent by the end of this year – and “for certain social groups, to as much
as 30 percent.” Those increases will
eliminate all the progress of the last 20 years.
Inevitably, she
continues, prices increases and pay backlogs will spark social tensions even
more than was the case in 2009, and this time around, the Russian population
has many fewer resources to cope, something which means that the problems it
faces will be translated into tensions far more quickly than in the past.
Russians are
financing consumption now with savings, but 42 percent of Russians do not have
any savings – and that number will continue to grow as prices rise and people
try to compensate by drawing down what they have put aside in the past. That
means that ever more Russians will feel the bite of the country’s demographic
and economic problems.
Because the
government and the media are not reporting accurately about this, many Russians
do not recognize how serious the current situation is and think that “everything
will be fine.” But “if people understood what this year is going to be like,”
regardless of whether sanctions are lifted, Maleva says, “they would not be
doing so.”
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