Abortion Still Legal in Putin’s Russia But Officials are Working Hard to Block Women from Getting One

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 29 – In another example of Putin’s desire to shift responsibility for unpopular steps away from himself, the Kremlin leader has not backed a ban on abortion at the all-Russian level lest any such ban spark protests at home and offend many people in other countries.

            Instead, he has backed moves in 23 federal subjects to prohibit “propaganda” supporting abortions, a lightly veiled means of frightening anyone who might conduct or seek such an operation; and his officials have lifted the licenses of clinics and hospitals in many places so that women who can’t get the operation near their homes are forced to travel enormous distances.

            The Transbaikal Kray is a case in point. Last winter, it adopted a law against “propagandizing” abortions, and in the months since, officials have lifted the licenses to conduct abortions of most clinics and hospitals outside the federal subject’s capital. That is no small thing, given that the kray is almost the size of Sweden. 

            Women there who want an abortion must either travel hundreds of kilometers from their homes to Chita or go to a neighboring oblast where abortions are still relatively available.  And that often causes delays which mean that they come to the hospitals doing abortions after the time that it is legally permissible for them to do so.

            What makes this all so sad is that Putin isn’t held accountable for this approach to denying abortions and also the fact that independent analysts have concluded that banning abortions does little or nothing to boost the birthrate, something which is at the center of what the Kremlin leader is pleased to call his “demographic policy.”

            On Putin’s sleight of hand in this area, something that allows him to effectively ban abortions without appearing to do so, and on why such moves are infuriating many women and their families, see sibreal.org/a/gosudarstvo-skazalo-rozhay-rossiyskie-bolnitsy-prekraschayut-delat-aborty-pod-davleniem-minzdrava/33573962.html.

 

Russia’s Looming Disintegration Not Result of Efforts by Other Countries but of the Kremlin’s Mistaken Policies, Ethnic and Regional Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 29 – In a new article, Sergey Shoygu, former Russian defense minister and now secretary of the Russian Security Council, says that Russia’s foreign enemies are working to try to divide up the Russian Federation into dozens of small statelets so that these enemies will be able to impose their will on them.

            They will not succeed, Shoygu adds, echoing what Putin and Russian propagandists have long asserted because the unity of the nationalities of the Russian Federation is too firm; but those who want to understand what is happening must look abroad rather than at home (aif.ru/politics/russia/sergey-shoygu-edinstvo-narodov-fundament-rossiyskoy-gosudarstvennosti).

            But Shoygu’s argument is fundamentally wrong and thus pure propaganda, according to regional and ethnic activists who form the Forum of Free States of Post-Russia in that it points to one factor which does not exist and ignores two others which very much do (region.expert/shoigu/).

            On the one hand, most of the countries Moscow identifies as its enemies are doing little or nothing to promote the disintegration of the Russian Federation. In fact, many are taking steps like closing down broadcasting to the peoples of that country or returning ethnic and regionalist activists who have fled Muscovite oppression.

            And on the other, Shoygu’s argument ignores two factors which are very much at work and will ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Russian empire – the natural and growing desire of the peoples living under Kremlin diktat to be free to make their own choices and Muscovite oppression which is fueling that desire. 

            Indeed, the Forum says, “the main threat to ‘the integrity of Russia’ is not the West but the very structure of Moscow’s colonial administration.”

Russian Officers in Ukraine Killing Their Own Soldiers and Moscow is Suppressing Investigations into These Crimes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 29 – In another sign of the deteriorating conditions in Putin’s invasion force in Ukraine, the independent Vyorstka news agency has documented 79 cases in which officers have killed their subordinates for disobedience or refusal to follow orders to go into battle.

            Not surprisingly, Moscow is trying to cover this up. Defense ministry prosecutors told Vyorstka that there is currently an informal ban on investigating crimes like these conducted by officers in Russian military units in Ukraine (verstka.media/im-pohuj-kogo-obnulyat-kak-kaznyat-v-rossijskoj-armii).

            This problem is far greater than the independent news agency has been able to document so far. It reports that a source in the military prosecutors’ office says that that body has received “more than 12,000” reports of killings by officers of those under their command or by Russian soldiers against other soldiers.

            One sign of just how widespread this phenomenon has become is that a new slang term for officers killing soldiers has emerged in Russia. It is “zeroing out,” which refers to such killings either by shooting, torture, or the sending of men whom the officers are displeased with into the most dangerous portions of the front without sufficient weaponry.

            Another is that other independent Russian news agencies are reporting on this phenomenon as well. Earlier this month, the Vot Tak agency published a list of 50 Russian servicemen in Ukraine who have been killed on way or another on orders from their commanders (vot-tak.tv/89209103/armija-prestupnikov).

 

Dozens of Russian Officials have Turned Putin Down when He has asked Them to Serve as Heads of Federal Subjects, Russian Political Scientist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 28 – Many assume that if Putin proposes someone agree to take the job that he offers, that is something no one can refuse. But in fact, Vitaly Ivanov says, “dozens of people” have turned down Putin’s suggestions that they serve as heads of this or that federation subject.

            That unexpected reality, the Russian political scientist says, has been highlighted by the fact that the position of governor of Tver Oblast has now been vacant for a month after his predecessor was elevated. Various officials have been offered the job and have turned Putin down given the region’s poverty (club-rf.ru/69/detail/7803).

            In the case of Tver and other oblasts, Ivanov continues, “some have refused on principle, others have refused because of the regions involved, some had assumed they would be offered a more interesting region, and some expected to be appointed to a higher post.” And a few even made their decision on the basis of how far the region is from Moscow.

            Filling the Tver post is especially hard, even though it is close enough to the Russian capital, the political scientist says, because it is poor and because plans for a high-speed highway through it have run into difficulties. Consequently, the post may remain vacant for some time to come.

            That senior officials are turning Putin down speaks volumes about their political calculation concerning Putin’s future and their own. If they believed that he was going to be around forever, they would be less likely to tell him “no” regardless of the reasons they might have for not wanting a particular post. 

After Falling from 80 Percent in 2010 to 65 Percent in 2020, 73 Percent of Russia’s Residents Now Tell Levada Center They’re Orthodox

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 28 – The independent Levada Center polling agency says that the percentage of Russia’s residents who say they are Orthodox has rebounded from its decline between 2010 and 2020 when this figure dropped from 80 percent to 65 percent and now stands at 73 percent.

            That rapid up-and-down pattern contrasts sharply with the share of the Russian population who declare affiliation with other faiths at more or less the same level throughout this period. Six percent of the population declare themselves to be followers of Islam, for example (levada.ru/2025/10/28/religioznye-predpochteniya-rossiyan/).

            And it strongly suggests that those in the Russian Federation who say they are Orthodox at any particular point, in contrast to those who declare another faith, are swayed less by any change in religious belief than to the insistence of Russian leaders and propagandists, stronger on some occasions than at others, that to be a “real” Russian is to be Orthodox.

Kazakhstan to Rebuild and Expand Its Riverine Trade Network First with China and Possibly Then with Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 27 – All the countries of Central Asia are worried about the drying up of their rivers and lakes. Kazakhstan is no exception; but more than any of the others, it is simultaneously seeking to rebuild and eventually expand its riverine network for barge carried cargo.

            Its initial effort in this direction is a plan to be jointly carried out by Kazakh and Chinese firms to develop the Ili River’s 450 kilometers of its navigable flow and ensure that Astana will have a greater voice in Beijing’s use of water from that river within China (timesca.com/kazakhstan-eyes-revival-of-ili-river-corridor-as-logistics-artery/).

            That route was operational until 1980 but hasn’t been in the last four decades. By 2027, Kazakh and Chinese officials say, it will again be open for cargo transport and will be used to carry bulk cargo not only between these two countries but more generally across Central Asia and even more broadly.

            If the Ili River project proves successful, officials on both side, that would likely serve as a model for developing broader riverine networks not only between Kazakhstan and China but between the Central Asian country “westward via the Ural River to Russia and northward via the Irtysh to the Northern Sea Route,” The Times of Central Asia says.

Putin’s War in Ukraine has ‘Clipped the Wings’ of Russia’s Regional Air Carriers as Far as Foreign Destinations are Concerned, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 27 – Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine and the sanctions it has generated in response has “clipped the wings” of the country’s most important regional air carriers, not only reducing their ability to service local markets but also forcing them to cut back on flights to and from foreign countries, Horizontal Russia says.

            Flights between important cities in Russia outside of Moscow and European, Middle Eastern, and Asian destinations during the 1990s and first decade of this century were one of the most important although frequently the less commented upon consequence of the development of Russia’s regional carriers.

            Now, as the portal documents, as a result of what Putin has done and how the West has responded means that people in these cities can travel to far fewer foreign destinations directly and must go via Moscow, just as in Soviet times (semnasem.org/articles/2025/10/27/vojna-podrezala-krylya-aviakompaniyam).

            The two largest regional carriers still fly to a few foreign destinations, but the number has been much reduced; and it will be very difficult for them to recover those psychologically important routes, far more difficult than rebuilding the local and regional routes within the Russian Federation that were their bread and butter at first. 

Will Kazakhstan Evacuate Last 300 Ethnic Kazakhs from Afghanistan?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 28 – Since 1991, Kazakhstan has taken in some 1.15 million ethnic Kazakhs from Afghanistan as part of its repatriation program. Now, a group of Kazakhs there which numbers about 300 is appealing to Astana to evacuate them from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

            Before the Taliban assumed control, such repatriation was relatively easy; but now it faces many obstacles, including both disputes in Afghanistan over who is a Kazakh and who is assimilated to one of the other indigenous Afghan nationalities and both concerns about the values that the Afghan Kazakhs may bring with them.

            As a result, a dispute has broken out in Kazakh media as to whether Astana should work to bring home the remaining Kazakhs of Afghanistan, with supporters and opponents changing charges that the other is ignoring an important reality (orda.kz/afganskie-kazahi-prosjat-tokaeva-spasti-ih-i-vernut-na-istoricheskuju-rodinu-408404/ and timesca.com/kazakhstan-responds-to-claims-it-has-abandoned-ethnic-kazakhs-in-afghanistan/).

            This dispute is likely to continue for some time but with the most likely end being the eventual evacuation and then absorption of Afghanistan’s Kazakhs into Kazakhstan. Indeed, there is precedent both for how long this will take and the way that this issue will likely become intertwined with others.

            That comes from the long-running story of the Wakhan Kyrgyz who wanted to return home but succeeded in doing so only after many fits and starts. (On this history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/are-wakhan-kyrgyz-finally-going-to-get.html and the sources cited therein.

Fergana Valley No Longer Set to Trigger Broader Explosion in Central Asia, Tajik Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 28 – For four decades, observers both in Central Asia and beyond have predicted the Fergana Valley, where the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan come together in a jigsaw pattern, would be the trigger that might set the entire region ablaze (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/fergana-valley-heading-toward-explosion.html).

            But Sherali Rizoyon, a Tajik political scientist, argues that while such a notion might earlier have been true, it no longer is because these countries have reached agreement on the borders among them and on the ways they can work together (cronos.asia/centralnaya-aziya/uzbekistan/nastupila-li-novaja-realnost-v-ferganskoj-doline).

            Having resolved all their border disputes, the three countries have now formed the Fergana Forum to meet at a high level on a regular basis and work to address infrastructure, water-sharing and other issues jointly rather than separately and thereby ensure that any move by one will not lead to any increase of tensions with the other two. 

Kremlin Unable to Face Up to or Think Seriously about Russia's ‘Catastrophic Demographic Situation,’ Chernyshov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 26 – The Kremlin and its allies are showing themselves incapable of facing up to “the catastrophic demographic situation” in the Russian Federation and then taking real steps to do anything about it, according to Yevgeny Chernyshov, who covers population questions for Yekaterinburg’s Nakanune news agency.

            Three days ago, the Kremlin convened the first session of its Council for the Realization of the Government’s Demographic and Family Policy; but speaker after speaker showed in his or her remarks that Moscow doesn’t have a demographic policy or even recognize what the basic demographic problems are (nakanune.ru/articles/124055/).

            Instead of focusing on the lack of access to apartments that could accommodate children, the financial problems Russian families now must deal with, or the commitment of an increasing number of Russian couples to be childless or have only one child, Chernyshov says, the meeting talked about secondary questions like paying teenagers who become pregnant.

            And even those who touched upon the need to reverse course and not as now pay families ever less for each additional child, they vitiated that positive notion by talking how to promote three or more children without focusing on how to get Russian families to have even one or two, the Nakanune commentator says.

            Unless families have at least two, they can’t have three – and so talking about three or more as Putin and others do is meaningless because Russian families today don’t want to have more than one and so no one can get them to have a third when they aren’t willing to have at least two. 

Dictatorship Only Three and a Half Hours by Car from Moscow – If There’s No Traffic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 27 – As in other countries, place names are often the subject of mirth or political controversy. And one just reported by the Most Media portal – Dictatorship – is likely to join the most prominent of these although how it will be treated remains uncertain (mostmedia.org/ru/posts/roditsja-i-zhit-v-diktature).

            In a story entitled “Born and Living in Dictatorship,” journalist Stanislav Pyatyorik describes Dictatorship, a settlement of 438 people in Tula Oblast just 3.5 hours by car from Moscow “if there is no traffic.” One can get there by taxi but otherwise there is no public transportation connection.

            Established during Stalin’s collectivization campaign and a place that originally took its name from the Soviet slogan of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” to which those who were compelled to give up their land and animals and join collective farms, it has nonetheless survived under the same name for almost a century.

            Undoubtedly some Russian wits will see the continuing existence of this toponym as symbolic of Russia’s trajectory from Stalin to Putin.

Putin has Used Foreign Agents Law to ‘Strangle Freedom’ in Russia, Abramenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – When the history of the Putin regime is written, the image that will stand out above all others is the Russian anecdote about the frog in hot water. If the frog is thrown directly into hot water, he will almost certainly try to jump out; but if he is put in lukewarm water, he will adapt only to die when the water heats up to an unbearable temperature.

            Again and again, Putin has introduced what appears to some a moderate measure even if many see it as repressive, had it accepted or dismissed by many as “not that bad,” and then tightened it to the point that it comes to “strangle” one or another of the few remaining rights that Russians had enjoyed before he became committed to dictatorial rule.

            Olga Abramenko, an expert at the Memorial Anti-Discrimination Center, describes how the Kremlin modified and then extended this measure step-by-step to the point that it has come to “strangle freedom” in Russia across the board  (themoscowtimes.com/2025/10/22/how-the-kremlins-foreign-agents-law-strangled-freedom-in-russia-a90872).

            Her article provides a useful guide to how this has been done, but she says that unfortunately, there is no sign that the Kremlin won’t go even further and use what started as a registration device to shutter and punish still more individuals and groups that the powers that be don’t want to have around. 

Putinism Represents ‘Not a Failure of the Post-Soviet Transition but Its Full Realization,’ Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – Many Russians view what the Putin regime has done to the rights and freedoms they gained under Gorbachev as a complete reversal of the direction they thought Russia would take after 1991; but in fact, Vadim Shtepa argues, Putinism is in no way “a failure of the post-Soviet period” as they and others imagine but rather “its full realization.”

            The Russian regionalist, who edits the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal, points out that Boris Yeltsin came to power openly committed to reversing Gorbachev’s modernizing and internationalizing reforms by arguing that “Russia must be revived” and that its people must “rise from their knees” (moscowtimes.ru/2025/10/22/obyazatelnoe-vozrozhdenie-imperii-ili-kuda-zavel-nas-postsovetskii-tranzit-a177923).

            By so doing, Yeltsin acted more like a Russian autocrat than a reforming democrat, Shtepa continues. And he continued in that way both by refusing to take part in any debates during elections because that was beneath the dignity of a Russian leader and by declaring war on the Chechens.

            Moreover, the expert on regionalism continues, the incomplete destruction of the Soviet Russian empire ensured that the Russian Federation would become “a base for imperial restoration given that it occupied a disproportionately major place in comparison with the other union republics” precisely what Yeltsin began and Putin has continued.

            Already under Yeltsin but ever more intensively under Putin, “post-Soviet Russian began to position itself as a continuation of the Russian Empire in its Soviet form.” That made conflicts with its neighbors and others inevitable because “form the imperial point of view, all post-Soviet republics were viewed as ‘unreal’ and their independence conditional and a formality.”

            Tragically, Shtepa concludes, the failure to recognize the ways in which Yeltsin created the road map that Putin has continued to follow, one that reverses the progressive moves taken by Gorbachev rather than extending them, continues to infect almost all discussions of why Moscow is doing what it is now and what it is likely to do in the future. 

Putin won’t End War in Ukraine Because He Fears Separatism in Russia, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 26 – Among the reasons that Vladimir Putin will not end his war against Ukraine short of a decisive victory is that he fears the example of any Ukrainian success in resisting the Russian army will give rise to a powerful wave of separatism among the regions and republics of the Russian Federation, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            The Russian commentator who earlier worked as a speechwriter for Putin says that Putin’s fear of such an outcome should not be ignored in assessments of how long the Kremlin leader will fight (facebook.com/abbas.gallyamov/posts/10229549389229651 reposted at   echofm.online/opinions/eshhyo-odna-prichina-pochemu-putin-ne-hochet-prekratit-vojnu).

            Putin is very much aware of two things, Gallyamov says. He knows that the hypercentralization of the Russian Federation that he has sponsored will at some point give rise to centrifugal forces “similar to the one that toppled the Soviet Union” a generation ago. And he knows how much non-Russian movements already “support Ukraine and condemn Moscow.”

            Consequently, the commentator says, the Kremlin leader feels compelled to continue his war in Ukraine until a victorious conclusion so that they can point to that victory as a reason why non-Russians and regional movements within the Russian Federation should give up because hey will have no chance.

            If Putin were to stop the war short of that, Gallyamov suggests, Putin’s assertions that he could stop a new separatist wave would be hollow indeed.

Ever More RF Residents Going to Court to Change Their Nationality from Russian to Something Else, ‘Vyorstka’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – For decades, some residents of the Russian Federation have gone to court to change the nationality listed in their documents, some so they can emigrate, others so that they can claim benefits, and still a third group to preserve the historical roots of their families.

            That may come as a surprise to many given that Moscow has dropped the nationality line from the passport, but in fact, ethnic nationality is still recorded on many documents and is the basis for many official decisions (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/nationality-line-and-official.html).

            An important window on this issue is provided by cases in Russian courts where individuals have sought to change their nationality; and now the independent Vyorstka news portal has examined more than 200 recent cases (verstka.media/nerusskie-korni-kak-rossiyane-sudyatsya-chtoby-smenit-naczionalnost).

            Among its most important findings are that since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, the number of such cases has increased; and “most often,” these are being brought by people who earlier had listed themselves as ethnic Russians but have changed their minds.

Perhaps, most striking of all however is Vyorstka’s discovery that those seeking to change from a non-Russian to Russian via the courts are “a great rarity” – although it is certainly possible that Putin officials are allowing them to do so without a decision of a court even though such a decision is required by law.

The largest number of RF citizens seeking to have their official nationality change are ethnic Germans who had earlier been listed as Russians but may want to emigrate, while the second largest are those who are members of the numerically small nationalities who benefit from such identities but were earlier reidentified as ethnic Russians.

Most applicants for a change in official nationality appear to receive approval, but Vyorstka recounts a number of cases in which individuals wanted to make a change but were turned down by Russian courts. 

When It Comes to Space Exploration, Russia Now at Most China’s Junior Partner, Kharlanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – The Soviet Union launched the first satellite and competed with the United States for many years in the space race; but now when it comes to space exploration, Aleksey Kharlanov says, the Russian Federation has fallen out of international space competition and is now little more than “the younger brother” of China.

            The expert at the Russian government’s Finance University says that this has happened as a result of Moscow’s failure to keep up, something that has resulted in what he calls “a catastrophic loss of competence” in this sector, something he doesn’t believe Russia will soon if ever escape (nakanune.ru/articles/124025/).

            As a result, Kharlanov concludes, for the foreseeable future, Russia is unlikely to be able to do more than realize ideas developed by others rather than being, as was true half a century ago, the source of cutting-edge programs.  As space becomes more important, that decline will be ever more widely felt not only in space but on the earth as well.

Turkmenistan Moving Quickly to Become Major Sea Power on Caspian

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – Until the last few years, discussions of Central Asia often ignored Turkmenistan because its policy of strict neutrality was accompanied by extraordinarily tight control over information about what it was doing. Nowhere was that more true than in the case of its ships on the Caspian, both civilian and military.

            That began to change in 2021-22 when Ashgabat became more active on the international front and took steps to build up its shipping capacity on the Caspian (turkic.world/en/articles/turkmenistan/283953 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/russia-not-keeping-up-with-naval-build.html).

            But at that time, it had only about 20 merchant ships and 16 naval vessels, all of which were small cutters and thus not in a position to pose a serious challenge to its neighbors or to withstand a challenge from them (jamestown.org/program/russias-caspian-flotilla-no-longer-only-force-that-matters-there/).

            This month, Ashgabat has taken two significant steps that appear likely to change that. On the one hand, it has contracted with a Dutch company to modernize its Caspian port of Turkmenbashi; and on the other, it has agreed to have South Korean yards build more ships (casp-geo.ru/kompaniya-van-oord-gotova-k-modernizatsii-porta-turkmenbashi/ and casp-geo.ru/turkmeniya-i-koreya-rasshiryayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-sudostroenii/).

            These moves will make it a more credible force on the Caspian and at the very least mean that Turkmenistan’s navy and merchant marine can no longer be ignored in any discussion of that body of water. 

Kaliningrad ‘Seeking to Play Role Baltic Republics Did in Soviet Times,’ Kotsyubinsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Today, Daniil Kotsyubinsky says, the Russian Federation exclave of Kaliningrad is “seeking to play the same role the Baltic republics did during Soviet times,” offering itself as ‘a piece of authentic Europe’ forcibly cut off from the West, with all the tourist benefits that entails.”

            In the 1990s, there was much talk that Kaliningrad might become “the fourth Baltic republic,” not only because it was then part of a Euroregion but because Russians who visited it would be affected and bring some of its values home, possibly transforming more of their country just as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did the USSR earlier.

            That possibility was very much on Putin’s mind, and from the start of his rule, he worked consistently to reduce Kaliningrad from that “window on the West” to a militarized outpost of the Muscovite empire lest it threaten his power and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/08/moscow-has-transformed-kaliningrad-from.html).

            But the people of Kaliningrad have not completely lost the spirit they had in the 1990s (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/kaliningrad-on-its-way-to-becoming.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/09/kaliningrad-is-why-moscow-must-control.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/05/an-independent-konigsberg-will-be.html).

            And according to Kotsyubinsky, a historian who focuses on Russian cities and their impact, it is now recovering in an interesting way, no longer being so compelled to downplay its German origins – Kaliningrad was Koenigsburg until 1945 – but instead using them to build up tourism and spread its influence among Russians from elsewhere (gorod-812.ru/kant-nash/).

            He describes how important Kant and the German past is for those who live in Kaliningrad not only as advertisements but as sources for the development of their own distinctive and separate identity. If Kotsyubinsky is right, then it is quite possible that that region has resumed its march toward becoming the fourth Baltic republic despite all Putin has done. 

Sakha Deputy Urges Republics to Unite and Take Back Powers Moscow has Stolen from Them

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 23 – It is long past time for representatives of the national republics within the Russian Federation to sit down together and then unite to take back the rights and powers Moscow has stolen from them over the last two decades or so, Sakha Republic deputy Aleksandr Ivanov says.

            Over that period – which coincides with Putin’s rule – Moscow has taken all the powers that the republics once had and accused anyone who resists this process of separatism even though it is the center which has “created the conditions for separatist thinking” (instagram.com/alexandr_ivanov_nrb/ https://echofm.online/news/deputat-yakutskogo-parlamenta-obvinil-kreml-v-lishenii-naczionalnyh-respublik-ih-prav-i-bogatstv).

            Ivanov, one of the republic deputies who recently voted against changing the republic constitution so that the last vestiges of its former powers were removed, says that he is now being trailed from undercover police. After this declaration, it is unlikely that he will escape arrest or worse.

            But however that may be, Ivanov’s words are important for two reasons. On the one hand, they are clear evidence that the most important centers of resistance to Moscow increasingly are not in the North Caucasus and in the Middle Volga but in the region east of the Urals, including not only Sakha but the Altai, Tyva and Buryatia.

            And on the other, they suggest that ever more people in the republics now recognize that their only hope of protecting what they have left and retaking what Moscow has taken from them is to work together by recognizing that they are all being oppressed and need unity to prevent Moscow from successfully continuing its divide and rule policies. 

‘Why are Russians Fighting in Ukraine Only to Hand Over Baikal to China?’ Residents Ask

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – A clash between residents of the Transbaikal, on the one hand, and Russian officials and Chinese workers, on the other, is spreading from Russian courtrooms to villages where in at least one case a Russian has taken the law into his own hands and even used guns against Chinese brought in to develop industry and transport there.

            The situation is getting out of hand, prompting one resident of the region near Lake Baikal to sayt “the Chinese have been saying for a long time, ‘Baikal is ours’” [and] soon they’ll say ‘And Crimea is ours too.’ I keep asking: what are our guys fighting for. So that these Chinese people can strut around here? Why?” (istories.media/stories/2025/10/21/ugol-zabaikalye/).

            According to the Important Stories portal, eleven years ago, Oleg Deripaska and his En+ group signed an agreement with China’s Shenhua Group to expand the export of coal to China from the Transbaikal, something that requires the expansion of mining and the development of transportation networks.

            Because of the negative environmental impact of both the expanded mining and the routing of new railways and highways through areas that had been off limits lest they destroy the unique natural environment around one of Russia’s most storied lakes, the project has sparked protests and court cases by residents even though Russian officials welcome it.

            In February 2025, a Russian court rejected a government ecological assessment and ordered the companies involved to cease work. The Russian coal company involved has appealed and new documentation is supported to be presented in a few months (baikal-journal.ru/2025/09/08/sud-priznal-ekspertizu-ugolnoj-dorogi-nezakonnoj-no-v-cheremhovo-vse-ravno-vyrubayut-kedrovniki/).

            But despite the decision of the court, the companies involved have continued to build roads and railways, often harming what had been protected regions.  Local people feel powerless to stop this. After all, they say, China is “a world power while we live in poverty.” And Russian officials are now welcoming in Chinese workers to do the job.

            Russian officials have helped Chinese companies force Russians out of their homes so that there will be a place for Chinese workers to live. In response, one resident took out his gun and began “shooting out the window” at the Chinese. Others have not gone that far at least not yet.

            But tensions are escalating, and the readiness of some residents to compare what is going on in Putin’s war in Ukraine – where local men have died – with the war of Russian officials against their own people in the Transbaikal to help not Russians but the Chinese is telling. And if the courts vacate their original stop order early next year, an explosion is likely. 

For a Bering Strait Tunnel to Work, Russia and US would have to Build Hundreds of Miles of Railways and Roads Linking It to National Grids, Verkhoturov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Russian leaders have a long history of proposing megalomanical projects that are forgotten almost as soon as they are made; but such proposals often benefit them by attracting the temporary support of Russians and of the leaders of other countries who also like to talk about giant projects.

            The latest example of this has been the boomlet of proposals from Moscow and the suggestion by Russian officials that the American government is interested in them to build a tunnel across the Bering Straits linking Russia and the US and reducing the influence of Europe on both.

            Moscow officials have even come up with detailed plans and estimated that the cost of building the tunnel would be an entirely manageable eight billion US dollars (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/252425/). But all such talk has ignored two “technical” issues that almost certainly will preclude the completion of this idea.

            Dmitry Verkhoturov, a Siberian economist, calls attention to two of the most obvious and the most difficult to overcome: differences in the gage of railways in Russia and the US and the lack of transportation infrastructure on both sides of the Bering Strait, a lack that unless overcome would make the tunnel an enormous white elephant (sibmix.com/?doc=18562).

            On the one hand, the expert notes, the two sides would have to figure out how to cope with the fact that the gage Russian trains use is different than the one US and Canadian trains do. Tracks in Russia are 1520 mm apart, while tracks in the US and Canada, as in most of the world, are 1435 mm.

            Transferring trains from one gage to another is a difficult and expensive process even where that must be done on land; but doing the same in or at one end or the other of a tunnel would be even more expensive and potentially politically explosive, given that neither side wants to suggest it is making a compromise with the other on this point.

            But on the other and far more seriously, there are now roads or railways connecting where the tunnel would run with networks in the Russian Federation or with networks in the United States and Canada. The nearest existing rail and road links between the tunnel and the national networks on both sides are hundreds of miles away.

            Such rail lines and highways would have to be built or the tunnel would not be of any use, and constructing them would be extraordinarily difficult and expensive given that they would have to pass through some of the most isolated and environmentally challenging locations on earth.

            Indeed, Verkhoturov suggests, overcoming these difficulties and building links on both sides of the proposed tunnel would be far more difficult and expensive than the tunnel itself, something that means this latest megalomaniacal Russian project will almost certainly die an early death, even if there are in fact some in Washington who support it. 

On Putin’s Order, Tajik Policemen will Soon be Working in Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Because of low pay and the departure of many Russian policemen to fight in Ukraine where salaries are far higher, the Russian Federation faces a serious shortage of police in many parts of the country and in some cases is looking to fill these vacancies with police from former Soviet republics. 

            Moscow last year brought police from Kyrgyzstan to work in Russian cities (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/to-cope-with-enormous-shortage-of.html); and now on Putin’s order (publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202510150046), it is doing the same from Tajikistan (nazaccent.ru/content/44674-v-moskve-poyavitsya-policiya-tadzhikistana/).

            In both cases, Russian officials have stressed that these officers will be working in special institutions to counter drug trafficking and relations with immigrants, but at least some of the Kyrgyz already and presumably some of the Tajiks in the near future will be working on the streets.

            That will likely offend many Russians and make it even more likely that they will give their support to units organized by the notorious Russian Community to work alongside or in place of policemen. If that happens, non-Russians, both migrants and indigenous, are likely to respond, sparking new conflicts (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russian-community-complains-chelyabinsk.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html).

Latvian Government Gives Neo-Pagan Faith Same Status and Rights as Other Religions in That Country

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – The Latvian parliament voted earlier this month to give the followers of Dievturibe, a Lavian pagan faith that created an organized hierarchy in 1925 but suppressed in Soviet times and one that 20 percent of Latvians sympathize with, the same status and legal rights as traditional religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam.

            This new status, which the followers of this neo-pagan faith have long sought,  means that Dievturibe leaders can conduct marriages which will have legal status, provide spiritual support in the military, hospitals and jails, and offer religious instruction in schools (mariuver.com/2025/10/21/dievturiba/#more-83971).

            Ugis Nastevics, head of the community’s administrative body, says that this action is “historic” because with the Seima’s vote, “Latvia has become the first country of the EU” to give the ancient and traditional faith of its population rights equal to religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam.  

            For background on this group and its history over the last century, see Anita Stasulane’s detailed 2020 article on the World Religions and Spirituality Project page at hwrldrels.org/2020/04/22/dievturi/ and the extensive bibliography she provides and the website of the group itself at dievturi.lv/.

Russians Tried but Failed to Make an Ethnic Kazakh Ashamed of His Name and His People, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 10 – The Horizontal Russia portal which reports on developments in that country outside of Moscow and especially among its non-Russian residents has published its latest article in a series on what it calls “the non-Russian world” of such people, this time about Tamerlan, a Kazakh teenager who was made to feel ashamed about his name and identity.

            The pressure against his name and background was so intense that at the age of 15, he wanted to change his name to the more Russian Timofey; but that he says now, three years later, he is glad that bureaucratic difficulties got in the way and he is proud of both his name and his nationality (semnasem.org/articles/2025/10/20/nerusskij-mir-tamerlan).

            His mother was an ethnic Ukrainian but she married a Kazakh man and lived in Kazakhstan before divorcing him and moving to the Russian Federation’s Tambov Oblast. When he enrolled in a kindergarten there, he immediately felt he was different from the other children. Many of them and even many of his teachers refused to use his real name.

            As a result, Tamerlan says, he became ashamed and sought on his own to change his name to Timofey or something else “more Russian” than the name he had been given at birth. Pressure to do so grew after his mother married a Russian in order to be in a position to get Russian citizenship.

The parents of his stepfather were openly hostile to all things Kazakh. One of them frequently said that “Russians taught you [Kazakhs] how to go to the toilet.” Unfortunately, no one in his family or among his fellow pupils disputed his words; and they left Tamerlan extremely depressed. 

Things got worse when Tamerlan excelled in classes on the Russian language. His fellow students said it wasn’t right for a non-Russian to know their national language better than they did. Such an outcome was unthinkable and thus must be the result of some misconception or other behind the scenes action.

At 15, he decided to change his name and his nationality. But that required going through a complicated bureaucratic process and so he didn’t complete it. One of his teachers also worked to keep him from doing so, arguing that as someone of mixed ethnic heritage, now living in another country, he was “unique” and that that uniqueness was something to be proud of.

When he turned 16, he visited the family of his birth father and fell in love with all things Kazakh. He began learning the language; and by 18, he decided against changing his language or his official identification. Instead, Tamerlan is now proud of his Kazakh roots and ignores the attacks some Russians bring against him because of them.

The upshot of this is that now Tamerlan plans to go to Kazakhstan to get his university education. 

 

Corruption Charges in Gyumri Likely Open Way for New Move against Russian Base in that Armenian City

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Corruption charges that have been brought against the pro-Russian mayor of Gyumri and seven of his associates may be less about their taking bribes than about Yerevan’s growing interest in reining in and possibly closing down the Russian military base there which currently is home to more than 4,000 troops as well as members of their families.

            When mayor Vardan Gukaysan returned to office this fall, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan charged that he had bribed voters to get his way, although the specific charges brought against him involved payoffs from others to him (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/10/20/v-armenii-zaderzhali-prorossiiskogo-mera-giumri-vardana-gukasiana-i-eshche-semerykh-chelovek-po-delu-o-vziatke-news).

            When police came to arrest Gukasyan and his colleagues this week, 60 to 70 people from the town assembled to try to block them, leading to a clash between the two groups after Gukasyan denounced the charges and called on residents of the city to defend their independence against Yerevan actions.

            Gukasyan has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Russian base; and with him behind bars, Yerevan will likely find it easier to make demands regarding its size or even continued presence without the fear that the mayor or some other senior official in the city would take up the cause of the base and organize demonstrations. 

Russian Region which Restricted Alcohol Sales Sees Alcohol Consumption Skyrocket

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 18 – Georgy Filimonov, governor of Russia’s Vologda Oblast, has attracted widespread attention for his flamboyant efforts to cut alcohol consumption by severely limiting the time when residents there can buy it. But statistics show that his campaign has backfired and that Vologdans are now drinking more than they were before he introduced restrictions.

            Still worse, the data show that consumption in neighboring and predominantly ethnic Russian regions where officials have not restricted alcohol sales continue to see the per capita consumption of alcohol decline, yet another example of the counterproductive impact of policies driven not be accurate information but by passionate belief that the powers know best.

            In January before the restrictions on alcohol sales went into effect, Vologdans were consuming alcoholic beverages at the rate of 7.7 liters of pure alcohol per person per year. But in September, their consumption had risen to a rate of 9.65 (moscowtimes.ru/2025/10/18/zhiteli-vologodskoi-oblasti-stali-bolshe-pit-posle-vvedeniya-ogranichenii-na-prodazhu-spirtnogo-a177602).

            And those are official numbers. The real ones are certainly far higher, and the problem is certainly greater if one includes as the official statistics generally don’t both home-brewed alcohol (samogon) and surrogates like perfumes and cleaning products that many Russians drink when they can’t get alcoholic beverages. 

            One hopes that these figures will take some of the air out of the populist governor’s campaign; but it is far more likely in the current climate that the authorities will simply cut back on the information they release or falsify the numbers they do give to the press. Otherwise the questions Filimonov should be asked are likely to be asked of other and more important officials.

KBR Officials Struggle to Damp Down Ethnic Passions in One of Russia’s Last Officially Bi-National Republics

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – There are only two remaining officially binational republics in the Russian Federation, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. In the first, the Turkic Karachays outnumber of the Circassian Cherkess and in the second, the Kabards, another Circassian subgroup, outnumber the Turkic Balkars.

            Managing these binational republics is difficult because any move by the authorities against a member or group from one ethnic community resonates not only within the republic given that the other can be expected to respond but across the North Caucasus and thus threatens ethnic stability in an already troubled region.

            Increasingly, this struggle requires officials to follow attacks against one group for its supposed extremism with attacks on the other for the same thing. But such attacks only exacerbate ethnic feelings because the nation with the plurality expects better treatment and the minority nationality fears that any attacks will presage a whole diminution of rights.

            KBR, where the Circassian Kabards form roughly 55 percent of the republic’s population and Turkic Balkars, where the latter form 13 percent, is now ground zero for such conflicts. Moscow has insisted that the republic authorities crack down on the Circassians given their increasing nationalism, and the authorities have done so.

            Most recently, they have moved to detain participants in unauthorized demonstrations in support of Circassian national goals such as recognition of Russia’s deportation of Circassians in 1864 as an act of genocide and permission for some of the seven million Circassians in the diaspora to return home.

            But in taking steps like these against the Circassians, the KBR powers have also focused expanded attention on the Turkic Balkars, charging and convicting a Balkar radical historian with fanning ethnic hatred with his attacks on Circassians (kavkazr.com/a/nikakaya-storona-ne-imeet-prava-govoritj-balkarskogo-istorika-nakazali-za-razzhiganie-nenavisti-k-cherkesam/33560596.html).

            The problem for the KBR leadership is that what the Balkar historian has been saying is little different from what the Kremlin in its evaluation of the Circassian national movement has said. And so while winning points in Moscow by this action, the KBR regime is losing support at home among the majority Circassians there.

            Moscow clearly wants the KBR authorities to keep things quiet; but its requirement that they balance attacks on one nation with attacks on the other almost certainly guarantees that the result will be exactly the opposite of what it seeks. Both Circassian and Turkic groups are likely to become ever more angry and radical.

            And if that is what happens, the formerly relatively quiescent western portion of the North Caucasus will join the central and eastern portions, which include Chechnya and Ingushetia, in the former, and Dagestan in the latter, as a renewed hotbed of nationalism in a place the Kremlin had believed things were completely under its control. 

Number of Foreigners Applying to Resettle in Russia Drops by Two-Thirds from Last Year to Lowest Level in 11 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – During the first half of 2025, the number of people wanting to resettle in the Russian Federation fell to 11,600, down from 36,400 during the same period a year ago, according to the Russian interior ministry, a decline that suggests the Kremlin’s effort to promote such returns is collapsing.

            The new figure, which is the smallest in 11 years, was reported by the MVD’s migration service (t.me/migrpost/715) and far smaller than the nearly 80,000 in 2021, is discussed by the Moscow Times at moscowtimes.ru/2025/10/19/chislo-zhelayuschih-pereselitsya-vrossiyu-iz-za-rubezha-ruhnulo-vtroe-a177612).

            Most of these resettlers were ethnic Russians from Central Asia. Only a relative handful came from further afield, with the largest numbers of these coming from Germany – 700 -- and Latvia – 600. And the number from other Western countries who supposedly returned to life in a country with traditional values, a group the Moscow media plays up, was microscopic.

            Russian observers say that the major restraining factor that is driving the numbers down is fear among potential returnees that they will be compelled to serve in the Russian army now fighting in Ukraine. But many likely have decided that the economic situation in Russia is now too risky to take the chance of moving there. 

 

Moscow has Succeeded in Getting West to Talk about ‘Not Provoking the Aggressor’ Rather than about Defending Itself, Lea and Taskin Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Wars are won not on the battlefield but on how those involved come to define them, Aaron Lea and Borukh Taskin say; and in the Putin’s war in Ukraine, Moscow has succeeded in getting the West to focus on “not provoking the aggressor” rather than on how best to defend itself against current and future attacks.

            In a two-part article for the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert, the two Israeli analysts of Russian background say that “Russia has taken over the European narrative and thereby forced Europe to conduct debates” not about how to defend oneself but about how not to provoke Moscow (region.expert/strat1/ and region.expert/strat2/).

            Just how radical a change this is from Cold War times and how much of a Kremlin victory it represents, the two write, grew out of Western notions of the end of history and a peace dividend from the supposed end of east-west conflict and Moscow’s success in presenting anything that it does as being only a justified response to what the West does in reaction.

            In this new situation, fears among Western publics and leaders have been transformed and then exploited by Moscow into a weapon that Putin can and does use against them. And Lea and Taskin provide example after example of the way this new reality differs from that of the past and helps Moscow to win without having the forces to do so otherwise.

            The Kremlin is thus succeeding by shifting the mental maps of Europeans and the West more generally so that each new Kremlin advance has come to be viewed as the new reality that the West must not challenge lest it “provoke” the Russians rather than as an occasion to prevent Russia from advancing still further. 

Nearly Half of Major Russian Companies Stop Publishing Key Financial Data

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – It isn’t only the Russian government that has stopped publishing essential data. Now, since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, almost half of Russia’s 100 largest companies have done the same, making it difficult if not impossible to know how they are actually doing especially for those considering investment in them. 

            According to the To Be Precise portal, only 52 of the 100 largest Russian companies in 2021 were still publishing basic financial data in 2024. Five of the others have closed, but 43 have stopped publishing such data altogether (tochno.st/materials/pocti-polovina-kompanii-vxodivsix-v-pervuiu-sotniu-po-vyrucke-v-2021-m-ne-opublikovala-finansovuiu-otcetnost).

            With this end to financial reporting, those who study the Russian economy either for investment or scholarly reasons have lost one of the major checks they had had on Russian government data. Officials now can make claims about profits and business operations generally without as much risk their claims will be disputed. 

Putin’s New Migration Policy Directed at Preventing Ghettos rather than Boosting Russia’s Population

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – For most of his time in power, Vladimir Putin has promoted immigration to compensate for the demographic decline of the Russian nation, but now, in the new concept paper he has signed, he instead is focusing on security issues instead so that immigrants can continue to help Russia but not retain their identities or form isolated ghettos.

            That is the overarching conclusion of Novyye Izvestiya journalist Aleksandr Kumanyev who argues that “the new concept is not simple an edited version of the old but a complete change of paradigm (newizv.ru/news/2025-10-17/novaya-kontseptsiya-migratsionnoy-politiki-rossii-chto-ona-izmenit-438076).

            “If the previous version of the document adopted in 2018 was essentially economic and demographic, then the current one in the first instance is a document about security,” about ensuring that immigrants can still come and do the work but not act in ways that will threaten public order or threaten the values of the Russian nation.

            To achieve that, the commentator says, Putin has called for the introduction of a new and tightly controlled system of managing immigrants, laying much of the responsibility for doing so not on government agencies but on businesses that want to use the labor of migrants, and blocking the rise of concentrated settlements of migrants, otherwise known as ghetto.

            Realizing these goals will not be easy. On the one hand, businesses will be upset about these additional responsibilities and monitoring the migrants will be enormously expensive given their number. And on the other, if such a tight system is put in place, the number of immigrants likely to come will fall, pleasing many Russians but hurting the Russian economy.

             And despite the obvious shift from demographic and economic considerations to security and control ones, this new paradigm will likely have serious demographic changes as well, pushing down the number of migrants and thus exacerbating the downward trend of the size of the Russian population. 

Russian Families with at Least One School-Age Child Nearly Twice as Likely to be Poor than are Others, New Study Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 13 – It has long been recognized that having children often drives Russian families into poverty, one of the major reasons why many married couples decide not to have any. But a new study provides details showing the impact of children at various ages on the financial standing of Russian family units.

            Conducted by Elena Tsatsura and Aleksandr Osavolyuk of the Russian Academy of Economics and Government Services on the basis of surveys in 2013 and 2022, it found that the risk of poverty varies depending on the ages of the children, with families which have school-age children suffering the greatest risk.

            The study, published in the latest issue of Demograficheskoye obozreniye (demreview.hse.ru/article/view/28499/23116), has now been discussed in detail on the To Be Precise portal (tochno.st/materials/risk-bednosti-u-semei-so-skolnikami-pocti-vdvoe-vyse-srednego-naibolsii-u-nepolnyx-semei).

            According to Tsatsura and Osavolyuk, the risk of being poor among families which have at least one child of school age is 1.8 times greater than among the average for all families. Families all of whose children are preschoolers are only 1.37 times more likely to be poor, although their per capita incomes are approximately 37 percent lower than childless pairs.

            They also found that single-parent families are twice as likely to be poor than are Russian families as a whole and that their propensity to fall into poverty is not affected at all by the age of the child or helped that much by existing government programs to help them avoid having such a fate.

            What this means is the impact of having children on family incomes is in some respects a delayed action mine and that the happiness of new parents may be dashed when they are compelled to send their children to school. 

Polls No Longer Reliable Because Russians Won’t Answer Questions from Those They Don’t Know, Academy of Sciences Sociologist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 16 – The Russian government can no longer rely on sociological surveys of the population because Russians aren’t prepared to respond to pollsters they don’t know or even to speak to them at all, Mikhail Chernysh, the director of the Federal Sociological Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says.

            He made that admission at a meeting of the presidium of the Presidential Council on Inter-Ethnic Relations in the course of a discussion about recent changes in popular attitudes toward polling (nazaccent.ru/content/44664-na-zasedanie-prezidiuma-soveta-po-mezhnacionalnym-otnosheniyam-obsudili-strategiyu-gosnacpolitiki-do-2036-goda/).

            Russians have long been suspicious of pollsters, but the situation has gotten much worse in recent times given the ability of the government to identify who has said what and the belief among many Russians that the Kremlin can then punish those it identifies as disagreeing with the regime.

            Chernysh said that one way of overcoming this problem is to develop a unified approach that would standardize the methods pollsters use and the criteria that various services use for determining objectivity. But it seems likely that such a cure might prove even worse than the disease and convince even more Russians that Moscow can identify who says what.

            That an Academy of Sciences sociologist should make such a proposal shows just how far things have gone in the wrong direction under Putin, especially given that the government has already effectively ended the possibility of conducting accurate telephone surveys (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/kremlins-ability-to-monitor-all-phone.html).