Even Jailors and Senior Investigators are Fleeing Russia in Droves, Romanova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – Perhaps the most surprising group of people to be leaving the Russian Federation over Putin’s war in Ukraine are his jailors and senior investigators, precisely the people who could be expected to enthusiastically back the Kremlin dictator’s policies and approach.

            But according to Olga Romanova, founder of the prisoner rights organization Sitting Russia, the trickle of such departures before 2022 has now turned into “a flood” with many of these supposed bulwarks of the Putin regime choosing to vote with their feet and leave the country (pointmedia.io/story/6929a586e657f59b666dce76).

            Not surprisingly, there are no official statistics on the number of such departures; and Romanova doesn’t provide any unofficial ones. But the anecdotal evidence she does provide suggests that the trend she points to is real, if seldom commented upon, and may create problems for the Kremlin both at home and abroad.

            At home, Moscow may find it hard to recruit replacements for such people; and abroad, Russia may discover that former jailors and investigators will be a key source to document the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as the broader category of victims of the Kremlin’s repression. 

To Boost Shipbuilding, Russia’s Transportation Ministry wants to Ban All Ships Older than 40 Years from Entering Russia’s Harbors But the Results are Likely to Be Disastrous

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Nov. 27 – Russia’s transportation ministry has come up with a draft law that would ban all ships older than 40 years from entering Russian harbors, a measure intended to stimulate shipbuilding in a country where 70 percent of its merchant ships are more than 25 years old with many far older.

            The measure would allow ships aged 30 to 40 years to enter harbors but only if they paid additional tolls.  Experts say Russian yards couldn’t build enough ships fast enough to compensate and that if the measure passes, shipping costs would go up by 45 percent or more (vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/11/27/1158444-mintrans-predlozhil-ne-puskat-v-porti-grazhdanskii-flot-starshe-40-let, ru.thebarentsobserver.com/mintrans-rossii-predlozil-zapretit-zahod-v-porty-dla-staryh-sudov/441505 and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-yards-cant-build-replacements.html).

            And this points not only to the problems that increasingly infect Russian development but also means that people along the Northern Sea Route and in other distant parts of the Russian Federation will face higher prices at best and likely shortages of key goods as well in the coming years. 

Russians Today More Satisfied by Their Lot Primarily Because Kremlin has Given Them Way to Channel Internal Aggression, Gudkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Surveys show that over the past few years, Russians have become more satisfied with their lot, the result, Lev Gudkov argues, primarily of the Kremlin’s skill in giving them a way to channel their internal aggression by attacking minorities at home and Ukraine abroad and thus allowing them to recover the sense that Russia is a great power.

            The Levada Center pollster says that as a result, the dominant attitude among Russians has changed from one that reflected the view that “it is difficult to life but it is possible to hold on” between 1994 and 2019 to “everything isn’t so bad; it is possible to live” (urbietorbi.online/contents/9 reposted at levada.ru/2025/11/26/paradoksy-massovoj-udovletvorennosti-mneniya-i-nastroeniya/).

            As that more positive assessment has become dominant, the formerly dominant one of despair has declined precipitously. In 1998-1999, 61 percent of Russians said that it was not possible to continue to live as they were doing. Today, Gudkov argues, the share of Russians who feel that way is down to five percent.

            He points to five changes which explain this: a decline in poverty, price increases for raw materials, the rejection of the heightened expectations many had in the 1990s for improvement overnight and “the stabilization of live under conditions of a new and authoritarian regime” which has allowed Russians to express their anger and feel themselves to be a great power.

            According to Gudkov, “the collapse of the basic system-forming institutions of Soviet totalitarianism … did not affect other crucial institutions of this system, including the political police, the army, the courts and education and thus did not lead to the liberalization of mass consciousness.”

            As a result, most Russians have retained “an authoritarian structure of consciousness,” with people expecting although not demanding from the state “primarily an improvement in their standard of living, protection from arbitrary actions by the bottom of the bureaucracy and criminals, but not seek freedom and political rights.”

            Over the last decade, he continues, “the return to great power rhetoric, to the struggle with ‘color revolutions’ and against ‘a fifth column,’ confrontation with the West after the Baltic republics joined the EU and NATO were thus greeted by ‘society’ with understanding, relief and approval.”

            This popular response helps to explain the return of authoritarianism. It is not just about the actions of Putin and his regime but about the response of the still authoritarian Russian people to what he is doing and approval of both a more aggressive foreign policy abroad as in Ukraine and a more repressive one at home against migrants and other minorities.

Chaos Theory Now Operational Basis of Putin’s Foreign Policy, Barbashin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 25 – Most analyses of Putin’s foreign policy suggest that it is driven by the desire to create a multi-polar world in which Russia will occupy a special place, but in fact, Anton Barbashin says, the real operational basis of his actions is the chaos theory that experts in the Valdai Club have been pushing for more than a decade.

            These experts argue that the world has entered a new period of chaos, “the natural and inevitable phase which follows the collapse of established ‘centers of gravity’ before a new and stable system of alliances, institutions and norms has emerged, the analyst who works as editor of The Riddle portal says (ridl.io/ru/svideteli-haosa/).

            As presented by the Valdai Club, this theory has five key postulates: First, “the old world cannot be restored” and those who try to do so are doomed to futility. Second, chaos by its very nature is “fundamentally unmanageable,” allowing those who act most rapidly and with the fewest constraints can make the most progress.

            Third, in this new world, “every actor is ultimately on his own,” forced to rely on himself alone and necessarily prepared to make rapid changes in the partners selected. Fourth, “morality and ethics no longer have a place in politics” either at home or abroad. And fifth, war is the natural condition of this phase and therefore “military power is the guarantee of survival.”

            The chaos theory, Barbashin concludes, “performs a triple function: it records the already accomplished changes in the rule of Russian foreign policy, it supplies them with an intellectual explanation, and it creates a broad context within which further unprincipled foreign policy steps appear logical and justified.”

Northern Sea Route Fails to Deliver Enough Coal to Chukotka, Forcing Military Settlements to Close and Meaning Residents Face a Cold Winter without Heat

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 22 – The new governor of Chukotka recently told Putin that his region was developing so well that it was in a position to help support Ukrainian regions Moscow has occupied, but in fact, the situation in the most distant region of the Russian Federation is close to collapse, with neither coal nor food being delivered in sufficient quantities for survival.

            This crisis has emerged for two reasons, local experts say. On the one hand, there is still too much ice in the eastern portions of the Northern Sea Route for transit of ships without the use of icebreakers, and Moscow prefers to use what icebreakers it has to handle ships carrying raw materials for export and to assist its Chinese ally.

            And on the other, the newly installed governor and his staff have utterly failed to understand to how to make use of the short summers not only as far as ships are concerned but regarding the delivery of goal and fresh fruits and vegetables from ports to inland villages and settlements (veter.info/posts/wU2LlJvu6Hbg).

            This year, ships delivered only one-third of the amount of coal needed to heat the homes of Chukotka residents and an even smaller fraction of fruits and vegetables, something that has sparked fears of a long cold winter and resulted in empty store shelves and skyrocketing prices when such foodstuffs are available.

            Chukotka’s 40,000 residents are already suffering: the region has the highest rate of alcoholism in the Russian Federation, and that rate is likely to increase still further this winter. Many are likely to come down with other illnesses and even die because of the failure to deliver coal and food because of Moscow’s preferences and the incompetence of Chukotka’s leadership.

            But for observers from beyond the borders of Chukotka, the most dramatic consequence of this collapse in the deliveries of coal for warmth and fruits and vegetables for the diet of its residents lies elsewhere: Russian military encampments are closing down, as can be seen from pictures provided by the Veter news agency. 

Russia Doesn’t Have Enough Psychologists and Return of Veterans from War in Ukraine will Overwhelm the System, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Some practicing psychologists say that as many as 10 percent of all Russians are suffering from psychological problems. There aren’t enough psychologists to treat them, and those who are practicing are about to be overwhelmed by the return of veterans from the war in Ukraine who suffer from PTSD and other problems.

            A debate has broken out about what to do. A senator has proposed introducing a state test to ensure that all those who call themselves psychologists are in fact professionals; but many psychologists say that such a bureaucratic step will push many of those now working out of the profession and make the situation even worse (nakanune.ru/articles/124133/).

            According to them, Russia is not anywhere close to have the number of psychologists needed in schools and firms, given how widespread psychological disturbances have become since the covid pandemic and more recently because of Putin’s war in Ukraine. And they are profoundly worried about what the return of veterans from that war will mean.

            These psychologists are calling on the government to train more psychologists rather than focus on weeding out unqualified ones and say that the defense ministry must take the lead because it has the money and its personnel are likely soon to become one of the heaviest new burdens on the system.

            If more psychologists are not trained and put in place, these practitioners suggest, the problems for Russian society as a whole will grow; and the costs of dealing with such difficulties will be far higher than the training and hiring of psychologists now. 

Moscow’s Anti-LGBT Laws Sparking Lively Growth in Underground Art Exhibitions Like Those in Soviet Times

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Between the death of Stalin and perestroika, artists who did not follow the state-approved socialist realism cannons regularly staged underground exhibits of their work in apartments and offices, Now, with the current Russian government’s anti-LGBT laws and policies, gay artists in Russian regions are doing the same.

            Art festivals for LGBT artists in Moscow and St. Petersburg have attracted some attention, but often more from the authorities and ationalist groups than from the broader public. But beyond the ring road, LGBT artists are increasingly active, according to a 4500-word report by the Horizontal Russia portal (semnasem.org/articles/2025/11/26/podpolnyj-kvir).

            There such exhibits are not only an act of protest against the increasingly dead hand of Moscow traditionalists but a means by which LGBT people can come together and develop a sense of solidarity, as well as reaching out to others who are simply interested in the latest artistic trends. 

Many Russian Companies aren’t Paying Workers Because Russian Government isn’t Paying Its Bills

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – As Putin’s war has continued, the number of workers who are owed wages by their employers has risen, not to the level of the 1990s but enough to be worrisome. But in general, most Russian reports on this have blamed the firms themselves or on other companies which owe them money for the problem.

            But an investigation by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service finds that a significant part of the problem has been caused by the failure of Russian government firms to pay what they owe in a timely fashion, a sign that the government itself is among the leading causes of this problem (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2025/11/24/1157368-biznes-predlozhil-resheniya-dlya-problemi-s-zaderzhkami-oplati-kontraktov-goskompaniyami).

            As this source of the problem of unpaid wages become widely known, many who are suffering because they have not been paid what they are owed are likely to blame the government and not just their employers and the government’s war in Ukraine, a trend that could spark more opposition to Putin and his war. 

Moscow Institute Calls for Diverting Portions of Flow of Two Rivers in Northwestern Russia to Occupied Portions of Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – As tensions rise over the possibility that Russia will divert part of the flow of Siberian rivers southward to Central Asia, the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Water Problems is calling for the diversion of part of the flow of the Northern Dvina and Pechora to drought-ravaged portions of Russian-occupied sections of Ukraine.

            The proposal, to be made formally next week (thebarentsobserver.com/news/former-environmental-minister-vows-to-divert-water-from-northern-rivers-to-occupied-donbas/441400, will certainly spark controversy both for all the reasons that Siberian river diversion projects have and because the Pechora flows through the Komi Republic, the site of massive environmental protests in the past .

            But the idea may pick up more support because it would allow Moscow to address several other serious problems: Water from the two north Russian rivers will be routed through the Kama and Volga rivers and then via the Volga-Don Canal to the Azov highlands and the Donbas.

            If this river diversion scheme were carried through, it might thus help Moscow solve the problems of falling water levels that it now faces on the Volga and especially on the Volga-Don Canal (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/10/caspians-falling-water-level-hitting.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/falling-water-levels-forcing-moscow-to.html and  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/siltification-of-caspian-and-volga-don.html).

            Moreover, if diverting water from these two northern rivers happens, Moscow and Russians are likely to be more disposed to support the other and larger Siberian river diversion project. And for that reason in addition to the prospect of new environmental protests in Komi, the fate of this proposal deserves careful attention    

Founder of Ukrainian Green Wedge Organization Arrested in Georgia and May be Deported

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 27 – Vladimir Dubrovsky, founder of the Ukrainian Green Wedge organization which seeks independence for Ukrainian territories in Russian Far East, has been arrested in Georgia on charges of violating that country’s immigration laws and now is at risk of being deported to the Russian Federation.

            If returned to Russia, he will face charges of terrorism and likely be imprisoned (t.me/port_media/5987, t.me/sotaproject/106163, govoritmoskva.ru/news/474377/ and https://echofm.online/news/v-gruzii-zaderzhali-glavu-dalnevostochnogo-separatistskogo-dvizheniya-i-ego-devushku).

            By detaining Dubrovsky, the Georgian authorities appear to have acted in deference to Russian interests. But the case itself is likely to call attention to the Green Wedge cause and thus work against Moscow. (For background on this issue, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/ukrainian-far-eastern-republic-recalled.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/moscow-declares-two-ukraine-wedge.html.)

In Unprecedented Move, Putin Puts Ethnic Russians at Center of Moscow’s Nationality Policy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 25 –In the past, Moscow’s nationality policy has always been about how the center treats the non-Russian living in that country rather than about how it treats the ethnic Russian majority. But now, Vladimir Putin has changed that, putting ethnic Russians at the center of nationality policy and demanding that the non-Russians defer to them.

            Even when Moscow pursued intensive Russianization and Russification campaigns, the official doctrine about ethnic issues focused on the non-Russians rather on the ethnic Russians; and so Putin’s doctrinal change is likely to represent a sea change in Moscow’s approach to what are historically called “nationality” issues, pleasing Russians and frightening non-Russians.

            This week, Putin signed a new nationality doctrine paper setting out his plans for the next decade (publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202511250024). The 41-page document replaces the current doctrinal paper that was issued in 2012 and has been updated twice since that time. The provisions of the new paper will go into effect on January 1.

            Among the key provisions of the new strategy document are the following:

·       The share of the population identifying as non-ethnic Russians is to rise to “more than 95 percent” by 2036.

·       This identity is to reflect “the common cultural code based on the preservation and development of ethnic Russian culture and the Russian language.”

·       The realization of the strategy is intended to “reduce the number of conflicts on an ethno-national basis” and unite all the country’s peoples around the ethnic Russian nation.

·       Moscow will devote a minimum of 50 percent of its spending on the survival and development of nations to efforts intended to help the ethnic Russian nation.

·       The Russian government will develop new programs to counter Russophobic propaganda among non-Russians emanating from hostile forces abroad, but it recognizes that the primary source of non-Russian challenges to Moscow come from domestic non-Russian elites and populations.

·       Moscow will also increase its efforts to reverse the formation of ethnic enclaves in Russian cities that have arisen as a result of immigration.

·       And it will work to integrate the newly acquired regions of the Russian Federation in the Donbass and Crimea on the basis of Russian values and seek to unify the Russian emigration to help Russia at home.

Not surprisingly, Russian commentators are celebrating these changes, with one suggesting they will prevent any repetition of the collapse of 1991 (vz.ru/news/2025/11/26/1376668.html) and another saying that finally the Kremlin has put an end to “the non-Russian Russia” that the Soviets imposed on the country (vz.ru/opinions/2025/11/26/1376788.html).

Undoubtedly many non-Russians are unhappy with this major shift in Moscow’s thinking, a change that goes far beyond what Putin has sought before, including making reference to ethnic Russians as the “state-forming nation,” something that he did not seek in the end during the last revisions of the constitution.

What these changes will mean, both in terms of specific policies and institutions, very much remains to be seen; but it is likely that it will intensify debates about a variety of issues – and very well may exacerbate ethnic tensions with ethnic Russians confident they will be supported and non-Russians fearing they are about to be subject to greater repression. 

Russia’s Non-Material Losses from Putin’s War Far Greater than Its Material Ones, Chernyshov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – “Putin has flushed down the toilet not only Russia's past and present, but also its future,” Dmitry Chernyshov says, less because of the losses of people and the basis for economic development than because of the ways that conflict has affected Russian culture and other “non-material” resources.

            The collapse of education, the worsening demographic situation, and the loss of technology and markets are all easier to measure, the Russian commentator says; but the impact on culture and related factors like the soft power Moscow had earlier are far more consequential (t.me/ResistanceRF/7614 reposted at  kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6926E8734F1BC).

            Indeed, Chernyshov continues, the negative trends in this area are multiplying ever faster because “the worse the situation becomes, the more rapidly everything gets worse.” And that means that the country is far more likely to die “not from defeats or Pyrrhic victories than from the loss of the ability to renew itself” demographically and culturally.

            In a commentary for the Resistance RF telegram channel, he says that as a result of Putin’s war, “Russia has lost an entire generation of intelligent and talented people.” Moreover, it “has lost access not only to scientific discoveries but even to the most up-to-date technologies” needed to keep it from falling further and further behind.

            But it has also lost “the soft power” Russia once had, “the ability to influence its neighbors through the attractiveness of its culture, values and way of life and not through military force.” Foreign students aren’t flocking to Russia as they once did, and those who have learned Russian in the past are forgetting it.

            Deaths from the war are leading to the depopulation of much of the country; and inside the Russian Federation, “an internal emigration” has begun with drunkenness and conversations in the kitchens coming to dominate life displacing any loyalty to or even identification with common tasks.

            As a result, Chernyshov suggests, Russia has been reduced to trying to survive rather than develop; and overcoming that will take far longer than recovering its material culture that it easier to measure but ultimately less important. 

CIS has Failed to Serve as Foundation for New Union, Moscow Historian Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – The Commonwealth of Independent States had two purposes, Aleksandr Dyukov says, to serve as a forum for “the civilized divorce” of the former union republics of the Soviet Union and as the basis for the preservation of the various ties that had linked them together and could lead to the formation of a new union state.

            But the CIS has not achieved either of those purposes, the scholar at the Momscow Institute of Russian History who is a member of the Presidential Council of Inter-National Relations says and is now “receding” into the past with few prospects for the future (svpressa.ru/politic/article/492283/).

            Ever more of the former union republics are entering into relationships with each other and with other countries that exclude Russia, Dyukov continues; and many of them are now thus “competitors” with Russia rather than its “strategic partners” however often they or people in the Russian capital say otherwise.

            Azerbaijan is a clear example of this: it is now an ally of Turkey and thus a competitor of Russia’s. Ukraine is openly hostile, and the countries of Central Asia are now forming alliances including Azerbaijan but not Russia and thus headed in directions ever more opposed to that of the Russian Federation.

            Indeed, except for Belarus, Moscow does not have the relationships with its neighbors tht it expected the CIS to ensure; and that means if it wants to rebuild those ties, it will have to come up with new structures rather than seek to rely on one that has hasn’t worked well up to now and isn’t likely to in the future. 

Arctic Ocean North of Russia’s Northern Sea Route Warming Far More than has Been Assumed

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 26 – Most studies of the impact of global warming in the Arctic have focused on how rising temperatures have affected the region just north of the Russian Federation through which the Northern Sea Route passes. But a new study by five Chinese scholars says portions of the Arctic north of there are warming more than had been thought.  

            The team from the Ocean University of China and the Laoshan Laboratory says that its research shows that climate change has had a far greater effect there than had been thought because the size of increases in the temperature of water there is too large to explain by anything else.

            For the report, see science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.adx9452; for a discussion of its findings and its impact on the biosphere there and the disappearance of some kinds of fish in adjoining regions, see thebarentsobserver.com/news/the-deepest-parts-of-the-arctic-ocean-are-warming-now-too/441361.

            What neither the Chinese authors of this report or the otherwise comprehensive Barents Observer article talk about, however, may be even more important in the future. If the waters of the Arctic far from the Russian coastline warms to the point that the ice melts and ships can pass through them, then the meaning of the NSR changes.

            Moscow’s promotion of the Northern Sea Route is based on the assumption, widely shared elsewhere, that the only passage way for shipping in the near future is along the Russian coast line. But if ships can go further north, they are likely to do so to avoid having to pay transit fees to Moscow.

            And that will reduce Moscow’s influence in the region and open the way to the expansion of a Chinese role in the Arctic far larger than it is today if not immediately than in the next decade or so. That Chinese scholars are the ones considering such warming most closely strongly suggests that this possibility is part of Beijing’s calculations. 

Another Manifestation of Moscow-Centrism: Russians Across the Country Build Models of Kremlin

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 24 – Andrey Platonov once proposed that Lenin’s mausoleum should be put on wheels so that it could tour the Soviet Union and allow workers and peasants to show their respects to the founder of the Soviet state. That never happened. But something analogous has been taking place in the Russian Federation, Ivan Kozlov says.

            In a 3,000-word and heavily illustrated article for The New Tab, the journalist describes the efforts of Russians across the country to build replicas of the Kremlin in their regions to underscore their loyalty to what has long been the symbol of Russian power (thenewtab.io/kak-i-zachem-zhiteli-regionov-sozdayut-kopii-moskovskogo-kremlya/).

            The phenomenon is clearly even larger than he can describe and shows the ways in which the symbol of Russian power remains strongly rooted in the minds of Russians from Kaliningrad to the Pacific, a physical representation of what is obviously an important component of Russian identity.

Russian State Library Sets Up Restricted Access Collection of Anti-Russian Books from Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 24 – The Russian State Library has set up a restricted access collection of anti-Russian books from Ukraine and plans to circulate the list of the more than 10,000 books in it to other Russian libraries so that they can do the same, Vadim Duda, the director of the library says.

            Such collections, known infamously in Soviet times as spetskhrany, are needed, he says, so that Russian scholars who study Russophobia in Ukraine can have access to them while general readers are denied that possibility (vedomosti.ru/media/articles/2025/11/24/1157528-v-rgb-sozdan-spetshran-ukrainskih).

            Duda continues by pointing out that not all the books in this collection have been identified as extremist by the Russian government. Instead, he says, many of them have been so classified by librarians and other officials of his library working on their own. He adds that he plans to publish the list as a guide for similar actions by other Russian libraries. 

Latest Clash between Chinese and Kyrgyz Workers in Kyrgyzstan Highlights Growing Anti-Chinese Attitudes Across the Region

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 21 – A clash between Kyrgyz and Chinese workers at a construction site in the northern portion of Kyrgyzstan on Nov. 15 that led to 15 arrests and at least one hospitalized highlights growing tension between indigenous Central Asians and Chinese arriving to work on Beijing-funded projects.

            This brawl is the latest of a series of such clashes which have taken place in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan over the last decade which both reflect and intensify anti-Chinese attitudes across the region (rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-chinese-workers-brawl/33594905.html and rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-chinese-workers-brawl-backlash/33595044.html).

            The governments of the workers involved have played down the incidents but such events suggest that there are likely to be troubles ahead not only in Central Asian countries but in the Russian Far East as well where Chinese workers are increasingly being bought in to perform work for which there aren’t enough qualified Russians.

            For background on this problem in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/anti-chinese-protests-in-post-soviet.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/09/anti-chinese-attitudes-in-central-asia.html.  

Moscow Must Restore Russian Names to Places in Ukraine to Show Russians and the West to Show Ukraine ‘Project’ is Over, Bondarenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 22 – Moscow must restore the Russian names of cities, villages and streets in what is now Ukraine to show Russians and the West that the Russians are not going to give up on their plans to put an end to Ukraine, something he describes as a Western “project” directed against Russia, Yury Bondarenko says.

            The president of the Return Foundation, which has long sought to restore Russian names in place of Soviet ones within the Russian Federation, argues that such changes are the best means of propagandizing Moscow’s commitment (mk.ru/politics/2025/11/22/ekaterinoslav-vmesto-dnipra-politolog-obyasnil-kakim-ukrainskim-gorodam-neobkhodimo-vernut-istoricheskie-imena.html).

            What Bondarenko does not say but what must be acknowledged by all people of good will is that such name changes are acts of genocide because they are intended to destroy the people who have insisted on the earlier changes and thus part of Putin’s broader approach to the Ukrainians and other non-Russians. 

Budget Problems Force Sakha Republic to Suspend Payments to Those Fighting in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 22 – As a result of budgetary stringency, the government of the Sakha Republic has had to suspend payments of money promised to those going to fight in Ukraine, although it says that it is trying to find the money in its budget to fulfill its earlier promises in this regard.

            On the one hand, Yakutsk says that the problem arose because more people volunteered than it expected (14.ru/text/ecology/2025/11/21/76132650/ and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/11/22/v-iakutii-priostanovili-vyplaty-uchastnikam-svo-iz-za-nekhvatki-deneg-news).

            But on the other, the Sakha government is clearly trying to maintain funding for local needs as much as possible even if it has to cut back on money given to those who are going to fight in Ukraine at a time when republic government budgets are in the red and a reflection of regional priorities.

            Two and three years ago, the regions and republics were competing with each other to offer supplements to those who agreed to fight; but now Sakha has become a leader among those cutting back and even ending such payments, yet another sign that the worsening economy and waning support for Putin’s war is having real-world consequences.

Moscow Backs Khabarovsk Plan to Restore Amur as Domestic and International Waterway

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 22 – The Russian Presidential Administration has approved a plan drawn up by Khabarovsk Kray governor Dmitry Demeshin to restore the Amur River which separates the Russian Far East from China as a major route for trade, a status it had before 1991 but has lost since the USSR disintegrated.

            Prior to the end of the Soviet Union, the Amur River carried as much as 26 million tons of cargo between the two countries and more than 500 million tons domestically between Russian ports; but by the mid-2010s, that annual amount had fallen to a tiny fraction of that, Artyom Aleksandrov of the Siberian Economist portal says (sibmix.com/?doc=18974).

            Reversing that trend is now a matter of priority given Putin’s turn to the east, and both Khabarovsk and Moscow hope that the amount of trade passing across the Amur either by new bridges or ports and riverways capable of operating even when water levels reach seasonal lows will be seven or more times what it was before 1991.

            Chinese businesses and officials welcome this initiative, Aleksandrov says, a good thing because they will likely have to bear much of the costs of this project given the Russian government’s current financial stringencies that have arisen as a result of Putin’s expanded and continuing war in Ukraine. 

New Russian Dictionary Says Constitution Not ‘Fundamental Law’ and Authoritarianism Best Form of Government in Difficult Times

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 21 – According to the new Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language prepared by the University of St. Petersburg under the direction of the Russian government, a constitution is “not the fundamental law” of a country and authoritarianism is the best form of government in difficult times.

            The new dictionary, which replaces the one released in 2000 just after Putin came to power, explicitly reflects his defense of traditional Russian values, involved the Russian Orthodox Church, and drops words like gulag which had been included in the earlier edition (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/slovar-tradicionnyh-cennostej-kak-kreml-perepisyvaet-russkij-azyk/441006).

            An electronic version of the book is already (publishing.spbu.ru/catalog/novinki/tolkovyy_slovar_gosudarstvennogo_yazyka_rossiyskoy_federatsii_v_2_tomakh/) and hard copies will be available soon at 2600 rubles (26 US dollars) each. And the book is intended in the first instance as a guide for officials doing their work.

            But both the definitions it provides – and there are thousands of new ones – and the examples it offers in support of them – and there are even more – are certain to affect teaching and thus the values inculcated in the younger generation and thus have an impact far exceeding what many might expect a dictionary to have.

            Of course, the new dictionary’s influence may not be exactly what its authors and their Kremlin backers hope. Russians are unlikely to give up the curse words that the dictionary doesn’t include, and many of them may not accept the definitions and examples it gives as the only reasonable ones.

            To give only one example of the latter: the dictionary asserts that life begins at conception. That is the view of the ROC MP, but it is not the view of many Russians, including not only those who get abortions but also the much larger number who believe that such operations are justified practically and even morally. 

Kremlin to Monitor Attitudes of Young Russians toward LGBTs, Childfree Advocates and War in Ukraine – and to Punish Regions where Too Many Young Give ‘Incorrect’ Answers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 21 – The Presidential Administration has announced plans to set up a system to monitor the attitudes of young Russians toward such issues as the treatment of LGBT people and Childfree advocates and the outcome of Putin’s war in Ukraine and to punish regions where too many of those surveyed don’t give Kremlin-approved answers.

            This plan builds on earlier surveys conducted by the HSE (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2025/04/18/1105155-rosmolodezh-podgotovit-zakritii-doklad-o-vliyanii-ekstremistov-na-molodih-rossiyan), but it is different in that the data on the results won’t be published and the regions with too many “incorrect” answers are slated to be punished in some as yet undefined way (moscowtimes.ru/2025/11/21/molodezh-vo-vseh-regionah-proveryat-na-loyalnost-k-voine-i-vliyanie-zapada-a180703).

            This is the latest effort by Moscow to determine just how much influence the now hated West has on the young, the current Russian government explanation for any positions among Russians it doesn’t approve of, and just how loyal young Russians are to Putin with regard to the lengthening war in Ukraine. 

            Given the not so implicit threat the Kremlin has issued about how it will react to regions where the wrong answers are given by significant fractions of young Russians, this new program will likely trigger expanded propaganda efforts by regional officials and thus a further restriction on what opinions are permissible in Putin’s Russia.

            But it may not work as the Putin regime intends. Many young Russians will certainly recognize that there are real dangers in expressing their own feelings and thus give “correct” answers entirely at variance with what they really think, leaving Kremlin officials in the dark about what the real situation in the country is. 

Difference in Cost of Living among Russia’s Federal Subjects Reaches Highest Level Ever, Rosstat Data Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 19 – After falling for the last two years, the difference in the cost of living among Russia’s federal subjects has risen by 12 percent over the last 12 months to reach the highest level ever, according to new data released by Rosstat, the Russian government’s statistical arm.

            The three subjects where the cost of living is highest are Chukotka, Moscow and Murmansk Oblast; the three where they are lowest are Saratov, Astrakhan and Oryol oblasts, where the cost of living is between one half and two thirds of the most expensive places (club-rf.ru/news/64068).

            These differences reflect extremely large differences in average pay, the high cost of delivering goods to the North and Far East, different levels of competition which serves to keep costs in check, and specific local problems like high rents in Moscow and private gardens in outlying regions which helps reduce the cost of living there.

            Keeping these differences in mind is important both in understanding how varied the Russian Federation is, far more varied than just between the capital and the areas beyond the ring road, and also how any changes in income, employment, and the cost of living diverge and hit some regions far harder than others. 

New Russian Law Requiring Medical School Graduates to Work as Assigned Already Backfiring

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 20 – A Russian law that will go into effect next year requires that those who graduate from medical schools in the Russian Federation work in their field and as assigned by the health ministry for a period of time is already backfiring, leading some medical school students to quit and students in others fearful that they will be subject to the same restrictions.

            Having done so much to destroy Russian healthcare with his “optimization” program that has closed hospitals and clinics across the country, Putin has now pushed through a law that will require medical school graduates to work as assigned after graduation (semnasem.org/articles/2025/11/20/mediki-nedovolny-zakonom-ob-otrabotke)

            This measure is designed to cope with a situation in which ever more medical school graduates don’t work in their profession or work in private clinics where they can make more money thus leaving public hospitals especially in rural areas from the capital without the staff they need.

            But even before it goes into effect, the new law is backfiring. On the one hand, some students in medical universities are leaving lest they fall victim to this measure which goes into full effect on March 1, 2026. And on the other, students in other subjects are expressing concern that they will be next as Putin restores yet another hated Soviet-era policy.

            Medical schools are now working hard to retain their students, although with mixed success (https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/124121/), and teacher-training institutions are becoming increasingly alarmed that they will be the next to be subject to such government rules (kavkazr.com/a/dobro-pozhalovatj-v-krepostnoe-pravo-rossiyskie-mediki-predrekli-kollaps-zdravoohraneniya-iz-za-zakona-ob-otrabotke-posle-medvuzov/33597969.html).

Closed Military Towns in Russian North have Lost 20 to 30 Percent of Their Populations Since Start of Putin’s Expanded War in Ukraine, ‘Khroniki’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 20 – Since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, the closed military settlements in the Russian North have lost 20 to 30 percent of their residents, a reflection of both mounting deaths in that region as military personnel are sent to the front and the longstanding trend of flight from isolated places in that region, Khroniki says.

            Those figures are estimates reached by the independent news agency on the basis of its contacts in nine closed cities of the Russian Northern Fleet, including the well-known locations  of Severomorsk and Polyarny (chronicles.media/iz-zakrytyh-gorodov-severnogo-flota-s-2022-goda-ischezlo-do-30-zhitelej/).

            While they cannot be independently confirmed, they are larger but entirely credible given that official Rosstat figures which show that since 2022, the population of Murmansk Oblast as a whole has declined by roughly ten percent (thebarentsobserver.com/news/murmansk-region-lost-10-percent-of-its-population-during-the-years-of-fullscale-war/441127).

            Both the collapse in the number of residents of the closed military settlements and the decline in the total Russian population at a minimum will make it difficult for Moscow to back up on the ground its constant talk about projecting power into the Arctic and toward the West in the North Atlantic region. 

Kremlin Rating of Heads of Federal Subjects on Demographic Behavior of Their Populations Deeply Flawed, ‘To Be Exact’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 20 – Among the key performance indicators (KPI) that the Kremlin has used to evaluate the performance of governors are three demographic indicators; but these are deeply flaws because most of these don’t depend on the governors, change more slowly than each year, and are extremely problematic, according to the To Be Precise portal.

            Since 2007, the Kremlin has evaluated governors on a statistical basis, the so-called KPI; and since 2024, it has included three demographic measures in its list, including life expectancy, birthrate, and size of the population. But none of these depend as much on the regions as Moscow suggests.

            That is the conclusion that the To Be Precise portal offers on the basis of a careful analysis of these measures, none of which is as dependent on the regions as Moscow suggests by insisting on such reporting (tochno.st/materials/v-rossii-est-demograficeskie-kpi-dlia-gubernatorov-my-sostavili-reiting-regionov-na-ix-osnove-no-on-pocti-ne-zavisit-ot-raboty-regionalnyx-vlastei).

            Among the most obvious shortcomings of this data are the following, the portal says. The data on which such figures are compiled all comes from Moscow, is often incomplete and increasingly late in coming out, reducing the accuracy of any such measurement of the performance of governors.

            Moreover, governors have little control over any of these measures in the short-term despite Moscow’s suggestion that they do. People move from region to region for abortion tourism or to take new jobs, changing the demographics of the regions involved independently of what the governors do.

            And third – and this is the most serious problem with these KPI numbers – it is Moscow policies and underlying social trends that are driving demographic changes rather than any actions of the governors, something that anyone analyzing demographic behavior in the Russian Federation should keep in mind.

            Those who don’t and accept these measures are accurate and useful will otherwise be participating in yet another effort by Moscow to shift attention and responsibility away from itself onto those who do not control the situation, an outcome that is likely the most important reason the Kremlin introduced these measures and continues to use them.  

Moscow Pioneered Use of Migration Directed Against Finland and Norway a Decade Ago and May Do So Again, Scandinavian Scholars Warn

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 21 – Moscow pioneered state-organized migration flows against neighboring states far earlier than many now think and in a place, Norway and Finland, that at the time attracted far less attention that its later moves did , according to Jyri Lavikainen and Karen-Anna Eggen.

            The two scholars, at the Finish Institute of International Affairs and the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies respectively, write in The European Journal of International Security what the Kremlin did then, it may do again (cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/implementing-a-new-tool-russias-strategic-use-of-migrants-towards-norway-and-finland-201516/A6EA1B686C7C3EDA3B4DB6F15F71DB0E and themoscowtimes.com/2025/11/21/russia-wielded-migration-against-europe-earlier-than-you-think-a91202).

            “Since 2020,” they write, “stores about the instrumentalized use of migrants have regularly appeared in the news … However, out research shows that Russia’s first test run with migrants took place years earlier, high above the Arctic Circle” when in 2015-2016, “Russia abruptly relaxed its own border contros and allowed more than 7,000 migrants” to go into Norway and Finland.”

            That this was a political decision rather than the result of migration pressures triggered by wars in the Middle East is clear because “access to the border zone in Murmansk is tightly regulated” and potential migrants couldn’t even reach the border unless Russian officials agreed to allow them to do so, something it had not done in the past.

            A tough response by Finland and Norway led Moscow to back down and to end this flow in a few days, stopping it “s suddenly as it had started.” But it is also clear, the two scholars say, that this Arctic operation “was less about winning clear concessions than about establishing coercive potential: increase the sense that Russia always has another lever it can pull.”

            And they argue that because this threat has not disappeared, “understanding how this tool emerged in the Arctic a decade ago is a first step towards understanding how Russia leverages laws and human beings to serve strategic goals; goals that may change over time as Russia tailors its approaches and evaluates the risk involved.”

 

Fertility Rate in Tatarstan Now Far Below Replacement Level, Kazan Demographer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 20 – Over the last four years, the number of births in Tatarstan has fallen by ten percent, largely the result of a decline in the fertility rate to 1.45, slightly above the rate for Russia as a whole but far below the 2.2 children per lifetime per woman needed to keep the population from declining, Aygol Khuramshina says.

            The director of the Center for the Family and Demography of Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences says that the population of the republic is continuing to grow because of inmigration from other parts of Russia and abroad but that the influx is now declining (business-gazeta.ru/article/688114 and idelreal.org/a/v-tatarstane-za-chetyre-goda-na-14-snizilas-rozhdaemost-kolichestvo-zaklyuchennyh-brakov-za-10-let-sokratilos-na-25-/33597065.html).

            And Khuramshina adds that period between the average age of the start of sexual activity – 16 – and the average age of the birth of the first child among residents of the republic – 29 -- has risen to the point that there are increasing problems of various kinds, including the impact this trend has on growth.

            But she says that it is currently impossible for demographers like herself to talk about current trends more precisely because over the last several years, the Russian government has stopped publishing data on demographic behavior and so in many cases, both scholars and officials who depend on them are flying blind.

            One thing is clear, however. In Tatarstan as in other predominantly Muslim federal subjects of the Russian Federation, birthrates are declining; and while they are not as low as those in predominantly ethnic Russian regions, they are converging on figures to be found in those oblasts, krays and cities.

            That means that traditionally Muslim peoples will continue to form a larger share of the population of the Russian Federation than they did in the past but that the rate of this increase may decline at least slightly unless fertility rates among Russians overall fall even faster overall. That is perhaps likely as the fertility rate in Moscow, for example, is already close to 1.0.

Ecumenical Patriarchate May Create Halfway House for Those Unwilling to Remain in Ukrainian Orthodox Church but Not Yet Ready to Join Orthodox Church of Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov 18 – The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople is developing a plan for the creation in Ukraine of a temporary exarchate to provide a temporary spiritual home for those who do not want to remain in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which is still viewed by many as a Russian church but not yet ready to join autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine

            The man behind this idea is Greek theologian Pavel Liberman who says that such a structure could sere as “a transitional canonical space” for such people and keep this process under the control of the church rather than risk it becoming a political football and continue for decades (ng.ru/ng_religii/2025-11-18/9_607_exarchate.html).

            Liberman says that such a temporary exarchate will in no way threaten the Ukraine’s autocephalous status or will in any way compete with the OCU for members. Instead, it will be designed to keep the future of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine a matter for the church rather than the state and thus a more natural one.

            Many in the OCU are nonetheless suspicious, and no final decision as been taken. In the view of some in Moscow, this idea is the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s response to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate’s decision to create an exarchate in Africa to undermine other patriarchates rather than being something in the first instance about Ukraine.

Kremlin Restrictions on Abortions Leading to More Back Alley Abortions and More Murders of Newborns, ‘Takiye Dela’ Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – The Kremlin has stepped up its campaign against abortions in the hopes of boosting the birthrate, an investigation by the independent media outlet Takiye Dela says; but instead of achieving that goal, it now faces a situation in which ever more women are seeking back alley abortions thereby putting themselves at risk or murdering their newborns.

            Official Russian government statistics dramatically understate the problems arising when abortions are effectively banned They show no doctors charged with performing illegal abortions in 2024, and only a relative handful of cases in which mothers of unwanted children decide to kill them (takiedela.ru/notes/ubiystva-detey-i-zapret-abortov/)

            But the experience of other countries and of Russia in the past when the state had banned abortions suggest that the real numbers of these crimes are far larger, Takiye Dela says, possibly by several orders of magnitude; and demographers are nearly unanimous that an abortion ban now will not achieve what the government hopes for.

            The murders of newborns restrict population growth, but back alley abortions are likely to have an even larger impact in that regard because they often leave the women involved without the ability to bear children in the future when their circumstances and hence desires concerning children may change

 

Moscow Patriarchate Official in Europe Likely Purged Not for Playing Poker but for Supporting Ukraine, ‘NG-Religii’ Journalist Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 18 – When Patriarch Kirill removed Metropolitan Nestor from his post as head of the ROC MP exarchate in Western Europe, journalists in Russia and the West had a field day suggesting that the head of the ROC MP had taken this step because of Nestor’s well-known passion for poker and other games of chance.

            But Anastasiya Koskello, a journalist for NG-Religii, points out that the Moscow Patriarchate did not give a reason and that it is more likely that Metropolitan Nestor was removed because of charges by other Russian hierarchs that the latter has been pro-Ukrainian (ng.ru/ng_religii/2025-11-18/9_607_episcopade.html).

            Those charges were made on the telegram channel maintained by Metropolitan Leonid over the last year in which he suggested that Nestor was guilty of pro-Ukrainian and Russophobic attitudes and had even taken part in church services with hierarchs of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

            If Koskello is right, this explanation suggests that Kirill, who as the former head of the ROC’s foreign office knows how important it is for exarchs abroad to balance Moscow’s requirements with local needs, almost certainly is seeking to send a message to what may be a growing number of hierarchs unhappy with the continuation of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine.

            And these events, she continues, highlight what appears to be the emergence of ever more opposition to Kirill’s slavish support for the Kremlin, an opposition that the Moscow patriarch may now be trying to put down by such purges and possibly in the future even the use of Russian state power to solidify his position by reaffirming his loyalty to Putin.  

Water Shortages Intensifying in Armenia along Turkish Border and in Syunik Oblast

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 19 – Approximately half of Armenia’s territory is suffering from desertification and another quarter is at risk of that, a disaster that is hitting regions along the Turkish border and in Syunik Oblast, which lies between Azerbaijan proper and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, particularly hard.

            As a result, it is proving ever more difficult for the Armenian government to maintain its population in these areas let alone move more people into them in order to promote its national security, especially as Yerevan lacks the funds to develop new water supplies in these places (vpoanalytics.com/sobytiya-i-kommentarii/armeniya-vodnye-problemy-tolko-vodokhranilishchami-ne-reshit/).

            In large part, this development is the result of global warming and losses in water used for less than optimal means of farming; but in part, it reflects Turkey’s increasing withdrawal of water from rivers that flow into Armenia and have cut their flow by 35 to 40 percent over the last dozen years.

            Building more small reservoirs, Yerevan’s current policy choice, won’t be sufficient to reverse this trend, one that is certain to have an impact on Armenia’s relations with Turkey and on plans to reopen the corridor through Syunik/Zengezur and even raise new security issues in both places that could undermine warning relations between Armenia and its neighbors. 

Moscow’s Failure to Meet Garbage Processing Goals Already Triggering Protests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov.17 – Six years ago, the Russian government promised that it would increase the processing rather than simple burial of trash from seven percent at that time to 36 percent in 2024 and have 100 percent of trash sorted by 2030. But it has fallen far short of its goals, and NIMBY protests against trash handling are spreading across the Russian Federation.

            Some Russian officials acknowledge that Moscow has made no progress in sorting and processing trash rather than burying it while other claim that the situation has improved slightly (iz.ru/1469278/anastasiia-platonova/seichas-na-pererabotku-idet-lish-7-otkhodov and rg.ru/2024/10/13/zamknut-cikl.html).

            But there is near universal recognition that Moscow has not kept its promises and won’t meet its goals for 2030 and that as a result, the Russian Federation still lags far behind countries like Germany where 84 percent of trash is sorted and processed and South Korea where that figure stands at 86 percent.

            Because of that failure, ever more trash trumps in the Russian Federation are expanding, contaminating air and water used by those who live near them and triggering the kind of NIMBY protests like the one at Shiyes in ever more parts of the country (sibreal.org/a/my-ne-krysy-rossiyane-protiv-gigantskih-musornyh-svalok/33586437.html).

            So far most popular anger has been directed at local officials rather than at Moscow and Vladimir Putin personally, with people appealing to the Kremlin to intervene on their behalf against the regional officials they hold responsible. But as the protests spread and intensify, that could change and thus become a serious challenge for Putin and his regime.

‘Now There are Six’ – Azerbaijan Joins Central Asian States, Transforming Geopolitics of Eurasia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 21 – Following the decision earlier this month by the five leaders of the Central Asian countries to include Azerbaijan in their grouping in the future, Hikmet Hajiyev, an advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared that “from now on, Central Asia includes six countries” and not five as in the past (x.com/HikmetHajiyev/status/1989973093759307986).

            Because these meetings of presidents of one region often are little more than talk shops, the significance of this change both for the region and for its role in the larger world have not yet been fully appreciated, but it appears likely that this change will play a larger role in both than almost any other international development in recent months.

            There are at least three compelling reasons for that conclusion:

·       First, the inclusion of Azerbaijan in Central Asia in this way makes that the region more influential because of the size of Azerbaijan.

·       Second, it makes Central Asia more Turkic both by adding a fifth Turkic state and by expanding the bridge between Central Asia and Turkey.

·       And third, it reenforces the Turkic and Islamic nature of Azerbaijan, developments that will have an impact on Baku’s role not only in the Caucasus and the new Central Asia but more generally.

Other fallout from this development is likely, including the possibility that Central Asia will expand again, including within its orbit not just Azerbaijan but Afghanistan and Pakistan. The inclusion of Azerbaijan will make that an easier sell in the other capitals, and such an outcome will be even more fateful to Eurasian geopolitics.