Paul Goble
Staunton,
August 14 – Fifty-four years ago this week, the East German government began
building the Berlin Wall to stem the tide of people fleeing that regime’s
oppression for the West. That action came to symbolize the division of the
world that the USSR had imposed and re-energized the West to resist and
ultimately turn back Soviet imperialism.
In
1961 and for many years thereafter, communist propagandists in an eery
foreshadowing of the terminology that the Putin government uses about its
actions in Ukraine called the Berlin Wall “the Anti-Fascist Wall” and said it
had been erected to prevent people from the West from coming into the communist
paradise.
At
the time, Western governments dismissed such nomenklatura as Orwellian, absurd
and a confession of the bankruptcy of communist ideology; but even more, they
recognized that Moscow wanted to act on the basis of what it claimed were “understandings”
rather than on the basis of “law” and “legal agreements.”
And
thus the Berlin crisis of the Cold War era presaged the way in which Vladimir
Putin has acted in Ukraine, Yevgeny Ikhlov argues on Kasparov.ru. The question
remains whether what the Kremlin leader has done will mobilize the West as did
his Soviet predecessors (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=55CCBFA919C72).
The
Moscow commentator argues that “the root of the Berlin crisis lay in the
confict between the efforts of the Western allies to follow the norm of law
(treaties and agreements at the end of World War II) and the Soviet attachment
to understandings” – theirs and not necessarily shared by anyone else.
“Stalin
and Khrushchev considered that according to ‘the understandings,’ occupied territory
must belong to the victors. The US approached the issue from the right of the
German and other peoples to self-determination,” Ikhlov points out, again an
eery foreshadowing of what has happened between Russia and Ukraine in the last
two years.
According
to the Russian analyst, “the Berlin crisis arose as a result of the successful
attempt of the Kremlin to do away with the allied agreement on the regime of
control over Germany by replacing the zones of control it established with the
right of each to dominate and rule its own space.”
“Similar
contradictions led to the current Ukrainian crisis,” Ikhlov says. “Yeltsin
indulgently watched how Kyiv moved between Moscow, Brussels (Berlin) and
Washington. Putin decided that Ukraine must become what Stalin wanted to see
Germany be – a weak and rickety state divided by regional and communal
contradictions.”
“According
to Putin’s understandings,” the commentator argues, despite the agreement of a “temporarily
weakened ‘Great Russia,’” to Ukraine’s sovereignty, in fact, “the eastern half”
of that country is in Russia’s zone of influence. The Maidan revolution showed
that Ukrainians didn’t accept his view and so Putin acted to impose it.
And
he wanted and still wants the great powers to impose this on Ukraine and is not
dissuaded by the fact that “90 percent of Ukrainians do not want to be in ‘the
Russian world,’” any more than his Soviet predecessors were affected by the
proof positive the flight to the West via Berlin showed that “90 percent of the
residents of the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic … clearly
preferred Western values to communist ones.”
Like
Shakespeare’s Shylock, the Kremlin “demanded its pound of flesh from the
debtor.” But the Ukrainians fought rather than surrendered even as “Moscow
remained true to itself because it is convinced that it can be only an empire.”
And what Putin really sought was that “people would kill and die in the Donbas
for the right to be Putinists.”
The
division of Berlin by the wall in 1961 led to a rapid reduction in the level of
military tensions that had existed in the middle of Europe from 1945 until that
time, Ikhlov suggests. Moreover, it allowed President John F. Kennedy to “find
a new moral impulse for the West,” something that elevated its goals from
consumer freedoms and “combined for the West Germans the ideals of freedom, ‘the
Western choice,’ and German nationalism.”
The
USSR in contrast by insisting on its “understandings” in place of international
law thus suffered a major defeat because the Berlin Wall meant that the East-West
contest shifted into “the realm of the philosophy of democracy,” one in which “the
Soviets had no chances to win whatsoever.”
Putin’s
effort to divide Ukraine “has helped [President Barack] Obama to find a new
moral impulse for the West, going beyond political correctness and combining
for Ukrainians the ideals of freedom, ‘the Western choice,’ and Ukrainian nationalism.” Putin has thus like his Soviet predecessors
pushed the issue into an area he cannot hope to win either.
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