Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 28 – Given his
economic problems at home and Western sanctions over Ukraine, many in the West
have convinced themselves that Vladimir Putin will not launch a major war. But
despite or even because of these challenges, Yury Felshtynsky says, Putin is
preparing for just such a conflict, even though time is working for Ukraine and
the West.
And because time is working against
him in that regard, the Russian analyst based in the United States says, the
possibility that he will launch a major attack in Ukraine or against other
targets in the near future is far greater than many think (apostrophe.com.ua/article/world/ex-ussr/2015-08-28/vse-ukazyivaet-na-podgotovku-rossii-k-mirovoy-voyne/2162).
Felshtynsky says that those who have
been following Putin’s aggression since March 2014 can be divided into
optimists and pessimists. Among “the optimists,” he says, is Andrey Piontkovsky
who argues that Putin is stymied by his current difficulties and that those
around him will soon remove him.
Felshtynsky puts himself among “the
pessimists” because he believes that “Putin and the people which he has put in
power and who have entered his closest entourage have not understood and do not
understand” the nature of the situation they face. Consequently, they are
likely to act in erratic, even irrational ways from the point of view of
others.
“The junta ruling Russia today
consists of primitive, uneducated officers of the Soviet and Russian special
services who have studied all their lives the specific science of destructin. They
have never learned to create and build.” They can sell raw materials like oil
at world prices, but they are incapable” of managing the country in the
direction of development.
This
group “seized power in order to restore the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire,
the ‘Russian world,’ but not a civilized, cultural, economically developed and
independent state,” the analyst says. Thus, Felshtynsky argues, “it is early to
conclude that the danger of a third world war has been liquidated by falling
oil prices and the low ruble exchange rate.”
“If it were possible to buy peace,”
the analyst continues, “there never would be any wars because any war is more
expensive than peace.” A corollary of that “a low ruble or a high ruble is not
a guarantee of European or world security.”
Wars happen not just because of what one side wants but also how the other
side acts or is perceived to act.
Thanks to the recent Bloomberg
report, we now know that the West told Kyiv not to react militarily when Russia
seized Crimea. “One after another in March-April [2014] leaders of Europe and
the US in one voice as from a script told their populations that Crimea is “immemorial
Russian land,’ and that Russia has every right to seize it.
And then these same leaders turned
things on their head and said that the fact that “Ukraine had surrendered
Crimea without a battle” proved that it was not really Ukrainian because
countries do not give up land that is really theirs.
Piontkovsky is among those who have
suggested that what took place was the result of a new “Munich,” in which the
West “paid for peace with the division of Ukraine” just as it had in September
1938 with “with the division of Czechoslovakia.” Nonetheless, the question remains: will the
West go to war against the aggressor as Britain and France did in September
1939?
“No one has yet declared war on
Russia, but Russia, in contrast to Hitlerite Germany, has stalled at the initial
stage of its aggression,” Felshtynsky says. Already for a year and a half, it
has not been in a position to break through beyond the borders of its puppet
DNR and LNR,” despite its enormous concentration of forces nearby.
Moreover, the Russian analyst says, “Russia
continues to exacerbate the military-political situation on the borders with
all its neighbors,” not just the Baltic countries and the former Soviet
republics but “also with traditionally neutral states like Finland and Sweden.”
And it has sent its aircraft along the US borders as a provocation.
And while this is going on, “throughout
the Russian Federation are being carried out military training exercises,
increases in military spending, changes in laws governing call ups of reserves,
concentration of forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, and so on and so forth,”
Felshtynsky points out.
“Absolutely everything points to
Russia’s general preparation for a world war.”
How has the West reacted so far? Has
it done enough to convince Putin that he must not act? The answers to those
questions are not clear. “No one has yet
imposed serious sanctions on Russia. The West is optimistic. It also considers
that Russia is so weak economically and militarily that it cannot possibly
think about a major war.”
“Therefore,” he continues, “the
leadership of Europe and the US, having replaced the slogan about Crimea as ‘immemorial
Russian land’ for a demand for the return of Crimea to Ukraine and the
withdrawal of Russian forces from occupied areas of eastern Ukraine is waiting
while preparing to give a rebuff to the aggressor.”
And “the leaders of the free world
justly consider that time is working for them and for Ukraine,” a conclusion
Felshtynsky shares. But precisely because it is, that could prompt Putin to act
more quickly and more broadly than they expect.
Putin certainly has concluded, the
analyst suggests that if he is going to act, he must do so while Barack Obama
is still in office as US president, that is, sometime before January 20,
2017. That is not because “Obama is bad
or good” but because “Obama came to office to end the wars begun by the
previous administration and hardly in order to begin new ones.”
“For that reason,” Felshtynsky
argues, “Obama would be the last person in the US ready to begin a war with
Russia over Ukraine or with Iran over the Iranian nuclear program. Putin, just
like Ayatollah Khamenei understands that perfectly.” And the Kremlin leader understands something
else as well.
Putin recognizes that “the new president
of the US, regardless of who it is and which party, will take a harder line
toward Russia and toward Iran.” That means, Felshtynsky suggests, that if Putin
is going to move, he will want to do so before that happens and before time
really works against him.
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