Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 25 – “Strange
tectonic shifts are taking place around the Kremlin,”
Andrey Piontkovsky says. And although evidence of them comes mostly in leaks, they are a clear indication of “the panic and confusion now ruling” there and the beginning in the Kremlin of “a showdown in the higher echelons of power.”
Andrey Piontkovsky says. And although evidence of them comes mostly in leaks, they are a clear indication of “the panic and confusion now ruling” there and the beginning in the Kremlin of “a showdown in the higher echelons of power.”
On Espreso.TV, the Russian
commentator says that what he sees behind the scenes is a shift from
competition among those around Putin for access to the boss to a competition
among them to distance themselves from him because they do not want to fall
when and how he will (ru.espreso.tv/article/2015/08/23/andrey_pyontkovskyy_kreml_podaet_sygnaly_otchayanyya_eto_bunker_1945).
The behavior of Putin’s press
secretary, Dmitry Peskov, is indicative. It appears, Piontkovsky says, that
Peskov is responsible for the reports about his wild spending, clearly hopeful
that he will be removed from his current post and sent with his new wife somewhere
safe abroad.
And Aleksey Venediktov, the editor
of Ekho Moskvy who in Piontkovsky’s telling likes to be seen as someone with
access, “suddenly has felt the need to describe very precisely that “before the
annexation of Crimea, a meeting took place in the Kremlin and literally all
those present – diplomats, military commanders, economists, and intelligence
officials – expressed definite concerns and doubts about this action.”
Nonetheless, Putin “didn’t listen to
them and took his decision.”
Such strange behavior, the Russian
analyst continues, reflects the lack of a strategy among those closest to
Putin. But it strongly suggests that they are now looking past his time and
trying to position themselves for good standing in a post-Putin Moscow and a
post-Putin international community.
Asked what one should expect from “the
main rat, if the other rats are deserting the ship,” Piontkovsky says that one
cannot exclude the possibility that Putin will do something “insane” if he feel
cornered. Indeed, the analyst continues, the Kremlin leader’s recent words
about supposed Ukrainian plans to attack may presage an expanded Russian attack
on Ukraine.
But if Putin does so, he will be
doing so in the face of a situation in which “Moscow understands that for such
an escalation, it will face very serious economic and political responses and
the supply of arms to Ukraine from the West. But perhaps,” Piontkovsky says, the
Kremlin hopes to put the blame on Kyiv for whatever happens.
“Provocations can have some tactical
importance,” he continues, “but strategically Putin has lost. No military
escalation will save him because he has lost for three most important
fundamental reasons.” First, Ukraine has resisted far more than he though and
rendered the idea of a Russian world including Ukraine impossible.
Second, Piontkovsky says, Putin “underestimated
the reaction of the West,” especially its reaction to his incautious words
about using nuclear weapons. The West
understood and understands that Putin must be stopped in Ukraine lest he move
on to the Baltic countries, whose NATO membership would require a military
response.
And third, the Russian commentator
says, the Kremlin leader misjudged the Russian people. They may have
experienced euphoria with the annexation of Crimea, but they increasingly are
disturbed by the costs direct and indirect of Putin’s aggressive actions in
Ukraine.
Putin’s effort to get out of this
trap he created for himself via the Minsk accords has also failed, Piontkovsky
says. The Ukrainian government understands exactly what he is trying to do and
consequently is doing everything it can to prevent that outcome. Now, Russian
officials are driven back to making threats or seeking contacts with those they
have offended.
This, Piontkovsky concludes, is “a
gesture of despair,” exactly like those in Hitler’s Berlin bunker in 1945.
On Facebook today, Valery Solovey
extends this thought. He says that all regimes just about to fall display “an
interesting logic:” They begin to act “as if they have gone out of their mind
and have been infected by an epidemic of mass idiotism” (facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007811864378&fref=nf).
Given that these regimes, he points
out, were not being run brilliantly even earlier, the cases of official
stupidity “take on an Homeric and particularly malignant character.” This can
be seen in Russia today with its “public destruction of food,” attempts at
prohibiting Wikipedia, banning imported dish soap, “and how many other things
still ahead!”
The populations of such countries
are driven to anger “not by the limitations of political and economic freedoms”
but rather by “the anti-human absurdity and illogicality of the powers that be.”
Why then do the authorities “go mad?”
The primary reason is that they feel they have lost control of the situation
and are desperately trying to find a way to matter once again.
They seem themselves as the victims
of “bad luck,” and they want to lash out because such a feeling of being
unjustly the victims “provokes in them nervousness and drives them to
stupidities.”
Solovey concludes by updating and
reversing Tolstoy: “All happy regimes are happy in different ways. All unhappy
ones go their end under the weight of their own idiotism.”
The Moscow commentator does not say
but perhaps one could add, updating Longfellow on Prometheus, an even more
ancient and appropriate observation about the situation now: “Whom the gods
would destroy, they first make mad.”
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