Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 8 – Having given the
world a lesson in the effectiveness of “hybrid war” in the case of Ukraine,
Vladimir Putin is now pursuing policies which can best be described as “hybrid
peace,” Dmitry Oreshkin says; and just as the adjective concealed what he was
doing in the former, it is again having the same effect in the latter.
On the Apostrophe portal yesterday,
the Russian commentator argues that it is obvious that “Putin does not want and
cannot annex this territory. In fact, he never promised to do this: he doesn’t
have the money or the desire” and sees keeping it “formally” within Ukraine working
for him (apostrophe.com.ua/article/politics/foreign-policy/2016-05-07/putin-gotovit-donbassu-gibridnyiy-mir/4824).
“On the other hand,” Oreshkin points
out, “the worse things are with the Russian economy, the more Moscow needs some
kind of symbolic victory” because it “must mobilize disappointed people” and
because three times, in Chechnya, Georgia and then in Crimea, “war already has rescued
Putin.”
Some expected Putin to be able to use
Syria in the same way, but the commentator suggests that the Kremlin leader has
sufficient “’wisdom’” to recognize that this is impossible. And so for the time
being in the Donbas, “’a hybrid war’” is going to be replaced by “’a hybrid
peace.’”
But because that is so in Ukraine,
it is all too likely that Putin is looking around for somewhere else where he
can get a victory, especially to those places where his early wars did not
achieve all that he or the Russian high command wanted in the past. The most likely of these is in the Caucasus,
Oreshkin suggests.
The commentator says that he has no
doubt that Russia was behind Yerevan’s recent moves in the direction of
recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, especially since the Russian
military is overwhelmingly pro-Armenian and anti-Azerebaijani, given Russia’s
tensions with Turkey.
Moscow declares its neutrality and
say both Yerevan and Baku are partners, but that is for public
consumption. Armenia is far more reliant
on Moscow than Baku is, and “without Russian support, Armenia could not fight
with Azerbaijan,” which is far stronger militarily and economically.
Oreshkin says that he believes that
Russian siloviki are now “developing many scenarios” for the Caucasus. First of
all, they are asking what should be done with Armenia. When Russia
invaded Georgia in 2008, it failed to solve its strategic task of
establishing a land corridor through Georgia to Armenia, forcing Moscow to
supply its troops there only by air.
For many Russian military
commanders, that is unacceptable and unfinished business, something Putin
certainly knows.
The same thing is true regarding
Transdniestria, which is ever more being forced by “objective conditions” to
turn away from Moscow and toward the EU, Oreshkin says, adding ominously that “in
the Russian general staff, this is viewed as a challenge” that Moscow should be
responding to.
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