But if they or anyone else are going to learn about the nature of that policy and its impact, they won’t be able to do so by perusing Krutikov’s article which inter alia says that the so-called declaration of Sumner Welles of July23, 1940, was not a policy statement but only “a publicistic essay … for the press.”
According to Krutikov, it was entirely written by Loy Henderson who “was married to a Latvian and worked in Estonia and Latvia in the 1920s and 1930s” and who later was pulled from the US embassy in Moscow at the insistence of First Lady Eleonor Roosevelt and dispatched to Baghdad.
Consequently, the Moscow commentator says, “’the Welles Declaration’ is not considered a legal document: it was something like a public declaration of a position in a maximally pompous form.” In Krutikov’s telling, it had no impact at all until 1952 when the Baltic lobby in the US forced the Congress to echo it.
“In part,” the Russian writer continues, “this was connected with the fate of Wells himself: he was caught in a VIP car of a train having sex with two black-skinned porters and as a result of this scandal at the end of 1942 was forced to retire and later worked as a radio commentator.”
Krutikov says that “in practice then, this ‘non-recognition of the occupation of the Baltics’ looks like a symptom of a split personality. Somewhere on the periphery of the American consciousness existed émigré ‘governments’ and ‘diplomatic missions’ of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.”
But “it was impossible to deny the objective reality” that they were three republics in the USSR. Because that was so, Krutikov says, “Washington did not once include the Baltic issue on the agenda of talks with Moscow … More than that ‘the Wells Declaration’ is not mentioned in the official documents of the State Department – and in [its] text is not mentioned the Soviet Union even in an abbreviated form.”
“That is,” Krutikov continues, “we recognize ‘the occupation of the Baltics, but we cannot do anything with this so we will make it appear that the Baltics do not exist. In the depth of our souls, we morally support the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians … and every ten years can organize some jubilee hearings in Congress.”
“But at the level of practical politics, we will not raise the Baltic issue; doing so isn’t recommended,” the Russian writer suggests American diplomats and officials concluded and thought.
According to him, “the single practical consequence of this ‘non-recognition of occupation’ was the absence of consulates of Western countries in the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR, and the ESSR,” a lack that complicated the lives of Western sailors who ended up in Baltic ports but that residents of these republics found ways to work around.
Official American delegations faced some problems because they weren’t supposed to visit “’occupied territories,’” but “nevertheless,” Krutikov says, “they actively travelled there to look at the horrors of occupation and taste Rigas Balsams.”
“In other words,” he says, “’the Wells Declaration’ on which American senators now suggest applying to Crimea in practice did not work and did not have any legally enforceable consequences.”
Perhaps not for Moscow in the way Krutikov imagines but certainly for the United States and the peoples of the three Soviet-occupied Baltic republics. Non-recognition policy meant that the US government never published maps showing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as being legitimately part of the USSR.
It meant that the US maintained contacts with the diplomats of the last pre-war governments right up to August 1991. (Despite what Krutikov implies, the US never recognized any “émigré governments.) The State Department had a Baltic desk and kept the flags of the three occupied countries up in the lobby of its main building. Moreover, every year after 1940 the US sent a national day message to the Baltic legations.
It further meant that no US official during a time in office that he or she had been confirmed to by the Senate could visit the occupied Baltic countries. And it meant that the US continued to recognize pre-1940 Baltic passports as legally valid travel documents for admission to the United States.
It wasn’t just some hearing every decade as he implies. And US representatives at various talks with the Soviets did raise the issue of the status of the Baltic countries and routinely referred to non-recognition policy, something that was broader and far more institutionalized that Krutikov’s dismissive remarks would suggest.
And finally non-recognition policy also meant that no US official during a time in office that he or she had been confirmed to by the Senate could visit the occupied Baltic countries. And it meant that the US continued to recognize pre-1940 Baltic passports as legally valid travel documents for admission to the United States.
But the real meaning of US non-recognition policy isn’t captured by those actions and prohibitions. Instead, it lies in another dimension altogether. It was the expression of American support for a principle that borders are not to be changed by force alone, and it was a sign to the Baltic peoples that they had the moral support Krutikov dismisses as meaningless and would once again be free.
Despite being equally illegal under international law, there are obvious differences between the Soviet occupation of the three Baltic countries and the Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea. In the first case, there were entire countries involved with governments and diplomas and in the second, there is a region that lacks some of those institutions.
Consequently, the specifics of a non-recognition policy regarding Crimea will inevitably be somewhat different than the specifics of US non-recognition policy on the Baltic countries. But the principle that must be reaffirmed is exactly the same; and one very much hopes that the outcome will be the same as well.
Krutikov in his attacks on Welles and Henderson fails to discuss what they really said. And one detail is especially critical in the current context: Henderson’s memorandum on which the Welles declaration was based explicitly drew on an argument Herbert Hoover’s secretary of state Henry Stimson had made in 1930 regarding Japanese actions in China.
At that time, Stimson refused to recognize Japan’s carving up of China because, he said, the US has long had a settled policy of not recognizing changes in borders achieved by force alone rather than by international negotiation. That makes what Wells said in 1940 and what the US senators are saying rather more important than Krutikov and Moscow can admit.