Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 23 – Petro Poroshenko
made autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church a centerpiece of national
strategy, used the power of the state to promote it by making it easier for parishes
to shift from the Moscow church to the Ukrainian one, and has pledged to
continue to fight for the independence of the national church even after he
leaves office.
His successor Vladimir Zelensky will
not seek to reverse autocephaly, but he is clearly less interested in using government
power to promote it, a position that some including Poroshenko will see as a
retreat from autocephaly but that others are already saying will make the rise
of a truly popular national church slower but more firmly rooted.
In a first assessment of what will
happen next, religious affairs specialist Aleksandr Soldatov says that
Poroshenko’s achievement of autocephaly was one of his most important “successes”
but his efforts to promote it as a means
of weakening the Moscow church in Ukraine are already being curtailed (graniru.org/Society/Religion/m.276046.html).
The key feature of those efforts was
the renaming of the Moscow church as the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, a
change that the Verkhovna Rada backed and that was intended to speed the shift
of Orthodox parishes in Ukraine from a church that has often served as the
Kremlin’s ally to a truly national Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Kyiv.
While many parishes have shifted –
the exact number is a matter of dispute – “over the months since the tomos was
granted, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate not only hasn’t
lost its leading passion on the confessional map of Ukraine but even has begun
a level revenge,” Soldatov says.
A Kyiv court ruled that a Ukrainian
law requiring the renaming of the UOC MP and establishing a deadline of April
22 violates the rights of that congregation, an action its leader, Metropolitan
Onufry views as a great victory – and perhaps one of the reasons he was the
first religious leader to greet Zelensky’s election.
Many Ukrainians view this as a
turning away from autocephaly and an indication that Zelensky won’t be its
defender (credo.press/224150/, dsnews.ua/politics/tserkovnyy-revansh-kak-moskovskaya-patriarhiya-planiruet-23042019102100 and depo.ua/ukr/politics/tserkovniy-revansh-yak-mospatriarkhiya-planue-vidvoyovuvati-vtrachene-v-ptsu-20190423953188).
Consequently, both Poroshenko and
the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada have pledged to defend not just autocephaly
but the state-supported means by which they believe it can best be implemented (risu.org.ua/ru/index/all_news/state/church_state_relations/75535/
and risu.org.ua/ru/index/all_news/state/church_state_relations/75522/).
That
sets up a fight between the former president and his allies and Zelensky and
his, and it may mean that the shift of parishes from the Moscow church to the Ukrainian
church will slow for a time, although it is unlikely to be reversed. Indeed,
Soldatov in his assessment suggests that in his view, the prospects for
Ukrainian autocephaly remain “very bright.”
That
is because by the further separating of religion from politics likely to occur
under Zelensky’s presidency may “breath new life into the Ukrainian church
rebirth. And the more successful and convincing this rebirth will prove, the
fewer chances the Moscow Patriarchate will have to ‘hold Ukraine.’”
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