Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 16 – Vladimir Putin
isn’t Lukashenka either in terms of the decay of his basis of support in the
population, something widely recognized, or in terms of how he will respond to
the events in Minsk, Vladimir Pastukhov says. If he were Lukashenka, he would
crush the protesters by force; but that isn’t who Putin is, at least not yet.
Putin instead is someone who views
Belarus with cold eyes and has at least two plans he will choose among depending
on developments, the London-based Russian analyst says. If Lukashenka holds on,
Putin will support him; if it looks like he is on the way out, the Kremlin
leader will accelerate the process (mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/minskij-kollajder/).
Given that the latter course of
events now appears the more likely although also the more complicated and
expensive from Moscow’s point of view, Pastukhov argues, Putin may be moving
toward the latest “upgrade” in his use of soft power, “from ‘managed democracy’
to ‘managed revolutions.’”
“One must not exclude the
possibility that what is occurring in Belarus is an enormous experiment about
the testing of new Russian political technologies for the transit of power,”
Pastukhov says, given that “in Minsk, a large revolutionary collider has begun
to work,” threatening both the regime and more immediately Lukashenka’s place
at its top.
In this situation, one must be alive
to the possibility that what Moscow will do may vary widely depending on
circumstances. “Many suppose,”
Lukashenka says, that Moscow wants to have Lukashenka remain in office but in a
much weakened position and thus be forced to agree to the Kremlin’s demand for closer
union between Belarus and Russia.
That may be what Putin wants and
what he would like to see; but it is an approach that carries with it the risk
that Belarus could develop in ways that would be even more unacceptable to the
Kremlin in the direction of Ukraine without the characteristics Ukraine has
that gave Putin the chance to intervene there.
“Moscow now cannot ignore the fact”
that Lukashenka hasn’t been able to push the genie of revolt back into the
bottle but instead has taken actions that have radicalized Belarusians against
him. The spread of the protests beyond
Minsk and especially the threats of strikes in ever more industries are
especially worrisome to Putin.
They show that the revolution has
deepened to the point that Lukashenka may not ever be able to come back. Most Russian commentators assume that Putin
will weigh in on Lukashenka’s side lest things get worse because in Moscow,
many fear that what is happening in Belarus now may be a dress rehearsal for
what could happen in Russia in 2024.
But those who make that argument
misunderstand the way the Kremlin thinks, the analyst says. “The collapse of Lukashenka’s regime is not
something Moscow projects on itself but rather views as yet another problem:
Plan A (support for Lukashenka) hasn’t worked. That means there is a need for
Plan B (find something who will replace him).”
Putin has no particular love for
Lukashenka. He views the Belarusian leader approximately the way Stalin did
Mao, “with deep suspicion and antipathy.” Deciding whether to support him or
not is business not personal. The Kremlin leader will wait and watch and then
act “without any rules and complete cynicism.”
Plan A would be cheapest and easiest,
but there are other plans; and “that means that Moscow at a critical moment could
betray Lukashenka and place its bets on someone else.” How Putin will do this is difficult to
predict. He may back some Belarusian force structure leader or he may back
someone in new elections whose outcome he will work hard to fix.
The one thing Putin won’t do is
respond in panic, Pastukhov says. He knows he has time and he will use it.
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