Paul Goble
Staunton, October 31 – Many analysts in Russia and the West discuss developments in Russia in terms of a continuing transition, but, Leonid Smirnov says, Russian elites are convinced that the post-Soviet transit in Russia ended this year and that the Putin system that has been put in place can last “forever.”
The Moscow commentator draws that conclusion on the basis of presentations at a recent Sakharov Center discussion on the political transformation of Russia that focused on why the Kremlin has chosen to concentrate in Putin’s hands “all the levers of administration” of the country (rosbalt.ru/moscow/2020/10/30/1870833.html).
Russian political scientist Aleksandr Morozov argued at that meeting that before 2014, Putin at least conditionally supported the ideas suggested by the term “administered democracy,” which involved “a combination of political norms with various forms of authoritarianism.” But after the Crimean Anschluss, the Kremlin shifted to “extreme” and “informal” rule.
According to Morozov, “the constitutional reform of this year completes the 20-year path of Vladimir Putin as chief of state … the post-Soviet transit is ended and, in this form, the state must continue to exist eternally, until the end of history.” He says that no other arrangements are now visible or likely.
In making that point, he cited the words of another Moscow commentator Kirill Rogov who “ironically” calls this mew construction not the Russian Federation but “Northern Eurasia State.”
Morozov says this power arrangement rests on four “legs” – the government, the force structures bloc, the State Council, and the Security Council,” with the latter two duplicating the first two and giving Putin room to play various groups against each other and retain his own freedom of action.
This configuration promises stability for the long term, he continues, adding that Putin has avoided one of the biggest problems many aging dictators face: the aging of his administration. Because he doesn’t rely on a party, the Kremlin leader has been able to promote much younger people to positions of authority than such states normally do.
“There is no gerontocracy: young people at 25 are becoming heads of departments in federal ministries, and those aged 35 are becoming governors.” Moreover, Putin has become “to rotate” the outsiders he has named to head regions very quickly, thus eliminating the danger that they will become too attached to those below them and work against Moscow.
The one real weakness, Morozov says, is that the Putin system has not been able to go beyond corruption and theft and adopt “a single big idea” which will unite all these component parts.
According to another participant in this discussion, Moscow analyst Nikolay Petrov, Putin’s solution so far has been to marginalize or exclude all those who might present such an idea. In Putin’s view, there “must not be anyone except the top man who holds all the resources – force, administrative, financial and so on – in his hands.”
A third participant in this discussion, journalist Andrey Pertsev, argues that the pandemic has created serious problems for the regime but that Putin has countered by allowing others like Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin to take the unpopular but necessary steps and silently approve them, thus preventing any anger from focusing on his person.
But the activity of officials like the governors and the inactivity of Putin does change the balance, giving a boost to the former and limiting the view of many that Putin is essential to the operation of Russia. What these officials have shown during the pandemic is that Russia will continue to function even if Putin doesn’t act.
That is not a lesson that promotes the stability of the current situation or serves as a guarantee of its permanency.
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