Paul Goble
Staunton, Aug. 25 – For the majority of Russians, Putin’s war in Ukraine is something distant, an event they see on television but do not see as being at the center of their lives, Aleksey Levinson says. Among other things, this means that as the Kremlin media will never admit that Moscow has suffered a major defeat in Ukraine, neither will most Russians.
As a result, the expectations of some that a defeat in Ukraine will inevitably lead to political turmoil in Russia is likely overstated, the head of socio-cultural research at the Levada Center says (thebell.io/kholodilnik-protiv-televizora--v-sovremennoy-rossii-ne-rabotaet-kak-izmenilos-rossiyskoe-obshchestvo-za-polgoda-voyny).
Six months into the war, “there is no sense that we as a people are fighting.” Instead, Russians are mentally schizophrenic as far as the conflict is concerned. On the one hand, there is the feeling “in general that nothing terrible has happened. But on the other, that what is taking place has historical and geopolitical significance.”
That view allows Russians a certain amount of self-respect and self-confidence, Levinson continues. What is happening matters but it is distant from them because Russians know that those fighting in Ukraine are professional soldiers who’ve chosen their fate rather that draftees who haven’t, as was the case in earlier wars.
“Many observers said that as soon as caskets began to come back to Russia, the level of dissatisfaction would grow. I don’t know how many people have laid down their lives on the field of battle but clearly it is no small number,” the sociologist says. “But where is this effect? I don’t see it.”
In the course of an extended interview with The Bell, Levinson makes five other noteworthy points:
First, “Ukraine in the eyes of Russians has been deprived of subjecthood. It isn’t viewed as a country but as a locality and Ukrainians are not seen as an enemy … Instead of Ukrainians, there are some kind of Nazis and fascists there. But people prefer not to think about what that means..
Second, “Putin’s authority … is not about gratitude. He in the eyes of the population in general is not responsible for domestic economic processes but for the glory of Russian on the international scene.” Third, the sense that Russia was humiliated in the 1990s and now is standing back up to its opponents abroad is “deeply rooted in mass consciousness.”
Fourth, in most countries a defeat would have the most negative consequences for leaders. But perhaps not in Russia: Russians will find out about it via television, and there is no possibility that “someone will appear on television and say that we have suffered a defeat.” As a result, few will take it in.
And fifth, “if one wants to identify something to be happy about, one can note that we are not seeing an explosion of chauvinism and anti-Ukrainian attitudes in Russia.”
In presenting these conclusions, Levinson also offers a cautionary note. “World sociology,” he points out, “was not able to predict the chief events of the 20th century.” And its predictive capabilities remain just as weak now.
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