Kremlin’s Failure to Define Extremism Forcing Moscow to Train Specialists who Can Testify about It in Court, Nisnevich Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – If the Putin regime had defined extremism in a legally defensible way, there would be no need to have specialists who can come into court and testify as to whether it exists, Yuly Nisnevich says. But because it hasn’t, the powers that be have decided to train a new generation of political science specialists on this issue.

            Presumably, they will be able to follow the changes in what the regime views as extremism, changing their definition to fit whatever the powers that be want, the political analyst at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics says (newizv.ru/news/2023-10-20/inoagentam-boy-universitety-gotovyat-spetsialistov-po-politologicheskoy-ekspertize-421974).

            As such, the regime’s decision to create this academic specialty is as much a confession of failure as of success; and it is likely to create problems for the regime as new graduates in this field and those teaching them discuss the issue and create definitions of extremism that the regime may not like.

            It is thus perhaps not surprising that instead of giving the creation of this specialty headline treatment, the Russian government has played down what it is doing  and limited its announcements about it to media directed primarily at the regions (e.g., interfax-russia.ru/siberia/news/specialistov-po-politologicheskoy-ekspertize-nachali-gotovit-v-rf).

 

China Increasing Its Military Presence in Tajikistan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 18 – Tajikistan has ratified an agreement with Beijing to increase the frequency of bilateral military exercises with China over the next five years, an arrangement that will allow China to expand its military influence there in ways that may challenge Russia’s which is based on the presence of a sizeable Russian base there.

            Russian experts are playing down this development and suggesting that China’s presence is “episodic” while Russia’s is more permanent (ng.ru/cis/2023-10-17/5_8854_tajikistan.html), but there is a chance that quantity will grow into quality and that Beijing may soon challenge Moscow for dominance in Dushanbe. (On that possibility, see jamestown.org/program/russia-china-dividing-responsibilities-in-tajikistan-is-conflict-possible/.)

            China has at least three reasons for wanting to expand its military presence in Tajikistan and sees the current situation as an opportunity to do so: first, it wants to ensure that instability in the region, including in neighboring Afghanistan, doesn’t threaten its “one road, one path” projects for channeling east-west trade through Central Asia.

            Second, it wants to prevent instability in the Gorno-Badakhshan from spreading into China itself. China has tens of thousands of people Beijing call Tajiks, but they are in fact not ethnic Tajiks but Pamiris, like those in the Badakhshan who are in revolt against Dushanbe (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/02/chinas-tajiks-arent-tajiks-and-thats.html).

            And third, regardless of Moscow’s dismissive comments, China clearly aspires to displace Russia as the paramount power in Central Asia and sees the weak regime in Dushanbe as offering it the best chance to do so, especially as China’s anti-terrorism role does not attract the attention from other powers concerned about Afghanistan’s Taliban.

            China and Tajikistan have been conducting joint counter-terrorism exercises since 2016, but Dushanbe up to now has been cautious about formalizing this because some in China claim part of Tajikistan as Chinese (jamestown.org/program/beijing-implies-tajikistans-pamir-region-should-be-returned-to-china/), and an expended Chinese presence could open the way to that.

            For background on the growing Chinese presence in Tajikistan, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/new-chinese-base-in-tajikistan-will.html.

Astana Responds Quickly and Forcefully to Manifestations of Separatism but Must Do More to Prevent Their Emergence, Chebotaryov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Kazakhstan faces a variety of potential separatist threats (jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-faces-variety-of-separatist-threats-any-of-which-russia-could-use/), but Astana has shown that it is ready, willing and able to act forcefully against them when they emerge, Andrey Chebotaryov says.

            But the director of the Alternative Center for Real Investigations says that there are risks that “mental” separatism in which people see themselves at odds with the central government may grow into “political” separatism which will challenge the regime and consequently, Astana must act prophylactically to prevent that (qmonitor.kz/politics/6478).

            At present, Chebotaryov suggests, the central government is not doing as much as it could in that regard; and consequently, there is a danger that one or another of the breeding grounds of separatist thinking could lead to the growth of poisonous weeds. He calls for more surveys of popular attitudes and more educational programs to counter that danger.

Russian Federation Citizens ‘Won’t Go into the Streets to Defend Putin or to Overthrow Him,’ Magaletsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – The fundamental reality of Russian political life is that most Russian citizens “won’t go into the streets to defend Putin,” but at the same time, “they won’t do so to overthrow him either,” Oleg Magaletsky says, a situation that may delay change but that means when change does come, it may take place more quickly than many expect.

            Most people in Russia will accept whatever their government does, but this support is passive, the organizer of the Forums of the Free States of Post-Russia argues. They are neither active in their support nor active in their opposition. As a result, the current regime is fragile but so too is the opposition (region.expert/win-win/).

            That is especially the case of the Russian liberal opposition, which, to paraphrase what Voltaire said about the Holy Roman Empire, is neither Russian, nor liberal, nor in a fundamental sense an opposition. It is Muscovite rather than Russian, it is liberal only for itself but not for others, and it is not prepared to challenge the incumbent regime in a serious way.

            Many Western governments are also “inert” as far as Russia is concerned. They are prepared to work with the existing regime because they generally assume that any change will be risky, even though the demise of the Russian Federation would be a “win-win,” something that would benefit themselves, the non-Russians and even Russians who say they are against it.

            As a result, change may be a long time in coming; but when it does come, Magaletsky argues, it may be remarkably quick because it will be the result of the struggle of minorities with other minorities and the majority will then go along with the new regime passively supporting it in much the same way that they are supporting the incumbents.

Moscow Seeks to Quadruple University Students Training to Manufacture Drones

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – The Russian government wants to boost the number of university-level students preparing to manufacture drones to 40,000 by 2025 and to 180,000 by 2030 and has committed 57.7 billion rubles (570 million US dollars) to the project, 5.3 billion rubles (53 million US dollars) in the next year alone.

            According to a study by the Groza portal, this is just the tip of the iceberg of the transformation of higher education in the Russian Federation intended to put the country on a war footing for decades ahead and to lead graduates to view all aspects of life through a military lens (groza.media/posts/militarizazzzia).

            Among the other ways in which Moscow is militarizing higher education in Russia, Groza lists the following, documenting the situation in various universities and providing extensive footnotes for its reporting:

·       Introducing courses on hybrid war which argue that all actions by the West regarding Russia should be seen as part of a war against it rather than as the norm of international relations,

·       Introducing or expanding military training at the university level,

·       Expanding the training for military journalists,

·       Redoing history coursework to include more on Russia and on the Russian state,

·       Providing free stipends to children of siloviki and those who have fought for Russia in Ukraine,

·       Introducing siloviki into positions of authority in universities,

·       Expelling anti-war faculty and students from higher educational institutions,

·       Having students and faculty collect materials for the army, and

·       Redecorating universities to stress military and patriotic themes.

Matriarchy Survives in Komi Villages, Helping National Language and Identity to Survive as Well

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Darya Ananyeva, a Russian feminist and human rights activist, last summer made a trip to villages in the Komi Republic to study the survival of matronyms in the Komi language. But she discovered something much bigger: the survival of matriarchy as a way of life. And the video she made about this has gone viral.

            Her video, The Matriarchate in the Komi Republic, is available on YouTube at youtube.com/watch?v=-KpRm_FFdDU&t=501s. She discusses her work in an interview at semnasem.org/articles/2023/10/19/sovsem-drugaya-zhizn-feministka-sezdila-v-sela-komi-i-nashla-zhenshin-vyrosshih-v-matriarhate.

            Metronyms, names that are drawn from the mother’s rather than the father’s, exist in a number of languages; but in the past they were widespread in Komi. What is remarkable, Ananyeva says, is just how widespread they remain outside the major cities of that republic. This feminist tilt, she points out, is reflected by the female bird in the republic’s coat of arms.

            And perhaps more important, Ananyeva continues, is that the authorities in Komi recognize these names and allow them to be used in official documents, something that seems certain to keep this tradition alive for another generation or more. But metronyms also reflect a deeper reality: the survival of matriarchy in the villages of the Komi Republic.

            The phenomenon survives for a variety of reasons: men leave for work elsewhere, women assume an equal or even dominant position, or children grow up in families where only one parent is present. It is so widespread, the feminist says, that Komi people do not recognize how special and important it is.

            According to her, villages where matriarchy remains are places where Komi identity and the Komi language are in the strongest position. Unlike in Syktyvkar, these villages still have schools where Komi is studied, and she says she found that “all the children” in the villages she visited spoke Komi among themselves and their families.

            Ananyeva’s next project is to conduct interviews across what Moscow calls “the Russian North” and show that it is nothing of the kind, that the peoples there have their own identities not derived from Russian and that calling the region “the Russian North” is an attack on these special identities.

Karabulak Regional Procuracy Urges Ingush Republic Interior Ministry to Examine History Textbooks for Extremism

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – The controversy over new Russian history textbooks and their treatment of Stalin’s deportations (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/moscow-promises-to-change-paragraph-on.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/after-north-caucasian-protests-kremlin.html) has taken a new turn.

            Now, the procuracy of the Karabulak region in Ingushetia has called on the republic interior ministry to examine the texts for extremism because, as he points out, they threaten to spark interethnic hostility (kavkazr.com/a/prokuratura-ingushetii-potrebovala-provesti-proverku-uchebnika-istorii-rossii-na-ekstremizm/32645243.html and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393553).

            It is highly unlikely that Moscow will permit Magas to do so, but the case calls attention to something that the Kremlin may not have calculated. All its new laws on extremism can be turned against it because in most cases, the central Russian authorities are more guilty than anyone else of what they are charging others with.