Regional Governments Freeze Salaries of Government Workers to Pay Volunteers to Fight in Putin’s War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 7 – Government employees including teachers, medical workers and researchers have seen their salaries frozen because the governments of federal subjects need the money to pay the enormous bonuses to those who volunteer to fight in Ukraine.

            So far, this new budgetary approach has hit distant regions like Sakha and Sakhalin, but it is likely to spread (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/07/v-rossiiskih-regionah-nachali-zamorazhivat-indeksatsiyu-zarplat-byudzhetnikam-iz-za-viplat-uchastnikam-svo-a205407).

            What makes this important is not that regional governments are having to juggle their budgets to pay for what the Kremlin wants them to spend on manning Putin’s “special military operation” but rather that it threatens to create a whole new class of Russians who may now oppose the war because it is hitting the so close to home.

Kremlin Outlets Outraged Armenian Leader Spoke in Armenian rather than Russian at Shanghai Cooperation Organization Meeting

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – After Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan used Armenian in addressing to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting at the end of August, pro-Kremlin commentators in Moscow were outraged and suggested his move recalled what the Baltic countries and Ukrainian leaders had done earlier.

            The most extreme of these said that what had happened in those countries began “precisely when their elites began demonstratively ‘forgetting’ Russia as the language of inter-internet communication” and using their own national languages instead (charter97.org/ru/news/2026/9/1/696892/ ).

            And they pointed out that all the other leaders of the former Soviet republics at the SCO meeting, including those of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had used Russian, which they argued was entirely appropriate at such times to ensure better communication.

            Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was also distressed but somewhat more measured in his words. He acknowledged that what Pashinyan had done was “a signal to assert Armenia’s sovereignty” but added that “frankly, we didn’t understand why that couldn’t be stated in Russian” (charter97.org/ru/news/2026/9/7/697541/).

            What is striking is that both Russian commentators and the Kremlin spokesman seemed more upset by this use of the national language of Armenia than they did by the declaration Pashinyan made only a few days before the SCO meeting that Yerevan no longer considers Russia to be a strategic partner.

            This is not the first time Moscow has been angry about the language used by heads of former Soviet republics. In 2024, Russians were very upset when Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomar Tokayev, used Chinese in Beijing but responded to Russians in Kazakh (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/11/kazakhstan-presidents-use-of-chinese-in.html).

Putin’s Assumptions about Western Weakness Pushing Russia toward Strategic Defeat, Gallyamov Says, Just as Happened to USSR at Its End

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 6 – Like the leaders of the Soviet Union in its last decades, Putin believes that the West is weak and will collapse if Russia simply makes a little more effort, a conviction that is giving Russia now certain tactical victories but is setting the stage for his country’s strategic defeat, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            The former Putin speechwriter and now prominent Putin critic argues that Russia has the resources to achieve some tactical victories. Indeed, examples of Western weakness can “unleash Putin’s hands tactically;” but the real resources of the West mean that pursuit of a strategic victory would lead to Russia’s defeat (vot-tak.tv/95251668/putin-zhdet-krakha-zapada).

            Any decision to engage in a strategic escalation, Gallyamov says, such as a new mobilization, the use of nuclear weapons, or pursuing the destruction of NATO in the short term would mean that Russia’s resources would decline faster than those of the West in whose weakness he is now counting.

            Putin’s approach in recent years, one based on waiting for his opponents to “run out of time” has meant both that “he hasn’t noticed how this ends for himself” or that he is in a position to recognize that “this is what happened to the Soviet Union” in the years leading up to its defeat and demise.

            In the last decade of the Soviet period, Gallyamov reminds, “Moscow has many foreign policy successes: the victory of North Vietnam over America … the fall of the pro-Beijing Khmer Route in Cambodia, the success of the MPLA in Angola and the expansion of a Soviet military presence” in many parts of Africa.

            The Soviet leadership also gained by the geopolitical shifts of Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Iran, Palestine and the GDR, he continues. Given all these trends, the Soviet leadership was certain that if it just pushed a little harder and for a little longer, the USSR would triumph because its Western opponents were retreating.

But then the situation developed in ways that Putin has failed to remember, Gallyamov says. These triumphs, genuine but tactical, rapidly became “expensive for the country. To finance this geopolitical glory, money was needed and money wasn’t there anymore.” To support them, Moscow turned to economic reforms and then the USSR collapsed.

The lesson from this is clear, the commentator says, “going from success to success, you can actually come to the edge of the abyss; and then, without noticing it, take another step forward toward collapse.”

Kumyk could Again Become Lingua Franca of North Caucasus, Alpaut Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 6 – Kumyk, a Turkic language that was the lingua franca of the eastern North Caucasus before the Russian conquest, could become that again, first in Dagestan, the most multi-lingual republic of the Russian Federation, and then again in neighboring republics where there are now many Kumyk speakers, Ramazan Alpaut says.

            An ethnic Kumyk himself who worked at RFE/RL and now lives in the United States, Alpaut says that this trend is especially striking in Dagestan where, in contrast to other parts of the Caucasus, many members of ethnic groups feely admit that it is dying or already has done so (facebook.com/czechKum/posts/pfbid02iD29J7XZQTTJ3u7zTFkhxGXa36tpFvmGLr4Dwm5kqq3cbEc5UQrPiKB6D9ZjoNvdl).

            In these discussions, he continues, even people who are not Kumyk themselves suggest that it could serves “as a potential alternative to Russian for interethnic communication.” At present, there are more than 500,000 Kumyk speakers in the North Caucasus, far more than the total in Dagestan alone.

            Alpaut suggests there are five reasons why such suggestions are not pie in the sky. First, there is the historical precedent. Before the Russian conquest, Kumyk played that role and even continued to do so in imperial and Soviet times, despite Moscow’s efforts to restrict its use first beyond the Kumyk community and then within that nation itself.

            Second, he says, “Kumyk is relatively easy to learn: it lacks many of the phonetic complexities of other languages of the mount peoples” as “there is no grammatical gender, no prepositions or prefixes, and word formation follows almost formulaic patterns thanks to the law of vowel harmony.”

            Third, it occupies “a rather central position among Turkic languages,” having elements both of Turkish itself and the Turkic languages of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries.  Fourth, Those who know Kumyk are those able to communicate easily with other members of the Turkic world.

            Fourth, “census data show that Kumyk has displayed a remarkable resilience” and even growth. “If current trends continue, the Kumyk-speaking population could become Dagestan’s largest linguistic community by the next census, except for Russian speakers, of course,” Alpaut concedes.

            And fifth, the Kumyks themselves lack “the political or demographic resources” to impose their language on other. Those who choose to use it do so because of its advantages, a very different situation than in the case of Russian which is imposed by Moscow and the Russian authorities locally.

            Most discussions of linguistic change in the Russian Federation focus on shifts from non-Russian languages to Russian; but Alpaut’s words about the increasing role of Kumyk for other peoples are a reminder that other and potentially dramatic shifts of this kind are taking place as well with smaller non-Russian nations shifting to languages of larger non-Russian ones.   

Putin Advisor Says Ukrainians on Course to Disappear as a Nation by End of This Century

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 6 – Anton Kobyakov, an advisor to Vladimir Putin, says that Ukraine has passed “the point of no return” as far as demography is concerned and will “die out” by the end of this century unless something changes dramatically, adding that in his view, “only Russia can save that country.”

            Kobaykov’s view, aired at the Eastern Economic Forum and one likely shared by the Russian president reflects demographic data that some Ukrainian scholars are now discussing (fondsk.ru/news/2026/09/06/ukraincy-mogut-vymeret-kak-dinozavry-dazhe-esli-voennyy-konflikt-prekratitsya).

            These experts have focused on the fact that the number of children entering first year of school has fallen dramatically, a trend Kyiv explains by the decline in birthrates as a result of the war and the move of many Ukrainian families abroad to escape the violence of the Russian invasion.

            Those reasons may explain much of the reason for the decline. Ukrainian economist Oleksiy Kushch says that the number of children entering first classes this year is 45 percent lower than was the case in the 2013/2014 school year and that the country’s overall fertility rate has fallen from 1.51 to 0.9 children per woman per lifetime.

            That figure is below the overall Russian Federation fertility rate of 1.3 and even below that of the rate in major Russian cities, which now stands at 1.0. And it is far below the replacement level that requires women of childbearing age to have approximately 2.2 children.

            But the Ukrainian figures set the stage for the appearance of progressively smaller cohorts of Ukrainian women of prime childbearing age who are also on course to have ever fewer children.  According to some Russian commentators, that would mean there would only be two to three million Ukrainians left by the end of this century.

            Such longterm demographic projections are notoriously inaccurate given that changes can and do take place over time. But these are especially worrisome not only because they highlight a major challenge Kyiv will have to face but also because they likely underscore decision making in the Kremlin about Ukraine. 

Putin Supports Plan to Man Air Defense in Regions with Those ‘Absolutely Unsuitable’ for Military Service

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 5 – At a meeting with five United Russia Duma candidates, Putin said he supports their proposal to man air defense facilities in the regions with men who because of physical or mental problems have been classified as “absolutely unsuitable” for service in the Russian army.

            Men in what is known as category “D” are not drafted and are not accepted for service even if they volunteer, but many of them want to serve their country, Putin was told; and the Russian president said he supports the idea (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/09/05/putin-odobril-ideiu-privlech-k-protivovozdushnoi-oborone-v-regionakh-dobrovoltsev-s-kategoriei-godnosti-d-absoliutno-ne-goden-k-sluzhbe-news).

            Putin’s backing reflects both his search for manpower to fill the rapidly thinning ranks of his invasion force in Ukraine and his desire to show the Russian people that he will do everything he can to limit or even end the impact of Ukrainian drone attacks on targets in the Russian Federation.

            But if the president’s approval leads to the actual use of such men, some of them may be sufficiently disabled that they won’t be able to perform as required – or potentially that this will prove the thin edge of the wedge and some of them may be sent to fight in Ukraine once they have become soldiers for air defense.

In ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Case, Moscow Making the Transition from ‘Individual to Collective Repression,’ Kolezev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 5 – Until recently, the Russian justice ministry had identified specific media outlets or journalists in compiling its list of foreign agents; but now, with the case of Novaya Gazeta, Dmitry Kolezev says, it is listing a large number of people under this stigma and thus moving from “individual to collective repression.”

            In listing Novaya Gazeta as a foreign agent, the Urals journalist who fled Russia in 2022 says, the ministry included a list of several dozen journalists who were not staffers of that publication but had published there (t.me/kolezev/17888 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/perehod-ot-individualnyh-repressij-k-kollektivnym).

            “Neither de facto nor de jure do these people have anything to do with the publication at the present time,” Kolezev says; but all of them and all at once are now labeled foreign agents at one and the same time and are thus required to identify themselves as such and suffer the restrictions such a label entails.

            According to the Russian journalist now in emigration, this represents “an episode of the transition from individual repression to collective, more massive: people are recorded as enemies already literally lists; and it isone that is likely to spread,” a development that will spread Putin’s repressions more broadlyt and quickly than before. 

Erdoğan’s Words about ‘Reclaiming Ajaria’ Set Off Alarm Bells in Georgia and Other Parts of Former Soviet Space

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – On September 1, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that he believes that “Turkey will reclaim Adjara,” a 400,000-strong autonomous republic in southwestern Georgia adjoining Turkey whose residents are overwhelmingly ethnic Georgia but a third of whom are Muslims and speak a Turkish-influenced Georgia dialect.

            Despite the hopes of some in Turkey and Russia, the Ajars did not develop the kind of ethnic or regional identities that might have led them to challenge Tbilisi as the Abkhaza and Ossetians did after Georgia acquired independence 35 years ago (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/05/national-traitors-in-moscow-in-2004.html).

            But Turkish influence has been growing in recent years, with Turkish businessmen dominating the economy and visiting Turkish officials behaving as if they were already in power there, developments that have worried Georgians and also Turkic peoples on the former Soviet space concerned about Ankara’s intentions.

            According to one commentator, “the internet is full of articles about the "creeping annexation" of Adjara. But they are outdated. The annexation has effectively already happened. Real power in the region lies with Turkish businessmen and the Turkish clergy. And if things do not go according to plan, Turkish security officials will step in” (asia24.media/news/ankara-ne-sprashivaet-kak-tbilisi-molcha-teryaet-adzhariyu/).

            Such judgments will only further inflame the situation and may create a new problem for Georgia and for adjoining states in the south Caucasus, especially as it moves to become a major east-west transit bridge, with Turkey seeking to expand its role and other countries, Russia in the first instance using its influence to try to block that.

Ukraine Objects to How Crimea is Shown on New World Map UNGA has Overwhelmingly Approved

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – The UN General Assembly has voted 164 to one against with six abstentions to urge all countries to stop using world maps based on the Mercator projection which has long been the international standard with the Equal Earth map which better shows the relative size of the countries and the regions of the world.

            As advocates of the change have pointed out, the Mercator projection shows Greenland as larger than South America and about the same size as Africa, whereas in fact, Africa is more than a dozen times larger than Greenland, a Danish island which is about the same size as the Democrative Republic of the Congo alone.

            Equally important for the backers of this change is the fact that the new map puts Oceania in the middle while the Mercator projection has the United Kingdom and by extension Europe at the center, a reflection of a geopolitics and population size that is increasingly at odds with reality.

            The US was the only country to vote against this African proposal, an action that has sparked much discussion and criticism; but the abstentions by Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia have not, even though in each case, this vote represented a principled position.

            Ukraine’s action, backed by Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova, is especially important. Kyiv objects to how the new map portrays Crimea. Instead of showing the peninsula as part of Ukraine, it portrays it in a different color from the one used for Ukraine -- but also different from the one used for Russia (https://echofm.online/news/na-novoj-karte-mira-oon-krym-otdelyon-ot-ukrainy).

            Unlike the United States, Ukraine and its supporters did not vote against the change in maps but used their right to abstain to protest about one aspect of the map few others apparently see as important overall but that is critically important to countries like Ukraine who face a Russia prepared to challenge existing international borders by force.

With Decision of European Court of Human Rights, Russians Lose Their Court of Last Resort – and Rights Activists Aren’t Pleased

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 3 – The European Court for Human Rights, a body that for many Russians was the court of last resort when they had exhausted their legal challenges in Russia, has said it will not take up the 879 cases by Russians about the violation of their rights by the Russian government.

            According to the court’s press release, all of the complaints it has now declined t hear were filed before September 16, 2022. That decision came in response to a Russian law banning the implementation of the court’s decisions coming into force in March of that year (rfi.fr/ru/россия/20260903-еспч-отказался-рассматривать-все-дела-россиян-которые-не-касаются-войн-в-украине-и-грузии).

            Now the ECHR has decided to stop considering such cases altogether if they concern domestic issues. It will however continue to take up cases against Russia related to wars in Georgia and Ukraine, which currently number approximately 5700 lawsuits, the press release stated.

            Among the issues of suits it will no longer hear are those involving the persecution of opposition figures, detentions at rallies, repressive legislation, restrictions on freedom of speech, prison conditions, immigration rights, freedom of movement, and the protection of personal data. For the time being, the ECHR will not hear such cases from Russians.

            Not surprisingly, Russian human rights activists are angry.  Maksim Olenichev of the First Department portal says that in his view, “this is a serious mistake, both legally and in terms of reputation … because these cases raise important issues in the context of modern Russia.” Others have said much the same.

            Anticipating such objections, the ECHR release said that it might be possible to reinstate such cases in the future “if circumstances change and conditions for the resumption of adversarial proceedings arise,” legalize for a shift in the Russian government’s position on enforcing ECHR decisions.

‘Horizontal Russia’ Lists Seven Steps Russian Voters Can Take to Limit Violations

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Noting that voting “is one of the few safe ways” for Russians to express their opinions about those in power and that rules governing elections have been violated in the past, the Horizontal Russia portal offers a list of seven steps Russian voters can take to limit such violations in the upcoming Duma elections.

            The eight, each of which is discussed in detail (semnasem.org/articles/2026/09/04/zashitit-svoj-golos), include:

1.     Vote in person at the polling place rather than online.

2.     Go the polls on the last day of voting rather than earlier.

3.     Ask for a new ballot if you make a mistake.

4.     Do not show your ballot to anyone once you have filled it in.

5.     Do not succumb to employer pressure as that is illegal.

6.     If you want to spoil your ballot, know in advance how to do it.

7.     Do not ignore violations at the polling place and know how to file complaints.

At a time when people in many countries are suspicious of how elections are carried out, it is intriguing to see that even in Russia, where violations by the authorities are typical and even expected, at least some people are trying to figure out how to act to make such violations harder and less common.

With Norwegian Seizure of Russian Ship, Svalbard Controversy Heats Up Again

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Russians have expressed outrage at the decision of a Norwegian court to detain a Russian ship in Svalbard (Spitzbergen) in fulfillment of a 2023 decision of the international criminal court to compensate a Ukrainian company for Russian seizures of its assets, a court decision that Moscow has ignored.

Vladimir Putin called the decision of the Norwegian court at the end of August and the actions of Svalbard police in carrying it out an act of “state terrorism” with others in Moscow demanding a tough response. So far, however, the Russian government has limited itself to appealing the decision and diplomatic protests.

            The passengers have been offloaded and will be returned to Russia, while the crew remains onboard. Whether Moscow will take further action very much remains to be seen (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/cuzezemcy-v-forme-i-spicbergen-russkaa-zemla-cto-proishodit-posle-aresta-professora-molcanova-na-arhipelage-i-v-rossijskih-media/457304).

            This is the latest chapter in the long-running story of Russian efforts to test the resolve of NATO on the archipelago that has a complicated treaty arrangement that Moscow has exploited to the fullest in the past and that some think will be the place where Russia will move first against NATO (jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/ and jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/).

            The ship in question, the Professor Molchanov, is identified by the Russians as a research vessel; but over the past two years, it has brought workers, tourists, and others to the islands to see just how far Russia can push the limits. (On that history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/moscow-organizes-summer-school-in.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/russian-victory-day-ceremony-on.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/03/russian-company-on-svalbard-hoists.html.)  

Russian Firms in Far East Registering in China to Escape High Taxes and Get Cheaper Loans

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Firms in the Russian Far East are now registering their head offices in China in order to escape higher Russian taxes and to gain access to loans from Chinese banks that are now being offered at far lower rates, business leaders in the region tell Vedomosti.

            The exact number of such firms and their total size is not publicly known; but this shift is ongoing and almost certainly gives Beijing yet more leverage over the Russian Far East (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2026/09/04/1226136-malii-biznes-rasskazal-o-peremanivanii-dalnevostochnih-kompanii-v-kitai).

            It isn’t always easy for firms to take or maintain this status given the complexities of Russian business law, but Moscow seems unwilling or even unable to block such moves entirely. And as more take place, there is likely to be a backlash given that firms that do more to China will cost the Russian government tax revenue and Russian banks earnings.  

Russia’s Standup Comedians Now Hiring Lawyers to Advise Them about Jokes that Could Land them in Jail, ‘The Insider’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Today, Russia’s standup comedians are hiring lawyers to review their material in advance lest they cross some as yet poorly defined line of the permissible and land in jail, Valentina Matryonina says. And audiences too want these comedians to avoid political jokes as well lest they be recorded and those listening get in trouble too.

            While many Russian standup comedians left in 2022, others did not and some who went abroad have returned, the Insider journalist says. The world they live in now resembles that of humorists at the end of Soviet times but the rules are less clear and constantly changing (theins.ru/confession/296457).

            As these humorists note, “there is no concept of ‘a sense of humor’” in the Russian criminal code; and so they need help in figuring out what will offend some group or officials and avoid those things just as they now avoid any criticism of Putin or his war in Ukraine because those are very dangerous things to speak about.

            Audiences generally accept that as they are there to be entertained more than anything else. Consequently, the demand for political humor has fallen as well, even when it is expressed by hints or Aesopian language as was the case before glasnost, standup comedians with whom Matyonina spoke say.

            In many cases, the organizer of the sessions insist on reading the standup comedians’ texts and “delete everything that is impossible.” Sometimes this leads to absurdities. One comedian had to drop a joke about “the services of women on call for money.” He meant nurses but the bosses said he had to “reformulate it so there is no hint of prostitutes.”

            One group of standup comedians gets away with things none of the others can: those who are still in their teens. “Because they are not taken seriously,” one older comedian says, “they get away with a lot.” But if they continue to use the same jokes when they are over 18, “the consequences can be quite different.”

            As a result of increasing repression, what the comedians say and what audiences want is narrowing. All this recalls a joke that was widespread among Russians at the very end of the USSR: When things are bad, the joke ran, they told political jokes; but when things got worse, they stopped. 

Neither Rising Age of First-Time Mothers Nor War in Ukraine has Any Significant Impact on Russia’s Birthrate, Independent Demographer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Neither the rising age of first-time mothers nor the war in Ukraine has had any significant impact on the birthrate in the Russian Federation, Aleksey Raksha says, despite Putin’s insistence that the first is critical and his opponent’s equally firm belief that the second is playing a major role.  

            According to the former Rosstat expert who now is an independent demographer, changes that can be attributed to either of these fall “within the margin of error” and thus are not behind the decline in Russian fertility (thereplica.io/post/demograf-aleksei-raksha-o-zayavleniyakh-vladimira-putina-o-prichinakh-nizkoi-rozhdaemosti-v-rossii).

            And despite the alarm expressed by Putin and other Russian politicians and commentators, Raksha says, “Russia’s current fertility rate is not exceptionally low compared to European countries.” Instead, it is “a perfectly average European level,” although Russia births still occur at a younger age than European ones do.

The demographer says that the age when women have their first child in Russia is 26.5, not the 29 years Putin has claimed; and the Russian figure while rising remains “one of the youngest” in Europe.  “Only Ukraine and Moldova now have lower ages” for when a woman first gives birth.

According to Raksha, the figure of 29 years cited by Putin is incorrect. "The calculation provided to him was wrong. It isn't 29 years; it's approximately 26.5." "This is one of the youngest ages for having a first child in all of Europe. Only Ukraine and Moldova have lower ages," he says.

While Russia is “roughly at or slightly above” this age metric among comparable countries for the first child, “it is noticeably below the average for the second. For the third, Russia ranks among the leaders … and for the fourth, Russia holds the top spot among this group of countries, including the US.”

Encouraging women to have a second child is both the most important and most difficult task Moscow faces in order to boost birthrates. After the first child is born, parents can see the impact on their lives and thus often are unwilling to have a second, Raksha’s analysis suggests. 

Russian Firms Less Likely to Hire Those who Took Bonuses to Fight in Ukraine than Those who Didn’t, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 –Russian firms are less likely to hire those who took bonuses and signed contracts to fight in Ukraine than those who went there after being drafted, according to research conducted by Sergey Alekseyev, published in the Journal of Peace on August 25 and now republished by the Russian-language Riddle portal.

            The Russian scholar who teaches in Australia says that this is not “proof” of anti-war attitudes among employers but rather likely reflects concerns among then about “exposure to violence or trauma, concerns about workplace adjustment, and [an association of] volunteary enlistment to financial desperation of ideological zeal” (ridl.io/ru/geroj-na-bumage-minus-v-rezyume/ resposting academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjag064/8769484).

            What Alekseyev and  his research colleagues did was to send 120 fake but plausible applications to employers which were similar except for the cv line about military service with 60 declaring that they had signed contracts to serve in Ukraine and 60 saying that they had served as draftees.

            The differences in the response of potential employers was “stark,” Alekseyev says. Fifty-five percent of those who said they had served as draftees got callbacks while only 36.7 percent of those who said they were volunteers did no, “exactly one-third” fewer than the applications which said they had been draftees.

            This research was carried out in the late spring and over the summer, when Russia’s official unemployment level was at an all-time low of 2.2 percent, but before the introduction by regional governments of requirements that firms hire a certain number of veterans or face fines.

            Alekseyev’s overall conclusion is that “the Kremlin can flatten distinctions in official speech while civilian behavior restores them given that employers appear to distinguish between service and choice and between putting on a uniform and volunteering for the campaign” in Ukraine.

            The new  regional quotas for hiring veterans, the scholar says, “may suppress the visible consequences of that distinction but may also conceal rather than eliminate it” – and that is yet another consequence of Putin’s war in Ukraine on Russia that is likely to last long into the future.

Few Russians are Prepared to Call Putin a Criminal but Most are Now Ready to Label Him Incompetent, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – What has been happening on the front lines in Ukraine and across Russia itself has not led many Russians to call Putin criminal – for the present, that is simply “too much,” Abbas Gallyamov says; but it has led a majority of them to conclude that he is incompetent and that in itself is eroding his support.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic, that is because “Putin ever more strongly recalls a religious fanatic: his struggle with the West looks ever more like a real crusade; and fanaticism from the point of view of the public is the opposite of competence” (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/11066 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/putin-vsyo-silnee-napominaet-religioznogo-fanatika).

            For most Russians as for most other people, Gallyamov continues, “a competent man thinks soberly and dispassionately; a fanatic however is not capable of either. And the latter, even if he doesn’t shout with bulging eyes like Hitler, still harbors a fixation which prevents him from viewing things in an adequate way.”

            Russians can now see that in Putin and it is why they are expressing less and less confidence in him. A recognition of incompetence by elites and masses can even be the start of his fall, something that has been true in the case of other leaders who have demonstrated their incompetence as well.

            Gallyamov sums up the situation by referring to the classic Soviet film about Stirlitz, the Russian spy in Nazi Germany, who was once told by “a wide Nazi general” that “fanatics can win at first, but they will never achieve a victory because they will get tired of themselves” and thus act in ways that will preclude such an outcome.  

Ingushetia Plays Down 1992 War with North Ossetia but is Worried Enough about That Clash to Bring in Police from Vladivostok to Man Border Post

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – The 1992 border war between Ingushetia and North Ossetia has been forgotten by many, but it is still very much on the minds of Ingush who were forced to flee. The Ingush authorities this year have played it down in the hopes of avoiding protests, but they have been worried enough to bring in police from Vladivostok to man border post.

            The independent Ingush portal Fortanga noted that no senior official or government media outlet used the occasion of the day of memory of MIAs to recall the 1992 clashes in the Prigorodny district, an issue that still roils Ingush society (fortanga.org/2026/09/vlasti-ingushetii-ne-vspomnili-o-zhertvah-tragedii-v-prigorodnom-rajone-v-mezhdunarodnyj-den-propavshih-bez-vesti/).

              Just how much those events of more than 30 years ago do affect the thinking of Ingush, however, was implicitly recognized by those same officials when they brought in police from Vladivostok in the Russian Far East to guard the border post between the two republics (fortanga.org/2026/08/chermenskij-post-na-granicze-ingushetii-i-osetii-budut-ohranyat-policzejskie-iz-vladivostoka/).

              The commanders of these Russian units and the Ingush government not surprisingly presented this decision as one intended only to block illegal flows of goods and to protect the population, but there can be little doubt that these outside forces were brought in to prevent any protests about 1992 and the unresolved problems the war left behind.

              Ingushetia has brought in police from the Russian Far East before when it has felt threatened by popular protests; but analysts said that this earlier move had proved counterproductive because it had shown the Ingush people they remain part of an empire (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/06/moscows-use-in-ingushetia-of-police.html).

              What has happened in Ingushetia is a useful reminder of both how people who have suffered conflicts do not soon forget them however much the authorities try to encourage that and also how these authorities simultaneously refuse to address these problems and instead use outsiders to repress their own people and maintain their reputation in Moscow.

              In this case, it may also be that Magas doesn’t trust its own security forces, a reasonable view given that a group of Ingush police broke with Magas over the protests about the deal with Grozny that gave away a large portion of Ingush land. (On that case and its resonance, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/european-court-to-take-up-case-of-13.html.)  

              While attention to Ingushetia has declined since the end of the protests in 2019-2020 and the subsequent trial of the Ingush Seven, these latest reports from Magas suggest that the situation there is anything but calm and stable and that the authorities both in the Ingush capital and Moscow are worried. 

             

Putin’s Much Ballyhooed ‘Time of Heroes’ Program to Make Veterans New Elite Being Quietly Shut Down, ‘Agents Media’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 – In February 2024, Putin announced the “Time of Heroes” program to train veterans of his war in Ukraine so that they could form the new political elite of the country. All federal subjects save Moscow city set up courses. But without fanfare, all but a handful have shut down; and the others are likely to soon, Agents Media reports.

            This is the latest example of a Putin program that was promoted by Kremlin media as a major policy effort that did not live up to expectations – few graduates entered elites even in the regions – and then was quietly shut down (agents.media/novoj-elity-bolshe-ne-nado-zapushhennye-putinym-karernye-lifty-dlya-voennyh-prekratili-nabor-pochti-v-90-regionov/).

            After Putin’s announcement, the governments of all federal subjects of the Russian Federation and four occupied and annexed territories of Ukraine set up these training schools and launched programs via the internet to recruit veterans to sign up so that they could become members of a new Russian elite.

            Almost immediately, however, current officials showed their unwillingness to accept even these privileged selectees as their colleagues; and both that resistance and the failure of the Kremlin to press the existing regimes to promote these new “heroes” to positions of responsibility suggested that the program was in trouble.

            By the end of last month, most of these programs were dying, with 77 of the federal subjects having taken in only one class in these programs, four taking in two, and only one -- St. Petersburg – having admitted the expected three rounds of veterans as students in this supposedly key Putin program. And few of them still had up accessible websites.

            Some 50,600 veterans reportedly applied to these courses, but only 3145 were admitted. Some veterans complained as recently as June, but the officials who oversaw the program have gone silent, an indication along with the cutback in access to their internet sites suggests the program is headed for the scrapheap.

Central Asians and All Others Must View Russian and Soviet History as ‘a History of Colonialism,’ Kazakh Historian Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Moscow continue to promote the myth that Russia was never an empire but a liberator and provider of assistance and that, if it had some aspects of an imperial state, these reflected authoritarianism rather than imperialism and were minor compared to the aid it gave to the people it absorbed, Botakoz Kasymbekova says.

            The Kazakh historian who is now at the University of Zurich says the facts of the case show that the Russian Empire and the USSR were imperial states who behaved like other colonial empires and that this must be recognized (azattyqasia.org/a/rossiya-i-tsentralnaya-aziya-ot-tsarizma-i-bolshevikov-do-nashih-dney/33842464.html).

            Russia to this day has “a state-forming myth that Russia has not advanced into countries but that they have voluntarily wanted to become part of Russia,” despite all the evidence of the ways Russia used military force to impose its discriminatory rule and then run the lives of the people in its colonies, Kasymbekova says.

            Not only do Russians not talk about these facts honestly, the Kazakh historian says; but they become angry when Central Asians or others who are members of the communities the Russian state has conquered and suppressed and seek to maintain a classical “post-colonial” situation in which the colonized do not recognize the truth.

            As she points out, “the great Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov wrote about this with his story of the myth about the mankurt, an individual who loses his memory and comes to love the colonizers.” Such people exist in Central Asia and many other places, and much must be done to disabuse them of these falsehoods.

            “The most successful colonial project,” Kasymbekova continues, “is one in which the dirty work of colonialism is carried out by the colonized who have in fact taken over the colonial narrative” of the imperial regime. That is a clear sign of “the semi-colonial imperial consciousness in which they find themselves.”

            The roots of Russian colonialism today are less in the tsarist past than in the Soviet one, she suggests. “The Bolsheviks believed that if they established communism anywhere, they are “resolved all problems” and were not prepared to accept that their actions directed from Moscow were depriving others of the right to choose for themselves.

            As result, despite all the communist verbiage, the Soviet Union was “a colonial empire.” Today, the leaders of the Russian Federation are pursuing the same goal and justify themselves by the same denials. Sadly, many others have bought into the idea that the USSR was not so much a brutal empire as one that sought to promote a better life for all its subject peoples.

            This commitment to providing assistance, she continues, has given rise among Russians a certain “imperial innocence,” the sense that because they were on occasion promoting social development, they were not and thus could not be held accountable for the imperial nature of their state.

As she puts it, Russians and their followers continue to insist that “Russia was not and is not an empire; and if it is in some ways, it was and is a positive empire, something that brough civilization and developmemtn rather than force, inequality, repression, and the suppression of cultures and nations.”

That has unfortunately been accepted by many in the region and beyond as has its corollary that Russia’s problem is “authoritarianism but not colonialism.” The empire’s subjects can criticism actions as authoritarianism but any suggestion they flow from imperialism is something Russians consider highly offensive, she concludes.

After Russia Disintegrates, Three Russian Oblasts -- Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk -- Should Form a Volga Republic, Mulyukin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – After Russia disintegrates, Aleksandr Mulyukin says, three Russian oblasts – Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk – should come together and form a new Volga Republic so as to be in a position to repel any challenges from a revived Muscovite state and the danger that local elites will take over and suppress democracy.

            The democracy activist, who fled Samara in 2019 to avoid persecution, argues that these regions like others need to avoid both of those threats and lays out his idea for a Volga Republic in a 6400-word article in Wschody, a Russian émigré journal published in Poland (wschody.net/povolzhskaya-respublika-shansy-na-uspeh-i-glavnye-lovushki-postimperskogo-perehoda/).

            What makes Mulyukin’s article so important is that it is a rare example of how predominantly ethnic Russian regions may cooperate to escape from Moscow’s rule and a proposal that seeks to address both threats from a surviving Muscovite state and from local elites who may seize power in the name of the people but rule for themselves.

            He begins with a proposition that is all too often ignored. “Independence,” Mulyukin argues, “is the beginning and not the end of history.” Past post-imperial transitions show that “the disappearance of the former political power center does not mean the disappearance of the former ways of organizing power.”

            Consequently, those who succeed in breaking away must “simultaneously protect their new statehood from the possible restoration of external domination and from a situation in which those who take power will not turn it into their own property in the early years of transition.”

            Creating an entirely new republic with new borders and a new capital city is a way to do both, Mulyukin argues, and indeed, its lack of a history is an advantage rather than the disadvantage many assume.  It can create a new world for itself and its people and thus will be more likely to survive and survive as a democracy.

            He continues: “If the Volga Parliamentary Republic is composed mainly of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, it may well define itself as a Russian national republic, a definition isn’t necessarily anti-democratic or imperial, since a nation state can be based on the cultural identity of the majority, without invoking that to rule other peoples.”

            Mulyukin makes and develops a variety of other points about such a Volga Republic and its potential analogues on the current territory of the Russian Federation. Among the most important of these are the following:

·       The greatest danger to such a new state is not military aggression by Muscovy but the privatization of state power into the hands of existing elites.

·       That means that institutions must be the focus of development because they are “more important thana strong leader” and are necessary to “change the culture of power itself.”

·       International cooperation is essential but they “cannot be a substitute for statehood.”

·       Security must be guaranteed both by cooperation and by the development of the new country’s military.

·       And finally “historical memory should not be allowed to become a new state religion.

But perhaps the most significant of Mulyukin’s arguments is that Russian identity isn’t “an obstacle to such a project because a Russian and Russian-speaking population may well create a Russian national republic for itself if self-determination is understood as the right to organize its own political life rather than a license to decide the fate of others.”

Like ‘Soviet’ in USSR Times, ‘Russian’ Today is a Constructed and Imposed Identity rather than an Innate One, Shamolin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – “’Russian’ like ‘Soviet’ is not an innate quality” in people, Roman Shamolin says. Rather, it is “nothing but a learned way of describing life” that the leaders of the country impose on the vast majority of people who don’t form it on their own but are prepared to accept what the authorities tell them.

            Putin often suggests that Russian identity is something that has always existed and in the form as it exists now, the anthropologist from Novosibirsk says. But that simply isn’t the case. Instead, it has changed as leaders have selected on or another possible model to impose (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/09/02/chto-znachit-byt-russkim).

            What it meant to be a Russian in tsarist times, in Soviet times and now, Shamolin points out, has varied enormously, not so much because those bearing that national self-identification have changed as because the state, dealing with a relatively passive population, has imposed its evolving understanding of what kind of Russianness works best for the regimes.

            A collective identity like “Russianness” is “formed in a very different way than individual identities are, not through personal experiences and experimentation but rather through the assimilation and repetition of ideas that are promoted by the authorities and that most people are inclined to accept.

            In tsarist times, to be Russian was to be Orthodox and loyal to the tsar rather than a member of a nation, Shamolin argues; In Soviet times, “with its focus on internationalism, specifically Russian things did not go beyond an interest in the distant past and folklore.” Now, of course, it means something much more significant.

            But what it does mean at present, the anthropologist says, is something that is the result of the decision of the authorities to stress only one of the two aspects of Russianness talked about in the 19^th century, the way such Russianness makes Russians relatives of Europeanness or the way it makes them separate.

            Consequently, Shamolin concludes, it is a fundamental mistake to accept the idea that Russianness is innate rather than the product of state policy or that it does not have the chance to change. Indeed, that is the most likely fate of any proclaimed identity, however ancient and unchanging its advocates claim. 

Half of Russians Now Depressed, Helping Kremlin Now but Undermining Russia over Longer Term, Academy of Sciences Study Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 2 – Forty-nine percent of Russians are now depressed, with more than two-thirds of these suffering severe forms of that feeling, according to a new study by the Russian Academy of Sciences, a finding that is leaving society incapable of resisting the state now but also incapable of development in a positive way later.

            Each quarter, the Academy’s Institute of National Economic Forecasting releases a report on the state of Russian society. The latest one contains these depressing statistics (ecfor.ru/publication/kvartalnyj-prognoz-vvp-vypusk-71/); and a commentary on its findings highlights why they are so worrisome (krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/106073).

            According to the report, most Russians are depressed because of the current state of the Russian economy and their own future economic prospects rather than any other issue such as the war in Ukraine. Economic concerns naturally hit better off people much less than others and young people just starting out especially hard.

            Drawing on data from the Institute’s report, the Krizis-Kopilka portal says that this level of depression is having a variety of serious consequences. Among the most important are the breakdown of ties, a focus on immediate needs rather than long-term goals, an unwillingness to have children, rising petty crime, and a retreat into silence or faith in cults.

            In this situation, the portal continues, “the state will begin to interact not with society, but with a crowd of individuals who require only one thing, the solution of their immediate problems. The authorities will thus be forced to solve an endless chain of small problems rather than be in a position to develop a strategy for the whole.”

            In the short term, this state of affairs may help the powers that be by precluding open protests about larger issues; but in the longer term, the portal says, it will make it impossible for the country to achieve any major breakthroughs or even develop in a normal way in the coming years, putting it further behind other countries and at risk of exploitation by them.

Immigration Only Temporary Solution to Russia’s Population Decline and One that Won’t Last, Sinelnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Immigration, which the Kremlin views as a major part of the solution to Russia’s demographic decline, can only be a temporary palliative given that now the overwhelming majority of countries now have fertility rates below replacement levels and soon won’t have anyone to export to Russia, Aleksandr Sinelnikov says.

            Last year, the sociology professor at Moscow State University points out, “the global birthrate dropped for the first time ever below the level needed for simple reproduction.” That has been true of Russia for some time, but it means that Russia soon won’t be able to count on massive immigration (readovka.news/news/248151/).

            Some people will continue to migrate for economic reasons going from poorer countries to wealthier ones, of course, Sinelnikov acknowledges; but as fertility rates fall further below the 2.2 children per woman per lifetime needed to maintain current population rates, the number choosing to do so will ultimately decline.

            That means that Russia cannot count on immigration to reverse its current and rapid population decline and instead will have to rely on its own efforts, efforts that will be expensive and take a very long time to show the kind of results that Moscow would like, the sociologist concludes.

Khasavyurt, ‘A Unique Event in Post-Soviet Russian History’ Deserves to Be Remembered, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Thirty years ago, on Aug. 31, 1996, Russian general Aleksandr Lebed and Chechen general Aslan Maskhadov concluded an agreement ending the first post-Soviet Chechen war and laid out the principles on which the independence of Chechnya could have been finally achieved.

            That was “a unique event in post-Soviet Russian history,” Vadim Shtepa, editor of the Tallinn-based regionalist portal, Region.Expert, for three reasons: how it was achieved, why it failed to live up to its promise, and how it could be a model for the end of Putin’s war in Ukraine but probably won’t (region.expert/khasavyurt30/).

            The agreement happened not because Russian President Boris Yeltsin negotiated an end to the Chechen war but because Aleksandr Lebed, a Russian general who had become a politician, was able to find common language with a Chechen general and for a time at least stopped the war and gave hope of peace.

            The Yeltsin regime had many weaknesses but one of its often unrecognized strengths was that it provided space for people like Lebed, a kind of Russian de Gaulle, to operate, something few regimes would have allowed but that meant peace could be achieved without Yeltsin personally having to take public actions that could have sparked a negative reaction.

            The 1996 agreement could have succeeded save for two things. On the one hand, it was not supported by the Western powers, something that forced the Chechens to seek cooperation with Islamist groups even though that meant there was no chance of support from that sector. And on the other, Putin launched the second Chechen war and drowned that republic in blood.

            There are lessons to be learned from all this, Shtepa says; but the most important question now is “can there be found in the Russian army any new generals capable of stopping” Putin’s war in Ukraine?  The answer is likely no; but the possibility shouldn’t be excluded as Russian moves deeper into a succession crisis.

Moscow Launches Campaign to Urge Young Russians Avoid Being Recruited for Sabotage

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 –  Moscow has launched a major campaign to urge young Russians not to allow themselves to be recruited by Ukrainian agents for acts of sabotage, an effort that has led in the last week to the erection of billboards in St. Petersburg and the launch of a website at выход31.рф/.

             The campaign's message is that young Russians are approached, they should turn down the Ukrainian agents and turn them into the Russian authorities. If they do so, they will not suffer the consequences that any participation in Ukrainian actions against Russia and may even be rewarded for their patriotism.  

             This effort, the full dimensions of which remain unclear, nonetheless highlights that a problem the Kremlin in the past has played down may be far larger than it has been prepared to admit (echofm.online/news/hladnokrovno-slilas-s-podzhoga-relejnogo-shkafa-v-peterburge-poyavilas-soczialnaya-reklama-gosudarstvennogo-proekta-pomoshhi-podrostkam-kotoryh-verbuyut-dlya-diversij).

            As such, it is yet another indication that the steps the Kremlin is taking are likely to prove counterproductive with more young Russians and their parents concluding that those recruited by Ukrainian agents are now a widespread phenomena and either support them as a way to end the war or alternatively be willing to support an even more draconian response to sabotage incidents.

            Either will cause the Kremlin problems. The fact that no one in the Presidential Administration appears to recognize those dangers is striking, an indication of problems descending from the top and likely making the coming weeks even more explosive in the Russian Federation than they have been and by a Russian action rather than a Ukrainian one.

Minor Events in Russia Repeatedly Trigger Protests but These are About More than their Nominal Causes, ‘Versiya’ Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Sixty-five years ago, a series of popular risings occurred across the USSR, most of which occurred following minor incidents, Igor Kiyan says. The Soviet authorities crushed them but the powers that be at that time “did not want to understand the true causes” and the result of the disaster at Novocherkassk the following year.

            The first of these was in Krasnodar at the start of 1961 when false rumors spread that the police were shooting at a soldier and 3,000 people went into the streets, resulting in the death of one protester and calls for stage “a second Hungary” in Russia, the Versiya commentator says (versia.ru/kak-buntovali-sovetskie-grazhdane).

            Similar events occurred later in the year, but the authorities concluded that they could deal with the situation by repression and court cases rather than by addressing the underlying opposition of the population. That explains their response to the Novocherkassk protests a year later when Moscow sent tanks against its own population.

            According to Kiyan, Moscow officials completely failed to understand that these protests reflected deep-seated hostility of the population to those in power rather than being only a response to the events that triggered their willingness to go into the street and demand change. These events are the occasion for protests but not the real cause.

            That pattern, with people going into the streets to protest or even stage a revolution over what seems to be a minor matter and with the authorities assuming that repression is enough, is a commonplace of Russian history. And it is one that the powers that be now should not forget, Kiyan suggests.

Moscow Fighting Regional Identities with Russia Propaganda Centers Beyond the Ring Road

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug.31 – Moscow is now working to combat regional identities in predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays with new “Russia” propaganda centers. Five have been opened so far, and 13 more are planned in the next several years, an indication that the Kremlin is concerned about regional and not just ethnic identities.

            These centers, the Horizontal Russia portal says, are intended to replace regional narratives with all-Russian ones, often at the cost of destroying much-loved institutions like the aquarium in Vladivostok to house the new facilities, by controlling propaganda messaging and reducing regional identities to folklore (semnasem.org/articles/2026/08/31/konvejer-regionalnoj-identichnosti).

            Local people, even veterans returning from Putin’s war in Ukraine, have objected without success; but observers in the places where these propaganda offices have opened and are targeting regional identities, many in the population are angry because the money being spend on these centers should go to solving local problems.

            Consequently, as so often with Putin’s programs, this one appears to be backfiring because its intention to replace all regional identities with an all-Russian one is only highlighting the ways in which Moscow is a threat and making people in the regions more conscious of what sets them apart from the center.

            The establishment of these centers and the population’s reactions are thus a useful measure of just how strong regional identities are, identities that seldom attract the same scrutiny that ethnic ones do but that may be powerful and play a key role in re-enforcing ethnic identification.