Soviet Totalitarianism Unlike Fascist Counterparts Because Its Practice and Its Propaganda Pointed in Different Directions, Ikhlov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 3 – Debates about differences between the Soviet and fascist variants of totalitarianism have been around for decades, but they are usually cast in the form of discussions as to whether one was “better” or more precisely “less evil” than the other rather than in close examinations of just where they were among all their similarities different.

            Russian commentator Yevgeny Ikhlov makes a useful contribution to the latter effort by pointing out that “Soviet totalitarianism was distinguished from German or Italian kinds … by the fact that its practice completely contradicted the values it propagandized” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5A748FCB29918).

            What that meant, he says, is that the model Soviet citizen had to learn to understand what those in power really wanted from him in an intuitive fashion rather than by listening to what they said publicly and the regime in turn had to impose a harsh censorship lest its population use that skill to intuit what the authors of Aesopian materials wanted them to take away.

            Those Russians who acquired such skills have not forgotten them: they continue to try to read between the lines on all things on the assumption that what they are told directly is not what is most important for them to understand and to at upon.  But the generation that has arisen since 1991 doesn’t approach things in the same way.

            That difference helps to explain why today some older Russians conclude that even if the authorities do decide to permit in words certain things such as the Aleksey Navalny demonstrations, these things in reality are prohibited either because they violate the law or constitute a revolt against the authorities. They feel that even participants “’should know this.’”

            “More than that,” Ikhlov continues, “every ‘sovok’ [as people with a Soviet past that lives on are often called] is firmly convinced (1937 was done to achieve exactly this) that the powers have the most complete right to short or send to the camps anyone and that only as a result of their greatest indulgence do they not do so with everyone.”

            This view of the world also explains why such Russians had no problem when “the Putin minister prohibited an anti-Stalinist film two-and-a-half months after Putin declared Stalinist crimes unforgiveable” just as they had no problem when Solzhenitsyn’s story, “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” was followed by Khrushchev’s attack on the creative intelligentsia.

            But such an approach comes into conflict with those who “devote particular attention to formalities” and who believe that the state must follow the law and do what it says.  That division which in many cases follows generational lines, Ikhlov suggests, is Russia’s inheritance from its different kind of totalitarianism.

Russians Increasingly Fearful of a State Machine Indifferent to All but Itself, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 3 – Popular reaction to a series of recent high-profile court cases shows that Russians are much less concerned about elite corruption than they were but far more fearful of the actions of an indifferent state machine that can “crush” people under any pretext, Sergey Shelin says.

            And that shift, the Rosbalt commentator continues, not only helps to explain why respect among the Russian population for the ruling caste is declining but also explains why “the gap between citizens and officials” in Russia has been growing ever more rapidly over the last decade  (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2018/02/02/1679382.html).

            Polls show that the recently concluded case against former governor Nikita Belykh did not attract the same attention as a very similar case against former minister Aleksey Ulyukayev, Shelin says. Most people appear to believe that Belykh was guilty as charged, but they viewed Ulyukayev as a victim of intra-elite squabbles and pressures.

            “Such a view of the bosses’ struggle with corrupt figures is today not simply typical,” he continues. “It is found with regard to a much broader circle of state actions.”  As a result, cases like the one against regional specialist Yury Dmitriyev who was falsely accused of pedophilia and doctor Elena Misyurina who was blamed for the death of a patient could be scandals.

            Their cases like those against Ulyukayev and Belukh resemble one another in that the authorities decide someone is guilty. But there is a major divide between the first two cases and the latter two: Ulyukayev’s former fellow ministers didn’t come to his defense, but doctors very much spoke out on behalf of Misyurina – and the powers that be have begun backing down.

             The latter development, the commentator continues, shows that society is no longer in every case “a dumb observer” but in certain circumstances is prepared to protest. Such protests if they involve a small number of people are something the regime can and does ignore, but “the anger of an entire professional community is unusual and one wants to believe more effective.”

            “One way or another,” Shelin says, “the gigantic distance between the ruling machine and the mass of the ruled” is becoming ever more obvious to the population and of ever greater concern to its members than is “the corrupt character of specific cogs and wheels of this machine.”

            A decade ago, Dmitry Medvedev prophesized that “the bureaucrat will decide the fate of a citizen without knowing anything about him or responding to him or turning attention to any of his arguments and being concerned only to satisfy his own bosses” and those charged with controlling the bureaucracy as such.

            As a result, Shelin continues, a Russian today “lives under constant threat of being caught in the gears not only of the defenders of the state but alsso of any other bureaucratic hierarchies, competing with one another but equally indifferent to ‘others’ or even to their former comrades in arms who have fallen” from their positions. Instead, these people behave like robots.

            And that is simultaneously reducing popular respect and deference for officials and convincing people that the best strategy is to avoid contact with them if at all possible.  In this situation, where there is ever less respect, there is only ever more fear.

Pupils in One-School Village in Tambov Region Launch Their Own Website

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 2 – Pupils in the only school in the village of Glazok in Tambov Oblast have launched a website about their town -- seloglazok.ru/ -- the first site of its kind in Russia and one that provides a unique childs’ eye view on how they see their village and what is happening there (takiedela.ru/news/2018/02/02/selo-glazok/).

            The project was developed with the help of Kruzhok-Tur, a group of Internet enthusiasts who have conducted “technology weeks” in various villages of the region, teaching young people how to create a site and post news and other materials on it.  The site’s five pages provide an unvarnished view of what Glazok and its 1500 residents are like today.

                Among the stories the site features are:

·         Each family maintains its own garden and animals. When they can, family members hunt and fish.

·         There is only one school. It suffered from a fire a decade ago. A sports facility was planned but stopped before it began.

·         There is a beautiful building where once there was a hospital, but “now there is only a therapeutic center.”

·         People work in the school, the shops, at the post office and at the bank. But there aren’t enough jobs and so many go off to cities. Nonetheless they do come back to their families for holidays.

·         The nineteenth century church was destroyed in the 1930s. Initially people hoped ot restore it, but in 2008 a decision was made to build a new one. It is still in the process of being built.

·         The House of Culture, “the so-called ‘third place’ is possibly the only one in the village where one can meet informally and also where it is warm.”

·         A war memorial was put up in 2008. In December 2016, the remains of a villager who died in Crimea during World War II were returned and reburied in the village.

·         The village has a good beach but it lacks amenities so far.

·         Getting to Glazok isn’t easy: take the train to Michurinsk, then take a taxi (600 rubles or 10 US dollars), or take a bus which runs between Michurinsk and Glazkov three times a day at 5:30 am, 2:00 pm and 5:00 pm.

·         There are three stores, all located on the main square and all supposed to close at 9:00 pm. Usually however they are open later but you have to knock hard. They don’t have all everyone needs but an order. “Forget about bank cards and don’t try to use Apple Pay.”

·         The monthly rent for a house in Glazok is about 5,000 rubles (83 US dollars).  Tehre is no Airbnb and it is best to call one of two children who are listed on the site and who will help find you a place.

·         After Russians elsewhere learned of the fire in the school library, they sent hundreds of books; but the school doesn’t yet have a good place for them. 

·         And finally: “In the past, Glazok was a district center. Older people talk about the millionaire sovkhoz in which they raised sugar beets and looked after cows and pigs. In the second half of the 20^th century there were several school buildings in Glazok, in which about 900 people studied. Here too was a big hospital with thereapeutic, surgical and birthing departments.”