Chechnya, Daghestan Express Willingness to Begin Talks on Border Dispute

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 3 – Officials in both Grozny and Makhachkala say they are ready to begin talks to delimit and demarcate the border between Chechnya and Daghestan, a border that is far from settled because of Chechen claims to a district in Daghestan and the use of pasture land by farmers in each republic in the other.

            The path forward is likely to be anything but easy not only because memories are fresh about what Chechnya’s acquisition of land in Ingushetia provoked there but also because Grozny has not allowed anyone to forget about its claims on territory within Daghestan populated by Chechens either now or in the past.

            But officials in both republics now say they are willing to talk about the entire border, a step forward from a situation in which each side viewed the border question as something too explosive to touch (capost.media/news/obshchestvo/sdelat-granitsy-mezhdu-chechney-i-dagestanom-uslovnymi-predlozhil-chinovnik/, doshdu.com/v-chechne-privetstvovali-zhelanie-dagestana-ustanovit-vzaimnye-granicy/ and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/364578/).

            Controversies over the border have deep roots extending back to Soviet times when after the Chechens were allowed to return from exile, their republic was not given back a Chechen area that had been transferred to Daghestan and to the immediate post-Soviet period when Chechen efforts to achieve independence precluded any talks between the republics.

            Beginning in 2008, both republics took steps to demarcate the border according to their respective positions; but the situation exploded in the spring of 2019 when Moscow called on all republics to settle their border disputes and residents from the two republics clashed violently when Chechens erected border posts clearly inside of Daghestani territory.

(On those clashes, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/08/on-border-issues-chechnya-united-but.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/russian-forces-now-keeping-chechens-and.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/06/chechen-daghestan-land-swaps-wont-solve.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/06/kremlin-doesnt-care-lot-about.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/06/moscow-which-had-pushed-for-border.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/06/agora-hopes-to-achieve-in-daghestan.html, and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/06/chechen-daghestan-border-controversy.html.)

Fearful that any discussion of the border could lead to violence, Daghestan refused to enter into negotiations (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/06/mass-protests-now-likely-in-daghestan.html). That position reflected not only these fears but also Chechen actions that many Daghestanis viewed as provocative.

In February 2020, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov sent permanent officials from his government to take part in the commemoration of the deportation of Chechens from what is now Daghestani territory. They joined some 10,000 Chechens who came from Chechnya and Ingushetia in a move clearly intended to reaffirm Grozny’s claims to the Aukhov District of Daghestan (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/02/kadyrov-again-highlights-his.html).

Pointedly, Daghestani officials ignored the celebration, a continuation of playing down Chechen claims. A year earlier than this, Makhachkala used the pandemic as an excuse to cancel Chechen plans for a congress in the Aukhov District to prevent Chechens from exploiting such a meeting against Daghestan (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/361098/).

The willingness of Chechnya and Daghestan to talk now likely reflects three things: pressure from Moscow to get a border agreement, Daghestani fears that Chechnya will take more offensive actions if there aren’t talks, and the belief of Grozny that Daghestan is now in a weakened position and that border talks will work in its favor. 

To Protect Putin, 50,000 Tests Given to Participants and Staff at St. Petersburg Forum

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 3 – Even though the Russian president has been vaccinated, officials gave 50,548 coronavirus tests to participants and staff at the St. Petersburg International Business Forum he is attending. They found “more than 500” tested “positive” and presumably these were excluded from any contact with Putin (fontanka.ru/2021/06/03/69949892/).

            The Russian government said today that it had registered 8933 new cases of infection and 393 new deaths from the coronavirus over the last 24 hours with the situation easing in the capitals but spiking elsewhere (t.me/stopcoronavirusrussia/4759, regnum.ru/news/society/3287593.html and regnum.ru/news/society/3277253.html).

            Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin said that he intends to lift the final restrictions this fall, and culture officials said they expected theaters to be allowed at that time to be able to operate at 100 percent capacity (mbk-news.appspot.com/news/kommunnitet/ and regnum.ru/news/3286965.html).

            But officials and experts remained divided about the pandemic’s prospects in Russia, with some predicting a continuing decline in cases and others warning that new strains could send the numbers up (regnum.ru/news/3287039.html, regnum.ru/news/3286718.html, https://regnum.ru/news/3286748.html and aif.ru/health/coronavirus/v_rf_vyyavili_bolee_1_tys_sluchaev_zarazheniya_novymi_shtammami_covid-19).

            How much data will be released on the vaccination effort remains open with health ministry officials acknowledging that they haven’t decided which data to release and when (regnum.ru/news/3287125.html).

            Elsewhere on the vaccination front, Moscow said it was now testing a vaccine designed to work against all strains of the virus (regnum.ru/news/3286779.html), Russia is gearing up to produce about 20 million doses of the vaccine each month (regnum.ru/news/3287109.html), and some are blaming doctors for the reluctance of Russians to get the shots (regnum.ru/news/3287185.html).

            Russia may soon be offering vaccinations to foreigners living in the country, but the government is still opposed to any plans to require university students to get the shots before returning to classes (nazaccent.ru/content/35857-glava-rospotrebnadzora-reshenie-o-vakcinacii-inostrancev.html and regnum.ru/news/3287485.html).

            And speaking at the St. Petersburg forum, Putin said that the Russian economy is now exiting the difficult period of the pandemic (regnum.ru/news/3287514.html).

            Meanwhile, in other pandemic-related stories from Russia today,

·         A Novaya gazeta investigation found that many Russian vaccines were rushed into use without full testing but powered by claims not supported by the evidence (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/06/03/operatsiia-e).

·         Russian orthographers continue to add new words to the Russian language as a result of the pandemic with variants often arising as a result of the Cyrillization of words from Latin-script languages (nazaccent.ru/content/35849-krash-i-chilit-ustupili-mesto-koronyazhke.html).

·         The editors of Nezavisimaya gazeta say that the reasons a majority of Russians do not want to get  vaccinated include the fact that “in the Russian Federation live not only patriots, optimists and defenders of the regime” and that instead, there are “signs of deep social diseases, universal distrust, anger, archaic attitudes, and divisions which leave the country incapable of a wise collective defense” (ng.ru/editorial/2021-06-03/2_8165_editorial.html).

Neo-Eurasians Far More Russian Chauvinist than the Originals, Sidorov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Whenever a group styles itself or is styled as “neo,” there is always the question as to how much it is like the original from which it is being contrasted. In the case of neo-Eurasianism, Kharun Sidorov says, the new version is far less interested in the non-Russians and far more infused by Russian chauvinism and imperialism.

            Neo-Eurasian leader Aleksandr Dugin, for example, the Prague-based Russian commentator says, talks about the multiple sources of Russian identity as earlier Eurasianists did but favors the liquidation of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation and the abolishing of Ukraine as an independent state (idelreal.org/a/31268031.html).

            In the neo-Eurasianist manifesto, “New Eurasia, the Noah’s Ark of the 21^st Century,” Dugin and his colleagues suggest that Russia unlike the European Union is the only place where various nations, languages, and cultures can flourish but then outline a program of Russianization and Russificaiton which makes such suggestions a nonsense.

            And the neo-Eurasianists spend more of their time attacking Ukraine and other countries for how they deal with minorities than they do in the discussions about and defenses of how Russia does. And they celebrate Russian nationalist abuses of non-Russians at home while condemning what some might see as far more tolerant policies toward minorities elsewhere.

            As a result, Sidorov says, the only difference between the neo-Eurasianists, on the one hand, and Russian chauvinists and imperialists, on the other, is that the latter are slightly more honest in what they are about. The neo-Eurasians, drawing on their origins, suggest they are defending one thing while in fact they are attacking it and promoting something else.

New Film Documents How Circassians Saved Jews During World War II

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Nations which have been the victims of genocide often stress their uniqueness in that regard that they don’t reach out to others who have been victims of this same crime against humanity. Two events highlight that the Circassians haven’t followed that path and are interacting with Jews, the victims of another and better-known genocide.

            The first involves a documentary film, A Feat of Mercy, prepared by Askarbiya Nagaply, which tells the story of how Circassian communities in the North Caucasus worked to save Jews from falling victim of the Holocaust when the Germans invaded. It will be shown in Maykop on June 22 (natpressru.info/index.php?newsid=12456).

            And the second was a visit to Israel’s Knesset by deputies of the municipality of Kfar-Kama, a Circassian community in Israel. They met with leaders of Israel’s parliament and provided them with a briefing on the genocide of the Circassian people by the Russian authorities in the 19^th and 20^th centuries.

            Such efforts by members of a nation which has been the victim of genocide to reach out to those of another that has suffered in that way can only help the common cause of exposing and thus preventing any repetition of such crimes and only help groups that do reach out in this way to achieve their goals as well.

            Indeed, what the Circassians are doing in this case with the Jews should serve as a model for other nations which have been the victim of genocides. They too should reach out to others. In such communication and even cooperation, not only both of the groups involved will benefit but so too will the international community.

Tyvans Say Buddhism and Shamanism Discourage Inter-Ethnic Marriages and Thus Help Defend Their Nation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Buddhism and shamanism and the syncretic mix of the two play an important social role in Tyvan society, one that their adherents welcome. These faiths, new research show, help limit intermarriage between Tyvans and outsiders, particularly Russian Orthodox and thus help defend and promote Tyvan identity.

            In the newly released issue of Novyye issledovaniya Tuvy, a group of scholars from the Altay State University and the Tyvan Institute of Humanities and Applied Socio-Economic Research, reports on the findings of sociological studies of religion and public life in Tyva conducted just before the pandemic (nit.tuva.asia/nit/article/view/965).

            According to the authors, the religious life of the republic is becoming more widespread and complicated, primary due to the registration of new Buddhist and shamanistic faiths and of Russian Orthodox parishes. The earlier growth in the number of Protestant groups has ebbed, although it may be that these groups simply are no longer trying to register with the authorities.

            The inter-confessional situation in Tyva is stable, the authors of the study continue, but primarily because of the overwhelming dominance of one religion, Buddhism, and one ethnos, Tyvan, there.

            Seventy percent of the 334 Tyvans queried said that it is “necessary” for an individual to be a believer. “More than half of the population of the republic makes religion an important part of their lives.” Buddhism dominates, but in addition to it, 16 percent of the sample practice a syncretic faith combining Buddhism and shamanism.

            Seventy-three percent of the sample say that they celebrate their religious duties at home and only go to datsans on major holidays. But they add that they consider this observation of Buddhism and shamanism in the home as necessary for the survival of their national identity and of the nation as such.

            At the same time, however, they overwhelmingly oppose having religious leaders get involved in politics in the narrow sense. Their task is to promote the faith and fulfill various social functions, the survey found; and one of the most important of these tasks is to discourage intermarriage with people from a different nation or religion.

            Tyvans form more than 80 percent of the population, while ethnic Russians form less than 17 percent. But it is striking that Tyvans consider blocking intermarriage so important. Their attitudes which may extend to other groups following Buddhism and shamanism are likely to be viewed with hostility in Moscow and may lead to clashes between Orthodox Russia and Buddhist and shamanist nations. 

Kremlin Battles an Age-Old Russian Problem: Abandonment of Used Up Land

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Much of Russia’s expansion happened because those who worked the land abandoned it after it had become infertile and moved on to other land where they repeated exactly the same process rather than remaining in one place and trying to make the land fertile again.

            That centuries’ old pattern has continued in post-Soviet times and been exacerbated by the flight of many rural Russians not just from land that no longer is productive but also to the cities leaving large swaths of the country completely unpopulated. Even worse, this approach has spread to neighboring non-Russian countries.

            Over the last several years, Anna Kryazheva, a Rhythm of Eurasia journalist says, the Russian government has begun to focus on this issue and to plan for the return to productive use of millions of hectares of abandoned land over the next decade (ritmeurasia.org/news--2021-06-02--zemli-zabroshki-ili-pochemu-ostajutsja-nevostrebovannymi-selhozugodja-54918).

            That may seem surprising given how large Russia is, she says. But she points out that many areas do not have enough people to work the land and so the problem of abandoned and unused land is a serious one. Putin has raised it, and the Russian State Council has discussed it (kremlin.ru/events/state-council/62418/work).

            At present, the Russian government had simplified laws so as to make it easier to recover abandoned land and announced plans to return to use some 12 million hectares of agricultural space over the next nine years. If this plan is carried out, experts say, it will not only ensure enough food for Russians but double earnings from the export of food to 45 billion US dollars.

            Whether this limited step to promote intensive rather than extensive economic processes will in fact work remains to be seen. Russia and Russians would certainly benefit, but both will have to overcome a deeply embedded attitude that when land wears out, there is always more elsewhere, and that it is easier to abandon the first and move to the latter.

1996 Russian Elections Made a Putin Inevitable, von Eggert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 2 – Twenty-five years ago, Russia had its last presidential election in which the outcome was not ordained. But after Boris Yeltsin’s orchestrated victory, Konstantin von Eggert says, the country entered yet another non-democratic era in which the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin was inevitable.

            In that sense, the independent Russian commentator argues, it is not wrong to see 1996 as having had as fateful consequences for Russia as those of 1991 and 1993 because the manipulated vote showed that even with democratic forms, those in charge could continue to infuse them with authoritarian content (snob.ru/entry/207474/).

            For those who have lived their entire conscious life under Putin, von Eggert continues, it may seem “fantastic” to talk about a Russian election in which the results were not foreordained. But that was exactly the case in 1996 when Yeltsin’s standing in the polls had tanked and KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov appeared to be headed for victory.

            Moreover, he says, “a quarter of a century ago on the screen on one federal TV channel the opposition leader (Zyuganov) could call for the retirement of ‘the head of the anti-people clique’ (that is, Yeltsin), while on another, the government’s RTR, Grigory Yavlinsky could demand the Kremlin end the war in Chechnya, and on a third, the satirical program ‘The Puppets’ laughed at the president as a hopeless tool of his entourage.”

            The commentator says in the course of preparing a program on the 1996 election, he found that Russian opinion on 1996 remains far more divided than it is on 1991. Those who backed Yeltsin then continue to claim that “the elections took place on the whole honestly” and that journalists backed Yeltsin because they felt it was in their interests.

            “But there is another point of view,” von Eggert says. It holds that the refusal of journalists in 1996 to be objective and instead to parrot the Kremlin line convinced those in power that “the manipulation of public opinion and brain washing of citizens will allow incumbents to retain power as long as they want.”

            In this view, “1996 became in essence the last year of Russian democracy. More than that, it became the starting point for the rise of Putin to the height of power, despite the fact that at that moment he could not know that.”

            “If Zyuganov had won 25 years ago, the backers of this point of view conclude, “then Russia for the first time would have experie4nced a genuine transfer of power to the opposition and this would have laid the foundation for a firm democratic system in the future,” von Eggert says.

            In 1996, von Eggert was an Izvestiya journalist. He says he backed Yeltsin given the alternative but that he never refrained from condemning the then-president for his mistakes. “But Russia is a country where halftones as a rule interest anyone.” Instead, people only talk about “who is guilty.” That will last until a large number begin to ask “what is to be done?”

            “However,” the commentator continues, “certain lessons of ‘the wild 1990s’ can already be drawn. The chief of these is that society must stop relying on leaders and see in politicians, even the most charismatic, people who must sooner of later pass from the scene.” That is not how Russians approached things then or how they do now.

            Instead, he says, in 1996 Russians asks “how can we live without Boris Nikolayevich?” Now they ask “who could there be except for Putin?” Such questions should forever be confined to the past. But that will be hard for a country “where cynicism and extreme individualism display their opposite side of weakness and lack of personal initiative.”

            “Amoralism and the sense that everything is permissible, cultivated by the ruling class will never disappear by itself,” the commentator concludes. It will happen only when Russian society “understands that it needs to demand from the powers not only supplements to pensions but a demonstration of a striving to act honorably to move the country forward.”

            “If this doesn’t take place,” von Eggert says, “then the argument of ‘the Yeltsin election’ will go on forever.”