Kazakhstan Becomes More Kazakh and Less Russian as Ethnic Russians Continue to Leave and Kazakhs to Return Home, Statistics Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 23 – Despite the influx of ethnic Russians after Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine and the decision of ethnic Russians already there not to move to Russia in wartime, the departure of ethnic Russians has now resumed at roughly the same rate and the influx of Kazakhs has continued as well.

            As a result, the slight uptick in the share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan’s population in 2023 has been replaced by the pattern of earlier years, with the Russian share of the population continuing to decline and the Kazakh share again increasing, Aleksandr Shustov says (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2024-07-24--ottok-russkih-iz-kazahstana-rezko-sokratila-svo-74637).

            To make his case, the Russian analyst cites data from the Kazakhstan government as well as from the Russian embassy in Astana. In 2022, 16,000 ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan, while 4,400 arrived. That meant that the ethnic Russian share of that Central Asian country’s population fell by almost 11,700 even as the war began.

            In that year, he continues, Kazakhs continued to return home far more often than to leave, with 7200 registering their return and only 1400 departing, for a positive increase of 7200, further shifting the ethnic balance which has been moving against the ethnic Russians since the 1980s.

            In 2023, the situation changed, with the exodus of Russians falling “almost six times,” Shustov says. Specifically, the outflow of ethnic Russians fell sharply, with 10,100 leaving the country but 8100 entering it, meaning that the number of Russians there fell by only 2,000 (stat.gov.kz/ru/industries/social-statistics/demography/publications/157454/).

            Ethnic Kazakhs, however, continued to arrive, with some 10,000 returning in 2023; and because only 1100 left, that meant that the Kazakh share of Kazakhstan’s population increased by 8800, further increasing their majority. They form almost 75 percent of the population, while Russians who once held a majority are down to less than 14 percent.

           A large number of Russian "relocaters" did come to Kazakhstan but many of them returned or went on to other countries rather than register as permanent residents. As a result, they have not been counted by Astana in its summary data on migration in and out of the country.

            Russian flight occurred in all regions of Kazakhstan except the three Western oblasts and the capitals. In those there was an increase in the number of ethnic Russians, Shustov says, but only an “insignificant” one that likely reflects the arrival of Russians leaving Russia because of the war.

            Figures from the first quarter of 2024 suggest that Russian flight has accelerated and the return of Kazakhs has continued, he says. During those three months, 608,000 more Russians left than arrived; and 3500 more Kazakhs arrived than left (stat.gov.kz/ru/industries/social-statistics/demography/publications/158501/).

 

Nearly a Quarter Fewer Immigrant Workers Arrived in Russia in 2023 than in 2022, Rosstat Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – In 2023, Rosstat, the Russian government’s statistical agency, says, 560,400 migrant workers arrived in Russia, 23 percent fewer than in 2022. It is likely that the number arriving in 2024 will be even smaller given the increasing hostility of Russians to migrants and the declining number of businesses that feel compelled to defend them.

            The Rosstat figures are available at rosstat.gov.ru/compendium/document/13283. They are discussed in most detail at rbc.ru/economics/22/07/2024/669a2afd9a7947271d418486. And because the debate about what Russia should do about immigration, they are certain to inform and even enflame discussions in the days ahead.

            Among Rosstat’s key findings are the following:

·       Nearly a third of all immigrants came from Tajikistan (31 percent), with ten percent from Kygyzstan, and nine percent each from Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan was the country of origin for four percent, and the other Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, accounted for half of that.

·       More than half (55 percent) were men; and 76 percent were of working age, with the largest age cohort between 20 and 24.

·       Most have middle education; few have higher educations and even fewer have no education at all.

·       80 percent of migrant workers want to live in cities rather than rural areas. The top three regions are Moscow Oblast, Tyumen Oblast and the Kanty-Mansiisk AD. They account for 57 percent of all migrants who arrived in 2023.

Regions and Republics Now Facing Crises with Their Own Trash Crises, Not Just from Moscow’s Sending Trash to Them from Major Cities

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – For almost a decade, the Russian government’s efforts to cope with the mounting trash problems of that country’s major cities have sparked protests in regions and republics that they are being swamped. The most significant but hardly the only such protest was in Shiyes.

            But it is not just the major Russian cities that are producing more trash than they are equipped to process. Many of the federal subjects are also generating more trash than they can deal with, something that is likely to trigger a new wave of protests in those areas which are the hardest hit (versia.ru/pochemu-v-regionax-nekomu-vyvozit-musor).

            According to a new survey, the federal subjects most in trouble are in order the Altai Kray, Vologda Oblast, Kabardino-Balkaria, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Magadan, Novgorod, and Novosibirsk Oblasts, the Altay Republic, Buryatia, Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Tyva, Tomsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts.

            These are among the poorest federal subjects, and officials there, pressed to meet other demands, have not made the investment needed to keep up with the ever-increasing amount of trash their residents are generating. If protests do break out, they will likely now be directed not just at Moscow as was the case in Shiyes but at Moscow and the federal subject leaders.

            The Kremlin may welcome this because it could allow it to deflect objections to its plans to send more trash from Moscow and St. Petersburg to poorer  regions, but any benefit the Putin regime may get from this is likely to be short-lived because NIMBY attitudes are certain to be reenforced rather than reduced by having two targets for complaint.   

Russia is “a Slavic-Turkic State,’ Altai Conference Participants Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – The Altai State University hosted a forum on the Slavic-Turkic World on the Space of Greater Altai July 18-20. Its participants stressed that “Russia is a Slavic-Turkic state” and urged that Moscow declare the Turks “a state-forming” people along with the Russians to strengthen ties at home and links to the broader Turkic world.

            The Turkic peoples now form eight percent of the population of the Russian Federation, the participants observed, and their numbers and share are rapidly increasing because they have higher birthrates than the Slavs and more Turks from abroad are taking Russian citizenship (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2024-07-23--bolshoj-altaj-i-evrazijskoe-edinstvo-74615).

            Consequently, as Russia turns to the east, it should recognize the Turkic peoples collectively as a state-forming group, something that will help Russia at home and abroad and make it clear to all that the Altai in Russia is the true homeland and proper focus of Turks around the world.

            Three things about this are noteworthy: First, it is a rare example of talking about groups broader than nations as playing a state-forming role. Second, it re-enforces the Eurasianist idea that Russia is not just Russian but Turkic as well. And third, it signals that at least some in Russia want to challenge Turkey for the right to be considered the center of the Turkic world.

Despite Repression and Lack of Moscow Media Attention, Russians Continue to Protest – and Sometimes Succeed in Forcing Change

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Since the beginning of July, Russians have taken part in protest actions across the country, the editors of Kholod Media say. Most of these actions have been small, far from Moscow and about local issues, all reasons why they have in most cases failed to attract the attention of central media. But remarkably some have succeeded in forcing change (holod.media/2024/07/22/10-protestnyh-akczij-o-kotoryh-vy-mogli-ne-znat/).

            Perhaps the most intriguing of these unreported protest actions took place in Perm on July 17. Then a group of more than 250 people calling themselves “Russians Against Islamization” assembled to demand that officials block the construction of a mosque there (activatica.org/content/663af95c-8c50-4708-8e2d-e099320cf755/zhiteli-permi-vyshli-na-miting-protiv-stroitelstva-mecheti, t.me/perm36/14085 and t.me/horizontal_russia/38311).

            Meanwhile, on July 4, in Nizhnevartovsk in the Khanty-Mansi AD, 50 people came out to protest plans to build a Russian Orthodox church in a residential district there (t.me/horizontal_russia/38047). Participants said they weren’t against a new church but only its location near their housing (https://muksun.fm/news/2024-07-04/tserkvi-tut-ne-mesto-v-nizhnevartovske-lyudi-vyshli-na-miting-protiv-stroitelstva-hrama-5129702).

            Earlier, on July 7, 300 residents of Ulan Ude in Buryatia assembled to protest the plans of officials to build a new “super” prison colony there, something that would involve the destruction of more than 160 hectares of land (t.me/Baikal_People/6196,   t.me/Baikal_People/6213 and t.me/rusnews/38283).

            And on July 14, villagers in Ulyanovsk Oblast organized a demonstation to protest against the erection of fences in a local woods, something that they said would deprive them of the opportunity to walk there as has long been their custom (t.me/horizontal_russia/38215 and ulpressa.ru/2024/07/20/zhiteli-sela-smorodino-pozhalovalis-na-ograzhdenie-lesa-chastnoj-firmoj/).

            Attracting more attention and forcing officials to respond have been protests about power outages in Dagestan, Krasnodar, Anapa, and Rostov (t.me/rusnews/56831,  t.me/rusnews/56717, t.me/horizontal_russia/31793,  t.me/horizontal_russia/38374,  t.me/horizontal_russia/38386 and vk.com/my_bataysk?w=wall-64588835_285988&ysclid=lytz0es2t0651751676

            And finally, there were at least two protests against increases in the price for communal services, one in Syktyvkar in the Komi Republic and another in Biysk in the Altai. In both, participants called on their fellow citizens to stop voting for capitalists and in the Komi republic for the governor to resign (t.me/horizontal_russia/37906,  t.me/horizontal_russia/37906, vk.com/wall-140177262_24221  and vk.com/wall-140177262_24258).

            In short, Russia is not quite as quiet as Putin likes to present it and as all too many in the capital and in the West prefer to believe. 

Aliyev Pledges to Support Independence Movements in French Colonies, as Activists from Them Assemble in Baku to Form United Front

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the latest sign of the deterioration of relations between Baku and Paris, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has pledged to do everything in his power to promote the independence of France’s last remaining colonies, as activists from them assemble in Baku to form a united front to achieve that end.

            Earlier this year, France blamed Azerbaijan and Russia for supporting pro-independence protests in New Caledonia; and Paris recalled its ambassador from Baku for consultations in protest (m.lenta.ru/news/2024/07/21/prezident-azerbaydzhana-poobeschal-podderzhivat-borbu-frantsuzskoy-polinezii-za-nezavisimost/).

            Now the  Baku Initiative Group (BIG) formed at the end of 2023 has assembled representatives of these colonies in the Azerbaijani capital to form an International Front for the Liberation of the Last French Colonies (https://www.rt.com/news/601288-french-overseas-territories-liberation-front and azertag.az/ru/xeber/v_baku_prohodit_sezd_dvizhenii_za_nezavisimost_kolonizirovannyh_franciei_territorii_video-3100234).

            Paris and pro-French groups in these colonies have denounced the move, but it likely signals plans by Moscow to promote instability in these places and the readiness of Baku to cooperate in such an effort. How far either will go is uncertain, but this is a classic example of how Moscow is using others to try to undermine the Western powers. 

Moscow Furious Yerevan Delaying the Opening of Russian Consulate in Syunik/Zengezur

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova has expressed Moscow’s displeasure that Yerevan, having agreed in November 2022 to the opening of a Russian consulate in Kapan, the capital of Armenia’s Syunik Oblast and allowed an advance party to begin work in September 2023 is dragging its feet about the opening of the consulate.

            The issue is especially sensitive because Kapan is located at the eastern end of what Azerbaijanis refer to as the Zengezur corridor, which was supposed to be reopened to traffic, and because Iran already has a consulate there and Turkey is talking about opening one (svpressa.ru/politic/article/423442/).

            Russia has a consulate general in Gyumri, next to its military base; but Armenia has a far larger diplomatic presence in the Russian Federation: consulates in St. Petersburg and Rostov, diplomatic offices in Novosibirsk and Vladikavkaz and six honorary consuls as well. Consequently, Moscow feels well within its rights to press its case on Kapkan.

            But because Yerevan has been distancing itself from Russia, the Armenian authorities have apparently decided not to open a Russian consulate in Kapkan in the near future; and their decision, has made this issue of a consulate whose presence affects not only Armenia but Iran and Azerbaijan an extremely sensitive geopolitical one.

            Moscow is thus trying to force the issue, the Svobodnaya Presssa commentary says, confident that it will eventually get its way especially given that the West very much wants the Syunik/Zengezur corridor to open and might even see a Russian presence as making that more likely and a useful balance to the spread of Iranian influence.