Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 8 – Rafael Khakimov,
the head of the Kazan Institute of History and an advisor to former Tatarstan
President Mintimir Shaymiyev, says there are few radical Muslims in Tatarstan,
despite speculation to the contrary and that in Tatarstan, like other Muslim
lands with high levels of education and economic development “they are not so
influential”
In an interview coinciding with the six-month
anniversary of the murder of a Muslim leader in Tatarstan that led to
suggestions that the Islamic radicalism is spreading from the North Caucasus to
the Middle Volga, Kahkimov says that scholars who have examined that notion are
rejecting it out of hand (http://www.kazved.ru/article/43254.aspx).
It is
generally known, he told “Kazanskiye Vedomosti” yesterday that “radical attitudes
were brought in by those who studied abroad or grew up in a criminal milieu.” Many
Tatars still respect those with such training, but one has to ask “what can they
teach the people of Tatarstan?” with their tradition of tolerance and high
levels of education and development.
Khakimov
says that, especially in the six months since Valiulla Yakupov was killed, everyone
in Tatarstan has focused on this question. “No one has remained in one place,
not the force structures, not the government organs, and not scholars.” His
institute has “an entire department on Islamic studies” which invites senior
scholars from Moscow and abroad.
The Tatar academician says that “it
is very useful to compare the situation in Tatarstan with that in Daghestan,”
as many have done. There are some “similar
tendencies which cause concern, “but there are also significant differences”
which allow for greater optimism about developments in the Middle Volga.
Tatars, Khakimov continues, “are
going along a different path because our history and culture have been formed
differently. In Tatarstan, there are
strong defensive points for opposition to extremism … and the level of
education is high, which creates the basis for continuing the traditions of
Jadidism, that is, reformed Islam.”
He said that research points to “a
positive dynamic” in the region in this regard, “including the strengthening of
regional identity and mutual accord.” As a result, “the positions of [ethnic]
Russians and Tatars on the territory of Tatarstan are not significantly
different,” and that “while [a non-ethnic] Russian identity is not weakening,
the regional one is strengthening.”
“That is a very good sign,” the
Tatar scholar said.
What it means is that “Tatarstan
residents are ready to live here together and to build a future on the basis of
the conviction that this will be a stable region.” Moreover, in Tatarstan, “even
the mentality of [ethnic] Russians is distinguished from the all-Russian
situation where intolerance to other ethnic communities continues to grow.”
According to Khakimov, sociological
work in the republic shows that approximately three to four percent of the
republic’s Muslims regularly go to mosque, about the same percentage as among
Orthodox Russians. “Atheists form no
more than one percent,” And that “95 percent” are thus just like everyone else.
“We work, we study, we teach. We
raise children and we earn our living.
And that was always the way it has been,” the scholar sad. “Who of us really believes is a separate
question,” noting that he “considers himself a real Muslim but doesn’t go to
mosque.” And he says he told a mufti who objected that “my mosque is my
computer.”
“If you serve the people” by
scholarship or anything else, Khakimov suggests, “then that is your devotion to
Allah. The Prophet Muhammed said: the
entire world is a mosque. Some may feel the need to pray collectively. That is
their choice, but no one can force me to do the same thing.”
In Tatarstan, the scholar points
out, “traditional Islam means jadidism, which spread among the Tatars and
Bashkirs beginning in 1804. By the beginning of the 20th century,
jadidism dominated 95 percent of the mosques in that region. It passed into
contemporary Tatar culture” and remains at the core of who and what Tatars are.
Kadimism, which opposed the jadids, “did
not make a contribution to Tatar culture,” but some of its followers did make a
lot of money as informers for the police.
Radicals within Islam, including the Salafites
today, are distinguished by the fact that “they do not recognize any
compromises. We say that we have liberal Islam and recognize differing opinions.
But the radical says if you do not recognize my view, then you are an enemy and
we can do with you as we like because you are outside the law.”
You can’t compromise with such people,
Khakimov says, because they reject compromise as a matter of principle, but you
can use public opinion to pull the ground out from under them. Indeed, the mobilization of public opinion is
“the best weapon” that can be deployed against the radicals.
Khakimov says that he “believes in the traditions
of reformed Islam and that they have deeply penetrated into the mentality of
the Tatars. Changing them would be
difficult. Nevertheless, one needs to
devote more attention to propagandizing these traditions.” Unfortunately, he
adds, Islamic sites today on the Internet aren’t much help.
That means Tatarstan must continue to
rely on education. It is “key” to the future not only of Tatarstan but of all
developed lands. The Kazan leadership
understands that but some in the population do not. A 1996 poll found that the population believed
that development of oil should be the top priority and education should be the
last.
In fact, just the reverse should be the
case. Oil is “not a good thing; it is a
test. “Where there is oil, there are wars and blood, the degradation of the
nation and a parasitic way of life. Development
is nowhere to be found.” Shaymiyev understood that, and he unlike some others
has pushed for developing education and a high tech economy rather than oil
alone.
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