Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 19 – On April 18,
1990, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev imposed an economic blockade on
Lithuania, an action that harmed the USSR as much as it hurt Lithuania but that
did nothing to dissuade Lithuanians from seeking the recovery of their
independence – a reminder of the limits of economic actions when a people is
committed to political goals.
Following the victory of the Sajudis
movement in the elections for the Supreme Council of Lithuania at the end of
February 1990, the Lithuanian parliament declared the restoration of the
independence on March 11, pointing out that the Soviet constitutions allowed union
republics to leave the USSR if they chose to do so(ru.delfi.lt/news/politics/25-let-nazad-gorbachev-vvel-ekonomicheskuyu-blokadu-litvy-so-storony-sssr.d?id=67742136).
Four days later, Moscow’s answer
arrived: The Soviet government said that such an exit could be possible only
after a new Soviet law governing such a step was adopted. Gorbachev for his
part publicly called for talks, even as he was conducting secret negotiations with
Lithuanian Communist Party head Algirdas Brazauskas concerning independence.
The Lithuanians refused to back down
and so Moscow issued an ultimatum on April 13: drop all talk about independence
or face economic sanctions in the form of a blockade. Again, Vilnius did not
retreat, and the Soviet government introduced sanctions against Lithuania as of
April 18.
The Soviet blockade of a republic
Moscow viewed as being part of the USSR began with restrictions on the supply
of oil and gas to Lithuania, then other products and raw materials were added.
Not surprisingly, prices for these goods shot up and forced the Lithuanian
Supreme Council to introduce rationing. Gorbachev then introduced a naval
blockade there.
But the Soviet blockade quickly
backfired on Moscow, not only because it limited the Soviet government’s
ability to supply the non-contiguous Kaliningrad oblast but also because
Lithuania stopped providing electricity to Soviet army units on its territory
and sending goods to the USSR.
Nonetheless, the Soviet sanctions
bit and bit hard, and on May 23, the Lithuanian Supreme Council appealed to the
international community to consider
what Moscow as doing as “economic aggression” and thus a measure that was
equivalent to “any other form of aggression” against a foreign state.
Failing to get the support it hoped for, the Lithuanian
Supreme Council five weeks later, on June 29, declared a 100-day moratorium on
its March 11 declaration and called for negotiations with Moscow. These talks
led to nothing, and on December 28, the Council reinstated the March 11
declaration on the restoration of independence.
That
action led Gorbachev to send additional Soviet troops to Lithuania -- there
were already 100,000 there –to enforce the Soviet draft. But in fact, it was an
act of intimidation. Two weeks later, on January 13, 1991, those troops fired on
peaceful demonstrators at the Vilnius TV tower, killing 13 and ending any
chance that Lithuania would remain within the USSR.
This
history deserves to be remembered for its own sake, but it also should be
recalled for what it says about politics and economics. When a nation has decided on a political
choice, it may be quite prepared to suffer even the most severe economic losses
in order to achieve what it seeks.
That
is something all who believe that sanctions alone are sufficient to achieve
their political ends need to recognize. They
may be useful, but they are seldom as decisive in such circumstances as their
authors imagine.
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