Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 12 – Writing in Warsaw’s
“Gazeta Wyborcza” a week ago, Wacław Radziwinowicz argued that Moscow’s victory in
World War II has become „the new civic religion” in Russia, a suggestion that
has provoked a strong negative reaction in that country with many Russians
saying that the Polish journalist had insulted their national history.
On April 1, Radziwinowicz, the
Polish paper’s chief Moscow correspondent, wrote in advance of the May 9 commemorations
that „the cult of a Victory of 70 years ago – a word which in Russia is always
written with a capital letter has been converted into the basis of a civic
religion, an indisputable dogma which the state, law and church guard with all
their strength” (wyborcza.pl/magazyn/1,144507,17700646,Niepokalane_rosyjskie_zwyciestwo.html#TRwknd).
His
article attracted the attention of many Russian media outlets, with some
Russians indicating in their comments that they agreed with the Polish writer
but with most sharing the views captured in the title of one article „A Polish
Journalist Pours Dirt on Russian History” (newsland.com/news/detail/id/1525505/).
Radziwinowicz
has now discussed both his argument and the Russian reaction to it with Anna
Plotnikova, a correspondent for VOA’s Russian Service, who also interviewed
Nikita Petrov, a historian with Moscow’s Memorial organization (golos-ameriki.ru/content/russia-poland-parade/2714241.html).
The Polish correspondent tells VOA
that what is happening with Victory Day is the result of Russia’s losses in the
oil and gas wars, the collapse in the price of oil and the decision of Europe
to find other sources for its energy needs.
“Therefore,” Radziwinowicz says, „the Russian
authorities have hurried to find for theselves another source of their own
legitimacy, and such a source has been found in the form of the mobiliation of
society.” He adds that in his opinion, „now Russian society is ready for war.”
The Kremlin has concluded that the
West is not prepared to use force against it, but Moscow has not missed a
chance to talk about its „nuclear potential” and readiness to „’defend
compatriots abroad,’ even if the latter do not ask to be defended.” Thus, this
cult is preparing Russians for another war.
„The ideological foundation for the mobilization
of its own population and the show of force is provided,” the Polish journalist
says, by constant reference to the Great Fatherland War, a conflict that was
holy and without flaws „when all good was on our side and all evil on the side
of our opponents.”
And that imagery is maintained by sacrificing
accuracy: The American use of nuclear weapons against Japan, for example, is
considered a war crime even though „the Soviet Union was also at war with
Japan;” and Soviet attrocities in East Prussia are simply ignored or denied altogether.
Petrov agrees. “The Great Victory is all our tradition,
all our history. The Bolsheviks cut off Russians from the history of the people
before 1917. With them the October Revolution was still sacred. [But] to us now
the only things left to be positive about are … the taking of Berlin and the
flight of Gagarin. What else can we be proud of in the last century? Nothing.”
The
selective memory of Russians about the war and its consequences, he continues,
reflects the fact that they “cannot imagine” that East Europeans do not share
their views about the victory and are not grateful for the Soviet occupation. “’We
liberated them from fascism and shared with them what we had,’ they say.”
One
of the reasons for the rehabilitation of Stalin is that Vladimir Putin wants to
use the conflict and its outcome in the same way Stalin did, Petrov says, privatizing
and personalizing it to win unquestioned support. But the Kremlin doesn’t see that this will isolate
Russia from the West for a long time to come.
Radziwinowicz
for his part suggests that the West will view the rehabilitation of Stalin in a
dual way. On the one hand, Western public opinion will view this as evidence
that the Russians do not understand that one must not deify mass murderers. But
on the other, the Western expert community will dismiss it as only Putin’s
latest ideological trick.
Petrov says that the
future of the Cult of Victory and any possibility that it will cease to be “a
civic religion” for Russians depends not so much on the passing of time but on
the policies of the Russian government. At present, however, no change in those
policies appears to be in the offing.
Instead, the
Memorial leader says, the war that ended 70 years ago “will soon cease to be
the most important theme and its place will be occupied instead by contemporary
Russian policies that from hour to hour and day to day are becoming ever more
aggressive and worse.”
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