Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – “Political
modernization will not take place simply by adopting good laws,” Denis Sokolov
says. “It is also necessary to force armed elites to play by the rules;” and
the two means other countries have used to achieve that end currently seem
beyond the reach of Russia at least in the short term.
On the one hand, the sociologist
says, political modernization can happen “as a result of military and political
competition of approximately equal opponents … but this is long and expensive:
only pioneers have proceeded along this path” largely because they had no other
option (republic.ru/posts/90970).
And on the other, it can occur by joining one social
organization to another that has already made that transition either as a
result of occupation “or voluntarily for example, as a result of the exit from
the USSR of the three Baltic republics” which viewed their future as “a return
to their own history.”
As Sokolov observes, “already at the start of the 2000s,
former bandits and siloviki in the
Russian-speaking Estonian city of Narva transformed themselves into law-abiding
entrepreneurs and public politicians. Some even preferred to sit in jail but to
remain in a European jurisdiction whose norms and institutions were to a
significant degree borrowed from the EU.”
In some other post-Soviet states, there has been a more
even balance of government armed forces and armed groups beyond the state,
something that opens the way to modernization, but in Russia, “there are
practically no real forces beyond the limits of the ruling class” and that
makes change very difficult indeed.w
“The only active political machine in the country
consists of the regional administrations of the FSB, which control investigations,
the courts, the criminal world, officials including governors who control
financial flows and major business,” Sokolov says. By its methods and business
culture, this institution is like organized crime which has seized everything.
As a result, “the conditions for political modernization are
equal to the conditions for changing the rules of behavior in this society of
well-armed gentlemen, if one rephrases the words of Benjamin Franklin,” Sokolov
continues. “The next question is why do
the armed gentlemen need this?”
This “’Chekist order,’” he continues, “is a completely
new state. It is not the USSR and it is not criminal post-Soviet Russia.” Rather it is a police arrangement “in which
the monopoly on the use of force de facto is degrading to the heads of regional
FSB administrations” who are in a position to impose their will on government,
business and the criminal world.
Not surprisingly, the analyst says, neither business nor
the criminal world is very happy about that.
As one Daghestani observed, as long as this arrangement holds, “there
won’t be any capitalism here; there will be banditism under various sauces …
There is no sense in thinking in economic categories.”
Regional business is being bled out, as are regional
elites who are also angry that “Moscow has introduced external administration …
Putin is trying to raise the stakes, to freeze the entire ‘Rusisan world’ and to
keep things as they are for eternity.
But the ice is becoming shaky and this in my view is more dangerous for
the regime than a moderate fall in the price of oil or meetings against toxic
trash,” Sokolov says.
Whether or not regional elites and major
business leaders understand it or not, Sokolov says, “the only chance not
simply to maintain their holdings but to survive and transfer something to the
next generation is the destruction of the existing political system either by
decentralization or by “the shift to independent judicial and force
institutions the functions of the defense of the individual, private property,
contracts, civil freedoms, and transparent elections.”
“The direct import of institutions
of this kind today has become possible as a result of the development of
communications and the choice of good institutions has ceased to be a political
question,” he says. All the things mentioned above “are not a question of
politics but rather attributes of contemporary society, like a smartphone or
links to the Internet.”
According to Sokolov, “Russian
Guards in helmets and Cossacks with whips can be a symbol of the state only for
the older generation. For young people, this is a zoo with strange animals and
a meeting is simply a dangerous safari.”
Because that is so, Russia’s regional elites and businesses will have to
act sometime in the ways the Baltic republics already have – or face the
prospect that they will disappear altogether.
In the face of the center’s efforts
to subordinate everything to itself by sending outsiders to rule in the regions,
“regional criminal networks, entrepreneurs connected with them and leaders of protest
movements are a potential political machine of decentralization,” Sokolov
continues.
“The paradox is that all that Moscow
can do to keep things as they are will only bring the demise of its political
system closer,” as is already on view in some of the republics of the North
Caucasus. Indeed, if the Kremlin sends
more money for infrastructure and the like as Putin says it will, that will be
stolen by these counter-elites and used to strengthen them, not Putin.
Sanctions will hurt local business, and
technological progress will eliminate the borders between regions and the
outside world, “guaranteeing local political sovereignty” as local players
enter the global marketplace. That too
is beginning to happen in Russia, Sokolov suggests.
But the most important reason for
expecting a transition of the kind he has described, Sokolov says, is that it
will allow many people to earn more money. “This argument in practice is much
stronger than any humanitarian goals.” Against that desire, “no archaic and
criminal machine will be able to stand for every long.”
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