New Law Depriving Political Emigres of Civil Rights Directed against Those Still Living in Russia, Martynov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 5 – The new law pushed through the Duma rapidly and quickly signed by Putin which strips Russian political emigres of many of their civil rights is in fact directed even more at those still living in Russia, according to Kirill Martynov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

            Indeed, he says, “the target audience of the new law  is 140 million people living in Russia” because the measure issued “before the elections” has the effect of creating “a legalized fear” of extrajudicial punishments beyond the scope of court decisions” (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/08/05/vechnye-vyrodki).

            As such, Martynov argues, groups of unnamed officials at the justice ministry who are responsible for maintaining the lists of those whose rights are limited can expand that list at will and thus they “perform the same function that the troikas played during the Great Terror.” For the moment, these new troikas aren’t depriving people of their real lives but only their civil ones.

            And consequently, the editor concludes, Russians can see that if the Kremlin is announcing such “vegetarian” techniques now, it may very well decide to make them something else after the September Duma elections are continued. That in itself produces fear among the population and generates more opposition to the government. 

Higher Education in Russia Now in ‘Systemic Crisis,’ Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 4 – Higher Education in Russia is now in a state of “systemic crisis,” according to Rostov sociologist Vitaly Kovalyov, with the state caring only about numbers and failing to come up with a new plan, students increasingly convinced they’ll get degrees without working very hard, and professors outraged by the decay around them.

            In a new article in Science, Culture, Society, the professor at the Southern Federal University notes that Moscow keeps pushing off the date for the introduction of some replacement of the Bologna system and seems to care only about retention and graduation rates (journal-scs.ru/index.php/scs/article/view/UFFHNM discussed at nakanune.ru/articles/124859/).

              Kovalyov interviewed students and faculty at a number of higher educational institutions and found that the former felt that they couldn’t be expelled lest the institution’s numbers would look  bad and the latter that this was forcing universities to view students as “customers” above all else.

              Half of the teaching staff told him that they have “lost their freedom” in making decisions and just under a third (31 percent) said the quality of staff was declining as a result. According to Kovalyov, the more qualified the professors, the more intensely such feelings were held.

              Only if the government recognizes that it needs highly skilled professionals and changes its educational model, the sociologist concludes, will Russia get the people it needs to ensure that its economy will grow and the country will prosper. Just putting up rosy statistics as now isn’t going to work. 

Single-Person Households in Russia Increasing Rapidly at Both Ends of the Age Spectrum, Institute of Sociology Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 4 – The number of single-person households in Russia is increasing rapidly both because of the share of younger Russians who have never married and that of older ones who are living longer even though their partners have died, according to the Moscow Institute of Sociology.

            Both are a matter of concern to the state. Fewer marriages among the young are further depressing the birthrate the Kremlin cares so much about , and that in turn is reducing the number of people who can help the older generation and forcing the government to spend more to compensate (ng.ru/economics/2026-08-04/1_9552_marriage.html).

            Census data show, Institute researchers say, that the number of never-married Russians increased from 70 per 1,000 in 2002 to 104 per 1,000 in 2020. The data also show that in 2002, 658 out of every 1,000 women over 70 were widows, with 427,000 of those aged 70 to 74 and more than 620,000 of women 75 and older.

            According to Oksanda Kuchmayeva, Ekaterina Vasiliyeva and Ekaterina Knyazkova, the share of single-person households has more than doubled in the last decade alone “with the greater number of people living alone found within the country’s working-age population.

            Among men, those under 45 dominate the category of those living alone; while among men, they are “typically widows over the age of 60. Thus most of the men living alone have never married, although a quarter of those doing so are divorced. Only one woman in five now living alone has never married.

            Among the young, Russians living alone have higher incomes, more space and higher expectations of what their lives should be like than those who don’t, the sociologists report.  Among the elderly, the reverse is true on all three metrics, the Institute of Sociology finds.

            One of the consequences of this trend, the sociologists point out is an increase in “the elderly dependency ratio and a projected increase in the state’s social obligations toward the support and servicing of elderly citizens living alone,” a large and growing problem for an already cash-strapped government.

In the Last Decades of Soviet Power, the KGB Used Movies and Books to Change Its Image and Win Support for the Organs, Mayofis Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 4 – Russian support today for the security services did not come out of nowhere in Putin’s time but rather was the result of the massive effort by the KGB in the final years of Soviet power to recast the organs not as the feared representatives of the Stalinist state but as the defenders of the country and its population.

            That is the conclusion Maria Mayofis, a Russian historian of culture now teaching an Amherst College in the United States, draws in a detailed new article for the Important Stories portal (istories.media/opinions/2026/08/04/nash-otvet-bondu-kak-kgb-menyal-svoi-obraz-s-pomoshchyu-kino-i-knig/).

              She says that according to documents from the Lithuanian Special archive analyzed in 2017, this secret plan to redefine the image of the KGB was outlined as early as 1963, a decision she suggests was prompted by the fact that by the late 1950s, the very word “chekist” had become almost a term of abuse.  

              The KGB supported the production of books and movies, Mayofis says, “to explain to the mass viewer and reader what the KGB did, to show that work in it was important and honorable, to show who in the modern world is dangerous and why, and to convince people that only state security can eliminate such dangers.”

              Exploiting Russian interest in Western entertainment figures, like James Bond, the KGB operatives sough to present “the Soviet intelligence officer is primarily an intellectual: his weapon is not a physical force or technical innovations like Bond, but rather analysis, memory, endurance, composure, multiplied by personal courage.”

              But beneath all this was the message that Russian security services were not only essential to the survival of the country but were always right, even when the political leadership of the country ignored them as Stalin ignored warnings from Soviet agents that Germany was about to attack the USSR.

              That this image has survived helps to explain Putin’s power, especially now when representatives of the security services like him are in the top positions of the Russian government. 

Siberians Now Search 50 Percent More Often than People West of the Urals Do for Information about MIAs in Ukraine War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 3 – Moscow works hard to hide information about things it doesn’t want anyone to know both from its own people and from the outside world; but in many cases, the central Russian government fails in this effort because it unwittingly allows the release of information that reveals much about what it is trying to hide.

            The latest example of this concerns MIAs in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Moscow hasn’t been willing to publish data about them, but those who search for information via Yandex about MIAs have found a treasure trove of information that speaks volumes about the regional recruitment and losses in the Russian Federation (baikal-stories.media/2026/08/03/bez-vesti-propal-na-svo/).

            Prior to the summer of 2023, the data show, almost no one asked Yandex for citations about MIAs; but now more than 100,000 people are doing so every month with this metric reaching 116,000 in June 2026 alone. That figure understates the numbers, of course, because people ask for information in various ways.

            But the figures one can obtain in this way are striking: People east of the Urals ask for information 50 percent more often than do Russians on average, with residents of Buryatia doing so 4.5 times more often than this average, while residents of Moscow and Moscow region ask about MIAs only half as often as the all-Russia average.

            That reflects the higher number of soldiers sent to Ukraine from Siberia and the Far East in general and Buryatia in particular and the far lower numbers dispatched there from the city of Moscow and the surrounding Moscow Oblast, thus confirming stories about the pattern of recruitment but also showing where anger about MIAs is likely to be greatest.

            More than that, this report should serve as a reminder to everyone that when Moscow stops publishing data, there often are alternative workarounds that allow observers to get the information they seek. 

Six Years Ago, Bashkirs Showed Power of Protesters who Demand the Russian Authorities Live Up to Their Own Laws

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 3 – Six years ago, the people of Bashkortostan came out in defense of Kushtau, a mountain that has been part of their national space for centuries; and they did so not by means of a frontal attack on officialdom but by demanding that the authorities live up to their own laws.

            Remarkably, they won, although their protests, unlike those taken in the name of the defense of the environment or of religious interests, the ones in Bashkortostan have attracted far less attention since they don’t fit into the idea of many about what a protest in Russia should be (nemoskva.net/2026/08/03/kushtau-zhivi-3-avgusta-godovshhina-protestov-protiv-vyrubki-shihana-kushtau/).

Many environmental movements arise because of a threat to the well-being of the people who live in an area. That was the case at Shiyes. Others appear because they affect places that have a religious or ethnic significance that people want to preserve or revive, as in many parts of the Russian North and the North Caucasus.

            But the case of the movement around Kushtau, a mountain in Bashkortostan, the situation was different and more complicated; and the reasons that the protesters, although powered by ethnic concerns, have achieved at least a partial victory is that they invoked federal laws to protect their republic against its own rulers.

            Bashkir activists were very clear that those seeking to defend Kushtau didn’t do so for religious reasons as some Russian commentators have insisted, pointing out that Muslims have no tradition of defending such a geographic landmark (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/08/status-of-bashkir-language-also.html).

            At the same time, these activists generally conceded that the development of the mountain by a soda company would not have a direct negative impact on the population around it. There would be some damage to rivers and to the range of plant and animal life but not necessarily a disaster to the Bashkir population.

            Given that thousands of protesters have come out to oppose the development of  Kushtau and more than 10,000 have signed a petition against that move, the question inevitably arises: “why is this Bashkir mountain so important” for Bashkirs?  The answer, Vasilia Yagodina of Knife Media says, is instructive (knife.media/kushtau-ecology/).

            More than two hundred million years ago, what is now Bashkortostan was covered by a Urals Sea. The four isolated mountains (shikhans) are the ancient reefs from that sea, and they can be seen from almost anywhere in the republic, thus making them symbolic of Bashkortostan in a way that Ararat is for Armenia.

            Originally, there were four shikhans, Kushtau, Orkatau, Toratau, and Shakhtau; but during Soviet times, the last was destroyed by being mined for soda. Now, Bashkirs fear that the development of Kushtau in the same way will cost them an important symbolic part of their national landscape.       

            Over the last two decades, scholars in Bashkortostan have sought to document the flora and fauna that are unique to that place and that would be lost if Kushtau were to disappear under industrial development. Their work has been widely covered in the Bashkir media, and Bashkirs know far more about the mountain’s ecology than many, including the government, think.

            They know that if these plants and animals are destroyed, they won’t be replaced; and they know that if yet another shikhan is reduced to nothing, they will lose something that has been part of their physical and mental maps for hundreds if not thousands of years, Yagodina continues.

 

            But they know something else that Ufa appears to have forgotten: the destruction of these forms of life and the environment which supports them is a violation of at least two federal laws, “On the preservation of the environment” and “On the animal world.” Consequently, they believed they could use Moscow laws against republic leaders.

            They want all three of the remaining shikhans to become a protected area and national park, and the strength of their protests forced Ufa to promise that, although in the years since, the authorities have not kept their promises, something that has kept the Kushtau issue at the center of Bashkir thinking.

Putin has Learned Three Important Lessons from World War I, Gayvoronsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 3 – Many commentators now draw parallels between Putin’s war in Ukraine and World War I, Konstantin Gayvoronsky says; but they typically fail to see that it is the three lessons the Kremlin leader has clearly drawn from that conflict that are already defining the Kremlin leader’s policies.  

            First of all, the Russian military historian now in emigration says that Putin has clearly learned a lesson Tsar Nicholas II did not: it is a major mistake to mobilize too many people lest doing so put strains on the country beyond its capacity to bear  (themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/03/putin-can-learn-3-big-lessons-from-world-war-one-a93402).

As even analysts at the time said, the tsar had mobilized three or four times more people than he should have and even suggested that a much smaller Russian force would have had a much greater opportunity to hold out and win than the behemoth he put in the field and then saw his empire dissolve.

Second, the Kremlin leader has learned that the legislature can turn against the ruler “at the world possible moment.” As Gayvoronsky observes, “the February Revolution in Russia did not begin when soldiers sent to suppress unrest in Petrograd shot their officers … it began when the Provisional Committee of the Duma proclaimed itself the new authority there.”

            By doing so, he argues, the Duma “legitimized the soldiers’ revolt across the country” and transformed “the supreme command briefly into an independent political actor,” forcing the tsar to abdicate. Putin has done everything possible to geld the current Duma and ensure no deputy will ever ask as Milyukov did “is this stupidity or is this treason?”

            Second, the Kremlin leader has learned that the legislature can turn against the ruler “at the world possible moment.” As Gayvoronsky observes, “the February Revolution in Russia did not begin when soldiers sent to suppress unrest in Petrograd shot their officers … it began when the Provisional Committee of the Duma proclaimed itself the new authority there.”

            And third, he has learned that it is critically important to his political survival that no general become a charismatic competitor lest such a military leader be able to mobilize troops and public opinion against the Kremlin leader and his regime. Nicholas II made a mistake in that regard but one not nearly as serious as Kaiser Wilhelm did.

            Putin understands as Wilhelm did not that “over time, a popular commander becomes not an asset but a threat. Indeed, it is not even clear which is more dangerous: to win with such a Hindenburg or to lose without him. So there will be no Hindenburg [under Putin] Indeed, there will not even be any new Brusilovs or Kornilovs in his war.

            “What will happen next, we do not know,” the Russian historian acknowledges. “But there certainly will be no analogue to February 1917 in Russia or November 1918 in Germany.” Putin learned enough not to make the mistakes of either of the rulers whose regimes collapsed at that time.

Soviet-Era ‘Sausage Trains’ are Returning in Updated Form, ‘Altyn Orda’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 2 – In Soviet times, people living in rural areas often took trains to distant cities in order to get butter, sausage and other foodstuffs that they could rarely find in their villages and towns. This practice became so widespread that Soviet citizens typically referred to the vehicles carrying them as “sausage trains.”

            Now, the Kazakhstan’s Altyn Orda portal says, “the sausage trains are back” in the form of cars and buses carrying Russians not into cities in their own country but instead into neighboring ones like Kazakhstan for gasoline and food (https://altyn-orda.kz/putin-vernul-rossii-kolbasnye-poezda-teper-rossiyane-edut-za-benzinom-i-produktami-v-kazahstan/

            The portal says that “in the summer of 2026, residents of the Samara, Saratov and Orenburg regions began to increasingly come to Kazakhstani gas stations. Particularly noticeable is the flow of cars with Russian numbers in Uralsk and other border cities” in northern Kazakhstan.

            The reason this is happening is “extremely simple” – gas in Kazakhstan is almost half the price of gas in the Russian Federation and there are no long lines at as stations, except perhaps when cars from the Russian Federation arrive in larger numbers than anyone anticipated.  

            The picture of Russian cars crossing the border to buy gas in Kazakhstan is “almost symbolic: a country that has called itself an energy superpower for decades has to send its citizens to find and buy gasoline” for their cars in neighboring countries – and while they are there, to buy food and other consumer products as well.

            Vladimir Putin has often spoken about “the return of Russia to its former greatness,” Altyn Orda says. And in one sense, he has “fulfilled this promise: Russia really has returned to the past,” including now with an updated version of the notorious “sausage trains” of the late Soviet period.

            “And while Russian television continues to defeat NATO, Europe and the entire collective West, residents of Samara or Orenburg are solving a much more practical task: travelling to Kazakhstan, refueling and loading the trunks of their vehicles with food products as well,” the portal says.

Russian Officials Increasingly Fining Muslims for Praying in Public, ‘Kavkaz-Realii’ Journalist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 3 – Even though Russian officials continue to refuse to build more mosques – the city of Moscow has only four for its more than two million Muslims – these officials are increasingly fining believers for praying in public, an action the authorities now describe as unauthorized missionary activity, Ekaterina Bezmenova says.

            The Kavkaz-Realii journalist says that without mosques to go to Muslims have little choice but either pray at home or in public places and notes that these actions are leading to the radicalization of Muslims who initially simply want to follow the requirements of their faith (svoboda.org/a/shtraf-za-namaz-kak-v-rossii-nakazyvayut-musuljman-za-ispolnenie-obryadov/33817398.html).

            Having surveyed the arrest and conviction of Russian Muslims for praying in public, frequently on the basis of denunciations, Bezmenova presents the results of her interviews with experts on Islam in Russia who are unanimous in suggesting that with such a policy the Kremlin is alienating Russia’s Muslims, including the man who only want to be able to pray in peace.

Kremlin's Promotion of ‘Civic Religion’ Emptying Out Orthodox Churches, Soldatov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 3 – Despite being at war, something that usually drives up church attendance, Russian Orthodox Churches are drawing ever fewer attendees at services, the result, Aleksandr Soldatov says, of Kremlin's promotion of Orthodoxy as a “civic religion” with ever less religious content or concern about church attendance.

            As a result, the Novaya Gazeta commentator who specializes on religious questions says, this year for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union, a majority of Russians say they never attend religious services, and supermajorities of young people say the same thing (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/08/03/kopipastva).

            Initially, Patriarch Kirill tried to hide this development by photoshopping pictures of church services that appeared to be overfilled with worshippers; but that began an embarrassment as the parishioners shown came to be known as “copies.” But his concern has diminished as the church has become increasingly funded by the state.

            Consequently, the fact that attendance is down so far doesn’t appear to worry him as much as it did a decade ago; and such photo-shopping has come to an end, Soldatov says.  And the empty churches are there for all to see, especially as government television channels routinely broadcast pictures of services at major and some minor churches.

            According to Soldatov, there are three major reasons why church attendance in Russia has fallen so far. First, for many Russians, Orthodoxy is now a civic identity rather than a religious commitment, the result of the Kremlin’s promotion of the church as one of the ties linking Russians together but not doing the same for the faith behind such churches.

            As a result, many Russians who don’t believe in Orthodoxy or even in God but who came to churches in the 1990s as a kind of protest against Soviet atheism say they are Orthodox but don’t attend services, something that has transformed Orthodoxy from a religion in many cases to a political marker alone.

            Second, the covid pandemic got Russians used to not attending church and many who did so up to that point have not gone back even when one might think that likely given the travails brought on by Putin’s war in Ukraine and the traditional choice of a people at war to seek solace in the church.

            And third, Soldatov adds, there is an international trend away from traditional religiosity and church attendance, one that Russia has been affected by not least by the decision of the powers that be to publish translations of books published in the West that have sought to explain or even promote that trend.

Anxiety among Russians Returning to Record Level of End of 2022, New Poll Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 1 – After Putin declared a mobilization in October 2022, 70 percent of Russians reported that they or their acquaintances were feeling anxious. Thereafter, the share doing so fell significantly; but now it has risen to 57 percent, according to polls by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM).

            The new figure is not only the highest since the end of 2022 but was three percentage points higher than a week earlier, likely the result of drone attacks and talk about the likelihood of a new mobilization after the Duma elections (fom.ru/Dominanty/15365 and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/08/01/trevoga-sredi-rossiian-vernulas-k-urovniu-dekabria-2022-goda-news).

            Among the events that Russians told FOM in a separate poll that they currently are most focused on were the war in Ukraine (43 percent) including drone attacks on targets in the Russian Federation (18 percent), drone attacks on Wildberries warehouses (10 percent), fuel prices and shortages (8 percent).

            Russian commentators suggest that the most recent increase in anxiety won’t be reversed anytime soon, with Ekaterina Schulmann saying that “we’re going for a record” in the near future (t.me/eschulmann/9086) and Ilya Grashchenkov saying no one should be surprised by the rise in anxiety levels given what is in the news (t.me/thegraschenkov/7026).

Russia’s Future will Be Result of Competition between Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces, Zubov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 2 – Just as was the case in 1991 when Soviet citizens voted for reviving the Soviet system and then a few months later supported the disintegration of the country, Andrey Zubov says, the future of the Russian Federation will be the outcome of competition between centripetal and centrifugal forces, Andrey Zubov says.

            At present, the Russian historian who now teaches in the Czech Republic says, there are forces pushing Russia in both directions, toward some kind of new unity and toward dissolution. How that will play out is uncertain (svoboda.org/a/rossiyane-do-sih-por-schitayut-sovetskuyu-vlastj-svoey/33820243.html).

            Many residents of the Russian Federation still view the Soviet Union as “their own,” Zubov says; and thus, they want to maintain or even expand Russia back to what it was. At the same time, however, many do not and seek the dissolution even of the Russian state into a number of new countries.

            For many, an empire is attractive “for the simple reason that in it you can dominate another person, people, social group and force them to do not what they want but what you do,” he continues. “This is the greatest pleasure, one even more captivating than sexual feelings” and so it retains support even when others reject the empire so they can live by their own rules.

            Many Russians remain attracted to an imperial arrangement, Zubov argues, and view the state as a means of maintaining their control. Only when they begin to see the state as a threat to themselves, as something they are not part of, do they change and seek a new arrangement for themselves if not yet for others.

            If that happens, and Russians realize that the state is not theirs but an alien force imposed on them as much as on others, he says, “then the liberation of Russian society will begin.”

            In the course of the interview in which he made that argument, Zubov made three others which deserve to be mentioned:

·       First, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is one of the key forces supporting the maintenance of the state and empire because of its tradition of servility; and fhe Kremlin does everything it can to keep it that way.

·       Second, when Putin passes from the scene, the government in Russia “will become different almost immediately,” seeking an end to the war in Ukraine and the restoration of relations with the West. No one besides Putin benefits from those things, but that doesn’t mean the essence of the state will change.

·       And third – and this may be Zubov’s most important insight – veterans returning from the war in Ukraine are likely to prove “mostly incapable of action” and won’t threaten the Kremlin; but those still fighting in Ukraine are “capable of more” and “a revolt at the front” is far more likely and a far greater threat.

Kremlin Stepping Up Pressure on Universities to Get More Men for Putin’s War as Part of Broader Effort to Block ‘a Generational Revolution,’ Vakhstayn Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – The Kremlin has increased its control of higher educational institutions not just to secure more men for its armed forces now fighting in Ukraine but also and perhaps more importantly to prevent the emergence of “a generational revolution” that could challenge Putin, according to Viktor Vakhshtain.

            The Russian sociologist who left Russia in 2022 and now  teaches and does research in Israel says that the changes that had taken place in Russian universities in recent decades have led the Kremlin to “view universities not as centers of scholarship but as sources of an existential threat to state stability” (echofm.online/news/rossijskie-vlasti-usilivayut-kontrol-nad-vuzami-chtoby-izbezhat-pokolencheskoj-revolyuczii-viktor-vahshtajn).

"Everyone understands perfectly well that a university—including a Russian one which has enjoyed 25 years of autonomy—is actually a highly resistant structure,” Vakhstayn says. “You can’t simply remove a rector and appoint a new one; even replacing half the governing body wouldn't work.”

“You have to use different tactics—for instance, by discrediting the administration in the eyes of the faculty and the faculty in the eyes of the students. In the past, if you went to the dean and said, 'Look, I think I’m about to be drafted; is there any way to schedule a retake so I can finish in time or perhaps avoid expulsion until the draft period ends?'’”

Until 2022, most deans “would try to ensure you didn't get expelled or conscripted,” the sociologist says. “Now, however, the dean receives a quota to send a certain number of people into the army.” As a result, students “probably wouldn't go to that dean with your problems anymore," the expert says.

In the pre-2022 period, students felt protected and thus became increasingly radical in their responses. Now, they know they aren’t going to be defended by their universities and that threats to them from state agencies are far greater. The Kremlin hopes that will keep them from radicalizing, although it is possible that it will do exactly the opposite.

 

Russia Responsible for 19 of 24 Cases of Pollution of the Caspian in June, ‘Transparent World’ Monitoring Project Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 1 – Russian coastal facilities were responsible for 19 of the 24 cases of pollution of the Caspian Sea in June by facilities in that littoral state, Azerbaijan for four,and Kazakhstan for one, according to a study based on satellite imagery the Transparent World in the Caspian Sea organization has carried out.

            Some of this pollution was the result of the draining of sewage into the sea, the group said; but most involved oil, including spills from ships and leakage from oil storage facilities and harbors (t.me/twworldkasp/5436 and svoboda.org/a/za-mesyats-v-kaspiyskom-more-zafiksirovali-24-sluchaya-zagryazneniya-boljshaya-chastj-u-beregov-dagestana/33819812.html).

            This study will exacerbate relations among the five littoral states, relations that are already fraught because of conflicts about the impact of reductions in the flow of rivers that help keep the Caspian from falling any more rapidly than it has been in recent years as a result of global warming.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks Giving New Impetus to Discussions about Moving Russian Capital to Siberia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – For more than a decade, Russian officials including those at the very top have been mulling the idea that if Russia is to make a new breakthrough in its development and be less integrated with the West, it needs to open “a window on Asia” analogous to the Window on Europe that Peter the Great did by establishing his capital in St. Petersburg.

            That is, Sergey Aksyonov of Svobodnaya Pressa says, Russia needs to decentralize the country’s economy and move the capital to Siberia, either by building up one of the existing cities there or creating an entirely new one analogous to what Peter the Great did when he established St. Petersburg as his “window on Europe” (svpressa.ru/economy/article/525545/).

            Of course, it would have been easier and better if this decision had been made calmly during the “fat” years when the Russian economy was growing rapidly rather than now when Ukrainian drones are raining down on the existing capital in Moscow,  the commentator says.

            But better late than never, he adds, even suggesting that interest in moving the capital has increased because if the political leadership moves, there will be less reason for enemies of Russia, Ukraine now but others in the future, to attack the city and thus allow it to remain the major economic center of the country.   

            Such a consideration will likely reduce the opposition many businesses are mounting to the idea of moving the capital, Aksyonov suggests; and so what has been an idea more or less at the margins of official discussions is now assuming a more central place – yet another consequence of the drone attacks on Russian thinking. 

Moscow’s Cutback in Release of Statistics Snowballing, as New Data Can’t be Released without Reference to Old Leading to Ever Larger Gap between Reporting and Reality

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Moscow has stopped releasing statistical data on a broad range of metrics especially since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine; and those cutbacks are now snowballing as the authorities end publication of more and more data sets and those they do release, which depend on suppressed data, are ever less accurate.

            During the first six months of 2026, the To Be Precise portal says, the Russian government stopped releasing data on the work of the courts and did not issue the bulletin on social supports (tochno.st/materials/suddep-perestal-obnovliat-dannye-o-rabote-sudov-a-na-emiss-aktualizirovali-vsego-54-pokazatelei).

            The loss of access to such data is serious, the portal says; but it points to another development which may prove even more consequential. Much new data on a wide variety of issues depends for its accuracy on comparisons with earlier data on the same subject. If the earlier data isn’t available, then soon such data sets can’t be released and now aren’t.

            That has enormous consequences for those seeking to analyze what is happening in Russian society, but another consequence that may prove to be even more serious happens when statistical organs release inaccurate data because they have to make estimates when the release of accurate date is stopped.

            That creates a situation where the difference between what the Russian government says and Russian officials and businessmen rely on and the real situation continues to grow,  something that introduces distortions in policies of all kinds as those involved assume that there are far more or far less of something than is in fact the case.

            That outcome will affect elections, draft quotas, production figures, and almost all issues where what the government or businesses do relies on data the government chooses to release, including data that by nature are inaccurate and becoming ever more so.

The Longer Putin Continues the War in Ukraine, the More Likely Ukraine will Become a Member of NATO, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – By launching and then carrying out his expanded war of Ukraine, Putin has not demonstrated his cleverness and strength but his weakness and cruelty, Abbas Gallyamov says (pointmedia.io/story/6a6c55e075d0d3346a25cb69). But more than that, by continuing the war, he is subverting his own purpose in launching it in the first place.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic, “if Putin had agreed to stop the war last year,” US President Donald Trump “would officially have denied Ukraine the chance to join NATO” (echofm.online/opinions/lechit-golovnuyu-bol-s-pomoshhyu-gilotiny).

            “If Putin were to stop the war right now,” Gallyamov continues, “the result would not be so obvious” as ever more countries in the West are ready to have Ukraine join the alliance given that Ukraine’s military successes would make it a valuable and welcome addition to NATO.

            But even more, the commentator says, “if Putin doesn’t stop right now, then in a year, NATO will ask Ukraine to join the alliance and Russia will not be able to prevent that from happening,” thus vitiating one of the key reasons Putin has given for carrying out his “special military operation” there. 

            The consequences of Putin’s miscalculations are already in evidence, Gallyamov argues. If he was afraid of having NATO approach Russia’s borders and that Ukraine would unleash a war against his country, “the worst has already happened;” and the longer the war goes on, the more Russia will suffer.

            “At the same time,” however, the commentator continues, “NATO did not ENTER the war – although the plight of the Russian army at some could it made it possible for the alliance to do so. This fact clearly proves that NATO was NOT GOING TO fight with Russia from the very beginning.”

            Thus, by going to war with Ukraine and continuing it for so long, Putin has “condemned his country to a strategic defeat. Russia is losing both in the east and in the west. In the east because Russia is tied down in a war; and in the West because Putin personally has opened the way to the revival of NATO and Ukraine’s membership in it.

In 2021, Moscow Focused on Blocking Registration of Opposition Duma Candidates; Now It is Doing More at Regional Level, ‘Horizontal Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – In the run up to the Duma elections in 2021, the Kremlin focused on blocking candidates it didn’t like from getting on the ballot, Horizontal Russia says. As a result, many independent-minded and even opposition-inclined candidates were able to run in regional and municipal elections.

            Already in tight control of the Duma candidate list, the Putin regime this time around has focused on imposing similar restrictions on regional and municipal balloting lest someone get on the ballot, win and then become a person around which people can mobilize against the Kremlin (semnasem.org/articles/2026/07/31/na-dalnih-podstupah).

            According to specialists on regional politics like Fyodor Krasheninnikov, the Kremlin’s fears in this regard are almost certainly exaggerated, those in power believe that they have an ideal opportunity to exclude from politics all who disagree anyone who is not happy either with Moscow or with Moscow’s agents in the federal subjects.

            There is another consequence of this shift, one that Horizontal Russia doesn’t address but that is critically important for shaping Western analytic opinion about what is going on. Because Moscow doesn’t have to do as much this time around to control the candidates for the Duma, its actions outside of Moscow as usual are getting less attention.

            And as a result, some may see the Putin regime as more successful in imposing its will and less likely to be increasing repression instead of being engaged in a real struggle for power at the regional and local levels where in fact, as Horizontal Russia documents, the Kremlin is if anything even more repressive this time around than last. 

Central Asian Countries have Exploited ‘Window of Opportunity’ Putin’s War in Ukraine has Given Them, Kyrgyz Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – Because Moscow has been focusing so exclusively on Ukraine since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, the countries of Central Asia have been able to address and solve issues that had long been considered too complicated” for any resolution, Adil Tudrukulov says.

            The five have exploited this “window of opportunity,” the Kyrgyz commentator says, to deal with complicated issues like border delimitation, building transport corridors, coordinating their policies with one another, and expanding ties with other world centers of power (exclusive.kz/ne-chuzhaja-vojna-kak-ukraina-izmenila-centralnuju-aziju).

            Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart took the lead in promoting a common front on foreign policy questions, Tudrukulov says; and Uzbekistan leader Shavkat Mirziyoyev served as “the architect of rapprochement” within the region. But the leaders of the other three countries in the region – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – have fully participated.

            The solution of many regional problems has further limited Russia’s influence in the region, given that many of them were of Moscow’s creation as part of its longstanding divide-and-rule strategy, the commentator continues, while acknowledging that Russian influence has not disappeared but rather has been limited by ties with other powers and a new self-confidence.

            Tudrukulov says that it remains to be seen what will happen once the war in Ukraine is concluded; but on the basis of the evidence he provides, when that does happen, one of the most important consequences of Putin’s war there may well be in Central Asia where countries are increasingly going their own way rather than remaining under Moscow.

            Indeed, the trends that the Kyrgyz analyst is pointing to mean that the war in Ukraine is yet another step toward the demise of the Muscovite empire, not only in Ukraine and not only in the former Soviet republics which gained independence in 1991 but in the other non-Russian state formations still under Moscow’s control. 

Udmurt Case Suggests Putin May No Longer Be as Committed to Naming Outsiders as Heads of Russia’s Federal Subjects

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – When Putin accepted the resignation of Udmurtia head Aleksandr Brechalov just before the Duma election and then named as his successor Olga Abramova, Russian analysts focused on the problems Brechalov has had in that Middle Volga republic and his much hinted at desire to move back to Moscow.

            But an émigré analyst suggests that the key to what has unexpectedly taken place at least as far as its timing is concerned may have been provided by Putin’s greeting to Abramova when he first met with her (wschody.net/game-changer-kak-kampaniya-za-nezavisimost-udmurtii-vybila-iz-kremlevskoj-kolody-regionalnogo-tuza/).

            When Abramova entered Putin’s office, Andrey Grigoryev says, the Kremlin leader greeted her with the words “you were born in Udmurtia, right? And then worked there almost all the time?” – inquiries that Putin may be more inclined to appoint locals as governors than he has up to now. 

            Not only does that background make Abramova very different from Brechalov who was parachuted into Udmurtia by Putin as what Russians call “a Varangian” or outsider, but it also and apparently not coincidentally comes after moves by the Udmurt opposition abroad to promote the idea that only Udmurts can understand Udmurt problems and only they have the right to resolve them.

            Earlier this summer, Grigoryev points out, “a group of political emigres from the republic initiative the Udmurtia is a Free Country campaign” to promote the idea that their homeland must escape from Moscow’s control. To that end, the group announced as an alternative to the Duma vote, the election of an independent council of the peoples of Udmurtia.

            That vote is slated to take place the same day Moscow will be holding all-Russian Duma elections; but this special Udmurt election will feature one major difference: Its organizers say that “only those who are directly related to Udmurtia and the Udmurt nation have the right to decide the fate of the republic,” the commentator says.

            Putin’s words to Abramova seem to be a kind of Kremlin response to this move and an indication that in the face of political pressure from below, the Russian president may be less committed to appointing outsiders than he has been up to now lest that practice spark more resistance to them and to himself than would otherwise be the case.

            If that proves to be the case, then what has happened in Udmurtia may be “the game changer” that Grigoryev suggests. 

Moscow Opposition Figures Tried to Tell Protesters at Shiyes How to Act, But the Latter Pursued Their Own Program and Won Out, Solovyova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Eight years ago, “one of the most high-profile, and most importantly successful protests in Russia began against the construction of a garbage dump at the Shiyes station” in Arkhangelsk Oblast, Elena Solovyova recalls. Their actions attracted the attention of people across Russia and around the world.

            But the Komi Daily journalist says that some Moscow liberals thought it was their job to tell the Shiyes protesters how to act. Fortunately, she continues, those taking part, from both the Komi Republic and Arkhangelsk Oblast, ignored that advice, continued on their own course, and won out (komidaily.com/2026/07/30/vosem-let-protestu-na-shiese/).

            Not everyone in Moscow behaved that way; but enough did, reflecting imperialist and paternalist attitudes of some of them to anyone from beyond the capital’s ring road that have limited the ability of many in Moscow to take seriously and work closely with people many Muscovites see as provincial.

            The Shiyes protests “revealed this colonial attitude very clearly,” Solovyova says. “And now, when eight years have past since they began, it is important to remember why the environmental protest against the construction of a trash dump became an anti-colonial one as well.”

            That the Putin regime and its supporters always viewed the Shiyes project as a colonial one was obvious from the beginning, she continues. Putin and his people talked about the need to shift trash away from where people lived and put It somewhere on the periphery.

            But they ignored the fact that there were people in precisely the areas Moscow wanted to put trash and that their interests needed to be protected to. That is what Shiyes showed, and that is why eight years on it must be seen as a powerful anti-colonial action, Solovoyova continues.

            Many Russian opposition figures in Moscow understand this, but a significant fraction of them still do not. They aren’t ready for people “from the provinces” to act on their own in defense of their interests and insist that such “second-class” people must subordinate themselves to the Moscow opposition.

            Had the protesters done so, they wouldn’t have created the powerful environmental defense party that these Muscovites promised. They would have given up without the victory that they won by continuing to protest. Looking back, Solovoyova says, that is what must be remembered now and in the future.

            For background on how environmental protests in regions became both political and more effective than what the Moscow opposition has tried, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/environmental-activism-often-seedbed-of.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/environmental-protests-in-russian.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/shiyes-protesters-victories-affecting.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/08/as-at-end-of-soviet-times-mass-actions.html.

Putin’s Much-Ballyhooed Pledge to Set Up Office to Help Russians Find MIAs Doesn’t have a Website, an Address or a Telephone Number, Soldiers’ Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Groups of Russians searching for relatives who are MIAs in Putin’s war in Ukraine have existed since that conflict exploded in 2022. Putin has responded by ordering the creation of a defense ministry office to help them, but that office, the Veter portal says, doesn’t have a website, a physical address or a telephone number.

            As such, it is so much “eyewash,” activists say that doesn’t help and relatives of MIAs who push for information are not given real help but instead often denounced as pro-Ukrainian disidents rather than genuinely patriotic Russians (veter.info/posts/p8LIsdJDgJbB and  novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/29/nagnetanie-chuvstva-zabroshennosti-i-bessiliia).

            As the war has continued and the Putin regime has adopted this stonewall approach, a new and large class of Russian citizens whose relatives have gone missing in action are increasingly alienated from the regime and speaking out in ever more radical ways.

            Russians are especially exercised by the failure of the Russian authorities to do more especially since Russian law and defense ministry regulations are very specific about the responsibilities of commanders and other authorities to go to extraordinary lengths to find those listed as MIAs.

            The powers that be aren’t doing so; and Putin’s promises, combined with the failure of the military to live up to its responsibilities and of the defense ministry to at least establish a website and phone number for those seeking information about such cases, are only adding insult to injury. 

Since 2022, Moscow has Sought to ‘Rebrand’ Jazz as an Authentic Part of Russian Tradition, Okhotenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – As Putin increased repression in the years before he launched his expanded war in Ukraine, “music emerged as one of the few remaining areas for public dissent,” Yana Okhotenko says; but  after 2022, the Russian music scene was “transformed” both as an instrument of state ideology and a form of personal expression.”

            In a lengthy article, the Russian musician now living in emigration offers an intriguing answer to the question: “If the state turns music into a weapon of propaganda, can music in turn become a weapon of protest?” (posle.media/article/russian-music-after-2022-between-propaganda-and-protest).

            After the expanded war began, the Kremlin stepped up its “demands not just for passive patriotism from its citizens – the silent loyalty that had once been enough no longer was – and insisted on active allegiance,” thus forcing musicians who had tried to remain apolitical to choose between working for there regime, actively opposing it, or choosing to emigrate.

            She gives numerous examples of how various musicians have navigated this divide but provides an especially intriguing example in how the Russian authorities have shifted in their treatment of jazz. “From the early 2000s until 2022,” she writes, jazz in Russia “thrived as part of an independent club and festival scene” closely integrated with western artists.

            But following the invasion, she continues, the regime redefined jazz not as a recent import but “as an authentically Russian tradition, downplaying the repression the Russian and soviet authorities had inflicted on it and even making the claim that “Russia has the coolest jazz musicians.”

            That is just one of the changes since 2022, Okhotenko says. Since then, “the Russian state has not only worked to reengineer the cultural landscape but also to systematically purge independent voices.” And is has come up with as strategy that makes protest by many musicians extremely difficult.

            This tactic consists of allowing musicians with opposition views to continue to perform alongside artists that the state approves of but not advertising the participation of the former in any advertising of the shows they are part of. Consequently, many Russian artists now are in a limbo: they can continue to perform but can’t count on reaching new audiences.

            Nonetheless, many Russian musicians have left the country since the expanded war n Ukraine began. According to estimates at the end of 2022, approximately 30 percent of Russia’s professional musicians have emigrated, sometimes to halfway houses like Armenia and Georgia and increasingly often to western countries.

            These artists face many problems including making a living and maintaining a distinct national identity while integrating with the music scene in the countries they now live in. Many continue to protest but their voices are mostly heard only abroad and only by those who already share their views, limiting their impact however much Western coverage they receive.

Crimes against Women in North Caucasus Seldom Reported or Investigated, Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Crimes against women, including violence within the family, rapes and honor killings are seldom reported in the North Caucasus because of fears of conflicts with families and society and, when they are reported, they are seldom investigated because officials don’t want to call attention to the problem.

            That is the unanimous verdict of the most important human rights groups working in the area, as summarized by Kavkaz-Uzel; and it explains why statistics about these crimes are completely unreliable and even have the effect of distorting all-Russian figures (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425319).

            As a result, the claims of the republic governments and even of Moscow about progress against such crimes should be treated with extreme skepticism and even disbelief, the activists say, because both social norms in the population and the calculations of officials mean that neither regional nor all-Russian figures are credible.

Kazakhstan’s Executive Branch Already Mono-Ethnic Kazakh and Its Legislative One has been Moving in That Direction, Asylbekov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Even though people who are not ethnic Kazakhs still form a quarter of the country’s population, the composition of officials in the executive branch of its government at both the center and in the region’s has become almost exclusively ethnic Kazakh and that of the legislative branch has been moving in that direction, Zhandos Asylbekov says.

            Unless this trend changes, it could exacerbate tensions in society, the head of the statistics department of Kazakhstan’s Procuracy says; but in the run up to the elections to the new unicameral legislature, it isn’t being discussed apparently because of “an unspoken taboo” (spik.kz/2667-najdutsja-li-v-kurultae-mesta-dlja-deputatov-nekazahov-i-skolko.html).

            Even in areas where ethnic Kazakhs form less than half of the population – Northern Kazakhstan and Kustanay oblasts – the minority majority of ethnic Russians and others is largely unrepresented in regional or even local executive branch positions, something non-ethnic Kazakhs have complained out, Asylbekov says.

            In the national legislature in the past, the share of non-ethnic Kazakhs has been less than their share of the population, although this metric as bounced around depending on the use of single member districts or party lists to determine outcomes, between 14 percent at its lowest point and “almost 30 percent” at its highest.

            The composition of the new single-member parliament will be determined exclusively by party list voting rather than single-member district majority voting and so that makes the decisions of the parties to include or not include non-ethnic Kazakhs on their lists critical.

            At present, most of these are far more ethnically Kazakh than is the population; and so it is likely but not certain that the new single-house parliament will be even more ethnic Kazakh than the current two-house one is and than the population is as well, Asylbekov says, noting that this could cause problems if that turns out to be the case.

Kazakhstan President Offers New Model for Dealing with Moscow, ‘Partnership without Political Alignment,’ Toyekin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – During his July 25 meeting with Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev offered a new model for non-Russian leaders dealing with Moscow: committing his country to “partnership” with Russia but not promising “political alignment” on all questions, Almat Toyekin says.

            The Kazakhstan analyst focuses on the way in which Tokayev acted; but perhaps indicative of his real goals in writing this piece, he placed it in the Caspian Post, an outlet devoted to South Caucasus affairs where Azerbaijan President Ilham Alyev has moved in a similar question (caspianpost.com/opinion/kazakhstan-s-message-to-moscow-partnership-without-political-alignment).

            What both Tokayev and Aliyev now offer is a new model of how the governments of the countries that gained independence in 1991 when the USSR disintegrated, one that represents a kind of halfway house between continuing subservience to Moscow that the Kremlin wants and the complete break with Moscow that many see as the only or at least ultimate pattern.

            Obviously, the Russian government will seek to limit movement in these directions; but by offering commitment to partnership without agreeing to support Moscow on all questions, many of these countries may find a way to navigate through what is a political minefield and prevent the Kremlin from taking more radical actions.

            Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are perhaps best equipped to strike out in this direction. They have large oil reserves, occupy portions of the geopolitical map especially important to both Russia and outside powers, and have been building up both their diplomatic and military strength.

            But they are not alone, and many of the others in the region may see what Tokayev and Aliyev are doing as an attractive next stage in their national life, one that may allow them to expand their independence from Moscow in a safer way than a clearer break with the past might allow.

            At the very least, this possibility deserves both attention and understanding, as the demise of the Russocentric empire continues. 

Only Four Percent of Russians Charged with Espionage or Treason had Access to State Secrets, ‘Vyorstka’ Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Only one in every 25 of people who have been charged by Russian prosecutors with espionage or treason – a mere four percent in all -- had access to state secrets before their arrests, according to a comprehensive study by Vyorstka of these cases, an indication of how Moscow is using an elastic definition against its opponents.

            Since the beginning of 2022, it says, Russian prosecutors have brought charges of high treason, espionage and cooperate with foreign states against at least 1904 individuals, the independent portal says, even though most have no connection with state secrets. Two thirds of them are Russian citizens; the remainder, Ukrainian ones.

(For Vyorstka’s extremely detailed 10,000-word report, perhaps the most comprehensive in the public domain, see verstka.media/issledovanie-vyorstki-o-presledovanii-po-delam-svyazannym-s-gosbezopasnostyu; for its highlights, see nemoskva.net/2026/07/29/lish-4-figurantov-novyh-del-o-gosizmene-imeli-dostup-k-gostajne/.)

            Not only have the use of such charges increased over the past four years but the severity of punishments have as well. In 2022, the average sentence on conviction for such trumped up charges was 12 years. So far this year Vyorstka reports, the average sentences has increased from that level by more than four years to 16.

            According to the investigation, members of Russia’s scientific community are especially at risk of facing such charges. Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, at least 15 of them have been accused of high treason. Two thirds of these were 60 or older at the time of their arrest.

Putin Restores Military Construction Battalions He Eliminated in 2006

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – As part of his most recent expansion of the size of the Russian military, Putin has restored the military construction battalions (stroybats) he disbanded in 2006. These institutions were notorious in Soviet times for their involvement with corrupt schemes and as places to keep non-Russian draftees away from a more active military role.

            The need for some kind of construction capacity in the military, of course, never disappeared; and in 2019, Moscow restored stroybats in all but name and in the view of critics for much the same reasons they existed in the Soviet military (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/12/notorious-soviet-style-construction.html).

            But now the Kremlin leader has formally restored them, nominally in order to cope with war damages especially from drone attacks as well as to create a ready reserve to fill losses at the front, according to Vladimir Mukhin, an observer for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru/armies/2026-07-28/1_9547_army.html).

            However, while Mukhin does not address this issue, the restoration of stroybats now may lead not only to a revival of the same abuses that happened before 1991 but also and perhaps more importantly to the creation of a new matrix for a broader militarization of Russian life.

            According to a recent Vyorstka analysis, such a militarization of what is now civilian life in the Russian Federation is one of the things many Russians now fear may take place following the Duma elections (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/07/russians-fear-kremlin-will-take-harsh.html).