Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Those who want to
see Russia become a democratic and law-based state after Putin must make it
clear they are calling for is “not a weak state after a strong autocracy” but
rather another kind of strong state based on politics and law but capable of
enforcing common rules for all, Irina Bursygina and Mikhail Filippov says.
Otherwise, these two Russian
analysts who now teach at Harvard and SUNY Binghampton respectively say, the
widespread fear among Russians that what the democrats seek is a weak state
unable to hold the country together and will continue to support autocracy (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/25/silnii-tsentr-kak-nedostayuschii-element-demokraticheskoi-alternativi-a196196).
Putinism, Bursygina and Filippov
say, “offers a politically understandable answer to Russian fears of a weak
center and more broadly of a weak state,” but “this answer not only destroys
political freedom but has other destructive consequences.” Consequently, those
who want democracy in Russia must offer a different but clear and
understandable answer.”
That answer, they argue, must call
for the creatio questionn of a strong state “together with politics and not
instead of that;” and a failure to come up with this answer and promote it will
leave the democrats without the allies they would otherwise have and ensure
that the supporters of autocracy will have more support than they should.
This view is held not just by Putin
but by a large number of Russians as a result of the events of the last 35
years. It is widely held because it is convincing … “The weakening of the
center is thus equated by supporters of the status quo as a weakening of the
state as such,” and therefore even many who don’t like Putin’s approach don’t
see an alternative.
What those who want to see a
law-based state with democracy and real federalism need to convince such people
of is that it is possible to make the government responsive to the people and
the laws institutions formulate but at the same time not making is weak,
something many Russians do not yet accept.
Byrsygina and Filippova say that “a
strong state after reforms is not a state which controls all political and
economic processes. Rather it is a state capable of maintaining a common space
of rules, ensuring the carrying out of decisions, resolving conflicts among
major interest groups, and not becoming a hostage to more powerful coalitions.”
Putinism by its authoritarianism and
suppression of politics addresses these problems in its own way and appears to
many to be “a practical resolution” of them. But it not only fails to do that
but creates a situation in which the state, however powerful it may appear, in
fact suffers from serious problems, they continue.
Having suppressed political
activity, they continue, the Russian state in its Putinist variant “loses not
only accountability but the capacity for self-correction” given that
“institutions deprived of autonomy ever more poorly send up bad news and
correct mistakes,” and the supposedly strong center operates increasingly blind
to what is happening.
“The war against Ukraine, Bursygina
and Filippov argue, “is the most vivid manifestation of this defect, a failure
of the Putin model even when judged by its own criteria.” Indeed, the Kremlin’s
unwillingness to listen to anything but echoes of itself has resulted in “a
monumental error” with far-reaching consequences.
Those who want to see democracy and
rule of law come to Russia not only must overcome the fears of many Russians
that moves in that direction will result in a weakened rather than strengthened
state, the two continue; and that as a result, what reforms are calling for
will open the way to the disintegration of the state followed by a recrudescence
of authoritarianism.
There are, of course, reasons for
such fears. The restoration of democracy requires that new players enter the
political sphere; but many of them will do so without the constraints that
limit such players in established constitutional systems – and as a result,
there is a danger that they will go too far at a time when the state has not
evolved in ways to limit such outcomes.
“This dilemma,” the two analysts
argue, “is most clearly evident in the relationship between the central
government and the regions” and in Russian fears about federalism undermining
the state. In fact, “federalism doesn’t equal a weak state: on the contrary,
federalism requires the simultaneous existence of a strong central authority
and strong regional elites.”
That is the lesson that can be drawn
from existing successful federations; but it is not one that most Russians have
accepted. They believe just the opposite. “Politically speaking,” Bursygina and
Filippov say, “the extent to
which these fears are rational is of little consequence; what matters is their
persistence.”
“Consequently, any federalization initiative
that fails to articulate the nature of a strong, democratic central government
inevitably narrows the coalition of support for reform from the start: regional
elites fear regulatory uncertainty; business fears asset redistribution; the
bureaucracy fears a loss of governability; and the general public fears a
return to chaos.”
What is critical then is that the advocates
of democracy, rule of law and federalism need to change the way the question
about the future of the country is posed. “The dispute is not taking place
between a strong authoritarian government” as Putin would have it “and a weak
democratic one. It must be between two models of a strong state.”
Unless the debate is reframed in that way,
those advocating democracy and rule of law are likely to find the battles ahead
far more difficult to win; and those who want something like the Putinist
status quo will find it far easier to mount a defense against any change either
now or when Putin leaves the scene.
