Kazakhstan and Other Caspian Littoral States Challenge Russian Dominance of Merchant Shipping There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – As important as Kazakhstan’s naval force on the Caspian has become as a counterbalance to Russia’s, its expansion of its merchant fleet that will carry cargo to and from its ports to the western and southern sides of that inland sea may be even more important not only for its ties with China and the West but as a means to be more independent of Moscow.

             In the past year, Astana has added eight new cargo ships to its merchant fleet, vessels that will not only carry cargo across the Caspian but also on the inland rivers of that land-locked Central Asian country. And to ensure they can operate, it has launched dredging operations in key locations (bugin.info/detail/volny-rosta-kazakhstan-ob/ru).

            Russia shows little sign of currently being able to match this buildup, although some of the other Caspian littoral states, Azerbaijan and Iran in particular, are also strengthening their merchant fleets. These actions will further reduce Russian influence there and open the way for greater influence by China and Turkey,  both of which are supporting such efforts.

New Draft Nationality Strategy Focuses on Boosting Ethnic Russians and Countering Foreign Threats

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – Moscow’s new nationality policy strategy document for the first time devotes much of its attention to preserving and developing the culture of the ethnic Russian people as the “state-forming” nation in the country and expands its attention on how to counter threats to Russia’s stability emanating from abroad.

            Prepared by the Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs and covering the period through 2036, the new document once approved will replace the one that had been in force since 2018 slated to run out this year (regulation.gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=157502 and nazaccent.ru/content/44100-fadn-opublikovalo-proekt-novoj-strategii-nacionalnoj/).

            The two most striking features are the draft’s focus on promoting the culture of ethnic Russians, something earlier nationality strategy documents said little or nothing about, and its obsession with threats to the country’s stability emanating from abroad, including but not limited to immigration and the impact of foreign efforts to reach ethnic groups in Russia.

            The current draft is certain to spark debate, possibly leading to a delay in its adoption as was the case with the earlier ones (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/10/new-nationality-strategy-opens-way-to.html). But the two main thrusts are likely to remain in place and reflect the Putin regime’s focus on the ethnic Russian majority and threats from abroad.

           And this focus overshadows the pattern which was true of all those earlier documents: a focus in the first instance on non-Russian minorities and the need to provide special protections for them because they are typically not in a position to defend themselves as effectively as the dominant ethnic Russian majority  

Measles, Whooping Cough and Rubella Skyrocket in Russia Because of Impact of Anti-Vaxxer Groups, Moscow Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – Russia’s consumer protection agency, Rospotrebnadzor, says that the number of cases of measles, whooping cough and rubella are skyrocketing in Russia; and medical experts in that country say that this is the result of the impact of anti-vaxxer groups who have convinced many parents not to immunize their children.

            The number of cases of measles, for example, almost doubled between 2023 and 2024, the Russian government agency says; and medical experts say that most of the reason for that increase is a radical decline in the share of Russian children getting vaccinated (kommersant.ru/doc/7794350 and fedpress.ru/news/77/society/3384008).

            Many parents have been convinced by anti-vaxxer propaganda that shots are more likely to cause harm than do good and so are not having their children vaccinated. As a result, the collective immunity of the population has fallen because to be effective 95 percent or more of a population must be inoculated.

            Unless the schools, media and doctors can convince parents to have their children immunized as they themselves were earlier, the future is bleak: these diseases which should have been wiped out by the shots are likely to become at least or even more widespread than they were in the past, experts say.

 

Case of Far Eastern Ukrainian Highlights Need for Clear Definition of ‘Ethnically Motivated Persecution’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – Charges Russian officials have brought against Nataliya Romanenko, a Ukrainian in Russia’s Khabarovsk Kray, based solely on her efforts to retain her identity and culture highlight the urgent need for a clear definition of “ethnically motivated persecution,” the ABN portal says.

            Because no such definition now exists, it suggests, many Ukrainians who are being persecuted in the Russian Federation for their language and culture alone are not counted as victims of persecution becaluse they aren’t political enough (abn.org.ua/en/liberation-movements/far-eastern-ukrainian-natalia-romanenko-her-path-of-formation-activities-and-history-of-persecution/).

            But under Putin, such persecution has become ever more common especially with regard to Russian treatment of Ukrainians and deserves both to be defined and included in the list of actions that qualify someone as a political prisoner or victim of political persecution however “unpolitical” their actions may appear to be. Otherwise, this type of crime will only increase.

Protests in Altay Kray Likely Puts On Hold Plans to Amalgamate Altay Republic with It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – One of the most obvious possibilities of the amalgamation of federal subjects that Putin has been promoting off and on since the start of his rule is that between the larger and predominantly ethnic Russian Altay Kray and the smaller Altay Republic which has a Russian plurality but a much larger non-Russian minority.

            There were rumors earlier this year that Putin would combine these two this year to restart that effort (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/another-sign-this-time-in-altai.html); but as has happened in other cases, something has gotten in the way, this time protest against Moscow’s moves against local self-government.

            The people of Altay Kray have taken to the streets and even blocked a highway to protest that Kremlin move (themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/13/kremlin-backed-reforms-spark-protests-in-russias-altai-republic-a89441 and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/06/12/na-altae-mestnye-zhiteli-perekryli-trassu-vo-vremia-protestov-protiv-glavy-regiona-andreia-turchaka-news).

            Like the Shiyes anti-trash dump protests which detailed plans to consolidate regions in the Russian North, these protests almost certainly will delay any amalgamation in the Russian east lest Moscow appear to reward or buy off a federal subject whose population protests against what the center is doing. 

            At the very least, these protests will delay any move to unite the two federal subjects – and that delay by itself may cause the Kremlin to put off at least for a time plans to combine any other pairs of regions and republics, a lesson to other federal subjects that may be under threat of losing their status. 

Diverting Siberian River Water to Central Asia ‘Almost Certainly’ Won’t Happen This Century, Zakhvatov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 15 – Despite recent talk about new plans to divert Siberian river water to Central Asia, such a project almost certainly won’t happen in this century because the obstacles to it are now even greater than at the end of Soviet times when Moscow decided to kill the project. Andrey Zakhvatov says.

            The Russian commentator who specializes on Central Asia and who in his youth worked on Brezhnev-era plans to divert Siberian river water to Central Asia says that the problems that would have to be overcome are so enormous that the completion of such a project before 2100 is “hardly possible” (ng.ru/dipkurer/2025-06-15/11_9272_courier2.html).

            Among the problems such a project would face, many of them far larger and better understood now than 40 years ago, are the following, Zahvatov says in an article for the Diplomatic Courier insert of Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta:

·       Now far more countries are involved than were then because the USSR has disintegrated and the new countries of Central Asia have emerged and because China and potentially other countries are interested in gaining access to water from Siberia. 

·       The costs of building canals or pipelines and of constructing new power plants are prohibitive. The Central Asian countries lack the funds to pay for these things; and no outside power, including Russia is ready to provide financing.

·       The impact on Siberia and the Russian North, partially understood in the 1980s, is now far better known and thus Moscow along with ever more ordinary Russians oppose such a project because it would have horrific consequences for Russia.

And in addition, Zakhvatov says, there is another reason, albeit seldom mentioned, why Russians will oppose the plan: if Central Asia got the water from Siberia, its birthrates would rise; and that trend in turn would put additional migration pressure on the Russian Federation, something Russians don’t want. 

KBR Government Joins Circassian Activists in Opposition to Moscow Plan to Require Anyone Seeking Repatriation to Know Russian

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 12 – Circassian activists both in the diaspora and in the North Caucasus homeland have opposed a Moscow plan to require anyone seeking repatriation to know Russian, arguing that it is unconstitutional because Circassian is the state language in three federal subjects, Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia.

            Now, the nationalities ministry of Kabardino-Balkaria has joined them by calling on the Russian government to change the draft legislation so that those Circassians abroad who know Circassian will have the right to repatriate to these three republics (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/412148 and zapravakbr.ru/index.php/30-uncategorised/1979-vlasti-kabardino-balkarii-otreagirovali-na-diskriminatsionnyj-zakonoproekt-o-repatriatsii-v-rf-vnesennyj-konstantinom-zatulinym).

            What makes this development so important is that it is a sign that Circassian governments within the current borders of the Russian Federation are now animated by many of the same feelings as the Circassian diaspora and that they are prepared to line up with that diaspora against Moscow.

            That would have been almost unthinkable earlier in Putin’s reign. That it is happening now is a sign that as he ages, Circassian governments are increasingly willing to stand up for their nations, a trend likely true in other non-Russian republics as well and one that will frighten the Kremlin but encourage national movements.

Buryats in RF Should Carry Passports to Avoid Being Misidentified as Immigrants and Abused, Governor Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – After a Russian veteran of Putin’s war who had joined the nationalist Russian Community attacked a Buryat woman in Moscow thinking that she was an immigrant rather than a Russian Federation citizen, Aleksey Tsydenov, the governor of Buryatia, suggested that Buryats should always carry their passports to avoid being misidentified and abused.

            Tsydenov’s statement is available online at astra.press/english/2025/06/14/9074/. Details about this specific attack which ended without serious injury are available at astra.press/russian/2025/06/10/8992/, astra.press/english/2025/06/11/9024/ and astra.press/english/2025/06/12/9043/.

            Three aspects of this situation make it noteworthy. First, it shows that nationalist groups like  the Russian Community are moving from going after immigrants to going after anyone who doesn’t have a Slavic appearance, a step that risks making interethnic relations in the Russian Federation far worse.

            Second, it suggests that despite some reports to the contrary, veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are in fact joining the Russian Community and apparently playing a role in its radicalization, thus making a group that had the reputation for not engaging in attacks of this kind one that is doing exactly that.

            And third – and this is far and away the most important – the head of a non-Russian federal subject has taken what must be an almost unprecedented step of declaring that the risks to members of the titular nationality of his republic are now so great that they must always have their passports with them to show that they are citizens and not immigrants.

Putin Consensus More Likely to be Destroyed by Putin Regime than by the Russian People, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Much Western analysis and even more Russian opposition understanding is based on the assumption that relations between the Putin regime and the Russian people are based on an exchange in which the Russian people give up something in exchange for something else, Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            But such a model leads to the conclusion that “the absence of benefits and advantages can provoke discontent and ultimately lead to the collapse of this contract,” a fallacy with far-reaching implications because that is not what has been happening, the Russian economist and commentator says (moscowtimes.ru/2025/06/11/putinskii-konsensus-i-ego-vragi-a165881).

            According to Inozemtsev, the real consensus between the Putin regime and the Russian people is different. It reflects the inertness of the population and means that “the people do not demand changes for the better: they are satisfied with what exists” and their support for the regime requires only that “life remains on the whole as it is now.”

            And that means that “the modern Russian system is strong not because it has the support of the majority as is so often claimed but because that majority is indifferent” to what the regime does except when the powers try to change something that affects most people. Thus, Russians were more upset by the threat of mass mobilization than by the invasion of Ukraine.

            This leads to two important conclusions: first, it explains why the Russian liberal opposition has completely failed, a development that is “due less to the persecution of it by the authorities than to the obvious inferiority of the agenda it has chosen.” It focuses on moral issues and the defense of minorities, neither of which agitate the Russian population.

            And second, it shows why “the only thing the current Russian regime cannot achieve are actions of a mobilization kind.” Indeed, a classic confirmation of this is the hopeless struggle the Kremlin has gotten involved with to increase the birthrate … The majority doesn’t want to strain themselves in that way [or any other] in anything and even not for money.”

            What this means, Inozemtsev says, is that the chief threat to the consensus between regime and population comes not from the population but from the regime many of whose members want to do things. But if they try to do anything that will require the people to act, they will upset the applecart and threaten their own power.

In Soviet Times, Internationalism Meant Russification; but It Mustn’t Now, Mari Uver’s Vasiliy Nikolayev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 13 – Vadim Shtepa, the editor of the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert, says that the notion widespread among many non-Russians that their republics on their own can end the Russian Empire is a mistake not only because of their relatively small size but also because of their lack of an internationalist component in their thinking.

            Shtepa advanced that argument in his latest Eesti Paevaleht article that he has translated into Russian for his own portal (epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/120383312/vadim-stepa-vene-rahvusvabariigid-on-veelgi-sojakamad-kui-keskvoim-neid-kreml-kartma-ei-pea and region.expert/republics-2/).

            Vasily Nikolayev, the editor of the Mariuver.com portal, which is also based in Estonia, says that no one can be against internationalism when it is correctly understood but for that to happen, many must overcome the way in which the Soviet regime corrupted that term (mariuver.com/2025/06/13/a-tak-li-poh-internacionalizm/).

            “In and of itself,” the Mari activist says, “the idea of internationalism, the promotion of friendship and cooperation among nations is absolutely positive. But in the USSR, unfortunately, this idea was perverted and under the slogans of internationalism … often was concealed the practice of russification.”

            That Soviet variant replaced the centuries-old internationalism “from below” which fostered cooperation among peoples, Nikolayev continued, and was about voluntary cooperation, mutual respect for each other’s culture, the knowledge of more than one language when needed, and the preservation of uniqueness by each people.

            “That ‘non-Russian’ internationalism is significantly distinguished from that which was practiced by Soviet power,” he argues, adding that “if present-day national movements in Russia really want to make progress, they need to take their inspiration from this ‘health internationalism’ of the indigenous peoples” and not from the Soviet past.

 

In Yet Another Return to Stalinist Principles, Kursk Officials Now Persecuting Even Those Loyal to the Kremlin who Back Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – One of the distinctive features of Stalinist totalitarianism was that no one was safe from persecution and arrest. Even those who were the most supportive were suspected of opposition because it was assumed that these “wreckers” were trying to rise further up the ladder of power and thus be in a position to wreck more.

            Now, something similar is happening in Kursk Oblast where officials are so worried about street protests that they have begun to attack even those “who are loyal to the authorities and supportive of the war.” Tragically, this federal subject which was occupied by Ukrainian forces is likely to prove a bellwether for the Russian Federation as a whole.

            That is suggested by a report in the media internet portal Reaspect.info which details the ways in which Kursk officials have sought to repress even ostensible supporters of the Kremlin and themselves, yet another sign that in Putin’s Russia, like Stalin’s Soviet Union, no one is safe (https://regaspect.info/2025/06/11/novye-politicheskie/).

            The numbers of people involved are still relatively small, but the decision of the authorities to turn on even their supporters is a very large move and deserves to be followed with extreme care. The 2500-word Regaspect.info report provides a baseline of this kind of political abuse that needs to be kept in mind if officials elsewhere in Russia take similar steps. 

Russian Increasingly Divided by Ever More Distinct Dialects, Despite Not Having Published Dialect Dictionary in a Decade

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – The Russian language, despite Putin’s efforts to suggest that it is a closely united and uniting language, is in fact increasingly divided into dialects sufficiently different from one another that residents in one place can’t understand residents in another and that the use of some terms instantly identifies individuals as locals or outsiders.

             Before 2014, the Russian government supported the publication of dialect dictionaries (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/russia-stopped-publishing-dialect.html), but since that time, it has not, despite the fact that ever more media outlets are pointing out just how different these dialects are becoming.

            The latest to do so is Sever-Press.Ru which declares that “in each region of Russia, there are words and expressions which only local residents understand” and which ignorance of which marks the speaker or writer as an outsider (sever-press.ru/narrative/obschestvo/govori-kak-mestnyj-regionalnyj-slovar-s-kotorym-vy-vezde-budete-svoim/).

            Among the many examples it gives from around the Russian Federation are the following: Muscovites call Red Square “the zero mile place” because that is where everything in Russia is measured from there, and St. Petersburgers call the 1000 ruble note “the ton,” possibly for reasons other than irony.

            Further from the capitals, the dialects are more different from  oth the Moscow standard and each other, something that both reflects and promotes regional identities, the portal continues. This is especially the case of Siberia and the Russian Far East, which use a dialect that draws on Chinese and local non-Russian languages.

            For background on the dialects of Russian, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/regional-dialects-mean-many-russians.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/regionalization-of-russian-language-now.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/06/internet-not-killing-off-dialects.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russians-from-provinces-need-to-speak.html.

Kremlin Should Focus on Boosting Size of Couples with Children rather than Pushing Those without to Have at Least One, ‘Kommersant’ Editor Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Russia’s low birthrate, well below replacement levels, worries many, Ivan Sukhov says; but the country is in a far better position than many others because large percentages of its population tell pollsters they want to have children and the share of Russian families who have three or more has doubled over the last decade.

            According to the deputy editor of Moscow’s Kommersant,  the Kremlin should pursue a demographic policy that looks first of all to those who already have children, because those who haven’t are unlikely to change their minds, and then to removing obstacles such as the absence of housing space that are keeping them from doing so (nakanune.ru/articles/123573/).

            Were the Kremlin to make such a change, it would stop or at least reduce its efforts to get those who have never had children before to give birth, such as teenagers and young adults, and promote expanding the size of families of couples who already have one or more children and thus have demonstrated that they really want children if conditions are right.

            That would likely require subsidizing the construction of housing with more square meters of space, but taking that step would likely bboostinge far more successful in boosting the birthrate in Russia than current exhortations that all Russian women should have children, something that isn’t going to happen in any case. 

 

Putin hasn’t Reduced Huge Differences among Regions in State Spending Per Capita, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Government spending per capita by the federal subjects is five times greater in Sakhalin than in Dagestan even after correcting for differences in the cost of living, the ‘To Be Precise’ portal reports. And these differences are something that Putin, despite his control over revenue flows, has done nothing to reduce over the past decade.

            Even if one adjusts spending for differences in cost of living, such government spending per capita is three to five times greater in Sakhalin, Yamalo-Nenets AD, Moscow and St. Petersburg than in the North Caucasus republics (tochno.st/materials/na-saxaline-na-odnogo-zitelia-tratiat-v-5-raz-bolse-cem-v-dagestane-i-za-desiat-let-razryv-ne-sokratilsia).

            These differences reflect the different economic situations these federal subjects are in and also the fact that the redistribution of taxes by Moscow has not reduced them, despite widespread assumptions that the wealthier regions are subsidizing the poorer. In fact, in per capita terms, the reverse may often be the case.

            And because the federal budget is now distributing less than it did earlier because of Moscow’s efforts to reduce spending domestically because of Putin’s war in Ukraine, that will increase. Last year, Natalya Zubarevich says, 53 of the federal subjects saw their subsidies decline in real terms, far more than before 2022.

Russian Officials Now Paying Bounties to Individuals, Groups and Firms which Get Others to Sign Up for Military Service

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Moscow has taken another step to ensure that enough Russians sign up for military service in Ukraine by launching programs in numerous federal subjects that pay bounties to individuals, groups and firms which get others to sign up for military service, the Vyorstka news service reports.

            While not as large as the bonuses offered to the men themselves, these payments are significant – from 5,000 to 350,000 rubles (50 to 3500 US dollars) – and individuals may multiply their earnings to getting more than one man to sign a military contract (verstka.media/kak-rossiyane-zarabatyvayut-otpravlyaya-drug-druga-na-voinu).

            In April, such payments were being made in at least nine federal subjects (verstka.media/dobrovolci-svo-verbovka); but the program appears to be effective and has likely  been extended to others, leading to a thriving business of bounty hunters who view such arrangements as a useful way to boost their incomes.

            But more important than that, a program of this type highlights just how many difficulties Moscow is having in filling the gaps lost by its mounting losses in Ukraine, losses that according to some estimates now total more than a million killed and wounded – and also Putin’s propensity to believe that money alone can solve the problem of recruitment.

Falling Water Levels Forcing Moscow to Dredge Rivers and Ports across Russia, Turning to China and Iran while Struggling to Build More Dredging Ships

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Drought, climate change and increased human use of water from Russia’s major rivers is forcing Moscow to dredge ever more rivers and ports from one end of the country to another and, given the shortage of its own dredging ships, to turn to China and Iran for help.

            Because Russia is far more dependent on its rivers for transport than almost any other country and because it hopes to use its ports to expand its contacts with others, Moscow has long been committed to keeping its rivers open for navigation. But since the disintegration of the USSR, two-thirds of the internal waterways open for shipping have ceased to be.

            Most of that decline has been since Putin took power (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html), and Moscow has responded by turning to China and Iran to keep the remaining rivers navigable (jamestown.org/program/iran-joins-china-in-dredging-russias-volga-river-further-solidifying-anti-western-axis/).

            A year ago, the Russian government committed itself to expanding its domestic dredging fleet (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/moscow-may-finally-be-about-to-confront.html); but there is less evidence to suggest that it has made much progress in that result and many reports suggesting that ships and barges can use ever fewer parts of its rivers (portnews.ru/news/373765/ and sudostroenie.info/novosti/45390.html).   

            Those reports have reached a crescendo in the last few weeks as the summer begins and dredging work takes off. For examples of the problems Moscow faces, see zol.ru/n/3ecb7, https://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/v_komi_nachalis_dnouglubitelnye_raboty_na_reke_vychegde.html, korabel.ru/news/comments/v_ob-irtyshskom_basseyne_nachalos_dnouglublenie_sudovyh_hodov.html and korabel.ru/news/comments/v_komi_nachalis_dnouglubitelnye_raboty_na_reke_vychegde.html

            The focus of Moscow’s efforts not surprisingly are on the Volga-Don Canal and the port of Astrakhan on the Caspian where falling water levels are preventing the use of the facilities of both for naval ships as well as merchant carriers (ast.mk.ru/social/2025/06/06/v-astrakhanskoy-oblasti-proydut-meropriyatiya-po-dnouglubleniyu-sudokhodnogo-kanala.html, astrakhan.kp.ru/online/news/6409990/ and portnews.ru/news/377951/.)

            Dredging operations in Russia and the increasing problems Moscow faces in keeping its rivers open seldom gets much attention in the West, but the absence of rail and highway networks mean that if Russia loses the ability to use its rivers for navigation, it will face major security and economic problems ahead. 

Moscow’s Claim that Domestic Wines Now Dominate Russian Market Latest ‘Potemkin Village,’ ‘Versiya’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – The Russian agricultural ministry’s claim that 58 percent of the wines Russians now buy are domestic is the latest example of “Potemkin village” type fraud, according to journalist Kira Remnoyova of the Versiya news portal. The real figure is far lower and the problems of Russia’s wine industry far greater. 

            The reasons for that conclusion are readily admitted by those who work in the wine industry. What Moscow is asking people to believe is that Russia has produced more wine even though the harvest from its vineyards has fallen this year because of bad weather and other problems, she says (versia.ru/rossijskoe-vino-ne-sovsem-rossijskoe).

            That has led wine producers to import grapes via the gray or black market and then label the wines as being completely Russian even though many of them are produced only with the use of grapes from abroad. That is illegal, but Moscow looks the other way because it is happy to claim a victory in import substitution.

            According to the rumor mill in the wine industry, Remnoyova says, much of the wine labelled as being from Russian-occupied Crimea is in fact produced with grapes imported from Kazakhstan which currently aspires to being a major producer of grapes for wines that will be made and sold in other countries.

            Moreover, people in the Russian wine industry say that the current federal project to boost grape and wine production by 2030 almost certainly will not be achieved whatever claims the Russian agricultural makes to the contrary, claims that will please Russian propagandists but do little for Russian consumers.

Moscow Project to Clean Up the Volga and Lake Baikal has ‘Failed’ Despite All the Money Spent, Officials Concede

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Despite all the money spent on the much-ballyhooed national project to clean up the Volga River and Lake Baikal, that effort has “failed” with only a tiny proportion of its stated goals -- perhaps as little as four percent having been achieved -- according to experts, Duma members and even senior officials in the Russian government now concede.

            That failure which leaves many Russians without the clean water the Kremlin had promised and them as well without the food resources the river and the lake had supplied has now been documented by Novyye Izvestiya (newizv.ru/news/2025-06-10/sryv-natsproekta-dengi-na-ochistnye-na-volge-i-baykale-potracheny-vse-rabotayut-4-437044).

            What makes this investigation so important is that it again calls attention to the more general problem that when Putin declares something a national project, everyone can be sure that much of the money allocated for it will flow into the pockets of his friends and allies rather than going to achieve its stated purpose.

Telegram Channels Not as Secure from FSB’s Prying Eyes as Many of Its Users Believe, ‘Important Stories’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Since the Telegram channel was created a dozen years ago, many Russians have shifted toward it out of the belief that this chat and messaging ap is far more secure than any other internet service, a reputation the company’s founder Pavel Durov has carefully cultivated.

            But an investigation by the Important Stories portal concludes that the electronic infrastructure on which Telegram channels are based suffers from serious vulnerabilities that the FSB or other intelligence services can easily exploit (istories.media/stories/2025/06/10/kak-telegram-svyazan-s-fsb/).

            Despite claiming that all his electronic infrastructure for Telegram is outside of Russia, Durov owns and thus cooperates with many companies of whom that is not true. Consequently, those who can gain access to the latter can gain access to the former, something that has been documented in court cases in the West.

            And while there is little evidence that the FSB has gained access to the content of messages, there is overwhelming data showing that the Russian intelligence service has enough to identify users and the likely content they are viewing, thus giving the FSB the whip hand in dealing with those opposed to the regime.

In New Threat to Non-Russians, Moscow Wants to Stop Calling Their Languages ‘Native’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – The Russian government has come up with draft legislation it hopes to push through quietly that will require schools to stop calling the languages non-Russians speak “native” and instead refer to them only as “languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation,” a change that many fear will lead to the further downgrading of both languages and peoples.

            The ministry which oversees public education made this proposed change in April (regulation.gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=156568); and Tatarstan’s Milliard.Tatar portal documented opposition to it among parents, officials, and experts (milliard.tatar/news/ty-kak-nerodnoi-eksperty-trebuyut-obsuzdeniya-pravok-v-zakon-o-yazykax-narodov-rossii-7640).

            The opponents believe that if non-Russian languages, in contrast to Russian, are no longer called “native,” then it will be easier for officials to argue that they aren’t essential and can be dispensed with in schools, continuing a trend that Putin has been promoting for almost a decade and reiterated his support in a speech on May 5.

            In his remarks at that time, the Kremlin leader said that schoolchildren in the Russian Federation are currently overburdened with courses and that some should be eliminated. Not surprisingly, many non-Russians believe that the change in nomenclature for non-Russian languages will put them on the chopping block.

            Their fears were heightened when Putin said at that time that “Russian should be the native language for all” residents of the Russian Federation. Experts from around the country and some members of the Duma have spoken out against this change because it will almost certainly have the effect of reducing the amount of education in non-Russian languages.

            And many of them further believe that cutting back even further on the study of these languages which Putin has made voluntary already will strike at the non-Russian national identities themselves, leading to massive Russianization and Russification and the further homogenization of the population.

Opposition to Subsidizing Teenage Pregnancy Grows and Russian Regions Cut It Back

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – Yet another program, promoted by the Putin regime, is being scaled back and may end entirely because of popular opposition. That involves paying subsidies to ever-younger teenage girls who give birth, something many object to because at least some of the young women are now having children to get government money rather than to start families.

            For background on this program, which Moscow has operated through the regions, and the opposition it faced from the start by some demographers and hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/rf-regions-promoting-teenage.html and jamestown.org/program/many-russians-outraged-by-government-promotion-of-underage-pregnancy-to-boost-birthrate/.

            In the last few weeks, officials in some reasons have been cutting back this program and some appear to be on the brink of cancelling it altogether given this opposition (nemoskva.net/2025/06/09/galya-u-nas-otmena-vlasti-regionov-kotorye-obeshhali-platit-beremennym-shkolniczam-i-studentkam-zadumalis-nad-sokrashheniem-spiskov/).

            Officials in Omsk Oblast have placed restrictions on just who can get the money including that the young women involved must live and study in that region to get money from it, an indication that some of the young women may be going from one region to another in the hopes of getting more funds.

            In St. Petersburg, a member of the legislative assembly called for ending the program for any minor lest the government create even more problems for children and itself by encouraging young women to have children long before they are in a position to take care of them (t.me/shtannikovazaks/299).

            And the authorities in Altai Kray said that they would give priority to university-level students rather than anyone still a pupil in schools because in their view, such aid must help “young student families” rather than just produce more babies, some of which may end up as orphans (asfera.info/news/129354-stali-izvestny-priciny-po-kotorym-nacali-vyplacivat-posobia-beremennym-ucasimsa?utm_source=chatgpt.com).

Failure of Russian Employers to Pay in Timely Fashion Rises to Worst Level Since 2021

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 -- A problem many associate with the 1990s has now returned to the Russian Federation with a vengeance -- the failure of companies to pay wages and salaries on time. Such indebtedness of companies to their employees has risen to nearly 1.5 billion rubles (15 million US dollars), 3.4 times more than was the case in 2021 and affection 7200 workers.

            Those are the official figures released by the Russian government’s statistical arm, Rosstat (ehorussia.com/new/node/32807). The real numbers are almost certainly greater all the more so because Rosstat does not accurately report on the situation in smaller firms (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/biggest-problem-with-rosstat-economic.html).

            Construction firms are the most often guilty of failing to pay workers and contractors, according to labor union experts. And what makes that especially dangerous is that it can create a cascading and expanding problem: when a large firm doesn’t pay on time, its contractors are often forced into bankruptcy and forced to lay off their workers. 

Three Factors Explain Why There are Environmental Protests in Some Russian Regions but Not in Others, HSE Study Concludes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – On the basis of an analysis of 1896 environmental protests in the Russian Federation between 2007 and 2021, researchers at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics say that three factors determine which regions protest and which ones don’t and help explain why regions that may appear quite similar behave so differently.

            First of all, they say, regions are more likely to respond to a specific action rather than to a problem that has been growing over time. Such events act as “triggers” and send people into the streets. Second, some governors are more ready to use repression than others; and those that do face fewer protests (kedr.media/explain/soprotivlenie-mozhet-uvenchatsya-uspehom/).

            And third, the HSE investigators conclude, poorer regions who are asked to help solve the problems of wealthier ones are especially likely to go into the streets to protest. Thus, plans to establish dumps in the Russian north for trash from Moscow have been especially powerful in generating protests.

            The study says that indigenous numerically small peoples are at the very top of this list because “their way of live is closely connected with the environment. Their main types of economic activity to the present remain fishing, hunting and reindeer herding. Moreover, their faiths and folklore” is based on the links between nature and people.

            But ethnicity is not the only such force. Strong regional or other communal identities can also play this role. The scholars give as an example protests in Voronezh Oblast against nickel mining. There, Cossacks played a key role streeting the links between the world around them and Cossack national traditions.

            The HSE researchers also suggested that the theories of American sociologist Sidney Tarrow on the cyclicity of protest are relevant in Russia and point to the ways in which protests have ebbed and flowed across all categories.  And they end by concluding that the war in Ukraine is giving rise to “a new form of ecological protest.”

            This involves videos by Russian soldiers in Ukraine highlighting environmental problems in their home areas that they send to officials and fellow citizens even while remaining on the front lines. (For background on the trend of which this is a part, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/soldiers-in-russian-army-in-ukraine.html.)

            The HSE study said that many of the protests succeeded in whole or in part, with one of the authors suggesting that is only one case where environmental protests cannot hope to succeed: in those cases, where what the protesters want stopped or done instead touch on the interests of Putin or his friends. 

Even the Furniture Circassians Use Contributes to Their Longer Life Expectancy, KBR Researchers Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 10 – New research by scholars at the Kabardino-Balkaria State University finds that the cultural code of the Circassians – the Adyge Khaze – the clothes they wear, and even the furniture they have traditionally used contributes to longer life expectancy -- including an unusual number of centenarians among them.

            The North Caucasus is famous for the number of people who live to great age, and many have offered their theories as to why that is so. (My personal favorite is a cartoon showing an older North Caucasian in traditional dress who, when asked how he has lived so long, replies that it is because he has never criticized the state.)

            But now scholars at the KBR University have offered a more scientifically-based explanation. They say that “an enormous role” is played by their cultural traditions, which include behavior, dress and even furniture (kbsu.ru/podrazdelenija/fakultety/meditsinskij-fakultet/news/uchenyj-kbgu-vyvel-formulu-dolgoletija-iz-tradicionnogo-byta-adygov/).

            The researchers say that perhaps the most important of these factors is the cultural code of the Circassians, which urges harmonious relations among people, respect for the elderly, patience and even minimalism in behavior. But other factors are at work including clothing that leaves much of the body free and furniture.

            According to these medical investigators, the stools and low tables Circassians traditionally use discourage people from sitting too long at meals and thus helps them avoid obesity and other diseases. The experts said that they recommend that members of other nations follow these same traditions. 

Central Asia has Just 250 Think Tanks, Most of Which are Small and Don’t Issue Many Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – The five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia have a total of approximately 250 think tanks, they are small, averaging no more than 12 people each, prepare only about 17 reports a year, and only one of them, KISI.kz, is in the top ranks of the Global Go-To Think Tank listing.

            That means, the Stanradar.Com portal says, that most Central Asians who want analysis have to turn either to think tanks abroad, few of which cover their region adequately, or to Central Asia media. Often such people have to rely on often problematic social media alone (stanradar.com/news/full/57582-stanradarcom-sozdaet-smysly-dlja-tsentralnoj-azii.html).

            This is a serious problem not only for experts and officials in these countries but for experts elsewhere who seek to understand what is taking place in these five increasingly important countries at the crossroads of east-west and north-south trade and communication corridors. 

Moscow Must Do More to Save Company Towns Because They’re Where Many Defense Plants are Located, ‘Profile’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 9 – As Russian has shifted to a war economy, the country’s monogorods as cities built around a single major industry are known have become more important because they are where a large share of Russia’s military industry plants are located. To attract enough workers, these plants want to save the company towns despite Moscow having largely given up.

            The factories are opening schools, medical points, and other infrastructure that had disappeared over the last several decades in order to try to keep younger residents from fleeing to the cities. That has helped some, Pyotr Sergeyev says, but there are some things only the government can do (profile.ru/dk/ugmk/prityazhenie-maloj-rodiny-kak-promyshlennye-predpriyatiya-borjutsya-s-ottokom-trudovyh-resursov-iz-monogorodov-1713742/).

            And he warns that unless Moscow changes course and begins to pay more attention to the problems of company towns and invests more money in infrastructure there, either the plants in these cities will have to recruit more workers from abroad or go under, either of which could make it impossible to meet military industry goals.

            The Putin regime has assumed that if it gives these companies more contracts, they will be able to raise wages enough to hold local Russians and attract more to these towns. But studies have shown, Sergeyev continues, that such an approach won’t work: Unless the company towns develop infrastructure and comfortable housing, young people will continue to flee.

            Failure to make such investments, Sergeyev says, will make it impossible to meet defense industry goals. Indeed, that sector may soon collapse unless the Kremlin recognizes that higher pay will not solve the problem and that it must devote more resources to infrastructure -- or revive the hated Soviet system of assigning graduates to their first work places.