Abdulatipov Says Chechen-Ingush Border Conflict Arose as Result of His Ouster

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 11 – In what may be an act of personal revenge or simply an observation of how finely balanced everything is in the North Caucasus, Ramazan Abdulatipov who headed Daghestan until September 2017 says that his departure led to the destabilization of the Caucasus in general and the conflict over the Chechen-Ingush border in particular.

            “I do not exaggerate my role in Russia and in the Caucasus,” the former republic head said, “but I ask you to focus attention on the fact that all this turbulence arose after my departure. When a more or less major figure is removed, turbulence arises in any system” (rbc.ru/politics/11/12/2018/5c0a900c9a7947d8929dd273).

            On a day when the situation in Ingushetia and Chechnya has been relatively quiet, a first for many weeks, the editors of Kavkaz-Uzel have taken this opportunity to present in summary form the arguments for and against the September  26 deal between Ingushetia’s Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/328973/).

            The editors note that most of the coverage of this crisis has been about developments in Ingushetia, a pattern that has led to an imbalance in reporting about the Chechen position about the border accord relative to the Ingush one. By this article, they say, Kazkaz-Uzel is seeking to redress any imbalance. 

            The arguments of the Chechen side are that no border existed between the two republics after the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist. They had to be created by the September 26 agreement by the two heads of the republics. And all the disputed territories had belonged to Chechnya in the past according to the 1934 Soviet map and the 1993 accord between Ruslan Aushev and Dzhokhar Dudayev.  No further referendum is needed.

            There is near unanimous support among Chechens for this position and hence for the decision of the Russian Constitutional Court. Significantly, even the anti-Kadyrov opposition in emigration takes this position although it has been quiet about it not wanting to give the incumbent Chechen head any show of support.

            Unlike the Chechens, the Ingush are divided. Ingush officials accept the Chechen arguments, but some republic deputies, religious leaders and the opposition do not. And their views were confirmed by the republic’s Constitutional Court, whose decision the Russian court then overturned.

            Those against the September 26 border agreement argue that any demarcation must follow the borders of 1921-22, borders that remained in place until 1928, when they say, Moscow decided to move to “liquidate Ingushetia.”  And they insist that any agreement must as the republic constitution specifies be subject to a referendum.

            And the Ingush opponents believe that the Chechen moves against Ingushetia are intended to set the stage not only for the loss of territory, oil fields and grave yards but also for taking sovereignty away from the republic.  As a result, they have no intention of ending their protests and efforts to reverse the decisions taken so far.