‘Russia has Already Lost Belarus’ – Three Analysts on Why Annexation of Belarus Now Unlikely

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 13 -- The past few weeks have been so filled with apocalyptic warnings that Vladimir Putin is about to annex Belarus in the name of his “Russian world” that it may be especially useful to take note of the following often neglected reality: ever more people are arguing it won’t happen.

            Just as both Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka have used the threat of annexation for their respective and in this case very different agendas, the three analysts whose arguments are explicated here are self-interested as well.  But because they highlight features of the current situation that are all too often neglected, they are worthy of consideration.

            In a Novaya gazeta commentary entitled “Minsk is Not Ours,” Vitaly Sklyarov, a political operative who has worked in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and the US, argues that any Moscow “Minsk is ours” operation will fail because it doesn’t have supporters in Belarus (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/01/12/79164-minsk-ne-nash).

            Twenty years ago, he says, Lukashenka might have been the governor of a Russian oblast; but in the intervening period, Belarusians have become a full-fledged nation used to be an independent state and one very different from Russia and they are used to having their country independent, albeit one still very dependent on Moscow grants.

            As a result, there are two four major “contradicitons” between Belarus and Russia that make any effort at amalgamation at least extremely difficult and problematic and at worst dangerous and explosive.

            First of all, Shlyarov says, Belarusian nostalgia for the Soviet Union is not directed at Moscow.  “It would be a misconception to think that kinds can do anythingthey want, that a personalit autocrat is equivalent to his country and thus free to take any decisions,” even if they “radically contradict” public attitudes.

            And Belarusian public opinion, while divided on many things, is “completely consolidated on the issue of integration into the Russian Federation. From the very first loyalist to the last opposition figure, from the provincial pensioner to the hipster in the capital, no one wants to become the 86^th region of the eastern neighbor.”

            Consequently, Shklyarov continues, “the very same people who in Ukraine viewed Russia as the stronghold of the lost Soviet past in Belarus see it as a world of the wild East” whereas they see their own country as an island of “the stability of socialism, government control, defense and concern.”

            As a result, “the very same attitudes that significantly helped the Kremlin in Crimea and in the Donbass would become a major obstacle in Belarus.” That is because in Ukraine, nostalgia for the Soviet past was directed at Moscow while in Belarus, it is focused “on itself and on Aleksandr Grigoryevich.”

            Second, while it is the case that “people in the Rusisan leadership who take major foreign policy decisions can ignore objective reality,” as time passes even they are forced to recognize some elements of the way things are in the world beyond their imaginations. Thus, the problems Moscow has had because of its actions in Ukraine serve as a constraint regarding Belarus.

            Third, the Kremlin is going about Belarus in an entirely different way that it did in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. In the earlier cases, it did not talk much about what it was planning to do but just acted. Now, it is talking and talking – which allows objections to be raised that couldn’t have been in the two earlier cases.

            This lengthy promotion of “public tension without real steps is uncharacteristic for this kind of action in the past,” Shklyarov says. The longer this is discussed without movement, the more likely that those experts with an adequate understanding of the situaiton will gain a hearing and may even be listened to.

            And fourth, given that many are aware of the costs Moscow’s actions in Ukraine have entailed, there will be a reluctance to move against Belarus, Shklyarov suggests. But nonetheless, the fact that Crimea boosted Putin’s ratings showed that such a strike can do that – and it is not impossible that is all the Kremlin leader now cares about.

            Belarusian security analyst Andrey Porotnikov also offers four reasons why he does not believe that Belarus will be annexed. In his view, that “train already left the station – and long ago at that.”  He too offers four reasons for that conclusion (sn-plus.com/ru/page/mainevents/9097/).

            First of all, any new Russian move will end any chance for Moscow to prevent the further disintegration of the post-Soviet space.  Even now, “it is difficult to say with which of the former Soveit republics Russia has managed to preserve friendly relations.” If it invaded Belarus, it would lose its only nominal friend – and Minsk plays on that.

            Everyone should take note that Lukashenka continues to use the “’fraternal’ rhetoric’” in his talks with Moscow but that it has essentially changed from being about ties between the governments to about ties between the two nations.  Russians have noticed this and now rate Lukashenka as highly as they do Putin.

             Second, Porotnikov says, “for the Kremlin, relations with Belarus have not been a priority for a long time.”  Trying to make them such from so low a point is something that will take enormous time and effort. And Moscow may not be able to achieve its goal regardless of what it does.

            Third, any move to tighter integration or annexation “without taking the position of Minsk into account” will be politically and legally difficult and entail “all kinds of negative consequences.”  These costs are especially problematic because it seems to many in Moscow that there is no need to take this step now.

            And fourth, he continues, “as the experience of Crimea nad Chechnya show, annexing territory is expensive and holding it is even more so.  The new possessions create many problems and “the bonuses [in this case] are not obvious.”

            Behind these, Porotnikov says, is one additional and perhaps determining factor: “For the Kremlin, Lukashenka is a known quantity,” admittedly costly but known. Annexation would almost certainly lead to his removal – and those who might come after him could be far more difficult and expensive as well.

            Finally, a Russian who blogs under the screen name “Masyaskin” says bluntly: “Belarus has been lost.” Moscow should have learned from Ukraine but it hasn’t and now is losing positions in Belarus and even in Armenia.   Still worse, it has given the US time to respond and to intervene in its own way (cont.ws/@molotofff/1191205).

            According to him, there are three reasons Russia can’t pick up the pieces in Belarus: 30 percent of its population is Catholic and already looks West, “the marriage between Minsk and Moscow” was always one of convenience and based on aid Moscow can no longer afford, and Belarus as a country without exportable natural resources will inevitably drift Westward.

            Consequently, he says, “Russia has already lost Belarus, above all because it put all its eggs in one basket and supported only Lukashenka.” Had it done otherwise, it might now have serious support there. But it didn’t. And “Lukashenka plays to the West with the complete certainty that Russia isn’t going anywhere as far as he is concerned.